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Despite more than three decades of empirical research there appears 
to be no general consensus as to which strategies are effective in 
successfully turning around a firm facing a decline that threatens its 
survival. There is a paucity of Australian corporate performance 
turnaround research using Australian based data. This research 
examines a sample of 88 financially distressed firms—from a population 
of 2220 ASX listed firms for the period 1995 to 2005 inclusive—to 
discover the effectiveness, intensity and timeliness of operational, 
strategic and financial strategies in achieving performance recovery. 
 
This research study found that there is no ‘one size fits all’ single road 
to achieving recovery. But rather, firms examined adopt an eclectic 
approach consisting of a combination of operational, strategic and 
financial strategies. Both recovery and non-recovery firms pursued 
similar strategies. However, the discriminating difference is that 
recovery firms effected timely and intense retrenchment and operational 
efficiency improvements at an early stage to arrest the decline and 
were able to embark on strategic or entrepreneurial restructuring 
sooner than non-recovery firms.  
 
This research fills a theoretical gap by adopting an integrated holistic 
approach, linking research findings to relevant extant theory by coupling 
 vii 
its findings with the resource based view (RBV) of the firm and the 
stage perspective of performance turnaround. Successful turnaround is 
conservatively measured as satisfying the operational management 
objectives of improvement in slack (surplus) financial resources, 
profitability and liquidity in a single study. 
 
Possible reasons for the relative effectiveness of turnaround strategies 
are discussed together with implications of the findings for strategic 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
'If you can look into the seeds of time and say which grain will grow which will 
not, speak then to me… ', Shakespeare—Macbeth, Act one, Scene three. 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
This thesis aims to evaluate and report on the relative effectiveness of 
corporate turnaround strategies undertaken by firms listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange. This thesis is a mixture of finance and strategy. It uses 
finance tools (i.e. terms and formulas) and its findings have implications for 
managers and strategists enacting a firm performance turnaround.    
Corporate turnaround research is like looking through the seeds of time and 
trying to discern between which grain (strategy) will grow (be successful) and 
which will not (be unsuccessful) in turning a firm around from performance 
decline. Despite more than three decades of empirical research, there 
appears to be no consensus as to which corporate strategies are effective in 
successfully turning around a firm facing survival-threatening decline 
(Chowdhury, 2002; Pandit, 2000), and which characteristics distinguish a firm 
that has successfully turned around from one that eventually spiralled into 
decline and insolvency (Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1995). 
Since the publication of Schendel, Patton and Riggs’ (Schendel & Patton, 
1976; Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1976) seminal articles, the development of 
corporate turnaround literature and research has been 'patchy' and 
incoherent, concentrating and emphasising the relative merits of turnaround 
strategies. To date, the results of turnaround empirical research, mainly in 
North America, have also been inconclusive and contradictory. In addition, 
strategy management scholars are still debating the relative merits and 
effectiveness of retrenchment versus entrepreneurial or strategic turnaround 




performance turnaround theory or theoretical framework to guide research, 
as well as a failure to link research to extant management theory (Meyer 
1988; Robbins and Pearce 1993; Pandit 2000; Chowdhury 2002). The 
literature review in Chapter 2 of this thesis attests to the present 'status quo'. 
Hence, within this 'charted but unsettled’ research domain, further testing and 
research is needed to contribute to existing corporate performance 
turnaround knowledge and literature and in the process provide guidelines for 
practising managers to effectively deal with firms facing survival-threatening 
decline.  
The bibliography on corporate turnaround research is, to date, populated in 
the majority by research conducted in the northern hemisphere economies of 
North America and the United Kingdom, (e.g. Argenti, 1976; Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997; Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Grinyer, Mayes, & McKiernan, 
1988; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Mone, McKinley, & Barker, 
1998; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel et al., 
1976; Slater, 1984; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Comparable Australian 
turnaround bibliography or bibliography outside the Anglo-American context 
is scarce (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003; Sim, 
2009). The research, in the main, measures performance decline and 
success of recovery based on firm profitability as a single construct (e.g. 
return on investment, return on assets, Altman’s Z-score and earnings before 
interest and tax) over the distress and recovery years. Corporate turnaround 
research to date (examples of which are mentioned above) normally deals 
with the causes of decline (the 'why' question), the various turnaround 
actions undertaken by sample firms (the 'how' question) and outcomes of 
decline  and recovery or failure (the 'consequence' question) as evidenced on 
an ex post basis (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004; Sim, 2009). In general, these 
research does not relate or tie the findings back to a theoretical framework or 
extant (management) theory (Pandit, 2000). This research aims to rectify 
these shortcomings. 
Firstly, this research contributes to corporate turnaround theory and model 
construction by introducing a more 'holistic' financial construct of measuring 




profitability, liquidity and leverage, thus incorporating financial management 
theory and prudent financial policy (Van Horne, 1977) into the test model. 
Under the accrual accounting regime practised by most firms, especially 
public listed firms, profitability does not always equate with liquidity. 
Adequate liquidity is important as it ensures that a firm is able to pay its debt 
as and when the debts fall due. A proper level of financial leverage (amount 
of debt in the capital structure) is important as excessive debt level carries 
restrictive covenants and fixed repayment and interest charges which have to 
be met, irrespective of whether there are firm profits to meet such obligations. 
Hence, profitability without an adequate level of liquidity and affordable 
financial leverage is not sustainable for going concern purposes. The 
inclusion of the liquidity and financial leverage constructs will make the theory 
and criterion relating to recoverability more robust and realistic.  
Secondly, for objectivity and theoretical rigour, this research introduces the 
Australian government three-year bond yield rate as the risk free rate for 
benchmarking recovery success. The theoretical rationale for this is that the 
three-year time frame ties in with extant corporate turnaround literature as 
reasonable recovery time frame of two years (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; 
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). Bibeault (1982) opines that the recovery time 
frame depends on firm size and ranges from one to three years. Also the risk 
free rate of return is the rate that a firm would have earned if it were risk-
adverse and did nothing other than buying an Australian government bond. If 
the main purpose of a business is to make profits (Friedman, 1962) then 
earning a minimum return is a prerequisite for its existence. In this regard the 
introduction of the three-year Australian Government bond rate in the test 
model is in line with extant business and economics literature. Hambrick 
(1985) is of the opinion that firms earning less than their cost of capital 
require a turnaround.  
Thirdly, this research uses the Resource Based View (RBV) (Barney, 1991; 
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) of the firm, the resource dependence 
perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and stage perspective (Chowdhury, 
2002) as the background theoretical framework for its analysis, thus rectifying 




research to a theory or theoretical framework serves two purposes. First, a 
theory describes a phenomenon and is used to predict future events or 
behaviour. Linking research to a theory or theoretical framework enables the 
theory to be either confirmed or modified by research results (Pandit, 2000), 
thus knowledge is accordingly advanced. Second, the theory or theoretical 
framework can act as a guide to facilitate the research process (e.g. agency 
theory in corporate governance, board of directors and top management 
team research).  
Fourthly, the researcher has proposed a new perspective—that of 'the 
opportunistic view of management' as an additional variant of the 
voluntaristic perspective. This perspective is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.2 Justification for the research 
The social and economic impact of business failures is often drastic and 
catastrophic. Business failures not only result in loss of capital and 
production but also in job retrenchment, thus adding to the unemployment 
statistics with undesirable social consequences (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). 
Organisational failures may have positive pedagogical outcomes in that firms 
learn from failures (Miner, Kim, Holzinger & Haunschild, 1999). But such 
positiveness pales into insignificance in the light of the negative social 
consequences.  
The following Australian Securities and Investments Commission statistics 
attest to the high incidence of business failures. The following figures show 
an approximate 10% increase between calendar year 2001 and 2005 (i.e. 




Calendar year total firms entering external administration (insolvent): 
2001 6634 
2002 6208 
2003 6661  
2004 6618 
2005 7277  
Total                                                          33,398 
Source: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Insolvencies 
terminations and new registrations (2001-2005). 
In addition, a munificent economic environment does not necessarily reduce 
the risk of business failures as highlighted by the following extract from 'The 
Australian Financial Review, Wednesday, 23 August 2006' (Tingle, 2006:4): 
Investment bank UBS has recently highlighted a "noticeable, not alarming" pick up in both 
business and personal bankruptcy in the first half of 2006, although employment growth is 
near record levels. It says that sharply rising loan arrears over the past six months and 
on-going wages pressures (which tend to correlate well with higher corporate bankruptcy) 
suggest the trend may deteriorate further over the coming year or so. 
The recent global financial crisis, colloquially known as the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, which started in the United States of America in October 
2007 and plunged the world into the worst economic recession/depression 
since the great depression of the 1920s, brought home the point that despite 
years of economic prosperity and growth, economic downturn can suddenly 
occur. Marshall Jacobs reported in The Australian Financial Review, that, 
‘The number of companies appointing administrators increased 64 percent to 
1095 in March 2009, compared with 668 for the same month last year, 
statistics from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
show'—italics added (Jacobs, 2009:3). 
 The following are reasons why Australian turnaround research may be 
different to its Anglo-American counterpart. 
Despite the high incidence and risk of business failures and their related dire 
social consequences, in general, 'only a few studies have examined 
turnaround outside of Anglo-American settings' (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004:6). 




granted that management has unobstructed autonomy to manipulate the 
empirical turnaround drivers of asset sales, initiate employee retrenchment, 
fire CEOs and the top management team, arrange finance, make strategic 
reorientation decisions—assumptions which may not be directly valid in the 
Australian context due to differences in regulatory regimes and institutional 
framework, for example, taxation, financial and workplace relations.  
The drivers of causes of decline may also be different. For example, 
anecdotally one of the main causes of performance decline is the inability or 
difficulty of distress firms to obtain finance to ride out the crisis.  Australian 
banks are generally more prudent in their lending policy than their American 
counterparts as evidenced by the recent much published US sub-prime and 
Wall Street financial crisis. The theoretical drivers and constructs in the 
Anglo-American studies may not 'behave' or be expected to behave in the 
same way in Australia. The high incidence of corporate failures as indicated 
in the above ASIC statistics highlights the need to study the phenomenon in 
an Australian context, in order to provide guidelines for Australian 
practitioners and strategic management to effectively deal with firm 
performance decline towards achieving recovery, and at the same time to 
make theoretical contributions to Australian turnaround research and test 
model construction.  
Another reason for studying corporate performance turnaround in Australia, 
rather than relying on the findings of Anglo-American studies, is that other 
than the similarity (although varying in degree) of overall corporate 
governance and regulatory framework, there are practical dissimilarities. An 
Australian firm's response to performance decline may be different from its 
US counterpart's due to differences in industrial relations law between the 
two. For example, the new Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) restated the notion of 
unfair dismissal, which was absent from its predecessor—the Work Choices 
legislation. Declining firms seeking to retrench staff need to take heed of the 
new regulatory industrial law framework. 
Another practical difference is in the area of corporate governance and its 




and mechanism of corporate governance is quite similar to that of the Anglo-
Saxon jurisdictions of the US and UK, but on a practical level there are 
dissimilarities. The Australian corporate governance system is not as 
regulated as the US or UK, with the principles of good corporate governance 
recommended by the Bosch (1991) report and the Australian Stock 
Exchange 'ASX'1 (Suchard, Singh, & Barr, 2001).  
In Australia, corporate governance is less prescriptive and more flexible 
when compared to the US Sarbanes-Oxley, that is, 'if a listed entity considers 
particular recommendations not appropriate to its circumstances, it can 
choose not to adopt them, as long as it explains why’ (Chen, Dyball, & 
Wright, 2009:220) that is, the ‘if not why not’ approach (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2010:5 & 6). Australian companies are encouraged by 
the Australian Stock Exchange’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations with 2010 Amendments to have board structures which 
add value to corporate governance by having a majority of the board 
consisting of independent directors—Recommendation 2.1 ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (2010). Duran (2010:3) reported that the 'Corporate 
Governance International, a governance ratings agency, grades Australia 
with a 7.3 out of 10 in terms of corporate governance practices, which puts it 
in fourth place worldwide'. GoveranceMetrics International’s, an independent 
corporate governance research and rating agency, 27 September 2010 
country rating of standards of corporate governance shows Australia has 
slipped to a sixth place from fourth place ranking in 2008 and 2009.  The 
same agency’s 27 September 2010 rating name the top six countries in 
descending order as United Kingdom first, Canada second, Ireland third, 
United States of America fourth, New Zealand fifth and Australia in sixth 
position (AMP Capital Investors Limited, 2011). The main reason why 
Australia has slipped from fourth place is because of its poor score in the 
area of environmental and social measures, whereby Australia is generally 
considered to lag behind countries like UK and Canada. The bottom six 
countries rated by the same agency as at 27 September in descending order 
                                                     
1 Refer to ASX publication:ASX Corporate Governance Council. 2010. Corporate 
governance principles and recommendations with 2010 amendments (2nd ed.): 




are: Turkey, China, Japan, Indonesia , Mexico, and Chile (AMP Capital 
Investors Limited, 2011) 
As per ASX listing rule 4.10.3, 'companies are required to provide a 
statement in their annual report disclosing the extent to which they have 
followed the Recommendations in the reporting period. Where companies 
have not followed all the Recommendations, they must identify the 
Recommendations that have not been followed and give reasons for not 
following them.' (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010). Compliance is 
not mandatory for all companies, only for ASX listed ones. In this less 
regulated corporate governance environment, boards of directors are less 
likely to and tardier about taking drastic action to initiate CEO departures in 
declining firms than in the US or UK, unless market pressures and 
institutional investor pressures are brought to bear (Suchard et al., 2001). 
The Australian stock market is small by market capitalisation and of less 
trading depth and volume than the US or UK. In this environment, institutional 
shareholders are less aggressive and invasive in putting pressure on 
company boards of directors to get rid of incumbent CEOs in declining firms, 
unless the share price falls below their comfort zone. Suchard, Singh and 
Barr (2001:20) found that the above market factors and corporate 
governance environment account for a 'lagged response' between firm 
performance and CEO turnover for Australian firms, when 'compared to the 
US/UK markets where current poor performance results in CEO removal'. 
They also found that Australian boards of directors, especially in larger firms, 
'are effective mechanisms in taking corrective action against poor performing 
CEOs'.  
Further, although duality of CEO roles, that is, the same person acting as 
CEO and chairman, is not considered good corporate governance, it is not an 
illegal2 practice in the Australian context. Anecdotally, the duality of the CEO 
role is often found in small or medium size firms where the founder or owner 
is the CEO and chairperson. Australian firms are generally smaller in size 
                                                     
2 Although the ASX corporate governance rules discourage such a practice, it is not illegal in 




than their US counterparts (see discussion on firm size, below). In this 
situation, removal of the CEO-owner is either highly unlikely or not a 
plausible consideration. Argenti (1976) found that one of the causes of firm 
decline is the dominance of the owner CEO over important firm decisions. In 
this situation, the internal control mechanism of 'checks and balances' 
between an independent chairman and the CEO is lacking and any wrong 
decision made could have a devastating effect on firm survival.  
The state of the general economy is often thought to have an influence on 
firm performance (Altman, 1971).The Australian economy is a resource-
based one. It relies heavily on the export earnings of resource firms. The 
volatility of the Australian dollar (AUD) exchange rate against the US dollar is 
testament to the cliché that the 'AUD is a resource-based currency'. The 
earnings of Australian firms, especially resourced-based ones, are often  
volatile (Yawson, 2004). Such volatility in earnings not only affects the 
profitability of resource firms but also the general Australian economy. In this 
environment firms are more prone to the risk of performance decline making 
this study highly relevant to management practice and knowledge 
contribution.  
Another factor which differentiates the US corporate scene from the 
Australian one is firm size and its classification. The US Small Business 
Administration defines a small business as one with less than 500 employees 
(Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009:532). That is, US firms that have 500 employees 
would be classified as small, while in the Australian context they would be 
considered as medium to large. In Australia, to the best knowledge of this 
researcher, there is no such equivalent administrative body. However, two 
Australian regulatory regimes’ regulations may help to enlighten this 'small 
business' classification issue.  
The Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 328.110 defines a 
small business as one which carries on business with an aggregated 
turnover for the fiscal income year of less than two million dollars. 
'Aggregated turnover', according to the Income Tax Assessment Act s 




'connected with', 'affiliates' and 'aggregated turnover' are defined in the 
Income Tax Assessment Act. An entity’s annual turnover (e.g. sales) for an 
income year is the total ordinary income (exclude abnormal income) that the 
entity derives in the income year in the ordinary course of carrying on a 
business, according to the  Income Tax Assessment Act s 328.110.   
The other regulatory regime, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 45A, defines 
a small proprietary company as one which, during the financial year,  
'satisfies at least two of the following paragraphs: (a) the consolidated 
revenue for the financial year of the company and the entities it controls (if 
any) is less than $25 million, (b) the value of the consolidated gross assets at 
the end of the financial year of the company and the entities it controls (if 
any) is less than $12.5 million, (c) the company and  the entities it controls (if 
any) have fewer than 50 employees at the end of the financial year'. 
Conversely, a large proprietary company is similarly defined as one which 
satisfies two of the above criteria, except with the respective corresponding 
parameters in excess of those specified above. In general, a proprietary 
company is defined in the Corporations Act as one which is limited by shares 
or an unlimited company with a share capital and having no more than 50 
non-employee shareholders. A 'public company' is defined therein as a 
company which is not a proprietary company and is listed on a prescribed 
financial market (Corporations Act s 9). Although it is not mandatory for a 
researcher to adopt the above small business criteria, they do illustrate the 
point that the parameters are in no way close to the 500 employees criterion 
in the US case. A logical deduction from this is that, in general, Australian 
firms are smaller in size than their US counterparts. This difference will have 
implications when firm size is used in research test models—for example, 
testing co-relation between variability of firm size and performance in 
corporate performance turnaround. In this context, research results and 
conclusions reached by US researchers relating to small firms may not be 
translated as directly applicable to the Australian context.     
The above examples highlight the importance of the need for further testing 
in the Australian context using Australian data. It is from this premise that the 





1.3 Research objectives  
1. To contribute to corporate performance turnaround theory 
development by relating the research findings to the Resource Based 
View (RBV) of the firm and the Stage Perspective of Turnaround 
(SPT).  
2. To introduce a more 'holistic' definition of financial performance 
recoverability in terms of profitability, liquidity and leverage. 
3. To add to management literature on organisation failure either from a 
deterministic perspective or a voluntaristic perspective.3   
4. To provide empirical support, if any, for the causal contingency of 
intensity and timing of turnaround efforts which prior research studies 
have identified.  
5. To identify effective corporate turnaround strategies as a guide for 
strategic management in dealing with firm survival-threatening 
performance decline in the Australian context. 
 
1.4 Research questions  
In the light of the above, the following are the research questions. 
1. To what extent do the causal contingencies of Resource Based 
View  (RBV) of the firm and Stage Perspective of Turnaround 
(SPT) relate to the research findings and affect the  relative 
effectiveness  of turnaround efforts? 
2. How do Australian firms react when faced with performance shock 
or firm survival-threatening  performance decline? 
3. What strategies or measures account for successful turnaround 
situations in the Australian context? 
4. Are intensity and timing of efforts in turnaround situations 
important? 
                                                     





1.5 Significance of research 
Theoretical contributions are: 
• contribute to extant Australian corporate turnaround empirical 
literature by adopting the RBV of the firm and SPT as the theoretical 
framework and relating/linking the research findings to the RBV and 
SPT, thus rectifying the weaknesses identified by Pandit (2000:31), 
that is, the lack of 'a priori theoretical guidance' and failure 'to relate 
findings to extant theory ex post ' 
• contribute to turnaround theory by adopting a 'holistic' performance 
construct by requiring financial performance turnaround to 
simultaneously meet improvements in the three critical areas of a 
firm’s financial  health, that of profitability, liquidity and leverage (Bird 
& Mchugh, 1977), thus integrating financial management theory (Van 
Horne, 1977) into the theoretical turnaround construct 
• contribute to theoretical turnaround model construction by introducing 
the Australian government bond rate as the risk free rate of return as  
the recovery benchmark 
• contribute to management literature by proposing a new variant to the 
voluntaristic perspective of management  
Practical and societal contributions are: 
• provide guidelines for Australian managers to discern between the 
relative effectiveness of strategic versus  retrenchment turnaround 
efforts in response to different situational contingencies 
• provide lessons and prescriptive performance turnaround  suggestions 
that will help minimise the risk of business failures, which will 
undoubtedly result in reducing the risk of job losses and 
retrenchments 
The empirical pluralism of inconsistent turnaround research results to date 




turnaround research outside the Anglo-American context further compounds 
this need. Anglo-American experiences may not be entirely relevant or 
appropriate in the Australian context due to idiosyncrasies or peculiarities 
inherent in Australian management practice and the Australian commercial 
and industrial environment as described above.  
  Finally, although this research is Australian specific, it has significant 
universal contributory content, as it uniquely and conservatively measures 
successful turnaround—by satisfying a three-fold performance criterion of 
improvement in profitability, liquidity and financial leverage—in a single study. 
This will rectify the 'looseness' or lack of rigour of performance turnaround 
measurement highlighted by turnaround researchers. 
 
1.6    Ontological perspective 
The positivist ontological perspective is adopted by this research. The 
epistemological paradigm is empirically based on the belief that corporate 
performance decline and turnaround are real events which can be captured, 
measured and quantified. The justification of adopting this stance taken by 
the researcher is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
1.7  Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this research involves examining a selection of 
firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) that had suffered 
performance decline or performance shock (Yawson, 2004) for the period 
1995 to 20054 inclusive. The main reasons for selecting this sample research 
period are as follows. This researcher started his doctoral studies in 2004-05. 
For contemporaneous, availability and currency of information reasons, the 
end period of 2005 was chosen. Also this period, 1995 to 2005, witnessed 
                                                     
4 The end year 2005 is extended to 2007 for sample firms that had two post-distress years 




the unfolding of certain macro economic events — the Asian financial crisis 
1997, the introduction of the Australian goods and services tax on 1 July 
2000, the technology wreck (dot.com) 2002 and the US sub-prime/oil crisis 
2007. Such environmental events have an impact on organizations/firms 
since environmental factors are important determining factors on 
organizational/firm performance as discussed in the literature review of 
Chapter 2.  
Following Yawson (2004), the selection of firms is made from the Aspect 
Huntley financial database (now called Morningstar DatAnalysis).The 
integrity of the financial database is test checked to publish financial reports 
and financial ratios developed for this research are based on those obtained 
from the financial database, whilst the majority are computed from sample 
firms’ published financial reports. Selected firms are those that suffered 
performance decline, defined as having experienced three consecutive years 
of profitability followed by one year of sudden operating loss. Pictorially this is 
represented by '+++-' selection rule5. 
This research uses multiple regression analysis (MRA) as the statistical 
methodology and the pc based SPSS software to analyse the relative 
effectiveness of turnaround strategies carried out by the sample firms. The 
MRA is considered more appropriate for this research because of its ability to 
handle multiple predictor variables and to assess their relative impact on the 
dependent variable. The MRA is preferred in this thesis as it enables the 
researcher to adopt an 'exploratory' approach rather than the (restrictive) bi-
polar/binary perspective of turnaround versus non-turnaround firms in 
matched pair bankruptcy studies—for example, Mueller and Barker (1997)—
and other turnaround studies (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996) using logistical 
regression analysis as the statistical tool.  
                                                     
5 The sample selection rule is adapted from that used by Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) of '++- 






This research defines successful turnaround firms as those meeting the 
three-fold performance criteria of improvement in profitability, liquidity and 
financial leverage. This thesis envisages that the research results will 
indicate that sample firms fall into three groups. For want of a better name, 
category one firms are those that had a successful turnaround and met the 
three-fold performance criteria mentioned above and detailed in Chapter 3. 
Category two firms are those that met the profitability criterion only and 
category three firms are those that did not meet the profitability criteria. A bi-
polar/binary perspective may not be appropriate or may constrain the 
subsequent analysis in this research. Further, this thesis is not a matched 
pair study.6  
Another statistical tool used. 
The effectiveness of the sample selection rule of '+++-' is validated by a 
review of the financial profile of sample firms by using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank T test statistic as reported in Chapter 4, section 4.11. 
Intensity and timing of turnaround efforts are critical determinants in 
achieving successful turnarounds (Argenti 1976; Schendel, Patton et al., 
1976; Hoffman 1989; Weitzel and Jonsson 1989; Sudarsanam and Lai 
2001).To test this proposition, the intensity and timing of turnaround efforts 
enacted by sample firms are tested in Chapter 5, section 5.4, by using the 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test.  
Theoretical framework. 
The theoretical backdrop utilises the Resource Based View 'RBV' of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) and the Stage Perspective of Turnaround 
'SPT' (Chowdhury, 2002), where applicable. The applicability of the RBV and 
                                                     
6 The researcher is aware of certain statistical restrictions (e.g. normality and linearity 
assumptions) imposed by the MRA methodology versus the non-parametric logistical 
regression methodology. However, such restrictions can be mitigated by using certain 





SPT perspectives will be assessed in Chapter 6 in the light of the research 
results. 
 
1.8 Outline of thesis 
Chapter 1 sets the 'road map' to this thesis by providing an overview of the 
research background, research problem, justification for this research and 
the paradigm and methodology adopted to solve and answer the research 
problem and questions. It also defines operational terms used in this 
research and discusses the delimitations, scope and assumptions adopted. 
Chapter 2 sets out the literature review of extant literature and related 
disciplines/fields of study relevant to corporate performance turnaround 
research. 
Based on the results of the literature review of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
describes the development of hypotheses for testing and the design of a 
conceptual model. 
Chapter 4 describes the justification for the ontological paradigm chosen, 
methodology, data collection and sampling. 
Chapter 5 presents the test results and data analysis. 
Chapter 6 discusses the test results and their implications in relation to extant 
corporate performance turnaround literature, practice and knowledge 
contribution. It also discusses the limitations of this research and concludes 
by suggesting directions for further research. 







1.9 Operational definitions  
 
a) Financial distress: is the risk of insolvency or the threat 
of 'going concern' viability when a firm has difficulty in 
its ability to 'pay its debts as and when they become 
due and payable', as defined in the Corporations Act, 
(ss 9, 95A, 347A). A prolonged period of financial 
distress without remedial efforts to turn it around often 
leads to business failure when a firm ‘involuntarily 
becomes unable to attract new debt or equity funding 
to reverse decline; consequently, it cannot continue to 
operate under the current ownership and management’ 
(Pretorius, 2009:10). In the Australian context, directors 
of financially distressed firms can file for voluntary 
administration under the Corporations Act whereby the 
firm and its business will be placed under the 
administration of a receiver manager/administrator. 
 
       b) Organisational decline and Performance decline: a 
firm is said to experience organisational decline if it 
experiences deterioration in its ability to utilise its 
resources sufficiently to achieve viability and 
sustainability (Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987; 
Lohrke, Bedeian, & Palmer, 2004). Cameron, Kim & 
Whetten (1987:224) define organisational decline as a 
‘condition in which a substantial, absolute decrease in 
an organisation’s resources base occurs over a 
specified period of time’. 
 On the other hand, performance decline is a 
consequence or manifestation of organisational 





performance decline ‘when its performance worsens 
(decreasing resource slack) over consecutive periods 
and it experiences distress in continuing operations. 
Decline is a natural precursor in the process to failure’. 
Performance decline may be as mild as a performance 
shock or severe, threatening the viability of the firm 
(Pretorius, 2004, 2009). Severity is often measured in 
quantifiable terms. For example , Hofer (1980) views 
severity of decline as distance from a firm’s breakeven 
profitability level. Situations requiring turnaround can 
include firms earning less than their cost of capital 
(Hambrick, 1985) or organisations not meeting 
performance expectation of their stakeholders, 
analysts, vendors and employees (Kow, 2004). 
‘Performance decline’ and its severity in this thesis 
refer to financial performance decline. 'Performance 
decline' is operationalised as satisfying the conditions 
in section 3.3.4. 
 
c) Performance turnaround: a firm is said to have had a 
'turnaround' or adequately recovered from a 
performance decline or firm-threatening survival/crisis 
when it reverses that decline and achieves improved 
financial performance, profitability. (Gopal 1991; 
Robbins and Pearce 1993; Barker and Duhaime 
1997; Lohrke, Bedeian et al. 2004). ‘Performance 
turnaround’ is operationalised in section 3.3.5. 
 
d) Top management team (TMT) and chief executive 
officer (CEO): Barker and Barr (2002:966) define 




directs strategic reorientation and includes two basic 
groups of leaders, the TMT and the board of directors 
(BOD)'. The top operational representative of the 
TMT is the chief executive officer (CEO) or managing 
director (MD). The CEO or MD is the person who has 
significant authority over operational management 
and is often responsible for the profitability and 
strategic direction of the firm. Results of empirical 
research on strategic change and top management 
team lends support to the above-mentioned 
definitional functional role (Westphal & Fredrickson, 
2001). 
 
1.10 Delimitations of research scope and key assumptions 
The following are the delimitations, key assumptions and scope of this thesis.  
Formal versus informal turnarounds 
Firstly, in the parlance of turnaround practitioners (e.g. professional 
liquidators and receivers) this thesis mainly deals with corporate informal 
performance turnaround strategies as opposed to formal turnarounds or 
corporate reconstructions. In Australia, formal turnarounds or corporate 
reconstructions are normally enacted within a formal legal framework of the 
Corporations Act —for example, Voluntary Administration within Part 5.3A of 
the Corporations Act. Receiver managers and liquidators under a formal 
reconstruction often adopt a 'slash and burn' realisation of assets approach 
with the objective of reviving the 'living dead', whilst this research deals with 
the relative effectiveness of turnaround strategies effected by corporate 
managers whose principal objective is to revive the 'living sick'.  
As far as the sample selection criteria described in Chapter 4 selected some 
firms undergoing formal reconstruction, they will be included in the study 





rather it deals with informal corporate performance turnarounds—of firms that 
had experienced varying degrees of severity of performance decline—
effected by internal corporate managers rather than by appointed receiver 
managers or liquidators.  
In line with the above stance, it is worth emphasising that firms that had 
suffered firm-threatening survival/going concern crisis are those that are 
considered, in this thesis, to be in 'financial distress' as defined in section 
1.9(a) above. Selected firms that are outside this category are classified, in 
this thesis, as those that had suffered 'performance decline' defined in 
section 1.9(b), which if left uncorrected will spiral into 'financial distress'. 
Availability of information 
Secondly, corporate performance turnaround research often suffers from the 
availability of information due to firm sensitivity and confidentiality reasons. 
As information relating to private non-listed firms is not readily available, this 
research will only consider public firms listed on the ASX. According to 
Barker, Patterson and Mueller (2001:245) 'there is no evidence that findings 
from turnaround studies are not generalisable to private firms'. Hence, data 
will be sourced from secondary sources in the public domain, as described in 
Chapter 4. 
Quantitative paradigm 
Thirdly, this research has adopted a quantitative ontological paradigm rather 
than a qualitative one. This is because the delimitations caused by sensitivity 
and confidentiality factors will further be complicated by the human tendency 
to blame the other person or external environment when things go wrong. 
Corporate managers are no exception. In this regard the findings of 
interviews done via a qualitative paradigm would most likely be skewed or 
biased by personal/subjective factors of the interviewee in protecting his/her 
reputation or past actions. Further, the likelihood of high turnovers of 
corporate managers in distressed firms would most likely impose spatial and 




corporate managers who were present during the time when the firm suffered 
performance decline leading to financial distress. 
Business strategy versus Corporate strategy 
 
In the strategic management literature, business strategy refers to how a 
single-business firm or an individual business unit of a larger group of firms 
competes in the industry or market in which the firm belongs (Bowman & 
Helfat, 2001; Grant, 2002:23,24). Corporate strategy deals with how a 
corporation manages a group of firms or business units together (Bowman & 
Helfat, 2001; Grant, 2002:23,24). ‘Corporate’ would generally denote the 
presence of a head office (in most situations, where the top management of 
the corporation is located) or parent company running multibusinesses, with 
associated firms and subsidiaries.  Grant (2002:24) discusses the distinction 
between the two as: business strategy deals with the question of ‘how should 
we compete?’ and corporate strategy deals with the question of ‘what 
business or businesses should we be in?’ Bourgeois (1980:25) as cited by 
Grant refers to corporate strategy as ‘domain selection’ and business 
strategy as ‘domain navigation’. 
 
This researcher is aware of the above distinction, especially in the area of 
research regarding the question of the relative determinants of firm 
profitability among business unit/firm effect, corporate effect and industry 
effect. However, this thesis is about turnaround strategies. The thesis title 
has the term ‘corporate turnaround strategies’. This researcher is also aware 
that the term ‘corporate turnaround’ has been used in the extant research 
literature and similarly no attempts were made to distinguish between 
‘business strategy’ and ‘corporate strategy’ in their findings, (e.g. Smith and 
Graves (2005); Sudarsanam and Lai (2001)).The word ‘corporate’ in the title 
of this thesis is used in the generic sense to denote companies or firms listed 
on the ASX.  
 
Most North American researchers use the US Compustat data base for their 
business research. US researchers are able to distinguish between firm-




of ‘SIC’ digit code reporting format of the Compustat data base. As far as this 
researcher is aware there is no comparable Australian data base reporting to 
that level of detail. Also currently the published annual reports of ASX listed 
companies do not have enough information to make the distinction between 
the two types of strategies enacted by management. Hence, this researcher 
cannot make the distinction between corporate versus business strategy in 
his findings. As far as this researcher is aware he has not come across any 
Australian turnaround research able to make a differentiation/distinction in its 
findings. Arguably, such delimitation may weaken but not invalidate the 
findings of this thesis. 
 
Despite the above factors, it is noted that firms seeking ASX listing have to 
satisfy, among other conditions, certain ‘size’ (e.g. amount of profit or assets 
test) threshold requirement per ASX listing rules7. The logical deduction or 
implication would be that listed firms are generally in the main bigger 
businesses, either single or multibusiness corporations with head office(s). 
Also Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005:243) state that: 
 
Strategy changes at the corporate-level usually bring changes at the business-level. 
Such strategic coherence entails multi-level analysis, and so makes it hard to separate 
strategies related to one level as against another. Since strategies have ‘fluid’ characters 
that spread out over time and space, a clear-cut delineation of strategies or their effects 
proves difficult. 
 
Hence, it is difficult or not feasible to separate out or determine which 
strategy is at the business level and which at the corporate level, especially 






                                                     






This chapter provides a foundational synopsis and 'road map' for the thesis. It 
introduces the background, objectives and questions relevant to the 
research. Justification for the research and definitions used has been 
presented. The ontological stance and methodology taken has been justified 
and briefly described, then the thesis has been outlined and its delimitations 
discussed. Having laid this foundational synopsis, the following chapters 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For many years, organisational performance has been a subject of interest to 
economists, organisational theorists, strategists, management theorists and 
management practitioners. In a capitalist economy where price acts to 
allocate scare resources, Adam Smith’s 'invisible hand' allocates resources 
to the most efficient players—for example, firms, institutions and individuals 
(Smith, 1776). An efficient player in a market economy is one who utilises 
input resources to produce an output (e.g. a product or service) at the lowest 
cost and maximum or acceptable quality, and financial performance success 
or failure is embodied in the notion of 'profit' or 'loss' respectively. From a 
financial perspective, 'profit' is defined as the excess of exit price of output 
versus the entry cost of input. 'Profit' or loss' is often referred to collectively 
as 'financial return'. In a monetary economy, the pricing of inputs and outputs 
is expressed in terms of a common denominator, called 'money'. Hence, 
organisations and companies must make enough return (profit) to survive as 
summed up by Walsh (2008:5):  
 
All commercial enterprises use money as a raw material which they must pay for. 
Accordingly, they have to earn a return sufficient to meet these payments. Enterprises 
that continue to earn a return sufficient to pay the market rate for funds usually prosper. 
Those enterprises that fail over a considerable period to meet this going market rate 
usually do not survive – at least in the same form and under the same ownership.  
 
In this regard the manifestation of Adam Smith’s invisible hand is seen to 
work by allocating scarce resources to successful firms, and firms that are 
unsuccessful will not attract resources to survive. Despite the obvious bi-
polar manifestations of firm financial performance of success or failure 
measured in terms of 'profit' or 'loss', the question of why some firms survive 
and prosper while some fall by the wayside cannot be unequivocally 





Firm failure has a considerable social cost as job losses have extensive 
negative social consequences. Since Schendel et al. (Schendel & Patton, 
1976; Schendel et al., 1976) published their seminal article on corporate 
distress and turnarounds in 1976, the subject has attracted considerable 
academic interest and research. It is worth noting that this interest has not 
been consistent over recent decades. Management scholars, particularly in 
the area of strategy, have considered this issue far less frequently since the 
1980s and much recent work has its roots and primary audience in the field 
of finance. However, the question of which strategies are more effective in 
turning round declining firms’ financial performance is shrouded with 
controversy as set out in the following literature review. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
 
A schematic diagram which summarises the literature review is presented in 
section 2.1. This gives a quick overview of the structure of the literature 
review. Section 2.2 traces the historical development of what constitutes 
organisational decline and its related response as found in relevant extant 
literature. Section 2.3 reviews corporate performance turnaround theoretical 
issues and research gaps. Section 2.4 reviews the background of corporate 
turnaround strategic management research literature since the 1970s. 
Section 2.5 reviews the various types of turnaround strategies. Section 2.6 
reviews the relevance of timeliness, as well as contextual and situational 




2.1   Literature review: a schematic presentation 
 
The following figure below, Figure 1, gives a quick diagrammatic overview of 




























Figure 1. Schematic presentation of literature review 
Note. Source: developed from analysis and synthesis 
Organisational decline: no single definition 
General consensus: organizational decline—pre-supposes  
a bad or adverse state or  condition 
Voluntaristic perspective: managers 
are effective actors whose decisions 
and actions determine fate of 
organization/firm. 
Deterministic perspective:  managers 
are passive actors. Environment & 
industry determine fate of 
organization/firm 
Deterministic factors: industry 
lifecycle, firm size, firm age-liability of 
obsolescence, liability of 
adolescence 
 
Homogeneity of firms: therefore unit of 
study is the industry 
Heterogenity of firms: therefore unit of 
study is the firm 
Development of management tools & failure 
prediction models to help management avoid 
decline 
Turnaround research: Schendel, Patton & 
Riggs (1976) & others 
Turnaround Strategies 
Operational? Financial ? Strategic ? 
Opportunistic perspectives: scans 
environment for opportunities to 
improve performance & resources 
Recovery or failure ? 


















2.2   Historical perspectives  
Organisational decline—a singular definition? 
For decades, the question of why and how some organisations manage to 
survive and thrive while others decline and fail to exist has intrigued and 
been debated upon by the organisational theorist and management 
researcher (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004; Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 1987b; 
Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Pandit, 2000; Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986a; 
Whetten, 1980).  
There is no one precise or singular definition of organisational failure or what 
it entails across a whole range of disciplines and even within the relevant 
business disciplines of industrial organisation, organisation ecology, 
organisation studies and organisational psychology (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004). This lack of a precise definition appears to be due to the different 
perspectives adopted by researchers and writers.   
Cameron, Sutton and Whetten (1988) define organisational failure as a two 
stage process: the first being the deterioration of a firm’s ability to adapt to its 
domain or microniche—defined as a firm’s market or product domain—and 
the second, the deterioration of a firm’s resources, for example, financial and 
human resources. The 'failure to adapt to the environment' perspective is 
also expounded by Greenhalgh (1983:232) when he views decline as the 
antithesis to successful adaptation by an organisation to its environment and 
defines decline as occurring 'when the organisation fails to maintain the 
adaptiveness of its response to a stable environment , or when it fails to 
broaden or increase its domination of a niche which has diminishing carrying 
capacity'. According to Greenhalgh, it is important for an organisation to 
adjust its speed and magnitude of organisational change in its adaptation to 
the changing environment. In a slow changing environment it is sufficient to 
adopt an adaptive or reactive response, whilst in a fast changing one 
proactive or anticipatory response is required. Organisational failure results 




Whetten (1980) takes a different view by identifying two types of 
organisational decline: stagnation decline and cutback decline. The first 
relates to passive, bureaucratic organisations. In this instance there may not 
be loss in revenues as normally happens in a munificent environment or 
when there are few competitors. Cutback decline relates to reduction in total 
market size or a reduction of the organisation’s ability to compete with its 
competitors in the market. Levy (1986) views organisational decline as an 
organisation’s failure to take heed of internal and external warning signs 
indicating the need to change. Alternatively, environmental warning signs are 
recognised but the lack of interest or resources leads to no corrective action 
being taken. The uncertainty literature sees organisational decline as the 
failure to deal with or manage uncertainty (Cohen & James, 1972; 
Thompson, 1967). Weitzel and Jonsson (1989:94) define decline as: 
'Organisations enter the state of decline when they fail to anticipate, 
recognise, avoid, neutralise, adapt to external or internal pressures that 
threaten the organisation’s long-term survival'.  
Despite this lack of a singular definition of organisational decline, Mellahi and 
Wilkinson (2004:22) are of the opinion that there is general consensus in the 
literature regarding the manifestation or symptoms of organisational failure 
encapsulated by negative descriptive words or terms like 'bankruptcy' 
(Altman, 1971) 'organisational death', 'shrinking financial resources' 
(Cameron, 1983) 'negative profitability' (D'Aveni, 1989; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 
1988) 'exiting shrinking markets' (Harrigan, 1982) 'a loss of legitimacy' 
(Benson, 1975) 'exit from international markets' (Burt, Mellahi, Jackson, & 
Sparks, 2002) and 'severe market erosion' (Mellahi, Jackson, & Sparks, 
2002; Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978).  
 
Performance decline and business failure 
 
 
Just as there is no one single definition of organisational decline, there is also 
a plurality of definitions and shades of meanings regarding business ‘failure’ 
and business ‘decline’ (Pretorius, 2008, 2009). From a fine-grained 




although related, are not of the same construct. Hence, the following 
paragraphs discuss and distinguish between ‘performance decline’, 
‘organisational decline’ and ‘decline’ versus ‘failure’. 
 
Pretorius (2009) is of the opinion that the reason why business turnaround 
research results to date lack comparability and are equivocal is because of 
the lack of a standard and acceptable definition of ‘failure’ and ‘decline’ and 
the failure to distinguish between the two. 
 
Performance decline is usually the manifestation of organisational decline. A 
prolong period of organisational decline often leads to performance decline, 
and if left unattended or ‘turnaround’, often leads to failure. In a business 
context, a firm is said to have failed if it is no longer a viable going concern, 
that is, it has liabilities in excess of its assets and is unable to meet its 
obligations and pay its debts as and when they fall due. The firm then 
‘becomes insolvent and is unable to attract new debt or equity funding; 
consequently it cannot continue to operate under the current ownership and 
management’(Shepherd, 2005:318). According to Pretorius (2009:10), ‘failure 
connotes finality about the inability to operate any further’. A firm is said to be 
in decline ‘when its performance worsens (decreasing resource slack) over 
consecutive periods and it experiences distress in continuing operations. 
Decline is a natural precursor in the process to failure’ and therefore, ‘decline’ 
and ‘failure’ are ‘distinctly different manifestations’(Pretorius, 2009:10) and 
not synonymous (Bates, 2005; Stokes & Blackburn, 2002). In short, ‘decline’ 
is process-oriented and ‘failure’ is the end result, that is, the finality of 
decline.  
 
This thesis deals with financial performance decline, which is taken to mean 
a deterioration of a firm’s financial performance, and its turnaround or return 
to profitability. The severity of financial performance decline varies from mild 
shock to one which may threaten a firm’s going concern viability (Hofer, 





In summary, the commonalities in the above definitions and perspectives of 
organisational decline are: decline assumes that there was a better pre-
existing state of affairs; most of the definitions are 'environment centred' 
(externally generated) or internally generated (internal sources), that is, 
failure to appropriately take heed and respond to external and internal threats 
caused by environmental (external) and organisational (internal) changes; 
the assumption of negativity and adverse consequences associated with 
organisational decline; the erosion or depletion of an organisation’s 
resources; and failure to deal with uncertainty. These theoretical perspectives 
are, in the main, descriptive and not prescriptive in that although some 
mention the need to adapt  to the changing environment, there is no mention 
of the need for turnaround strategies—which Mukherji, Desai and Francis 
(1999) believe are needed to restore an organisation’s competitiveness in the 
face of  environmental exigencies and pressures.   
Response to organisational decline 
Despite the pluralism of organisational theory, the two over-arching views in 
the literature regarding the response (explanation) to organisational decline 
or failure are: the deterministic school of thought, expounded  by the 
disciplines of classical industrial organisation and organisation ecology and 
the opposite voluntaristic view, expounded by the disciplines of organisation 
studies and organisational psychology (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Mellahi & 
Wilkinson, 2004; Rasheed, 2005). The deterministic perspective posits that 
the environment determines the fate of an organisation and strategies 
undertaken by management are ineffective, symbolic or have limited 
influence on organisational outcome (Morrow, Johnson, & Busenitz, 2004; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In this respect, organisational failures are caused 
by external factors, rather than firm factors, beyond the control of internal 
management. The voluntaristic perspective posited by organisation studies 
and organisational psychology theorists attributes the cause of organisational 
failures to the perceptions, decisions and actions of internal management, 





The deterministic perspective  
Population and organisational ecologist viewpoint 
As the name suggests, the organisational ecologist shares the same view as 
the population ecologist, that organisations are passive actors and their 
destiny (e.g. mortality versus survival) is shaped (determined) by the forces 
of the environment much like the Darwinian natural selection thesis which 
seeks to explain the rise and fall (evolution) of natural species (cf. 
organisations and population). As both share similar theoretical viewpoints, 
the terms 'population ecology' and 'organisational ecology' are often used 
interchangeably (Scott, 1998). Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) are of the 
opinion that the organisational ecologist takes the cue from organisational 
theories of the 1950s called human ecology (Hawley, 1950) which posits that 
population of organisations that share the same strategy or form often 
respond in the same way to environmental forces. The emphasis here is that 
characteristics of population which a focal organisation belongs to affect its 
survival or failure and not organisation specific factors (Barnett & Caroll, 
1987; Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989). This 
assumption of equivalence maintains that that there is no variation among 
organisations in the same population because they compete for the same 
scarce resources and are equal competitors (Baum & Mezias, 1992). This 
population ecology view is a macro view of organisation–environment 
relations, based on the notion that 'environmental resources are structured in 
the form of "niches" whose existence and distribution across society are 
relatively intractable to manipulation by single organisations' (Astley & Van 
de Ven, 1983:249).  
Following on from the above, organisational ecologists believe that collective 
actions of other organisations—for example, in the same industry—and 
population characteristics over time determine the mortality or survival of a 
particular organisation. Hence, organisations are at the mercy of the 
environment or industry as they either fit into a niche or are selected out and 
fail, a kind of 'survival of the fittest' (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). According to 




organisational ecologist’s viewpoint—for example, automobile manufacturers 
(Hannan, 1997; Hannan, Caroll, Dobrev, & Joon, 1998) breweries (Caroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000) newspaper publishing (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982) and 
the hotel industry (Baum & Mezias, 1992).8 
The above proposition provides the theoretical foundation of the much 
quoted population ecologists Hannan and Freeman’s (1977) natural selection 
model in explaining the rise and decline of organisational populations.  
Accordingly, because of the reasons of inertia, structural and environmental 
constraints, organisations seldom make major adaptive changes and the law 
of environmental selection is a more appropriate way of explaining the death 
or survival of organisation (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). This environmental selection favours firms that are well fitted to the 
environment  or 'niche' that they operate in (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  
According to this perspective the logical unit of analysis should be the 
population or industry the focal organisation belongs to.  
The above macro perspective is in line with that taken by the industrial 
economist whereby industrial structure is 'defined as the relatively stable 
economic and technical dimensions of an industry that provide the context 
within which competition occurs.' (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983:250). Industry 
structure is preserved by entry barriers which inhibit firms from easily 
traversing different markets and place limits on firm strategic alternatives for 
each particular type of industry (Caves & Porter, 1977).  Similar views are 
shared by the economic historians like Chandler (1977) and institutional 
economists like Williamson (1975) who 'contend that industrial structure 
evolves in determinate ways' (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983:250). Such 
determinate ways in a competitive economy are due to  the market 
transactions of small traditional enterprises, which eventually evolved into a 
                                                     
8  Baum, J. A. & Mezias, S. J. 1992. Localised competition and organisational failure in the 
Manhattan hotel industry, 1898-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 580-604.1992 
looked at the consequences of localised competition in the Manhattan hotel failure rates in 
terms of variations in exogenous organisational variable of size, geographical location and 
price. In this study there was acknowledgement that localised organisational variables do 




regulated economy dominated by big businesses the rise to dominance of 
which is due to them collectively being a more efficient instrument in 
minimising transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) and the distribution of goods 
and services in the economy (Chandler, 1977). Following on from this, the 
determinate ways of the environment therefore are more powerful than the 
individual strategic actions taken by the individual firm. 
According to Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004:23) the ancestor of the 
deterministic perspective is the Schumpeterian economics thesis of 'creative 
destruction' whereby 'jolts in the external environment generate waves of 
organisation failures'. Such environmental jolts may be caused by 
technological, new regulatory, economic or demographic changes (Scott, 
1998). The result of the creativeness of the environmental changes is that 
firms that are weak and not able to adapt to the new environment will fail or 
exit leaving new and better firms in the market; a sort of Darwinian survival of 
the fittest. The deterministic perspective is premised on three assumptions 
(Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004): 1. Environmental changes affect the strategies 
of management and are more influential or powerful rendering them 
ineffective. 2. Firms in the same industry or segment of the same industry will 
pursue similar strategies. 3. Management are assumed to be rational thinkers 
acting in the best interests of the organisation and as such organisational 
failures cannot be attributable to or caused by their actions. 
Organisational ecologists consider the ultimate of organisation decline is 
organisational failure. In accordance with this, Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) 
cite Freeman, Carroll and Hannan’s (1983:694) definition of organisation 
dissolution as the stage when the organisation 'ceases to carry out the 
routine actions that sustain its structure, maintain flows of resources, and 
retain the allegiance of its members'. Since external environmental factors 
are considered central to the deterministic perspective, a considerable 
amount of the literature on organisation deals with causes of environmental 
changes and their effect on organisational behaviour and outcome (Barnett & 
Carroll, 1995; Child, 1972; Jurkovich, 1974; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1998; Starbuck, 1976; Staw & Szwajkowski, 




dimensions9 into  three broad kinds of environment dimensions affecting 
organisational behaviour and outcome (e.g. organisation exit from industry). 
Using Dess and Beard’s three environmental dimensions (refer below), 
Anderson and Tushman (2001) seek to find out how changes in 
environmental factors and their relative impact affect firm exit rates. 
Influential environmental factors include drivers like technological change, 
regulatory change, economic change and demographic change (Anderson & 
Tushman 2001; Scott, 1998). According to Weitzel and Jonsson (1989:98) 
'failure to scan the environment is an indicator of an early stage of decline'. 
The environmental factors are grouped into: dynamism, munificence and 
complexity (Dess & Beard, 1984).  
Dynamism refers to the unpredictability created by the environment which 
caused uncertainty for firm management (Anderson & Tushman 2001:682). 
Firms operating in a dynamic environment, that is, fast changing, will try to 
adopt strategies (e.g. better administrative systems, mergers, entering into 
long-term contracts, backward and/or vertical integration, alliances) to cope 
with uncertainty and increase their ability to predict the environment. 
Environmental dynamism tends to increase the likelihood of organisational 
failures (Anderson & Tushman 2001). 
Environmental munificence—or a benign environment which enables 
accommodation of firms—is an environment which allows firms to grow, 
achieve stability and enable accumulation of slack resources to act as a 
buffer during lean times. Such an environment is characterised by higher 
demand for products, lower competition and availability of resources. Among 
some of the business strategies to adopt during this munificence of resources 
are those which aim to increase the rate of sales growth and market growth. 
Environmental munificence and resource availability often influence the 
choice of turnaround strategies (Pretorius, 2008). 'Industrial organisation 
scholars suggest an adverse relationship between failure rates and 
availability  of resources' (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004:23). 
                                                     
9 Capacity, stability-instability; turbulence, homogeneity-heterogeneity; concentration-




Environmental complexity refers to the complex web of linkages both within 
and outside the organisation, like its range of input-output activities, external 
competitors, stakeholders, competitors, alliance partners, institutions and 
communities which the firm has to interact with (Anderson & Tushman 2001; 
Child, 1972; Dess & Beard, 1984). Anderson and Tushman (2001) contend 
that from a resource dependence perspective, firms with a complex input-
output mix—for example, multiple product lines—face more complex 
(uncertain) procurement of inputs and sales of output problems than those 
with fewer input-output mix. The main reason for this is the greater number of 
customer networks and suppliers the organisation has to contend with. A 
complex or heterogeneous environment increases uncertainty and 
management would require better and greater administrative control systems 
and information processing systems to monitor the various linkages and 
actors in the environment (Duncan, 1972; Galbraith, 1973; Pennings, 1975; 
Tung, 1979).  
 
Economic and technological change 
 Anderson and Tushman’s (2001:678) longitudinal study of exit rates in the 
US industries of cement manufacture (1888–1980) and minicomputer 
manufacture (1958–1982) found that 'both economic and technological 
uncertainty pose significant challenges for organisations struggling to survive, 
while munificence and complexity appear unrelated to the hazard of exit. 
These effects are significant even after ecological and economic conditions 
are controlled. Firms seem able to cope with the ups and downs of the 
business cycle and of demand growth much more readily than they are able 
to cope with relatively unpredictable demand conditions and technological 
regimes'. 
 A recent example of the damaging effect of sudden economic change is the   
2007–2010 global financial crisis (GFC). The GFC, which many reckon as 
the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1920s, saw an 




to the unforeseeable and unpredictable uncertainty exerted by changes in the 
economic environment in Australia despite the munificent environment of the 
Australian mining sector.  
Gupta and Wang (2004) found the globalization-induced 1997 East Asian 
crisis rendered the organizational design and management structure of a 
Chinese technology-electronics group obsolete, driving the group to near-
bankruptcy state. The crisis forced the group to make organizational change, 
adopt entrepreneurial leadership and improve on their value generation 
capabilities to achieve a successful turnaround.   
The advent of Internet trading in recent years is an example of the 
unforeseeable and unpredictable uncertainty exerted by changes in the 
technological environment. The introduction of Internet trading saw the 
demise of other book sellers who could not adapt to the new Internet 
technology and compete with the online trading activities of Amazon.com. 
Such uncertainties bear testimony to the workings of Schumpeterian thesis of 
'creative destruction' (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). In the same vein, this 
researcher believes that the introduction of mini computers and personal 
computers (pc) led to the gradual decline of main frame computers in favour 
of a decentralised computing environment typically represented by a 
dedicated pc server connected to a network of personal computers and 
terminals.    
According to Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004), organisation ecologists posit that 
the four critical factors which determine the survival or failure of organisations 




Population density refers to the overcrowding of participants in the industry 
which leads to legitimation of the industry and competition. As an industry 




legitimate institution able to attract resources, which assists its members to 
survive and prosper. But overcrowding eventually leads to keen competition 
over scarce resources, resulting in weak firms failing. Mellahi and Wilkinson 
(2004) cite Hannan and Freeman’s (1988) suggestion that the opposite effect 
of legitimation and competition leads to a U-shaped relationship between 
density and  failure in that legitimation attracts entrants into an industry but 
eventually competition kills some of them  off.  
 
Industry lifecycle 
Proponents of the industry lifecycle view believe that an organisation follows 
a set course, just like any organism, irrespective of the actions of its 
management (Klepper, 1997). This inevitable life cycle view is also shared by 
the system theory of organizational science, which views an organization as 
an organic entity with a metamorphosis life-cycle of birth, growth and maturity 
(Whetten, 1980). Expansion (growth) and decline are part of the dynamics 
and life cycle of an organization (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Organisational 
failure is a natural phenomenon due to the efficient operation of markets. 
 
Firm size 
Larger firms have always been taken to have more resources than smaller 
ones. According to Whetten (1980), the literature of the dynamics of 
organization is premised on the belief that growth is good for an organization 
and that bigger is better. Although there are studies and literature which 
support the advantage of smallness (Child, 1972; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; 
Myer & Zucker, 1989; Pant, 1991)—characterised as being nimble versus 
size related inertia, in a changing, uncertain dynamic environment—the 





Economists believe that big equates to market power (Bain, 1956) and 
economies of scale (Jovanovic, 1982; Mansfield, 1962).The resource 
dependency view also inherently assumes bigger firms have more 
resources—financial and managerial capacity—which can insulate the firm 
from adverse economic downturns and better accessibility to external funding 
sources (Haveman, 1993; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Failure rates are 
reported to have a negative relationship to firm size (Dunne, Roberts, & 
Samuelson, 1989; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Sutton, 1997). Bankruptcy and 
related reorganisation studies have shown that larger firms are more likely to 
possess unsecured capital and assets to provide as collateral security toward  
obtaining additional borrowing in times of financial distress (White, 1983).  
Economy of scale, in terms of firms’ bankruptcy costs, was found to be in 
favour of larger firms (Campbell, 1996; Wagner, 1977). Size—the 
manifestation of the pursuit of growth and diversification—automatically 
brings with it operational efficiency and effectiveness. It enhances the coping 
ability of an organization with a changing external environment and brings 
with it competitive advantage (Argenti, 1976). The emphasis and analysis of 
competitive advantage is to earn above normal rates of return (i.e. superior 
performance) (Porter, 1985). 
Agarwal, Sarkar and Echambadi (2002), applying the time-variant and 
industry life cycle approach, found that the mortality rate of smaller firms is 
less during the mature phrase of an industry within which the firm operates 
than during the industry growth phrase.  This is because during the growth 
phrase, when competition is fierce, the bigger firms have more resources to 
access, develop and commercialise technologies, create customer demand 
and marketing infrastructure, thus squeezing the smaller firms out of the 
competition. According to Caves and Porter (1977) smaller firms have a 
place in niche markets ignored by the bigger players in the mature phase. 
Such a view is supported by Klepper (1996) who suggests that small firms 
venturing into peripheral markets may be profitable due to the lack of 
incentives of large firms in pursuing all innovative opportunities or because of 




However, growth brings additional challenges to an organization constrained 
by the availability of scarce resources and extra information flow and needs. 
Such challenges often bring stress to an organization, which unless properly 
managed and resourced, leads to organizational decline and eventual death. 
Yet, despite this inevitability of decline as part of an organisation’s life-cycle, 
the literature on organisational decline was a bibliographical rarity until the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). 
 
Firm age 
Organisation ecologists posit that age is a determinant factor in firm survival 
and failure rate. Since Stinchcombe’s seminal article (1965)—in which he 
argued that younger organisations have higher mortality rate than older 
organisations—introduced the concept of the liability of newness, a 
considerable number of studies have shown that new ventures and newer 
firms have higher failure rates, for example, Swaminathan (1996); Carroll  
and Delacroix (1982); Gaskill, Van Auken and Manning (1993); O’Neill and 
Duker (1986); Bruno and Leidecker (1988); Sutton (1997); Caroll (1983); 
Freeman, Carroll and Hannan (1983). The negative relationship between age 
and mortality holds true even after controlling firm size (Freeman et al., 1983) 
and population heterogeneity (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982). The rationale 
supporting this liability of newness-age proposition is that older firms have 
more established sources of resources, are less resource deficient, have 
avenues for capital accessibility, established procedures, systems and 
routines and management structures, more accumulated experience and 
established customer relationships (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Stinchcombe, 
1965). Stable organisational structure of older firms leads to customer trust 
and is one reason for the higher mortality rates of newer firms (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989). Ooghe and Prijcker (2008) found that the common 
characteristics among bankrupt start-up companies were: poor management 
with limited managerial and industry experience, had  weak administrative, 




causes of failure appear to be internal as they found the external 
environment had no influence on their demise. 
This ‘most firms die young’ firm failure distribution is also demonstrated by 
Robert Cressy’s (2006) theoretical model of firm growth under uncertainty. 
Basing his model on portfolio theory of balancing risk and return, the Random 
Walk for growth under uncertainty and managerial risk aversion influencing 
market positioning and expected returns, he demonstrated that the important 
determinants of firms dying young are financial capital and management’s 
skill in entrepreneurial risk management. Initial financial capital is often 
depleted through trading losses and bad luck. The role of managerial human 
capital was shown to be important as it ‘enabled the more talented 
entrepreneur to grow faster at lower cost measured by the increase in her 
firm’s equity risk’, which ‘reduces the chances of equity falling below 
acceptable levels’ (Cressy, 2006:113). The results of his model confirmed 
empirical research findings in that the distribution chances of ‘failure first rise 
deeply and then tail off gradually to converge on a small long run failure 
rate’.(Cressy, 2006:113). 
Younger firms find it harder to attract customers away from older firms that 
have, over the years, built up established links with external stakeholders 
(Freeman et al., 1983). Hence, older firms have over the years built up 
external legitimacy with long standing customers, suppliers, stakeholders and 
players. Henderson (1999) found failure rates decline with age, as a firm 
faces a more hazardous journey during its early and adolescent years. The  
advantage of age is also consistent with the findings of other organisation 
ecologists, for example, Freeman et al. (1983), Carroll and Delacroix (1982), 
and evolutionary economists, for example, Sutton (1997). 
Given that the literature shows the risk of failure is higher for firms who are 
young and small, Thornhill and Amit surveyed and examined a sample of 339 
bankrupt Canadian firms between March to August 1996, with different firm 
ages, for the underlying causes of their demise in order to understand the 
‘age-varying determinants of firm failure’(2003:505). Their results confirmed 




youth. Within the theoretical context of the Resource-based view (RBV) of 
the firm, they found empirical support for the link between success and the 
possession of valuable strategic resources and capabilities (e.g. 
management skills and organizational systems). Younger firms failed 
because of poor managerial knowledge, general and financial management 
skills. Surprising, marketing development was not found to be a significant 
contributory factor (Thornhill & Amit, 2003:504). They found, older firms were 
‘vulnerable if they did not adapt to the demands of a changing competitive 
environment’ (Thornhill & Amit, 2003:505) due to rigidity and inertia. Lastly, 
their results confirmed the influence of industry membership on firm survival. 
Early failure was found to be more prevalent in the food, beverage, and 
accommodation sector as when compared to manufacturing. In addition, they 
found failed firms in the wholesale and retail sectors were typically older 
when they went into insolvency. 
 
Firm age and organisational change 
The Singh et al. (1986b) study of non-profit Canadian voluntary social service 
organisations, as to whether internal organisational changes or external 
factors are significant in affecting the liability of newness proposition, found 
more support for external legitimacy factors (e.g. gaining Community 
Directory listing, acquisition of a Charitable Registration Number and board 
size at birth) than internal changes. They found that except for internal CEO 
changes, which lower death rates, external legitimacy factors 'significantly 
depress organisational death rates' (Singh et al., 1986b:171). Results of 
research on the interaction between the liability of newness, organisational 
changes and failure rates are mixed. Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) cite 
Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett’s (1993) study of Finnish newspapers that 
changed their newspaper content or frequency and thereby increased the 
risk of failures, while a majority found the opposite results, in that firm survival 
rates improve or firm performance improves due to major organisational 
change (Barnett, Greve, & Park, 1994; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Stoeberl, 




may mitigate the disadvantages associated with the liability of newness 
factor. 
 
Firm age and lifecycle of industry 
Applying the passage of time and the life cycle of industry to the liability of 
newness-age perspective, Agarwal, Sarkar and Echambadi (2002) found 
newer firms in the growth phase of their industry, when barriers to entry are 
lower, have lower mortality rates than in the matured phrase of their industry 
when barriers to entry are higher. They argue that during the growth phase of 
an industry, newer firms are less fixed in their modus operandi, are more 
entrepreneurial, have access to newer technology and are more willing to 
experiment with newer innovations. The newer firms help to mould and 
reshape the evolving industry population during its growth phase until it 
reaches an equilibrium stage towards industry maturity (Christensen, Suarez, 
& Utterback, 1998). The growth phase favours entrepreneurial activities as 
older firms are less nimble with routinized regimes (Winter, 1984). 
 
Firm age—liability of obsolescence 
Closely related to the liability of newness and failure is the liability of 
obsolescence. According to the liability of obsolescence (or liability of 
senescence) viewpoint, older firms are set in their ways and over time inertia 
makes them misalign or fail to be responsive to their changing environments 
and they die of obsolescence. The consequence of this is that failure rates 
are expected to increase with age and growth rates are expected to decline  







Firm age—liability of adolescence 
In an alternative argument to the liability of newness viewpoint that firm 
failure rates decrease monotonically with age, organisational ecologists also 
proposed the liability of adolescence viewpoint: that new firms tend to die at a 
young age (Brunderl & Schussler, 1990; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991). This 
view argues that new firms take a while to fail, as their initial founding stock 
of resources (e.g. capital) would last them for a few years before they 
disband or fail (Henderson, 1999). This 'honeymoon period' and eventual 
decline into failure manifest an inverted U-shaped curve when plotting the 
relationship between failure rates and age (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991; 
Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). Empirical support exists for this 'honeymoon 
period' (Mitchell, 1991; Singh et al., 1986a). 
On the whole, the newness–age liability perspective tends to support the first 
mover advantage principle. The first mover advantage principle posits that 
firms who enter the industry first (i.e. earlier entrants) have an advantage 
over newer entrants as they have already established their market share and 
dominance making it difficult for the newer entrants to break in. Hence, on 
balance, older firms have an advantage over younger ones and are better 
placed to weather the changing environment. However, in general, the 
majority of liability of newness–age research fails to demonstrate 
unequivocally what 'newness' entails, although a study of small firms in the 
US by Bracker Keats and Pearson (1988) found about 65% of  start up firms 
failed in their first five years. Also, does this average age vary from one 
industry to the next? In a twenty-first century digital information world, new 
revolutionary innovations by younger firms may upset the conventional 
knowledge of older firms, for example, as in the Microsoft and Amazon.com 
cases.  
In sum, the deterministic view10 posits that the influence of the environment 
(e.g. industry influence) is powerful in affecting the mortality rate of firms, 
                                                     
10 In this study, deterministic factors are allowed for by the control environmental variables 





rendering the efforts of internal management futile. This 'black box' view of 
the firm leads critics like Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004:27) to remark that: 'The 
main weakness of IO/OE scholars is not what they examine but what they 
ignore'. If environmental factors alone account for firm failure, such a 
simplistic view sits contrary with the question of why some firms in the same 
industry fail while others prosper. Also some critics of the organisational and 
population ecology perspective point out that all members in the same 
population may not compete for the same resources or be equal competitors 
(Winter, 1990), hence 'population density, a count of the number of 
organisations, may not provide the most precise measure of the competition 
faced by different organisations in a population' (Baum & Mezias, 1992:580). 
  
The voluntaristic perspective 
 According to Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) this view is premised on the 
heterogeneity of firms and that the actions and strategies of internal 
management are more powerful than environmental influence in shaping the 
destiny of firms. Managers are considered principal decision makers 
(Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Lohrke et al., 
2004; Szilagyi & Schweiger, 1984) and their actions premised on their 
perception of the external environment, constrained by available resources 
and commitments, are important determinants in firm success or failure 
(Greenwood & Hining, 1996).  
This view considers firm failures as the result of management’s inadequacies 
or inappropriate response to environmental threats. Francis and Desai’s 
(2005) study of 97 US firms from the industrial and commercial machinery 
and computer equipment-manufacturing industry, reported that successful 
turnarounds are more attributed to factors under the control of management 
and management actions than situational (e.g. size) and environmental  
factors (e.g. environmental munificence-industry growth). Bibeault 
(1982:30,35) found that internal causes account for 80% of organizational 




Argenti (1976) in his seminal book, Corporate Collapse: The causes and 
symptoms, are factors relating to top management actions, for example, 
over-trading relative to limited capital and the danger of a dominating 'one-
man band' CEO (especially in an owner CEO situation).  
The voluntaristic perspective has led to a proliferation of literature and related 
studies concentrating on the 'micro' aspects of a firm (often termed firm level 
factors), that is, on the attributes and actions of its decision makers (top 
management) and the heterogeneity of its resources in trying to explain 
derivation of competitive advantage and relative effectiveness of turnaround 
strategies. Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004:28) note that the voluntaristic 
perspective expounded by organisation studies and organisational 
psychology 'lacks a grand theory in explaining organisational failure', so 
much so that there are a whole series of what they call 'middle range 
theories' resulting in contradicting research results. Examples of contradicting 
research results due to different factors, in the context of enacting successful 
turnarounds, include the effectiveness of frequency of CEO changes, inside 
versus outside directors, optimum board size, demographics of TMT, long 
versus short tenured TMT, just to name a few examples. Mellahi and 
Wilkinson (2004:31,35) are of the opinion that this lack of a grand theory to 
tie the bits and pieces of uncoordinated issues and observations relating to 
firm level factors into a coherent whole is an 'Achille's heel', endangering the 
study of organisational failure by falling into a 'fragmentation trap'. (They 
define fragmentation trap as a trap which 'emerges when too many new 
middle range theories are proposed at too fast a pace in order for the 
scientific community to be able to evaluate each contribution properly and to 
integrate them into a reasonable coherent knowledge structure'). 
 
The adaptation viewpoint  
A variant of the voluntaristic perspective is the adaptation viewpoint which 
historically has occupied a central place in organisational studies. The 




responds by adopting appropriate strategies to adapt to the changing 
environment for organisational survival (Cyert & March, 1963; March & 
Simon, 1958; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Organisations which fit the 
environment will survive. This adaptation view runs contrary to the 
deterministic (selection) view held by the organisational ecologist or 
population ecologist (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983).  
As described above, the organisational ecologist believes in the deterministic 
natural selection principle, whereby unfit or environmentally unaligned 
organisations are 'selected' or weeded out of the organisational population. 
Organisational changes are not important in the grand scheme of things. 
Singh et al., (1986a:588) believe that Hannan and Freeman in their (1984) 
publication modified their view on organisational inertia in relation to the 
deterministic environmental effect on organisational population, when they 
see structural inertia 'as a consequence of selection processes rather than a 
precursor to them'. This effectively opens up the role of organisational 
change, as they posit that structural inertia is due to the rate of environmental 
change outstripping the rate by which an organisation can make structural 
reorganisation or changes.  
The Singh et al. (1986a) study of organisational change and organisational 
mortality, found that organisational changes that increase the legitimacy of 
the organisation result in lower (higher) organisation death (survival) rates. 
Their findings did not support the extreme ecological proposition that all 
organisational changes lead to increases in organisational death rate (Singh 
et al., 1986a:605). In addition, another significant finding was that the stage 
of the organisation in its life cycle has an impact on the effectiveness of 
organisational change. They found organisational changes effected  'earlier 
in the life cycle are more likely to influence the hazard of death, whether 
adaptively or non adaptively, than changes made later in the life cycle' (Singh 
et al., 1986a:605). However, Singh et al. (1986a:606) warned of the danger 
of generalising their findings as they may be peculiar to the Canadian non-
profit voluntary social service organisations, which are normally institutions 





The opportunistic viewpoint 
This researcher proposes 'the opportunistic view' of the firm as another 
variant of the voluntaristic perspective. During normal times, firms often scout 
the environment for investment and entrepreneurial opportunities to increase 
profitability. In times of performance decline, one would logically expect a 
declining firm to curtail investment and entrepreneurial activities and not 
choose a growth strategy due to lack of slack resources. Chowdhury and 
Lang (1996) found in their study of turnaround of small (less than or equal 
500 employees) US manufacturing firms that sample firms chose efficiency 
over entrepreneurial/strategic moves in the short-run to alleviate immediate 
emergency, as small firms often lack the resources to embark on 
entrepreneurial ventures especially during the decline stage.  
However, Rasheed’s (2005) study of small government contractors in the 
USA found small business owners are likely to choose growth 
(entrepreneurial) strategies during decline, irrespective of whether their 
perceptions of past financial performance and resource availability are high 
or low. This is because as owner/founder operators, as distinct from 
employee managers in multi-nationals who are fearful of losing their jobs, 
they are emotionally involved in the business, are used to risk-taking, have 
assumed a personal risk in the founding days and therefore are more prone 
to strategic thinking to solve problems. Rasheed (2005) notes that 
entrepreneurial management (e.g. owner manager) often thrives on 
introducing innovation, and according to the theory of disequilibrium and 
chaos, creates disequilibrium by doing so (Stevenson & Harmeling, 1990). In 
the declining stage of his firm the manager/owner with an inherent venturing 
and aggressive spirit finds it hard to make a mental transformation to the role 
of a professional turnaround manager. This lends support to other studies of 
threat-rigidity thesis in dealing with adversity (e.g. Staw, Sandelands, & 
Dutton, 1981) and indicates that small business owner/managers will pursue 
opportunistic growth strategies and remain aggressive even in periods of 




deficient resources and near bankruptcy also pursue growth strategies in an 
effort to turnaround. 
It is proposed here that this opportunistic perspective of the firm is best 
manifested by the modus operandi of private equity and venture capital 
firms/funds. Putting the question of ethics and social responsibility aside, for 
example, the debate over the public good, these firms or funds scan the 
business environment looking for business opportunities, to make a fast 
return on their equity funds (Clark, 2007; Morrell & Clark, 2010:250). 
Typically these firms/funds look for undervalued and/or underperforming 
assets/firms, restructure them, run them for approximately two to three years, 
turn them around and list them on the stock exchange. The recent Myer 
acquisition in Australia by private equity firms is a typical example of this 
opportunistic modus operandi of the private equity firms/funds. Venture 
capital firms, on the other hand, scan the environment for opportunity to 
invest in projects or start up firms with promising upside potential, for 
example, in new technology or new products (Morrell & Clark, 2010). 
The deterministic, voluntaristic and opportunistic perspectives are expository 
attempts to find a theory of the firm (and turnaround), and at the same time 
provide an explanation or response to the question of why firms prosper 
and/or decline. The answer to this question inevitably involves the 
determinants of firm performance. The two streams of research in the 
business policy literature identified by  Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) 
regarding the determinants of firm performance are: one based on the 
economics tradition of influencing external markets factors; the other is firm 
specific whereby firm organisational factors and their fit or alignment with the 
environment determines firm performance success. The economics tradition, 
more specifically microeconomics essentially, sees the firm as a 'black box' 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999) and profit maximisation is based on the 
normative pricing theory of setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost 
(Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). The two streams of research are 'macro' 
in their approach and firm management needs specific tools to manage and 




performance decline). Hence, this led to the birth of operation research and 
management science as academic disciplines and tools of management aid.    
 
Tools of management 
In the area of Management Science (e.g. Operation Research), since the 
1960s and 1970s a considerable number of preventative and diagnostic 
management tools were developed to help management cope with the stress 
and challenges of growth and change. Such tools include linear 
programming, marketing plan, marketing audit, balanced score card, SWOT 
(Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats) analysis and competitive 
five forces framework  analysis, to name a few (Andrews, 1971; Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996; Porter, 1980). Yet, despite this impressive repertoire of 
management tools, organizations do continue to suffer performance shock 
and decline, which if left unchecked or does not 'turnaround' will spiral into 
demise and oblivion. 
In the discipline of Finance, in the 1960s and 1970s, Altman (1968) was one 
of the pioneers to use financial ratios to predict a firm’s performance decline 
and risk of firm bankruptcy. His pioneering work is one of the first to study the 
subject of corporate failures in an analytical manner. 
Altman distinguishes between the various degrees or types of financial 
distress, those of failure, insolvency and bankruptcy (Altman, 1971). Failure 
is when a firm is not earning a sufficient return on its capital. This loss making 
situation can go on for years without having to shut down and discontinue 
operations so long as it is able to pay/meet its liabilities as and when they fall 
due. Insolvency is a more restrictive and definitive term—meaning a firm is 
not able to pay its debts as and when they fall due, thus affecting its going 
concern viability. This is also the definition contained in the Corporations Act  
(ss 9, 95A, 347A). This is much more serious than failure and is often 
reflected by a negative net worth balance sheet, that is, a firm’s liabilities 
exceed the value of its assets. Such a negative net worth situation can go on 




Corporations Act so long as the firm is able to pay its debts as and when they 
fall due—for example, ongoing support by its owners or its parent entity. (In 
this situation, it is a serious offence for the directors of an insolvent company 
in Australia to continue to trade). Ultimately such a situation is not 
sustainable and the firm will run out of cash reserves to meet its financial 
obligations and slide into bankruptcy.  
In Australia, as in the United Kingdom, the term 'bankruptcy' often refers to 
an individual as opposed to companies being 'insolvent'. Bankruptcy is the 
ultimate destination for failing firms, and is petitioned by the failing firm to the 
courts to liquidate its assets, to meet its liabilities or to enter into a recovery 
programme of bankruptcy—reorganisation or reconstruction, the main aim of 
which is to salvage and preserve any remaining value in the firm, which is 
worth more to its creditors than having the firm liquidated, that is, 'letting it 
die'. In Australia, directors of a firm can protect themselves by opting for 
voluntary administration (VA) whereby a professional, normally an accounting 
firm acting as the administrator, will be appointed to run and control its 
operations. The insolvency accountant is required to assess the company’s 
viability and situation and make recommendations for a suitable outcome 
within a short time frame—Corporations Act s 438A.  
Altman believes that despite the influence of external factors like gross 
national product, money supply and stock market performance on a firm’s 
financial performance, internal factors pertinent to a firm are more important 
in predicting firm financial collapse and bankruptcy. By using multiple 
discriminant analysis technique, he evaluated a paired sample of 33 bankrupt 
firms and 33 non-bankrupt firms, matched on industry and size and 
developed the famous Z-score, a single composite score/indicator, calculated 
from the following equation using 5 financial ratios derived from the subject 
firms’ financial statements. 




Where X1 is working capital/total assets, X2 is retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 is earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, X4 is market value of 
equity/book value of total debt and X5 is sales/total assets. 
Altman found that if Z is less than 1.8 there is high chance that a firm will 
become bankrupt and that if Z is more than 3.0, it is unlikely that the subject 
firm will fail. A Z-score between 1.8 and 3.0 is the zone of uncertainty, where 
misclassification can occur, termed by Altman as the 'zone of ignorance'. 
Altman believes that the predictive power of the model is such that it is 95% 
accurate for firms failing within one year, 72% within two years with falling 
accuracy of 48% within three years and about 30% accuracy for years four 
and five preceding bankruptcy. 
The Altman Z-score model is widely used by credit agencies and banks and 
was subsequently tested by other researchers and found to be fairly accurate 
within two years of bankruptcy occurring. An Australian study by Lincoln 
(1984) of 90 survived Australian public listed companies and 41 failed ones 
covering four different industries of manufacturing, retail, property and 
finance for the period 1969 to 1978 found Altman’s Z-score model to be 
highly accurate in predicting levels of insolvency risk, especially between one 
to three years before failure. Other published Australian studies using 
financial ratios in the prediction of corporate distress/failure and classification 
of bankrupt firms versus non-failed ones include the works of Izan (1984), 
(Altman & Izan, 1982) and Castagna and Matolcsy (1981). Other non-
Australian Anglo-US researchers using financial ratios as predictors of firm 
failure include, for example, Beaver (1966a,1966b, 1968); Deakin (1972); 








Types of decline 
 
In the area of management literature, D'Aveni (1989) distinguishes three 
types of decline from a temporal perspective, those of: sudden decline, 
gradual decline and lingering decline.11  
Sudden decline refers to the rapid deterioration of resources and 
performance from organisation health to a sudden collapse of a firm followed 
by bankruptcy—in the Australian context receivership and liquidation—in a 
short period of time. Some researchers (Cameron & Zammuto, 1988; 
Chowdhury & Lang, 1993:8) refer to sudden decline as 'crisis' which 'involves 
a sudden performance drop, involving a major downward shift in the 
performance trends. Therefore, crises are more perceptible, more rapid, and 
appear to be more immediately threatening to the firm'. Sudden collapse is 
often brought about by some serious error of management, for example, a 
firm overextending beyond its means—for example, beyond its capital base 
or ability to service financing commitment—in expansion or acquisition of 
some costly assets or plant, or taking on high risk ventures (Argenti, 1976; 
Richards, 1973). This sudden shock may rock firm management out of 
inertia. Smaller firms are found to respond better to and achieve successful 
turnaround from sudden decline rather than gradual ones (Chowdhury & 
Lang, 1993). On the other hand, Francis and Desai (2005:1206) argue that 
'rapid declines may lead a firm to focus mistakenly on operational actions 
instead of on developing long-lasting sustainable resources'. This is 
understandable due to a knee-jerk reaction to the rapidity of decline.  
Gradual decline refers to slow incremental decline towards receivership and 
liquidation. Chowdhury and Lang (1993:8) refer to this type of decline as 'a 
relatively smooth trend, involving a sustained low rate of deteriorating 
performance'. This decline is similar to the type two failures identified by 
                                                     
11 Argenti was one of the first to categorise various types of decline, which he calls type one, 
two and three failures, as discussed above. Refer Argenti, J. 1976. Corporate Collapse: The 




Argenti (1976). Firms which experience this type of decline are  those that 
are either aimless or inflexible in adapting to their external environments  
(Miller & Friesen, 1977). Over time the failure to undertake strategic 
reorientation or taking too few strategic reorientations to align to their 
environment, incrementally increases their insensitivity and misalignment 
with their environment (Tushman  & Romanelli, 1985). Gradual decline is 
often the precursor to unsuccessful turnaround (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). 
This is because the imperceptible gradual nature of decline does not create 
the urgency to take timely remedial actions until it develops into a crisis. 
Lingering decline refers to firms which decline neither suddenly nor gradually. 
According to resource dependency perspective, this is due to inadequate 
financial and managerial resources. Firms experiencing this type of decline 
linger on the border of collapse but manage to delay liquidation or 
receivership by downsizing as a method of cutting costs to survive, hence 
delaying the inevitable for several years. This type of firm is similar to the 
type three failure identified by Argenti (1976). 
The phenomenon of decline and its dire consequences on the firm and on 
society enkindles growing interest in research regarding the cause of 
organisational decline and remedies to arrest or correct the decline. This led 
to the birth of corporate turnaround strategy as an academic interest and 
research subject since the 1970s when the seminal publications of Schendel, 
Patton and Riggs (1976; 1976) and Argenti (1976) first appeared on the 
academic horizon. However, research and literature in corporate turnaround 
strategy has since been dogged by theoretical pluralism, contradiction and 
empirical inconclusiveness as discussed below. 
 
2.3    Theoretical Issues and research gaps 
Corporate performance turnaround and recovery has been a topic of great 
interest to practitioners, scholars and researchers of organizational studies, 
finance and corporate strategy. Despite more than thirty years of turnaround 




measures account for a successful turnaround in performance of declining or 
distressed firms remains 'largely idiosyncratic and open-ended' (Chowdhury, 
2002:249). This sentiment is also echoed by Pandit (2000:31) that 'our 
understanding of the (turnaround) phenomenon is very incomplete despite 
over two decades of research effort'—italics added. 
 Two basic reasons account for the above status quo. First, is the lack of a 
generally accepted theoretical framework or a theory of turnaround to guide 
empirical research (Chowdhury, 2002; Meyer, 1988; Pandit, 2000; Robbins & 
Pearce, 1993). Second, is the lack of a generally accepted operational 
definition and measurement of performance decline (Pandit, 2000; Pretorius, 
2009 Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). That is: what constitutes bad performance, 
which requires a turnaround or its antithesis good performance, where one 
can say a firm has successfully turned around?  
Most researchers and writers have adopted a temporal measurement of what 
constitutes performance decline and a successful turnaround. For example, 
in Schendel et al. research (1976) it was four consecutive years of 
decreasing profits (representing performance decline) and four consecutive 
years of profit improvements (representing successful turnaround). 
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001:188) define in their study a distressed firm as one 
that has 'a minimum of one year of negative Z-scores after two consecutive 
years of positive Z-scores' (Z-score refers to Altman’s Z-score) and 
successful turnaround is measured by two positive Z-score years following 
the distressed year. The above are some examples to illustrate that there is 
no universally acceptable performance measure or threshold and the amount 
of time required for turnaround. This has led to poor research design (Pandit, 
2000) and contradicting research results, further leading to many 
unanswered questions  regarding which characteristics separate successful 
turnaround firms from those that spiralled into bankruptcies (Arogyaswamy et 
al., 1995). 
It is this researcher’s belief that it is difficult to obtain universal agreement on 
the question of performance measurement and turnaround time frame 




(Bibeault, 1982), severity of decline (Hofer, 1980), matured business 
(Hambrick & Schecter, 1983), to name a few. Despite these difficulties, 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983:235) are of the opinion that 'a systematic study 
of turnarounds should articulate criteria for decline and upturn, even though 
they may not suit all circumstances'.  
 
2.4    Background of corporate turnaround strategic management  
research 
The footprint of research on firm turnarounds from going-concern decline first 
appeared in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the publication of the 
pioneering works of strategic management researchers like Schendel, Patton 
and Riggs (1976); Schendel and Patton (1976); Hofer and Schendel (1978); 
Hofer (1980) and Bibeault (1982).  
Schendel, Patton and Riggs’ (1976) main contribution was that they 
introduced the notion of cause and appropriate response. To address the 
core problem of performance decline, management needs to understand its 
causes and implement the appropriate measures (responses) depending on 
whether the decline is caused by strategic reasons (e.g. weak relative 
competitive position due to poor adaptation to its environment) or the result of 
poor operations (needing efficiency improvements) or bad implementation of 
a sound strategy. Accordingly, they recommend a list of remedial actions 
based on the two broad categories of 'strategic cures' as responses to 
performance decline caused by strategic misalignment or bad strategy and 
'operating cures' for those caused by operational problems or inefficiencies. 
Similarly, authors like Hambrick and Schecter (1983) have referred to the 
former as entrepreneurial (e.g. new product, market, technology, new 
revenue stream and revenue-increasing actions) and the latter as efficiency 
(e.g. cost reduction and asset disposal/reduction). In short 'strategic' 
turnaround deals with 'doing different things' and 'operating' deals with 'doing 
things differently' (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983:232). The importance of 




appropriate and effective strategies was also echoed by Arogyaswamy, 
Barker and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) and Ford (1985). 
Inappropriate response actions lead to business failures. However, the notion 
of cause and response essentially deals with the 'what' to do question leaving 
the 'how' and 'when' (timing) questions unanswered.  
Hofer (1980), on the other hand, introduced the propositions of severity, 
magnitude and timing (how rapid) of performance decline as contingencies 
relevant to implementing recovery measures. Similar to Schendel, Patton and 
Riggs (1976), he distinguished between the turnaround dichotomy of 
'strategic' versus 'operating' turnaround actions. Based on his study of 12 
poorly performing firms, he introduced a framework connecting the 
characteristics of a firm’s performance (in relation to its break-even) and the 
appropriateness of turnaround strategies. He suggested that turnaround 
strategies or 'gestalts' comprise of revenue increasing, cost reduction, asset 
reduction, product/market refocusing or a combination of all of them. For 
firms performing close to performance break-even (i.e. less severe), 
successful turnaround involves cost-cutting actions, while firms operating far 
below break-even (i.e. more severe), revenue-increasing or asset reduction 
actions are more effective. He is of the opinion that 'cost-cutting actions 
produce results more quickly than revenue-generating or asset reduction 
strategies' (Hofer, 1980:26).  In regards to severity and magnitude of decline, 
an assessment of the firm’s financial health may indicate that the firm’s going 
concern value is less than its liquidation value and any turnaround effort may 
be futile. Asset reduction measures are more drastic than cost reductions, 
and are appropriate in severe cases (bordering on bankruptcy). 
In sum, the above propositions of Schendel, Patton, Riggs and Hofer, based 
on the study of 54 US companies in 40 different industries and 12 poorly 
performing firms respectively, are essentially firm-based. However, the firm’s 
management decision-making process and the various stages of its life cycle 
were not considered as relevant variables. This was left to a group of 
researchers who introduced the concept of organizational stagnation, which a 




Performance declines are manifestations of organisational stagnation 
(Grinyer & Spender, 1979; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976) or crisis 
when an organization fails to align or adapt its internal systems, processes 
and strategy with an ever-changing business environment. Management 
inertia (failure or stubbornness to response to change) often leads to 
performance decline. Organisational stagnation is an inevitable stage in an 
organization’s life cycle. Successful turnaround strategy requires a complete 
change in management thinking, processes and strategy to best achieve a 
better fit with the existing environment. 
Next, contextual factors—for example, competitiveness of the firm’s 
industry—were found to affect the success of turnaround strategies. 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) and O’Neill (1986) were the first to investigate 
this. Hambrick and Schecter’s (1983) turnaround study of 260 US mature12 
industrial-product business units over a four-year period found that efficiency-
oriented measures, rather than entrepreneurial, are more successful and 
faster in achieving profit improvement and turnaround. Their findings also 
confirmed the presence of Hofer’s four 'gestalts' and his contingency 
'closeness from break even' propositions described above. O’Neill found that 
in strong competitive industry environments, growth strategies were not 
effective in turnaround recovery but rather in average competitive situations. 
Further, cost reduction and restructuring strategies were found to be most 
effective in weak competitive industry environments and for mature or 
declining product life cycle situations in achieving long-term turnaround 
recovery.  
Robbins and Pearce’s (1992) seminal research gave the 'efficiency school of 
thought' a great impetus. For more than two decades since Schendel, Patton 
and Riggs (1976) introduced the notion of causes and appropriate response, 
it was generally accepted that effective turnaround response depends on an 
understanding of the causes, that is, strategic or operational, of corporate 
performance decline. Robbins and Pearce’s (1992) study of 32 distressed US 
                                                     
12 Defined in Hambrick & Schecter’s (1983) study as less than 10% annual industry real 





textile manufacturing firms challenged this view that irrespective of the 
causes of corporate decline, retrenchment (i.e. cutbacks of costs and assets) 
is the first and necessary step towards achieving a successful recovery. They 
also found the extent of retrenchment is related to the severity of decline. As 
severity of decline worsens, retrenchment should intensify from cost 
reduction to asset reduction strategies. Essentially it is a reduction and 
consolidation strategy. Earlier writers tend to assert that strategic change is a 
prerequisite to achieving recovery (Barker & Duhaime, 1997:14) while more 
recent large sample testing by researchers, especially those after 1992, tend 
to support retrenchment as a panacea for recovery.  Barker and Mone (1994) 
challenged Robbins and Pearce’s proposition and propositioned that 
strategic change is necessary and indeed retrenchment often diminished the 
firm’s capacity, thus exacerbating further decline. A subsequent study by 
Barker and Duhaime (1997) supports the 'strategic change school of 
thought'.  Studies by Smith and Graves (2005:317) found that companies that 
increase their asset base—contrary to retrenchment of assets—are more 
likely to achieve a successful recovery. 
However, the retrenchment proposition is far from settled. Castrogiovanni 
and Bruton (2000) are of the opinion that the retrenchment proposition may 
be 'context-specific' (i.e. not universal and generalisable) and may only be 
applicable in an independent firm context. Their study of 46 distressed US 
firms in a post-acquisition context examined the relative effectiveness of firm 
acquisitions, capital infusion, integration of acquired firm’s assets and 
business into the parent’s, and retrenchment in achieving performance 
recovery. They found no significant retrenchment effect. Post-acquisition 
capital infusion by the parent firm into the acquired distressed firm resulted in 
worse performance. Integration of the acquired firm’s assets and business 
into the parent’s was significant on performance recovery of the distressed 
acquired firm. This tends to imply that general applicability of the 
retrenchment proposition as a 'cure all' for all stages or severity of decline as 
concluded by Robbins and Pearce’ (1992) study is questionable. 
Castrogiovanni and Brutton (2000) also highlighted several weaknesses of 
the Robbins and Pearce’s (1992) study, including a narrow and small sample 




success was defined and measured as two consecutive years of profit 
improvement. In addition, if retrenchment is thought to yield quicker pay-offs 
then using a short two year success measurement period tends to bias 
strategic change proposition in favour of the retrenchment proposition 
(Castrogiovanni & Brutton, 2000:27).  
Cognisant of criticism, Robbins and Pearce (1993) modified their earlier 
retrenchment proposition by  introducing a model which incorporates  the 
need for strategic change in the recovery phrase following retrenchment. The 
choice of strategic or operational measures depends on whether the 
problems stem from operational inefficiency or bad strategic misalignment, 
which requires major entrepreneurial manoeuvring.   
Studies by Rasheed (2005) of 68 US small firms consisting of small 
government contractors (average firm size by employee numbers was 35) in 
the US Small Business Administration database, found that choosing a 
growth or retrenchment strategy in declining small firms (e.g. entrepreneur 
owner manager) is contingent on their perception of past financial 
performance and availability of firm resources. Entrepreneurs are more likely 
to choose a growth strategy rather than a retrenchment one if their 
perception of past firm performance is high and that there are available 
resources to support their strategic moves. Surprisingly, he also found that 
the reverse is true, that is, these entrepreneurs will pursue a growth strategy 
even if there is a combination of low perception of past firm performance and 
low resource availability. He concludes that declining small firms remain 
aggressive and may still pursue growth strategies due to their risk taking 
nature, as they see growth as their only solution to severe performance 
decline. His findings lend support to D'Aveni’s (1989) findings that low 
resource near-bankrupt public firms also chose growth strategies. Hence the 
dichotomy of choices when facing performance decline as to whether a firm 
will choose entrepreneurial growth strategy or retrenchment cannot be 
unequivocally answered.  




A stage perspective 
As the turnaround process is a metamorphosis phenomenon it inevitably 
involves the element of time. In this regard, researchers started to focus on 
the stages a turnaround firms goes through in achieving turnaround recovery. 
Hence, a multistage perspective was proposed in the quest to further 
understand the turnaround process.  
The first proponent of this stage perspective was Bibeault  (1982) whereby 
the turnaround process was posited to go through five stages. The first stage 
is the change in management, which Hofer (1980:26) also sees as 'a 
precondition for almost all successful turnarounds'. The second is the 
evaluation stage, which normally takes a few weeks, whereby the different 
options and the causes of decline are evaluated. The third stage is the 
emergency stage when retrenchment measures consisting of cost cutting 
and asset reduction are taken to stop the 'cash burn' in order to survive and 
return to positive cash flow. The fourth stage is the stabilization stage, 
emphasizing organizational rebuilding and stabilization. The fifth stage is the 
return to normal growth stage, which is more strategic and long-term in focus, 
as it deals with market share growth and development. The previous stages 
deals with the 'here and now' survival issues while the fifth stage deals with 
the 'next and where' long-term sustainability and growth issues. 
 More recent research also supports the abovementioned proposition, for 
example, Balgobin and Pandit (2001); Grinyer and McKiernan (1990). 
According to Robbins and Pearce (1993), Bibeault’s main contribution to 
turnaround literature is that the retrenchment phase can be viewed as a 
separate isolated phenomenon from the recovery phase, with the extent and 
duration of the former phase dependent on the firm’s financial health, that is, 
severity of decline. In this respect, Bibeault’s observations that the degree 
and extent of the retrenchment phase is a function of the severity of a firm’s 




'Large sample' (sample size greater than 30)13  research (32 US distress 
textile manufacturing firms)  conducted by Robbins and Pearce (1992) also 
supports the multistage perspective of turnaround, in particular the 
importance and necessity of the retrenchment phase as initial and critical to 
successful turnarounds. More specifically, they propose a two stage process 
of: the retrenchment response and the recovery response .They are of the 
view that a firm’s prolonged performance decline often depletes a firm’s 
slack/surplus financial resources. Hence, retrenchment strategies should be 
the precursor strategies to stem the depletion in order to restore financial 
viability and sustainability. They did not rule out the need for recovery/growth 
or entrepreneurial strategies, but the emphasis is on retrenchment as the 
vital and necessary ‘initial phase of a turnaround strategy’ (Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992:287). This view, however, was challenged by researchers like 
Barker and Mone (1994) and Arogyaswamy, Barker and Yasai-Ardekani 
(1995) who argued that cost cutting and asset retrenchment are often a  
consequence rather than cause of turnaround in firm performance. They 
argued that downsizing due to cost cutting and/or asset disposal endangers 
the firm’s capacity to recover and hence runs contrary to the objective of 
recoverability. Further, implementing retrenchment measures without regard 
for the cause of the decline may hasten the decline into failure.  
Francis and Desai’s (2005:1219) study of 97 industrial, commercial and 
computer equipment-manufacturing firms in the US found that 'although 
retrenchment is a positive organizational strategy for many firms in decline, it  
may not be absolutely necessary to achieve a turnaround particularly if the 
firm is extremely productive in utilising its resources'. However,  Grinyer and 
McKiernan’s (1990) study of 25 UK 'sharp-bent' firms from stagnating to 
decline and recovery reported that strategic changes were less frequent than 
operational recovery measures with 80% of the firms implementing steps to 
reduce production costs, 55% improved quality and service and 75% 
                                                     
13 Corporate turnaround research sample size is typically small and sample size of greater 
than 30 is considered as 'large'. See Pandit (2000:44 &46). Pandit, N. R. 2000. Some 




improved their marketing. Hence, the importance of retrenchment being a 
critical content of turnaround is far from being settled. 
Following from the multistage perspective of turnaround, Arogyaswamy, 
Barker and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) propose an integrative two stage model 
viz: decline-stemming strategies (stage one) and recovery strategies (stage 
two). This model differentiates itself from the earlier models in that it 
highlights the fact that the two stages are not distinct time sequential events 
with each overlapping and feeding back as input into each other. In addition, 
it expands on what managers need to do beyond just retrenchment, 
emphasizing the importance of remedial actions based on an understanding 
and assessment of the cause of the decline, consideration of the firm’s 
competitive position in the industry and availability of slack resources.  
The abovementioned model emphasizes and integrates the role 'critical 
contingencies play at each stage of the turnaround process with a focus 
toward integrating the literature'  (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995:497). Such 
critical contingencies include stabilizing the firm’s internal and external 
environment. This includes garnishing the support of external (e.g. financiers, 
banks, external non-executive directors and unions) and internal (e.g. 
employees and executive directors) stakeholders, the stabilization of internal 
decision processes and maintenance of staff morale and a 
positive/supportive internal climate (e.g. 'we are in it together and seeing it 
through, successfully'). The stage two recovery process builds on the 
decline-stemming and stabilization process of stage one. While stage one 
deals with the consequences of decline, stage two deals with the causes of 
the firm’s decline and its competitive position to ensure the firm’s 
fundamental business model is viable to ensure a sustainable recovery. 
Teng’s (2004) study of turnaround of Australian listed companies proposes 
four stages of decline which he labels as stagnation stage, deterioration 
stage, alert stage and crisis stage. He hypothesised that entrepreneurial 
strategies are more effective when a firm is in the stagnation stage, efficiency 
strategies are more effective in the deterioration stage, cost strategies are 




crisis stage. He found statistical support at the 0.05 level for the first three but 
not the cash strategies for the crisis stage. 
Chowdhury (2002), cognisant of the lack of a general acceptable turnaround 
theory, proposes a theoretical model based on process theory. Process 
theory is a variant of the organization life-cycle theory, which emphasizes the 
evolutionary changes an organization goes through, for example, 
birth/emergence, growth, maturity, decline and death. In his opinion, 
turnaround involving change and process theory would provide a suitable 
foundation for the development of a turnaround theory.  
Chowdhury (2002) observes that turnaround research to date emphasises 
the 'content' (what to do, e.g. policies and actions taken) of turnaround rather 
than the 'process' (how to do it) or stages that a firm undergoes through from 
performance decline to sustainable recovery or eventual demise. The 
'content' approach is static as it essentially examines via statistical methods 
the relationship between independent variables (e.g. cost cutting) on 
dependent variables (e.g. financial performance) as a means to explain the 
variation in performance (e.g. financial) due to the implementation of various 
turnaround strategies (Chowdhury, 2002:249). 
Although not discounting the importance of the 'content' emphasis approach, 
Chowdhury proposes a stage theory as an overall theoretical framework. A 
stage theory emphasises that 'turnaround is not a single event or state; it is a 
process composed of a sequence of events that, when combined described 
the occurrence of performance improvement over a particular span of time' 
(Chowdhury, 2002:251) Each stage is identifiable by the characteristics of a 
key/trigger event, which explains and builds on or provides the springboard to 
the next. Accordingly, he proposes the four stages of decline, response 
initiation, transition and outcome as the four characteristics of the turnaround 
process. These four stages have sometimes been extended to five with the 
following comparable generic captions: decline and crisis (decline), triggers 
for change (response initiation), recovery strategy formulation, retrenchment 





Taking Chowdhury’s 4 stage model as an example of the stage theory 
perspective, the 'Turnaround Clock' in Figure 2 below summarises the above 
discussion. It integrates the various stages a distressed firm goes through 
and the three categories of turnaround strategies within the 'continuum of a 
time clock', emphasizing the count down towards recovery success or failure. 
The results, information and the success or failure of each stage feeds back 
into the other as strategies and corrective actions are fine-tuned and 
amended to increase the probability of a performance turnaround.  
Chowdhury (2002:256) cautions that each stage is not discrete and 
standalone, ‘rather they are sequentially linked and mutually reinforcing’. The 
triangle in the middle shows the three generic categories of turnaround 
strategy—operational (aimed at efficiency improvements) (‘O’), strategic 
(aimed at re-orientating or changing the business the firm is in) (‘S’) and 
financial (‘F’) (strategies of a financial nature—dividend cuts, share 
placement, equity-loan swap, to name a few examples), a distressed firm 
may implement in its effort to turnaround. Figure 2 is not to be taken to imply 
that ‘S’ causes decline, which is fixed by ‘F’ and ‘O’, but rather a distressed 
firm may implement a combination of the three types of strategy or any one 
of them to turnaround its performance decline. The three categories will be 
discussed in the following section 2.5.  
Chowdhury (2002:253, 254) defines ‘decline as the first stage of a turnaround 
process’ and distinguishes two types of decline: ‘K-extinction’, which is the 
property of the environment, refers to decline caused by external or macro 
factors. ‘R-extinction’ decline is organisational decline, which is the property 
of the organisation, and refers to ‘a reduction in resources within an 
organisation independent of changes in the environment’. R-extinction 
decline essentially is caused by management’s errors or faults. According to 
him, both types of decline are likely to result in a deterioration of level of 
resources and performance decline. An understanding of their causes is 
crucial in the selection of appropriate turnaround strategies.  During decline, 
a stimulus event may trigger top management to take remedial actions either 
voluntarily or involuntarily due to pressure from various parties, for example, 
shareholders, banks, government, union and interested stakeholders. Such 




selection of turnaround strategies and influence the speed or duration of 
each of the four stages.   
Chowdhury (2002) in his exposition of his 4 stage turnaround model, 
distinguishes between strategic cures versus operating ones. In addition, the 
following diagram incorporates financial strategy as discussed in turnaround 
literature.  
In the response (selection-of-strategy) stage, a distressed firm may be 
constrained by the domain it is in. Strategic cures like divestment, 
diversification and vertical integration may have limited applicability in single 
independent business or at business unit level of a multibusiness corporation  
(Chowdhury, 2002:254). Small business response and  selection of 
strategies in turnaround differ somewhat from large businesses (Chowdhury 
& Lang, 1996; Rasheed, 2005). Small businesses, constrained by limited 
resources and access to outside capital,  tend to lean more to using 
operating efficiency improvement strategies in their efforts to turnaround 
(Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). 
The transition period sees the implementation of the chosen strategies of the 
response stage. Here resources (physical, financial and human resources) 
are committed according to policies and programs set up to achieve the 
desired turnaround. The extant literature highlights the importance of this 
stage emphasising that it is not the programs or policies that make the 
difference as successful turnaround depends on ‘the process through which 
turnaround strategies are implemented, not their content per se’ (Chowdhury, 
2002:256). The interaction of ‘soft and hard’ factors such as leadership 
qualities, firm culture, politics, management skills, management structure, 
industry factors, resource availability, employee incentive and reward policies 
and their management therefore are critical factors during the implementation 
stage. Chowdhury (2002) cautions that elapsed time (the length of the 
transition period for successful turnaround) is important as management 
must allow sufficient time for the implemented programs to bear fruit. The 
elapsed time period varies from one situation to another. Chowdhury 




results of turnaround strategies show’.  As an indication, the average time 
period between distress and recovery reported by some studies is between 
three (Hofer, 1980) to four (Bibeault, 1982) years, whilst the average time for 
improvements to show was found to be 7.7 years with a range of four to 
sixteen years (Schendel et al (1976) as cited by Chowdhury (2002:255)). 
The outcome of the implementation is either success or failure. The 
determination of a successful or failed turnaround depends on management’s 
predetermined performance indicators. Chowdhury (2002:256) states that 
‘the measure used to determine outcome—success or failure—are the same 
as those used to define decline at the first stage of the turnaround process’. 
Single measurement centred on this dichotomy between ‘success and failure’ 
may not be operationally helpful. Accordingly, Chowdhury (2002:256) opines 
that a more balanced view is to use ‘a series of measures that capture 
different dimensions of performance’ in order to ‘ give a better reflection of 
the role and interplay of different incidents that represent the speed and 
depth of recovery or failure’14. The series of measures chosen must meet 
stringent requirements and attainable and not be too loose or ambiguous. 
Among such requirements is the importance of choosing success 
performance thresholds that provide clear and unequivocal signals when 
success is achieved (Chowdhury, 2002; Krueger & Willard, 1991). 
                                                     
14 The multiple measurement indicator concept ties in with the three performance area 




















Decline type: K-extinction or R-extinction. 
Response type: Strategic, Operational, Financial  
Transition: Implementation. Time period for the implemented strategies to 
work themselves out.  
Outcome: Success or failure determined by performance indicators 
 Figure 2. Turnaround clock15 
Note. Source: Adapted from Chowdhury’s (2002) 4 stage model and amended, 
where applicable. 
 
Whilst financial distress is seen by many as an undesirable state to be in, 
Wruck (1990)  believes that there are beneficial effects. He is of the opinion 
that financial distress often forces managers to critically look at the firm’s 
operations and strategies with a view to undertaking 'value-increasing 
                                                     
15 The turnaround clock figure summarises the stage theory into a single illustrative diagram. 




organizational changes they would not have otherwise undertaken' (Wruck, 
1990:434). 
 
Pretorius matrix: A conceptual matrix model for turnaround situation 
 
From the above literature review, it is clear that turnaround is a complex 
subject involving the interplay of external and internal variables acting on the 
subject firm. As the literature of turnarounds lacks a theoretical framework to 
tie all associated concepts together so as to provide guidance for research 
and practice (Pandit, 2000), Pretorius (2008) proposes a conceptual model, 
based on Porter’s generic strategy matrix as a starting guide and screening 
tool  for practitioners facing a turnaround situation.  
 
Porter’s strategic typology, as a recipe for firms wanting to earn above 
average returns, is based on the strategy principle of aiming for cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus (Akan, Allen, Helms, & Spralls, 2006). 
Pretorius (2008:19) believes that Porter’s model is more appropriate for firms 
‘operating “normally” (profiting from demand for its product in a competitive 
environment’ and is not suitable as a recipe for firms facing a turnaround 
situation. In Pretorius’ model, four situations are distinguished against the 
backdrop environment of resource munificence. Pretorius believes that to 
achieve a successful turnaround managers need to know the cause of the 
decline and the ‘environment’ (specifically, environmental munificence) the 
firm is in. The environment, as discussed earlier in this chapter, has been 
well documented in the literature as ‘not only one of the causes of a firm’s 
decline, but also affect the eventual turnaround outcome.’(Francis & Desai, 
2005:1205).Francis and Desai (2005:1205) refer to ‘environmental 
munificence’ as the ‘environment’s capacity to accumulate firms’. 
 
Environmental munificence refers to the abundance or scarcity of critical 
resource to support and accommodate firms within an environment 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991). Resources in the environment ‘influence the survival 




into the environment (Castrogiovanni, 1991:543). The literature supports the 
proposition that the availability of resources is related to the range of strategy 
and organisational options that firms pursue (Castrogiovanni, 1991; Dess & 
Beard, 1984; Mahoney, 1995; Tushman  & Anderson, 1986). When 
resources are plentiful, firms can concentrate on working normally to 
maximize profit and generate slack resources to act as buffer for periods of 
resource scarcity (Cyert & March, 1963). But when resources are scarce, 
competition intensifies and firm survival becomes a focal issue. Closely 
related to this construct, is the availability of slack resources that are needed 
to finance turnaround strategies. Slack resources have been defined by 
Smith and Greaves (2005) as the ‘level of free assets’ that can be used as 
collateral for raising more funds through financing. The level of free assets 
has been found to be a distinguishing significant predictor of corporate 
recovery (Campbell, 1996; Casey, McGee, & Stickney, 1986; Routledge & 
Gadenne, 2000). Other writers (e.g. White (1989); Barker and Mone (1998)) 
also stress their availability as an important factor in turnarounds. 
 
Pretorius’ (2008) conceptual model consists of a four-quadrant matrix with 
the upper half denoted as ‘resource abundance’ and the bottom half as 
‘resource scarcity’. Four types of firm are depicted in the matrix. The first 
type, in the upper left hand quadrant operating under a resource abundance 
environment, are firms who are not in distress and therefore do not require a 
turnaround. This first type of firms because of abundant resources and well 
positioned in the market can pursue organic and inorganic growth through 
new market development and acquisitions to further improve their returns. 
The second type of firms in the upper right hand quadrant operating in this 
same abundance environment are under-performing with low sales and 
falling margins with diminishing competitive advantage and depleting human 
capital as staff start to leave for better outside positions. Pretorius believes 
that this category of firms require to focus on a re-positioning itself by 
strategic re-orientation or strategic restructuring, for example, pursue 
product/services differentiation or diversification to new markets or industry 
as there are available resources to do so. In other words, it requires ‘big 




depicted in the left-hand side lower quadrant operating in a scarce resource 
environment, should pursue an efficiency improvement strategy, for example, 
lowering of inventory levels (hence reducing carrying cost), cost cutting, 
improve margins, improve debtors collection and supply chain logistics, to 
name just a few examples. Efficiency strategy is generally aimed at 
improving internal operating procedures making them more effective and 
more cost effective. When such firms improve or turn around to profitability 
which leads to improvement in available resources they may eventually 
progress into the first type of firms depicted in the left hand top quadrant of 
the matrix. The fourth and last type of firms consists of those who are in crisis 
and operating in a scarce resource environment. They are depicted in the 
lower right hand quadrant of the matrix. Efficiency strategy is generally not 
effective as the severity of their decline requires strategic decisions and fast 
actions to ‘stop the bleeding’ of cash. Last resort strategies are warranted 
which may include liquidation, defensive merger, debt forgiveness and capital 
restructuring, to name a few examples. 
 
In sum, the four quadrant conceptual matrix captures a complex multi-faceted 
turnaround problem into a concise matrix, synthesising the two important 
determinant theories of turn around, principally the resource munificence 
theory and the causality of distress theory (causes of distress). On a practical 
level, Pretorius comments that the matrix was well received by a practitioner 
focus group and he found it useful as a screening tool when diagnosing a 
troubled/distressed firm. The model also ‘suggests that  the regression of a 
venture (firm) in decline is not necessarily a linear one through 
underperformance, decline, distress and then crisis (if left uncorrected) ’ 
(italics added) (Pretorius, 2008:25). 
 
 
2.5  Turnaround strategies  
The decline of a firm from economic viability and sustainability, irrespective of 




management difficulties and/or its business strategy (Francis & Desai, 2005; 
Schendel et al., 1976; Sharma & Mahajan, 1980; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). 
Although a munificent environment does assist in recovery (Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983); Bibeault (1982:35,30) found that internal causes account for 
80% of organizational decline, and 6% was due to environmental factors like 
competitive/industry conditions. The extant research to date revealed that 
firms respond to firm threatening crisis in a variety of ways. This is because 
'external and internal inadequacies combined to depress performance' 
(Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990:138). Turnaround strategies in effecting 
performance recovery can be conveniently grouped under the following 
generic categories. In reality decline stemming and turnaround strategies and 
measures adopted by firms often overlapped depending on the severity and 
cause of decline (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Ford & Baucus, 1987). It is 
highly improbable that managers will effect efficiency measures and wait for 
them to work before addressing strategic issues and problems.  
 
2.5.1   Operational restructuring strategies 
The focus here is normally to effect immediate relief from firm survival 
threatening pressures resulting from performance decline and poor cash 
flows. Normally they are the first steps or measures in the turnaround 
approach emphasizing operational efficiency (Cameron, Freeman, & Mishra, 
1991,1993; Finkin, 1985; Ford & Baucus, 1987) with the objective to stabilise 
operation and stop the bleeding of cash (Hofer, 1980; Sudarsanam & Lai, 
2001). Operational restructuring strategies or measures include but are not 
limited to the following.    
Retrenchment16 
This is the general term for downsizing, cost cutting and/or asset reduction 
activities aimed at returning the firm to a sustainable operational state by 
mitigating the conditions that led to the downward performance spiral (Pearce  
                                                     
16 The term ‘retrenchment’ in turnaround literature is wider than just retrenchment of staff, 




& Robbins, 1994; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Generally, such activities 
manifested themselves in retrenchment of staff and/or divestiture of 
unprofitable or low margin business units and non-performing assets (Denis 
& Kruse, 2000; Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). 
Retrenchment as an efficiency increasing down-sizing tool is also 
increasingly used by successful firms in their growth period to further 
increase profitability (McKinley, Zhao, & Rust, 2000). From the single 
objective of reducing costs, the retrenchment of staff and downsizing in 
general is often used as a management strategy (Cameron et al., 1993; Clair 
& Dufresne, 2004), to increase organisational effectiveness, efficiency and 
performance (Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Macky, 2004; Zyglidopoulos, 
2004), improve competitive advantage, including global advantage, by 
reducing labour cost  (Kets de Vries & Balazs, 1997) and expectation of 
productivity increase (Gandolfi, 2007).  
According to Gandolfi (2007), Cameron et al (1991, 1993) distinguish three 
kinds of corporate downsizing as: workforce reduction, an organisation 
redesign and systemic strategy. Workforce reduction or lay-off, as the name 
suggests, relates to the reduction of the number of employees in the 
organisation. It takes the forms of golden handshake and or parachutes, 
natural attritions, early retirements, redundancies, and a freeze on hiring. 
This strategy is often pursued and implemented as a short-term reactive 
response to declining profits and as a cost cutting measure.  
Organisation redesign focuses on the elimination of work and work flow 
rather than employee number reduction. It takes the form of elimination of 
functional departments or groups, eliminating work function and practices, 
work flexibility, multi-skilling, a flatter organisational structure, discontinuation 
of product or services, merging and consolidating tasks, departments or units 
and reduction of overall work hours. The overall objective is to be more 
efficient and effective. Organisation design takes longer to plan and 
implement versus the short-term reactive lay-off strategy, as discussed in the 




Systemic strategy differs from the former two in that it is more holistic, macro, 
with a long-term focus, comprehensive and wide-ranging in its emphasis 
(Cameron et al., 1993). It is wide-ranging in that it involves reviewing and 
implementing downsizing measures to the greater parts of the organisation, 
including suppliers and customer relations, inventories, design processes 
and production methods (Cameron, 1994; Gandolfi, 2007). This strategy is 
pervasive as it aims to change the organisational culture, attitudes and 
values of the firm’s employees (Gandolfi, 2007; Macky, 2004). Hence, in 
terms of time frame implementation this takes longer in planning and 
implementation than organisation redesign. The distinguishing feature of lay-
off is that it is reactive to a declining performance or short-term crisis, whilst 
systemic strategy in the context of downsizing is proactive in that it aims to 
achieve long-term organisational goals and objectives (Macky, 2004). Macky 
(2004:64) notes that prior to the 1980s downsizing has frequently been 
associated with cost reduction as a reaction to declining sales and 
profitability, but since then downsizing is seen as a 'human resource 
management "strategy of choice" ' (Cameron et al., 1993). 
In recent years, profitable Australian banks and large companies, for 
example, Telstra, (White, 2010) have engaged extensively in retrenchment of 
staff (Financial Sector Union of Australia, 1996; Gandolfi, 2007). Gandolfi 
(2007:148 & 150) reported that Australian bank managers generally resorted 
to employee retrenchment strategies rather than 'organisation redesign and 
systemic strategies' and that 'the downsizing of Australian banks is not a 
phenomenon of the past' and predicts that 'downsizing will remain a principal 
strategic tool for the major Australian banking institutions'. This has resulted 
in the decline in the Finance Sector Union (FSU) membership—most bank 
and financial institution employees are members of the FSU—since the early 




reported that between 1998 and 2003 there was a more than 10% decline in 
the workforce of the Australian finance industry.17 
In the context of distress firms, lay-offs will most likely be reactive to a 
declining performance situation. In the short-term, downsizing was found to 
improve firm financial performance (growth in sales and share price) 
Wayham & Werner, (2000). However, paradoxically, empirical evidence does 
not convincingly support downsizing as a contributory factor of superior 
organisational performance (e.g. profitability, share price) in the longer term 
(Cascio, Young, & Morris, 1997; De Mause, Bermann, & Vanderheiden, 
1997), it failed to achieve expected cost reductions and efficiencies 
(Cameron et al., 1991), has negative psychological impact on both 
retrenched employees 'victims' and those who 'survived' (Kets de Vries & 
Balazs, 1997) and is detrimental to organisational learning capacity, for 
example, when individuals are deleted from informal organisational networks 
built up over the years (Reynolds-Fisher & White, 2000). Other than the 
psychological negativities (e.g. mistrust of management, job security, lost of 
loyalty, etc) one of the reasons why downsizing does not achieve expected 
organisational benefits is because of hidden costs, which can offset any 
potential savings and productivity increase (Cascio et al., 1997; Macky, 2004; 
Ryan & Macky, 1998). Such hidden costs may include a 'too lean' workforce 
to take on the recovery phase, which will inevitably affect the firm’s ability to 
recruit and it will be forced to pay a higher price for human capital in a tight 
labour market as the economy improves. 
Whilst the long-term impact is not convincingly beneficial, D'Aveni (1989:599) 
found downsizing may help lingering firms—defined as slow declining firms, 
the decline of which is either rapid or gradual—buy more time and linger on 
before eventual bankruptcy or recovery. He argues that downsizing and 
efficiency improvement strategies can buy more time for the firm as it waits 
for the environment to improve and eventually reverse the decline. Further, 
he argues that environmental conditions are a determinant of the 
                                                     
17 It should be noted that it is not argued here that the decline in FSU membership is a result 





effectiveness of downsizing. As the environment deteriorates (declining 
demand) downsizing and efficiency improvement strategies are insufficient to 
reverse the decline 'because they do not change a firm’s direction or move it 
to a more favourable environment'. The Cascio et al. (1997) study of 5,479 
instances of changes in US firms’ employment level between 1980 and 1994 
found that firms that purely undertook employment retrenchment did not 
show higher returns (return on assets and share price and dividend 
appreciation) than the average firm in their industry.  
For a declining firm, Castrogiovani and Bruton (2000) cite three possible 
benefits of retrenchment as: (1) efficiency restoration, (2) slack generation 
and (3) momentum creation. 
(1) Efficiency restoration 
Organisational stagnation or inertia is observed to be an inevitable stage of 
an organisation’s life cycle (Grinyer & Spender, 1979; Hedberg et al., 1976; 
Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Organisational stagnation often results in excess 
capacity, which in a business context needs maintenance and inevitably 
translates to additional costs. Like an organism which stagnates and is slow 
to respond to a changing environment, an organisation builds up 'layers of 
fat' (e.g. bureaucracy and red tape) and becomes inefficient and non-
competitive relative to its competitors. Stagnation, if not attended to, 
eventually leads to organizational decline (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).  
Retrenchment aims to shed the 'layers of fat' and restore a firm’s efficiency. 
Common retrenchment actions  are asset/cost surgery resulting in cost or 
asset reductions and selective product/ market pruning resulting in 
discontinuation of unprofitable product or exiting unprofitable markets or 
segments (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). 
(2)  Slack generation 
The concept of ‘organisational slack’ in the literature ‘conveys the notion of a 
cushion of excess resources available in an organisation that will either solve 




realm of those dictated by optimisation principles18’(Bourgeois, 1981:29). 
Bourgeois (1981:30), paraphrasing the work of James March, defines 
organisational slack as: 
 
Organisational slack is that cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an 
organisation to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external 
pressures for changes in policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the 
external environment. 
 
There are various definitions of slack in the literature since its original  
introduction as a concept by Chester Barnard (1938) and subsequent 
attachment of the term ‘slack’ by Cyert and March (1963). The commonality 
among the definitions for ‘slack’ are: firm resources which are ‘surplus’, 
‘spare’, ‘uncommitted’ (Bourgeois, 1981; Child, 1972; Cyert & March, 1963; 
Dimmick & Murray, 1978) and that they act as ‘shock absorber’, ‘cushion’, 
‘buffer’ to draw upon in bad or economic crisis times. ‘Slack is the resource 
that enables an organisation to adjust to gross shifts in the external 
environment with minimum trauma’ (Bourgeois, 1981:31; Cyert & March, 
1963). Applying this definition to decline and turnaround, the buffering 
characteristics of slack ‘enables a firm to respond appropriately to decline’ 
(Francis & Desai, 2005:1207) by providing the  resources to finance remedial 
turnaround efforts.     
 
According to Castrogiovanni and Bruton (2000:26), Cyert and March 
(1963:36) refer to ‘slack’ as ‘payments to members of the (organisational) 
coalition in excess to what is needed to maintain the organisation’. Examples 
of such excess payments are: ‘excess dividends to shareholders, prices 
lower than necessary to keep buyers, and wages greater than needed to 
keep labour’ (Bourgeois, 1981:30).The excess payments or discount given 
represent excess costs that could have been saved. 
                                                     
18 The optimisation principle in economic theory assumes zero slack (Cyert, R. M. & March, 
J. G. 1963. A behavioural theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.) Bourgeois 
commented that in practice this is unrealistic as firms satisfice than optimise by maintaining 






In more recent times, reference is made to ‘absorbed slack’ and ‘unabsorbed 
slack’. Singh (1986:567) defines absorbed slack as ‘excess costs in 
organisations’ and unabsorbed slack as ‘uncommitted, liquid resources in 
organisations’. Liquid resources refer mainly to financial resources such as 
cash, inventory, or access to credit (Francis & Desai, 2005). The ability of a 
firm to access credit also depends on the amount of ‘free assets’ (unpledged 
assets) that can be used as collaterals for bank loans. Smith and Greaves 
(2005) found recovered failed (in liquidation or receivership) companies have 
higher levels of free assets. 
 
The concept of slack is tied to the concept of efficiency. Bourgeois (1981) 
hypothesises that the relationship between firm success and slack is positive 
up to a point, then negative; displaying a curvilinear pattern (∩). Successful 
firms need to maintain slack at a sufficient level to smooth out work flow, 
innovate and to act as buffer for meeting environmental threats or 
performance down turns. But too much slack may lead to inefficiencies. 
Flowing from this, firms in decline would be on the right hand side of the 
curve consuming more resources relative to their needs and operational level 
requirement and hence have lesser slack.  
 
To restore efficiency, distressed firms need to eliminate or reduce the 
unnecessary  excess ‘layers of fat’ in the system so as to realise or convert 
the excess capacity and or resources (slack), to say cash or near cash, to 
finance turnaround efforts. One of the ways to reduce this excess to an 
acceptable level is through retrenchment. Poorly performing firms may not 
have enough slack resources or access to capital to enable them to finance 
strategic turnaround efforts (Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000). To generate the 
resources needed, retrenchment of assets and costs are needed to reverse 
performance decline (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) and release resources for 







(3) Momentum creation 
Stakeholders’ (e.g. bankers, shareholders, employees, creditors) support is 
an important determinant in influencing the success or failure of turnaround 
strategies and efforts (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). They are impatient and 
nervous if improvements and turnarounds are not forthcoming within a 
relatively short period. The creditability of management with internal and 
external stakeholders depends on its ability to put 'runs on the board' as soon 
as possible. Stakeholders’ (e.g. bankers) continued support is important as 
the availability of additional or (slack) resources (e.g. funds) are vitally 
needed by a firm in performance decline. Quick improvements can build 
confidence, lift employee morale and generate management’s credibility in 
the eyes of stakeholders that things are getting better. It is generally believed 
that retrenchment measures have a shorter time lag in generating profitability 
than strategic moves (Hofer, 1980).News of improvement and success, 
however small, often serves to motivate stakeholders to provide continuing 
support, thus keeping the momentum of expectation that things are turning 
around, 'alive and kicking' (Khandwalla, 1983-84). 
The above three notions are of particular importance to small firms, which 
often do not have large slack resources to cushion the effects of performance 
declines. Chowdhury and Lang’s (1996) study of 153 small (average number 
of employees 14) US manufacturing (chemicals, machinery, electrical and 
electronic) firms, between 1984 and 1987, found that there was a preference 
for  turnaround efficiency operational actions as opposed to entrepreneurial 
ones. This is understandable as small firms’ limited slack resources and 
restricted access to additional capital creates the urgency to stem the decline 
as fast as possible. In addition, they found employee productivity and the 
stretching out of accounts payable credit days are significant predictors of 
small firm turnarounds.  Plant and equipment investment (absolute change in 
gross book value of plant and equipment) 'had a significant negative 
relationship with turnaround' (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996:174). This is in line 
with a small firm environment where production relies more heavily on  labour 
than capital, and employees are nearer to the 'coal face of decline' (because 




induced passion and motivation to preserve their jobs by turning things 
around.   
Asset sales can be operational or strategic. The former deals with disposal of 
assets at the functional unit level with an operational efficiency focus, for 
example, closure of stores or branches, disposal of surplus/non-performing 
plant and machinery, sale and lease back of building, reduction/factoring of 
trade debtors and sale of inventory at discounted price. The latter, often at 
business or corporate level is undertaken with a longer term focus, for 
example, discontinuation of unprofitable product lines or brands and sale of 
corporate level business segments or subsidiaries (Grinyer & McKiernan, 
1990). John and Ofek (1995) found asset sales/divestitures often increased 
the firm’s focus resulting in improved performance in the following year from 
remaining assets as the firm got rid of non-synergistic assets to concentrate 
on its core business. In addition, a firm’s share value often increased as the 
market responded to the announcement of divestitures. Denise and Kruse 
(2000:394) found 'on average restructurings are met with a positive stock 
price reaction'. In addition, firms that had asset restructuring, following 
performance decline, had experienced 'significantly greater operating 
improvements'  than firms that did not (Denis & Kruse, 2000:394). 
Asset and/or investment restructuring strategies may include strategic 
alliance, co-opetition19, joint ventures, management buyouts, licensing 
agreements, mergers and divestments. 
In both cases of operational or strategic asset sales and restructuring, the 
objective is increase cash in-flows into the firm. In practice, the distinction 
between operational and strategic asset reduction and/or restructuring can 
sometimes be blurred and not easily differentiable.  
                                                     
19
 The term 'CO-OPETITION', a combination of the word 'competition' and co-operation', was 
first coined in the 1980s by Ray Noorda of Novell, to refer to the concept of simultaneous 
competition and co-operation. 'Co-opetition' means competitors co-operating with each other 
for mutual benefits. Brandenburger, A. M. & Nalebuff, B. J. 1996. Co-opetition (1st ed.). 




2.5.2    Strategic restructuring strategies 
Perspective: RBV (resource-based view)20 
To explain variation in firm performance, the Resource Based View of the 
firm (RBV) posits that the sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage is 
based on utilization and exploration of its 'bundle of resources' (tangible and 
intangible assets) which are valuable, inimitable, scarce and non-
substitutable (Conner, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 
1984). The RBV has its roots in Ricardian rent, an economic principle that 
suggests that superior production factors earn superior (above normal) 
economic rents (profits) for the owner (Ricardo, 1817)21. RBV emphasises 
the heterogeneity of firms in that firm-specific factors influence firm 
strategies, affect performance outcomes and sustain competitiveness (Grant, 
1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993). According to Rumelt 
(1984:569) strategy formulation is 'the constant search for ways in which the 
firm’s unique resources can be redeployed in changing circumstances'.  
Following classical economic theory, categories of resources identified by 
Penrose (1959) are: land and equipment; labour and capital. These 
resources have been further extended and 'modernised' by several authors 
to cover financial resources (debt, equity, cash) and capital (Penrose, 1997; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), physical resources (plant and equipment, inventories and 
land and building), skilled human capital (Miller & Shamsie, 1996) and their 
knowledge22, organisational resources (systems,organisational relationships), 
                                                     
20 In relation to the RBV, the term ‘perspective’ is used rather than ‘theory’. See Priem and 
Butler for a discussion of why the RBV has not reached the requirements of a ‘theory’ yet. 
Priem, R. L. & Butler, J. E. 2001. Is the resource-based view a useful perspective for 
strategic management research? Academy of Management Review, 26(1): 22-40. 
 
21
  An example of such a rent is the above normal rent earned by a piece of land with a 
unique location or with locational advantages. 
 
22 The knowledge based view (KBV) of the firm posits that knowledge is owned, exercisable 
by and resides with employees (Grant, R. M. 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the 




technological capabilities (superior production systems, high yielding and low 
cost) and intangibles (technology, reputation, culture, brands, goodwill, brand 
names, copyright, patents,) (Arend, 2008; Barney, 1996; Grant, 2002; Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978; Rasheed, 2005). Summarising the above items into 
resources and capabilities we have: resources are ‘stocks of available factors 
that are owned or controlled by the firm’ and capabilities are ‘information-
based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific and are 
developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s 
resources’ (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993:35). Hence, the firm is viewed as 
'essentially a pool of resources' (Penrose, 1997:36) or ‘resource portfolio’ 
(Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb, 2007). 
Several authors (e.g. Barney & Arikan, 2001; Grant, 2002; Priem & Butler, 
2001; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007) comment that 
possession of firm-specific RBV resources alone is necessary but not 
sufficient to sustain competitive advantage and superior performance, but 
rather the effective utilisation and management of such resources is also 
important. The combination of firm assets and differential in the skills and 
abilities of top management has been suggested by Castanias and Helfat 
(2001) as contributory factors why some firms generate economic rents. In 
particular, Grant (2002:137) remarked that the possession of resources per 
se does not confer competitive advantage but rather 'formulating and 
implementing a strategy that exploits the unique features of each firm’s 
collection of resources and capabilities' which, working in combination, create 
'organisational capability' (Grant, 2002:139) superior to that of its 
competitors’. Thus, the aggregation and combination of resources and 
managerial capabilities in identifying and evaluating resources create 
competitive advantage over competitors (Grant, 1991, 2002; Prahalad & 
                                                                                                                                                      
The KBV literature posits that competitive advantage depends on how well a firm integrates 
specialist knowledge into value adding processes, product and services (Spender, J. C. 
1996. Making knowledge the basis of a dynamic theory of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal 17(Winter) : 45-62.; Kogut, B. & Zander, U. 1996. What firms do? Coodination, 
identity and learning. Organisation science, 7(5): 502-518; Spender, J. C. & Grant, R. M. 





Hamel, 1990; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).Over time these resources 
may be depleted, exhausted or out of alignment with their environment 
resulting in a firm’s competitive advantage or going concern status being 
threatened, for example, by competitors (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Thornhill 
& Amit, 2003). There is a tendency for firms to over 'exploit' and under 
'explore' their competencies created from the bundle of resources (Pandit, 
2000). As exploitation of firm competencies results in revenue and 
exploration of new resources entails costs there is a tendency for firms to 
over 'exploit' and under 'explore' their resources/competencies. A firm will be 
in performance decline if the balance between resource exploitation 
(depletion) and exploration (renewal) is in disequilibrium. Continuing 
disequilibrium and substantial loss of resources will lead to organisational 
decline (Lohrke, Bedeian, & Palmer, 2004). Francis and Desai (2005:1204) 
view ‘decline as a result of erosion of productive resources’. Hence, business 
strategic re-adaptation and re-alignment may be needed (Arogyaswamy, 
Barker, & Yasai-Ardekani, 1995; Ford & Baucus, 1987; Grinyer & McKiernan, 
1990) to stem the decline. '"Excellent" firms were internally well fitted and 
externally well adapted' (Chakravarthy, 1986:438) to their environment. 
The RBV is 'macro' or ‘black box’ (Priem & Butler, 2001:32,33) in its 
exposition and does not deal with the 'micro'/detailed reasons (the when, 
where and how it may be useful) for the loss of a firm’s competitiveness and 
hence its performance. It is an attempt to explain the antecedents and 
determinants of superior performance return and sustainable competitive 
advantage via the possession of resources which are scarce, inimitable, 
valuable and non-substitutable (Grant, 1996). If superior performance is 
dependent on the possession, better utilisation and alignment of such 
resources with the firm’s competitive environment, Thornhill and Amit 
(2003:498) suggest that conversely, ‘failure is more likely when there is 
misalignment between what a firm can do and what the competitive 
environment requires’. However,  ‘what  a firm can do’ that is its strategy, 
including turnaround strategy, is ‘constrained by, and dependent on, the 
current level of resources’ it has (Collis, 1991:51; Levinthal, 1991; Pretorius, 




The RBV perspective identifies the four characteristics (valuable, inimitable, 
scarce and non-substitutable) of strategic resources and capabilities or 
factors that are beneficial to a firm. Such a strategic asset view point deals 
mainly with possession of factors that are beneficial to a firm but does not 
deal with possession of factors that are detrimental to the firm. Recently, 
several authors (Arend, 2004, 2008; West & Decastro, 2001) posit that the 
distinction between resource strengths and resource weaknesses in 
achieving sustained competitive advantage is important. It is important for 
managers to know the differences and characteristics between the two 
constructs when enacting performance turnaround. By considering  ‘a firm’s 
factors as all of a firm’s resources, capabilities and competencies in total 
(e.g. its tangible, intangible assets, knowledge, structure, reputation, etc)’ 
(Arend, 2008), Arend calls factors that affect a firm’s sustained competitive 
performance (SCA for sustained competitive advantage and SCD for 
sustained competitive disadvantage) as Strategic Factors (‘SF’), and 
distinguishes two sets of sub factors within SF that are relevant in turnaround 
context. An SF is either a strategic asset (‘SA’) or a strategic liability (‘SL’). 
SAs are firm factors that satisfy all the four characteristics (i.e. Valuable, 
inimitable, scarce and non-substitutable) of RBV resources (Arend, 
2008:339). If one of the characteristics is missing it is not an SA. SLs have 
the three characteristics of being ‘costly, rare (i.e. scarce and non-
transformable), and appropriated (i.e. non-transferable) by the organisation’ 
(Arend, 2008:339). SAs are beneficial to the firm as they provide its SCA and 
create firm values (e.g. earn economic rents), whilst SLs are detrimental to 
the firm as they provide its SCD and destroy values (e.g. realisation of 
economic costs). Using a questionnaire survey of a final sample of 310 select 
members of US turnaround specialist practitioners (Turnaround Management 
Association) between July 2005 and October 2005, Arend (2008:346,347) 
found the top three SAs were strong brand, good customer service and 
specialised knowledge, and the top three SLs were incompetent 
management, bad strategy and financial problems. In addition, he found ‘the 





The above findings indicate that not all resources of a firm are beneficial 
towards the pursuit of earning economic rents, value creation and sustaining 
competitive advantage. The over exploitation of a firm’s resource, without 
renewal and replenishment may have eroded the resource’s earning capacity 
and the firm’s competitive position over time (Rumelt, 1984). Hence, a firm’s  
resource portfolio (‘the sum of all firm controlled resources i.e. tangible and 
intangible assets’ Simon et al (2007:278)) needs to be reviewed to maintain 
competitive advantage. Such a review entails the enhancement, 
replenishment or retention of resources that have SAs qualities and culling or 
minimising those with SLs qualities. From this resource-based perspective, 
performance decline and loss of competitive advantage is the result of 
possessing an inefficient and/or ineffective portfolio of resources. In the same 
vein a declining/distressed firm’s portfolio of resources will be in 
disequilibrium with its competitive environment as discussed above. 
Therefore, to achieve a successful performance turnaround and regain 
competitive advantage the firm’s portfolio of resources needs to be reviewed 
and restructured.  
As alluded to in the above discussion, the criticism against the RBV is that it 
does not deal with the specifics (e.g. processes, managerial involvement and 
input (Barney & Arikan, 2001; Mahoney, 1995; Priem & Butler, 2001; Sirmon 
& Hitt, 2003)) inside the ‘black box’ and outside influence (e.g. the 
environment). It identifies the characteristics of the broad category of firm-
specific resources that are the determinants of competitive advantage and 
superior returns (Sirmon et al., 2007). In fact Barney and Arikan (2001:174) 
comment that the RBV assumes that once a firm has possession and control 
of valuable, rare, costly to imitate and nonsubstitutable resources, ‘the 
actions it should take to exploit these resources will be self evident’. From a 
process view point, Castanias and Helfat (2001) have suggested the  
importance of managers’ role and abilities on working and managing the firm 
resources to generate managerial rent. Sirmon and Hitt (2003:339) state that 
‘resources must be managed effectively’ in order to create wealth.  Apart 
from managerial input, it is therefore logical to assume that as firms do not 
operate in a vacuum, but often in a competitive environment, environmental 




performance and its value creation for its owners. The literature suggests that 
environmental factors (e.g. environmental contingencies, dynamism, local 
and global competition) do have an impact on firm performance and value 
creation (Brush & Artz, 1999; Francis & Mariola, 2005; Lippman & Rumelt, 
2003; Miller & Shamsie, 1996; Morrow, Johnson, & Busenitz, 2004; Sirmon et 
al., 2007). Makino, Isobe and Chan (2004:1037) found country effects (i.e. 
national contextual factors) and industry effects do influence firm behaviour 
and economic performance of foreign affiliates of  multinational corporations. 
If environmental factors have an impact on firm performance, any 
performance turnaround effort has to consider internal and external 
influencing factors. In this regard, the effectiveness of a particular recovery 
strategy depends on an understanding and analysis of the causes of a firm’s 
decline and its relative competitive position, that is, whether it is firm-
based/specific or industry-induced. An overhaul/fundamental strategic re-
adaptation or re-alignment would be ineffective for firms (especially weak 
competitive positioned firms) facing a cyclical/temporary industry-based 
contraction, where firms compete for limited resources (Arogyaswamy et al., 
1995). Successful firms in a competitive environment are those that are 
efficient in the utilization of limited resources. Hence, an incremental strategic 
change emphasising achieving efficiency in the process and utilization of 
resources where the firm has an existing competitive advantage (e.g. brand 
names and customer loyalty) would be more effective in achieving 
performance turnaround in a cyclical industry based contraction 
(Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). Similarly, firms facing industry demand decline 
should consider factors like customer traits, product traits, competitor traits 
and exit barriers and should adopt counter strategies like early exit, 
containing present investments, reducing or increasing investments—for 
example, buying out competitors (Harrigan, 1980b). Increasing investment 
would depend on the availability of slack resources.    
Conversely, for firm-based (i.e. factors specific or peculiar to the firm) 
decline, strategic re-adaptation is needed to replenish/create existing 
(Gentry, Newbold, & Whitford, 1995) resources and capabilities so as to 




al., 1995; Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Hofer, 1980; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; 
Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1976). Per Grinyer and McKiernan (1990) 
strategic re-adaptation includes product differentiation, steps to gain cost 
leadership, diversification into new markets and acquisitions to consolidate 
market positions. Snow and Hambrick (1980:529) distinguish between 
strategic adjustment and strategic change, with the latter involving major 
modification of 'technology, structure and process to fit the new alignment'. It 
also includes mergers, joint ventures and strategic alliance. In summary, 
strategic change often involves 'big picture' manoeuvring and positioning.  
Firms facing external challenges or pressure often adjust rather than change 
their strategies (Snow & Hambrick, 1980). 
Overhaul strategic re-adaptations are often expensive as they entail 
fundamental change in business models and processes, and may compound 
the risk of further decline as valuable slack resources are consumed in the 
process of warding off the ill effect of industry-based contraction. The 
availability and magnitude of slack resources as a 'buffering' cushion was 
found to be an influential determinant of turnaround (Francis & Desai, 2005; 
Francis & Mariola, 2005; Hambrick & D'Aventi, 1988). In a large sample 
testing of 97 US firms Francis and Desai (2005) found that the effects of firm-
level factors, such as factors under the control of managers, were  more 
influential than industry effects in affecting turnaround. Such a view 
incidentally does not resonate with the structural analysis S-C-P 'Structure–
Conduct–Performance' paradigm (Porter, 1979; Scherer, 1980). The S-C-P 
paradigm posits that the structural characteristics (e.g. firm size) of the 
industry environment (e.g. munificence, growth, maturity) influence the 
conduct of the firm—such as strategies, investments, financing, 
retrenchment—which in turn determines firm performance. 
 
Top management team (TMT) change and board of directors (BOD) 
The important role that TMT plays in turning around a failing firm from 




(Lohrke et al., 2004). However, the importance, effectiveness and role of 
TMT change as a strategic effort in turnaround situations has not been 
clearly established. Non-routine changes in TMT are often symptomatic of 
declining firms. Managers in poorly performing firms experienced more 
disciplinary pressures to 'shape up or ship out' (Denis & Kruse, 2000). The 
three most common sources of pressure are threat of corporate takeovers, 
board dismissals and shareholder activism (Denis & Kruse, 2000). Gilson’s 
(1989) study of 381 US  exchange-listed firms found 52% of sample 
financially distressed firms experienced TMT change compared to a 19% 
corresponding TMT turnover rate in non-financially distressed firms. Of the 
management changes 21% were attributed to pressures from banking 
institutions (Gilson, 1989). Often the arrival of a new chief executive officer 
(CEO) is perceived to signal change, raised aspiration of change and 
expectations of  better times ahead (Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990). Of the 26 
'sharp-bender' firms studied by Grinyer and McKiernan (1990), 55% had 
changes in their CEO. Singh, Tucker and House’s  (1986b), study of non-
profit Canadian voluntary social service organisations found that CEO 
change lowered organisation death rates. Thain and Goldthorpe’s (1989a) 
study of twenty seven successful turnaround listed Canadian firms found the 
two most important changes in the firms were new management and 
improved controls. They found in 14 out of 19 cases of change in new 
management, change in CEO was the only management change even 
though cause of performance decline was attributable to environmental 
factors. The main reasons given for the change in top management  were: 
‘top management was held responsible for declines; a different type of 
leadership was required; the change was symbolic, signalling to employees, 
suppliers, customers and investors that the firm was taking decisive action 
and the change was a punishment for management mistakes’ (Thain & 
Goldthorpe, 1989a:7,8). 
Despite some empirical evidence that TMT change does bring strategic 
reorientation to declining firms, the question of whether there is a relationship 
between the frequency of TMT change and the chances of successful 
turnarounds in firm performance also remains largely unanswered (Barker, 




effect on the share price of declining firms and market reaction to TMT 
change announcement has produced contrasting results (Sudarsanam & Lai, 
2001).  
On a theoretical level, there are mixed views as to whether a firm’s TMT 
really matters in relation to firm performance. Earlier strategy theorists 
(Andrews, 1971) and ecology theorists (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) believe 
that the environment plays a greater role on the fate and outcome of firms 
than the actions of TMT, as the environment provides the firm’s resources, 
opportunities and contingencies that the firm has to deal with. Pfeffer and 
Salancik  (1978) consider TMT’s role as mainly symbolic and Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) as passive in relation to firm competitive performance.   
However, later studies by other researchers suggest that the characteristics 
and demographics of TMT do affect firm performance. Hambrick and 
D'Aveni’s (1985) match-paired study of the characteristics of 60 large US 
companies’ TMT for the period 1970 to 1982 found that functional orientation, 
technical and academic qualifications, length of executive tenure and the 
number of inside versus outside directors were differentiating determinants 
between bankrupt and successful companies. They found that TMT of 
bankrupt firms was characterised by the presence of a larger number of 
executives with functional orientation in production, process engineering and 
accounting than those with a sales/output orientation in marketing, product 
R&D and sales, shorter executive tenure, fewer outside directors and more 
MBAs and BBAs than those with technical qualifications. Declining firms 
often find it difficult to attract prestigious managers with educational 
achievements and outstanding status to enhance their human capital 
(Becker, 1975; D'Aveni, 1989). These outstanding and well regarded 
managers often confer legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders 
(D'Aveni, 1989). 
Most TMT change research to date focus on the demographics of the TMT 
members but not on the circumstances (Barker et al., 2001) or 'critical 
situational contingencies' (Lohrke et al., 2004:69) which may affect the 




and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) argue that in an external generated cyclical 
industry downturn, which is perceived by stakeholders as not the fault of 
TMT, replacing the CEO and TMT may have dysfunctional consequences. 
The effectiveness of replacing the CEO as a turnaround measure 'will be  
contingent on the extent that top management lacks credibility in the eyes of 
stakeholders' (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995:505).  
Besides the importance of external stakeholders’ perceptions, internal 
stakeholders’ perceptions are also important determinants on the 
appropriateness and success of turnaround efforts. TMT response to 
performance decline is critical. This is because the choice of a particular 
strategy depends on top management’s perception of the causes of the 
decline (Mone et al., 1998).  
Based on causal attribution theory, Barker and Patterson’s (1996) study of 29 
US firms attempting turnarounds between 1975 and 1989 found shorter-
tenured TMTs (i.e. high TMT replacement) displayed a significant tendency 
to attribute causes of firm decline to internal, permanent, stable, controllable 
sources. Long-tenured (existing pre-decline) TMTs displayed a tendency to 
attribute the decline to external industry sources due to preservation of self-
esteem and egos and were slow to react, hoping to ride out the crisis. As 
cited by Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004:29) long tenured TMT’s 'rigidities' in 
response to organisational crisis include 'rigidity and commitment to standard 
practices (Katz, 1982; Miller, 1991), a reduction in information processing 
over time (Keiser & Sproull, 1982; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Staw et al., 1981), 
reliance on increasingly narrow and restricted sources of information 
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991), management cohesion (Michel & Hambrick, 
1992), and entrenchment (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992)'. According to Mellahi 
and Wilkinson (2004:29) such rigidities may cause organisational failure and 
exacerbate the problem.  
Changing TMT may be effective in turning around firm-specific (as opposed 
to industry-induced) declines, which are often the results of misalignment 
with industry trends or a mismatch between core competencies and firm 




(2002) of 29 US firms for the same period revealed that managers who 
attributed the causes of decline to internal rather than external factors were 
more likely to effect entrepreneurial/strategic reorientation rather than 
operational measures. In addition, board of directors’ turnover was found to 
be positively related to the extent of strategic reorientation. Such findings are 
pertinent to the question of when it is advantageous to turnover a failing 
firm’s TMT.  
O’Neill (1986) is of the opinion that TMT change is not a prerequisite to 
successful turnarounds, and TMTs survival and success depend on a 
number of factors like cause of the decline, controllable versus uncontrollable 
factors, (e.g. business cycle 'uncontrollable' or internal causes 'controllable'), 
board composition (e.g. executive dominated board more sympathetic than 
external directors) and industrial idiosyncrasies and norms. Mueller and 
Barker’s (1997) study of the difference in the characteristics of TMT and 
board of directors between non-turnaround and turnaround firms supported 
this view. Their matched-pair study of 66 non-turnaround and turnaround US 
manufacturing firms over a six-year cycle (three years of decline followed by 
three years of recovery), between the sample period 1977 and 1993, 
revealed that CEO duality, board composition, board size, TMT size and TMT 
change were differentiating characteristics. CEO duality aided turnaround 
due mainly to the decision-making speed of the CEO being both the 
chairman and CEO.23 This effectiveness was further enhanced if the CEO 
displayed strong and unambiguous leadership and decision-making style. 
However, a study by Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985) of 21 pairs of 
failed and non-failed US retailing firms for the period between 1970 and 1976 
contradicted some of Mueller and Barker’s (1997) findings. They found CEO 
duality and insider-outsider orientation of boards were not predictors of 
turnaround. So research results are equivocal on the question of TMT 
change being a prerequisite to successful turnarounds. 
                                                     
23 There are currently no restrictions in the Australian Corporations Act 2001 regarding CEO 
duality, although such a practice would not accord with good corporate governance 
principles of the ASX:ASX Corporate Governance Council. 2010. Corporate governance 





Board of directors (BODs) 
Recently, BODs, as the senior component of TMT, have attracted 
considerable interest and attention in academia and practice. The recent 
global financial crisis further heightened this interest, regarding the corporate 
governance role and stewardship role of BODs especially in situations where 
firms suffer lacklustre or poor financial performance. Presently, three over-
arching theories have been used by researchers as backdrop theory in 
relation to TMT–BOD research. The three theories are: agency theory, 
managerial hegemony theory and the resource dependency theory. 
The agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) essentially deals with the conflict of interest between principals and 
agents. Specifically, the principals are owners of the firm (e.g. shareholders) 
and the agents are employee managers. This theory deals with the conflict of 
interest between the personal goals of the employee manager and owners of 
the firm. The personal self interest of the agent (manager), who is hired to 
make decisions for the benefit of the principal (owners), may not always be in 
alignment with the interests of the owners, and he/she may make decisions 
on strategies which serve his/her personal interest rather than those of the 
owners. The agency role of directors refers to the BOD’s 'governance 
function in which directors serve shareholders by ratifying the decisions of 
managers and monitoring the implementation of those decisions' (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000:235). Essentially it is a stewardship/control/fiduciary 
function (Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al., 2000; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In this regard the BOD’s 
fiduciary duty is to protect shareholders’ wealth by acting as a check and 
balance and monitoring mechanism on CEO and management actions and 
decisions by vetoing poor decisions and also assist in creating shareholders’ 
wealth. In failing organizations, Mellahi (2005:263) believes that the BOD is 
‘the last line of defence against management misbehaviour and/or poor 
management decisions’. He is of the opinion that corporate collapse may not 
be caused by a single bad decision but rather from a series of bad decisions 
made by management over a period of time. Accordingly, the BOD as a 




threats against the firm and advise management on actions to take or 
turnaround strategies before the situation deteriorates incrementally out of 
control from performance decline to crisis. A series of strategic errors made 
by a management filled with hubris and narcissism was found to be the 
reason for the incremental decline and eventual collapse of Eron in the US 
(Chatterjee, 2003). ‘The role of the board of directors is to assess the risk of 
each strategy to stop management from gambling away the future of the 
organisation’ especially in declining organizations where management is 
prone to take extra risk ‘in response to threat of failure’ (Mellahi, 2005:264). 
The recent collapse of Australia’s biggest corporate failure that of the HIH 
insurance group brought home the disastrous effect if BODs failed in the 
effective discharge of their stewardship/fiduciary duty (Mellahi, 2005).    
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) seminal article distinguishes the role of strategic 
decision making and its implementation as executive management’s role and 
the decision control of monitoring and legitimising of strategic decisions as 
that of the BOD’s. Flowing from this role, in the interest of shareholders, BOD 
is expected to get rid of members of ineffective TMT, for example, a non-
performing CEO. 
A contrary view is expressed by the managerial hegemony theory, which 
posits that BOD existence as a legal requirement is just to satisfy corporate 
law, that is 'a de jure, but not the de facto governing body of the organisation' 
(Stiles, 2001:628). Under this viewpoint, it is management who runs and 
controls the firm. BOD is ineffective in influencing the strategic decisions of a 
firm. Rather it is internal management who makes the strategic decisions 
without board direct participation as they (BOD) only legitimise or endorse 
the strategic decisions made by corporate management (Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992; Mizruchi, 1983). BOD members are selected or recommended by 
executive management who ensure they (management) retain control and 
dominance of the decision making process (Mace, 1971; Pfeffer, 1972; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Further, the advantage of having day-to-day 
hands-on knowledge of the internal workings of the firm gives the manager 
an advantage over the board. A further argument is that a profitable firm is 




reducing its reliance on external equity capital, and therefore is less reliant on 
shareholders (Mizruchi, 1983). In sum, this viewpoint posits that due to the 
domination of management, BOD is ineffective and passive in addressing the 
inherent potential conflict of interest between the self-serving corporate 
managers and the shareholders (Kosnik, 1987; Vance, 1983). Results of a 
2005 study of the link between board composition and corporate 
diversification in Australian firms by Chen et al., (2009) support the 
managerial hegemony theory and the resource dependency theory. They 
found that 'in 2005, the independence of boards of directors in Australia did 
not have a noticeable impact on corporate strategic decision making process' 
(Chen et al., 2009:218). In relation to the resource dependency theory, they 
found ‘that corporations with interlocking directors with extra-industry ties 
would be more likely to diversify their operations’ (Chen et al., 2009:218). 
The resource dependency perspective posits that the role of directors is to 
provide an avenue to obtain essential external resources (e.g. funds) and as 
a linkage to a firm’s external environment (Boyd, 1990; Gales & Kesner, 
1994;  Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989).  According to this view, the external environment is fluid 
and uncertain and BOD helps a firm to manage and stabilise its external 
dependencies. Firm survival depends on its ability to successfully cope with 
uncertainties, control and procure external resources, and its effective 
exploitation of these essential resources via choice of business strategies 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The Hillman et al., (2000) study of US airline firms 
undergoing deregulation provides support that board composition (e.g. 
insiders, business experts, support specialists and community influentials) 
changes in tandem with environmental change (e.g. from a regulated to a 
deregulated environment) to reflect the changing resource dependence 
needs facing the firm. They found 'during regulation board replacements 
were more likely from the insider (current and former directors)  and support 
specialists (lawyers, bankers, insurance company representatives) category, 
while during deregulation board replacements were more likely to come from 
business experts (current senior officers, directors of other large for-profit 




faculty, members of clergy, leaders of social or community organisations)'—
italics added for clarity—(Hillman et al., 2000:252). 
Using the resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
researchers have been attempting to establish whether there is a link 
between firm performance, BOD size and BOD insider-outsider orientation 
(Alexander, Fennell, & Halpen, 1993; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Goodstein, 
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Provan, 1980). The resource 
dependence perspective posits that the BOD is one of the conduits or 
interfaces that a firm uses to acquire external resources and to reduce and 
control environmental uncertainties (Gales & Kesner, 1994; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). A logical extension is that bigger BOD size enhances the 
firm’s ability to access external resources. Outside directors not only can 
provide necessary skills, access and linkages to capital, information and 
resources but also confer reputation, creditability and legitimacy (Daily & 
Dalton, 1994a ; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) to a firm. 
Thain and Goldthrope (1989b) found Canadian firms enacting turnaround 
made board changes to bring in outside directors with proven business 
expertise. Some research support exist for the BOD-resource acquisition 
proposition (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Zald, 1969).   
Accordingly, resource dependency would suggest that BODs of distressed 
firms would increasingly be an important vehicle to achieve turnaround and 
long-term viability. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999) found BOD 
size and financial performance are positively related for both small and large 
firms and the relationship is more significant for small firms. Pfeffer’s (1972) 
study of 80 large US firms found that BOD size is significantly and positively 
related to firm sales (proxy for size) and firm leverage (debt/equity ratio). In 
addition, he found highly leveraged firms had larger outside director 
orientation and that deviation from the preferred outsider-insider orientation 
affected firm performance. Mueller and Barker (1997) also found board 
composition with higher proportion of outside directors was also a significant 
contributory factor to achieving turnaround. Consistent with the resource 




access to outside skills and capital resources, which were critical to curtail 
the further decline.  
Mueller and Barker (1997) found a mid-size board with five to seven directors 
appeared more effective in a turnaround context. Mueller and Barker (1997) 
found no support for the Agency theory, which posits that outside directors 
would help to contain the opportunistic and self-serving interest of TMT. This 
was because in a turnaround and survival mode context there was a 
congruence of goals (i.e. for the firm to survive) between managers and 
shareholders.  
Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985) found board size and corporate 
failures were related as non-failed firms had bigger boards. However, 
Chaganti et al. (1985) expressed uncertainty as to whether smaller BOD size 
caused decline or smaller size was a consequence of decline as board 
members were likely to abandon the firm as it approached bankruptcy. 
Positive relationship between board size and organisational performance was 
found in a study of 46 non-profit human service agencies by Provan (1980). 
Conversely, large BODs may suffer from slowness and inertia in decision-
making, large group syndrome, and inefficient internal control and 
governance (Walsh & Steward, 1990). Zahra and Stanton’s (1988) study of 
100 Fortune 500 firms between 1980 and 1983 found no association 
between board size and outsider directors ratio with firm financial 
performance. 
The above highlights the fact that BOD and TMT provide fertile ground for 
further research. The relevant theory most used by turnaround researchers 
appears to be the resource dependency perspective as discussed above.  A 
review of BOD literature revealed that, in summary, BOD research to date 
mainly deals with the role of BOD, its demographics and composition (e.g. 
age of directors, composition—inside versus independent/outside directors) 
and their relative effectiveness in relation to firm corporate governance, firm 
financial performance and corporate/business strategy (Baysinger & Butler, 




1994b; Kiel & Nocholson, 2003; Mizruchi, 1983; Pearce  & Zahra, 1992; 
Stiles, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Given the above conflicting research results, this study will assess the 
relative significance of CEO change and BOD size in achieving firm 
performance turnaround in the Australian context.  
This research will examine the relative effectiveness of strategic restructuring 
strategies in achieving successful performance turnarounds. 
 
2.5.3    Financial restructuring strategies 
Poor cash flow and deficiency of liquid (near cash) assets to meet 'debts as 
and when they become due and payable', as defined by the Corporations Act  
(ss 9, 95A, 347A), are often symptomatic of financial distress (Dolan, 1983; 
Murty & Misra, 2004; Poston, Harmon, & Gramlich, 1994). Under accrual 
accounting, profit may not necessarily equate to cash due to the time lag 
between earning (accruing) the income and its cash or cash equivalent 
realization, although generally firms with poor profitability often have poor 
trading cash or cash equivalent reserves. Cash generation policies and 
procedures (e.g. prudent working capital management, that is, increasing 
debtors collection, and optimal inventory levels) are often necessary to 
alleviate financial distress (Yawson, 2004).  
The extant strategy–based literature generally omits or does not consider 
financial restructuring as an important strategy in corporate turnarounds 
when compared to finance-based research and literature (Sudarsanam & Lai, 
2001). Similarly, Hofer (1980:23) is of the opinion that 'in the longer term, 
however, finances will usually take care of themselves if the business is 
healthy in terms of its markets, technology, and production facilities'. 
However, the importance of financial strategies is that they often 'tend to 
provide a short-term solution to performance problems' (Yawson, 2004:6). 
Grinyer and McKiernan’s (1990:138) study of 25 United Kingdom 'sharp-




found that 80% introduced stronger financial controls. The importance of 
strong financial controls in turnarounds is also echoed by Balgobin and 
Pandit (2001). Ofek (1993) found a positive relation between pre-distress 
high leverage and debt restructuring when times were bad. Financial 
restructuring and strengthening financial controls are therefore important 
elements in the repertoire of strategies in corporate turnarounds. 
With reference to capital structure theory and financial economics, financial 
risk relates to the mismatch between business risk and the level of debt 
versus equity in a firm’s capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
Generally, firms with high business risk should pursue lower financial 
leverage (lower debt/equity gearing ratio) as debt interest is a charge against 
profit as opposed to dividend which is an appropriation of profits. The former 
are fixed commitments, which have to be met irrespective of profitability 
whilst the latter need not be paid if there are no retained earnings. Financial 
restructuring strategies, defined as the recrafting/realignment of a firm’s 
capital structure to alleviate cash burn, can be classified as equity-based 
and/or debt-based (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Firms in financial distress 
often experience 'cash burn' (Murty & Misra, 2004), and failure to meet debt 
interest payments. The logical response to alleviate cash flow pressure is to 
increase cash inflow and reduce fixed cash outflow commitments.  
Classical finance theory, as posited by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), 
suggests a neutral relationship between profitability and debt level (i.e. 
financial leverage). They assume perfect capital markets with costless and 
symmetric information. In this 'perfect' environment they show that 
investment decision and financing decisions are independent of the capital 
structure decision. Consequently, a firm’s profitability is not affected by 
changes in its financial decisions and policies. In a real world, this is not 
possible as debt finance carries with it borrowing covenant and risk of 
insolvency if interest and related fixed charges are not met. Debt charges 
and borrowing expenses are charges against profit irrespective of whether 




However, Barton and Gordon (1988:630) found that  corporate strategy and 
managerial behavioural perspective affect the capital structure (debt/equity) 
decision, and when these factors are taken into account they found 
significant negative relationship between firm profit and debt levels. 
Managerial behavioural perspective relates to the desire for flexibility and 
freedom from excessive restrictions and debt covenant that comes with 
borrowing. Profitability provides the avenue to avoid this as its eventual 
realisation into cash provides the internal generated funds to finance the 
business. Although equity finance may dilute ownership control, Weston and 
Brigham (1981) suggest that large firms may use equity financing, as issue or 
placement of additional equity often has little influence on the control of large 
corporations. In this researcher’s opinion such a suggestion will only be valid 
if the firm’s shares (distribution) are widely (dispersedly) held, and such 
dispersed shareholders are not organised into a voting block, for example 
through the mechanism of organised shareholders associations and 
institutional ownership (e.g. superannuation funds) demanding board 
representation. Barton and Gordon (1988:631) found weak or no statistical 
significance to support the hypothesis that firm size is inversely related to 
debt. 
Equity based restructuring strategies include issuing new capital and 
reducing or suspending dividend payout. A firm in financial distress may find 
it difficult to raise additional capital, hence would most likely vary or suspend 
its dividend policy and payout because of cash constraint, debt commitments 
and strategic considerations and restrictions—for example, to appease 
labour unions and creditors (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990). Decrease in 
dividend payout was found to be a significant variable in identifying and 
classifying financially failed firms from non-failed ones (Gentry et al., 1985). 
Also companies that have not reduced their dividends are often seen as 
better performing firms and top managers working in those firms are also 
seen as better managers. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) found that if dividend 
cuts are used as a measure of firm performance there is an approximately 
50% chance that their top executives (chairman, chief executive officer or 
president) are less likely to be sought after for directorships by outside firms 




dividend cuts and policy may have more far-reaching 'ripple' effects than just 
dividend reduction per se. 
Debt based restructuring strategies normally aim to reduce the pressure of 
meeting periodic/recurring fixed debt commitments like interest and/or 
principal repayments. Distressed firms, with their ability to raise additional 
loans curtailed, normally would embark on debt based restructuring (Ofek, 
1993), which may include seeking a moratorium from creditors, refinancing 
with lower interest and repayment, extension of loan term and debt-equity 
swap. Highly geared distressed firms are more likely to undertake financial 
restructuring during performance decline (Jensen, 1989b; Thain & 
Goldthrope, 1989a). Thain and Goldthrope (1989a) found debt restructuring 
alone was not sufficient to successfully turnaround a distress firm although it 
did buy more time for other recovery actions. 
This research will attempt to determine the effectiveness of financial 
restructuring strategies in effecting successful performance turnarounds.  
 
2.6  Timeliness, effectiveness and situational contingencies  
 The timely implementation of any turnaround measure or strategy often 
influences its effectiveness. Often time is of the essence as procrastination 
regarding appropriate actions may exacerbate and accelerate the spiral into 
decline. Prompt, decisive and immediate action is often needed to stop the 
'cash burn'. The severity of the decline often determines the urgency of 
appropriate remedial actions. A study of small (less than 500 employees) US 
firms by  Chowdhury and Lang  (1993:12 & 14) concluded that 'performance 
turnaround is related to the rate of decline' and found that 'firms experiencing 
crisis indeed appear to have more successful turnarounds than those 
experiencing more gradual decline'. This is because crisis decline often spurs 
management into the immediate action of mobilisation of resources, as well 
as remedial action, whilst slow gradual decline often leads to failure to take 




Internal situational contingencies may impact the success of turnaround 
efforts. These include: effective management of external stakeholders’ 
relationship with the firm, internal environment and organizational culture 
(e.g. staff morale), the firm’s internal decision making process, management 
inertia and stigmatization (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Ford & Baucus, 1987). 
'Paradoxically, competitive success itself may trigger organizational decline 
by encouraging complacency' (Lorange & Nelson, 1987:42). Successful 
organizational response to performance decline requires managers to make 
timely adjustments to their 'mental models', being attentive to environmental 
changes and respond with appropriate corporate strategy (Barr, Stimpert, & 
Huff, 1992).  
External and firm specific structural characteristics (e.g. industry and firm 
characteristics) may be related to and affect corporate performance 
turnarounds. Using the structure/conduct/performance framework, Pant's 
(1991) study of turnaround and non-turnaround US firms found that 
turnaround firms are generally smaller in size (measured by log of sales) than 
larger firms and that industry characteristics (heavy investment in research 
and development, level of industry advertising) and low entry barriers are 
influential factors in improving member firms’ operating results.  
This study will consider the effect of timeliness, intensity of efforts and 
severity of decline on the success of turnaround efforts enacted by internal 
firm management. Situational contingency variables of firm size, industry and 
effect of the macro-economy will also be incorporated into the test model. 
 
2.7 Summary and conclusions 
The literature review traces the development and progression of extant 
literature in trying to find a singular definition for 'organisational decline'. It 
found that there is no singular definition, but there is general consensus 
regarding the manifestation or symptoms of organisational decline (Mellahi & 
Wilkinson, 2004). Decline presupposes negativity; that there was a better 




Most of the definitions or perspectives of organisational decline are 
'environment centred' in that organisations run the risk of being in decline if 
they are not successful in adapting to the changing environment in which 
they operate, for example, Cameron et al. (1988), Greenhalgh (1983). Levy 
(1986) sees organisational decline as the result of failure to take heed of 
internal and external warning signs of the need to change, whilst Greenhalgh 
(1983) takes the view of inappropriate response by  the organisation to the 
environment. 
Despite the plurality of organisational decline definitions and viewpoints, this 
research takes an ex post perspective that a firm is in decline if it deteriorated 
from a better pre-existing state of affairs as measured by certain financial 
criteria set out in the following chapter.   
Next, response to organisational decline was discussed in the context of the 
two over-arching viewpoints of the deterministic perspective and the 
voluntaristic perspective of the organisation. The deterministic perspective, 
taken by the disciplines of classical industrial organisation and organisation 
and population ecology, posits that the environment determines the fate of an 
organisation and management are passive actors whose decisions, 
deliberations and strategies enacted are ineffective in influencing 
organisational outcomes (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). The voluntaristic perspective takes the opposite view that the 
decisions and actions of management are important determinants of 
organisational success or failure (Hambrick et al., 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Lohrke & Bedeian, 1998; Lohrke et al., 2004; Szilagyi & Schweiger, 
1984). 
This follows a discussion of the fact that despite the development and 
availability of 'tools of management'—for example, linear programming, 
SWOT analysis, balance score card, five-forces framework analysis, and 
Altman’s Z-score bankruptcy prediction model, to name a few—as diagnostic 





Following on from this, the various types of organisational decline, those of 
sudden decline, gradual decline and lingering decline, as classified by 
D’Aveni (1989)—cf. Argenti’s, (1976)— were discussed. The purpose of this 
discussion is to show that corporate failures may not happen suddenly but 
could be a slow, imperceptible, creeping phenomenon and if an organisation 
does not take heed of warning signs and fails to align or adjust to the 
changing environment it will worsen and spiral into oblivion. 
The literature review then focus on the area of corporate or firm performance 
decline and turnaround. The conclusion here is that despite more than thirty 
years of research since Schendel, Patton and Riggs’ (1976) seminal article, 
there appears no consensus as to what the effective corporate strategies are 
for turning distressed firms around. The present status quo is because there 
is no grand theory or theoretical framework of turnaround to guide empirical 
research—Meyer (1988); Robbins and Pearce (1993); Pandit (2000); 
Chowdhury (2002). Further, there is no generally acceptable definition of 
what constitutes decline, or more specifically performance decline and its 
related measurement. This researcher believes that as the causes of decline 
are multifaceted and multi-disciplinary, there appears to be small likelihood of 
achieving general consensus regarding acceptance of a grand theory or 
theoretical framework and acceptance of a standard performance 
measurement among the research community to guide research. It is this 
researcher’s belief that the above two reasons largely account for the 
contradicting research results to date. Hence, further testing is needed in 
order to identify which turnaround strategies are statistically significant to 
successful turnaround from performance decline and achieve recovery. 
The literature review also discusses the two opposing schools of thought 
relating to performance turnaround, those of 'strategic' versus 'efficiency'. On 
the whole, earlier writers tend to posit that strategic change is a prerequisite 
to achieving recovery (Barker & Duhaime, 1997). However,  Robbins and 
Pearce (1992) are adamant that retrenchment (assets and cost) is needed, at 
least during the initial stage of arresting the decline, irrespective of the cause 




proposition that successful turnaround depends on adopting strategies 
relevant to the cause of the decline.  
Based on a review of extant literature, the various turnaround strategies are 
generically categorised into the three broad categories of: operational 
(efficiency) restructuring, financial restructuring and strategic restructuring. 
Strategies under each of these categories were detailed and discussed. 
The literature review suggests that effectiveness of strategies also depends 
on contextual factors like timing and intensity (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001) of 
turnaround efforts and severity of decline (Hofer, 1980). External and internal 
factors are also relevant situational contingency factors. External factors 
include the state of the general economy and the industry the firm is in. 
Internal factors include: management of external stakeholders’ relationship 
with the firm, internal environment and organizational culture (e.g. staff 
morale), the firm’s internal decision making process, management inertia and 
stigmatization (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Ford & Baucus, 1987) and the role 
of TMT (Lohrke et al., 2004) and BOD. The literature review reveals that test 
results on the effect of situational contingency factors as determinants of 
turnaround efforts have been contradictory. 
Within the context of performance decline and the turnaround process, the 
stage perspective or theory of turnaround (SPT) is discussed in the literature 
review. The SPT is summarised and presented in a diagrammatic form of a 
turnaround clock, which synthesises the urgency of time, the various stages 
a firm goes through from decline to turnaround and the various categories of 
turnaround strategies.  
The applicability of the resource-based view (RBV) in the context of 
performance decline, strategic restructuring and alignment with the 
environment is also discussed. 
From the results of the literature review, the conclusion reached is that 
corporate performance turnaround research is a 'charted but unsettled sea' of 
contradictory test results requiring further testing and confirmation. This study 




decline and turnaround due to its appropriateness to this thesis as managers 
are considered the principal actors enacting turnaround strategies. It will 
utilise the RBV and the SPT as background perspectives in this thesis. It is 




CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
 
3.1 Introduction and chapter outline 
 
The objective of this chapter is to develop hypotheses for testing and 
construct a conceptual model incorporating factors relevant to enacting a 
corporate financial performance turnaround. This chapter is to be read as a 
‘seamless’ chapter with chapter 224. 
 
Section 3.2 develops and discusses the test hypotheses based on prior 
research and extant corporate turnaround literature review of chapter 2. 
Section 3.3 proposes a conceptual model as a theoretical framework for this 
research. Based on the results of the literature review of Chapter 2, 
contributory and determinant factors relevant to corporate firm financial 
performance turnaround are selected and incorporated into the conceptual 
model, which supports the basis for the construction of hypotheses. The last 
section 3.4 concludes. 
 
 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
As mentioned in the literature review of Chapter 2, Schendel, Patton and 
Riggs (1976) were one of the first few to study corporate performance 
turnaround as an academic discipline. Their main proposition is that 
successful turnaround depends on adopting appropriate turnaround 
strategies relevant to the cause of the decline. They distinguish between two 
main causes of performance decline: decline caused by operational 
inefficiencies and strategic decline caused by strategic causes. Operational 
inefficiencies are more of a 'micro' short-term perspective nature and 
strategic causes are more of a 'macro' entrepreneurial long-term perspective 
nature. They recommend that to address the performance decline, 
                                                     
24 Because of the size of chapter 2 both in length and subject content, for easy reading the 




management needs to understand its causes and implement appropriate 
measures (responses) relevant to the causal factors, so that operational 
decline (e.g. resulting from poor operations or bad implementation of a sound 
strategy) needs efficiency improvement action and strategic decline (e.g. 
weak relative competitive position due to poor adaptation to the firm’s 
environment) needs strategic remedies. Accordingly, they recommend a list 
of remedial actions based on the two broad categories of 'strategic cures'—
as responses to performance decline caused by strategic misalignment or 
bad strategy—and 'operating cures' for those caused by operational 
problems or inefficiencies. Hambrick and Schecter (1983) distinguish the 
dichotomy of strategic versus efficiency actions as: 'strategic' turnaround 
deals with 'doing different things' and 'operating' turnaround deals with 'doing 
things differently' (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983:232). The importance of 
identifying the causes of performance decline in order to implement 
appropriate and effective strategies was also echoed by Arogyaswamy, 
Barker and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) and Ford (1985). Inappropriate response 
or mismatch is thought to lead to unsuccessful turnaround or business 
failure. In practice the distinction between the two generic categories of 
strategies is often blurred, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
On a practical level, within the generic dichotomy of strategic versus 
operational strategies, the extant turnaround literature distinguishes and 
categorises turnaround actions into three broad categories: those of 
operational, strategic and financial (Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Sudarsanam 
& Lai, 2001; Yawson, 2004). Teng (2004) distinguishes a fourth category, 
that of cash strategies for firms facing crisis stage decline. This research 
considers that, other than an injection of cash via loans, cash strategies can 
be grouped under the broad category of financial strategies, for example, 
additional cash raised through share or equity related placements. To gauge 
the success or failure of turnaround strategies a measurement construct and 
medium has to be found. 
 
The construct of profitability is often used by researchers as a measure of 
firm business and financial performance (Chakravarthy, 1986). Although 




Rahman, 2005; Woo & Willard, 1983), this researcher, for reasons discussed 
in section 3.3.2, considers 'return on total assets' ('ROTA') as the most 
preferred for this research. According to Walsh (2008) ROTA shows how 
much profit a company is making on the assets used in its business. It 'gives 
a measure of the operating efficiency of the total business' (Walsh, 2008:50). 
 
In the context of corporate turnaround, Harrigan (1980a:22) remarked that 'a 
number of strategies were used during decline; there was no single road to 
success'.  
 
Flowing on from the above—borrowing the notion of cause and appropriate 
response from Schendel, Patton and Riggs and taking note of Harrigan’s 
remark as per above—the following hypothesis is  proposed. 
 
Multiple regression analysis model (MRA) 
 
H1:  ROTA is positively related to the adoption of a combination of 
operational, financial and strategic turnaround strategies. 
 
The reason why the researcher has decided to test ‘a combination of 
operational, financial and strategic turnaround strategies’ as the first 
hypothesis is because of Harrigan’s (1980a) comments that 'a number of 
strategies were used during decline; there was no single road to success'. 
From the results of the tests obtained for H1, the researcher can 
subsequently use stepwise and hierarchical regression analysis methods to 
assess the relative influential power of the various predictor variables 
(strategies) on the dependent variable, ROTA.  
 
The above hypothesis is mathematically represented by the following 
equation. The linear function, below, is based on empirical literature that 
performance turnaround is linearly related to the independent variables 
(Denis & Kruse, 2000; Kang & Shivdasani, 1997; Yawson, 2004). The 





Using ROTA (return on total assets) as the dependent variable we have: 
 
ROTAit = a +βX∆O
X it  +βY∆F
Y it + βZ∆S
Z + Cit + µit  where: 
 
ROTAit, the Return on Total Assets, is the expected performance  indicator 
for firm i in time t, 
 
β’s are beta co-efficients derived by using multiple regression analysis, 
 
Ox it is the xth operating strategy (efficiency improvements) adopted by firm i 
in time t, 
 
Fy it is the yth financial strategy adopted by firm i in time t, 
 
Szit is the zth strategy adopted by firm i in time t, 
 
Cit is the control variable for firm i in time t 
 
µit  is the residual  
 
a is the constant, the vertical axis intercept 
 
 
 Industry effect 
 
Studies in industrial organisation economics and strategy management 
suggest that competition affects firm behaviour and firm financial 
performance (Grant, 2002; Porter, 1979, 1980; Rumelt, 1991). However, 
classical industrial organisation economics (e.g. Bain, (1951)) believes in the 
homogeneity of firms belonging to the same industry, and that the unit for 
study and analysis is the industry as it affects firm profitability, due to the 
collective behaviour of firms restricting rivals, putting up barriers to entry and 
‘tacit collision’ (McGahan & Porter, 2002:834). In summary, the industrial 




firm performance’ (McGahan & Porter, 2002). According to economic theory, 
organisational failure is largely due to adverse effect generated by the 
macroeconomic environment (Schumpeter, 1950).  
 
On the other hand, the study of business strategy posits that the unit of study 
and analysis is the firm, which through good management and adoption of 
appropriate strategy accounts for the variance in firm profitability and not 
industry specific. Grant (2002:68) notes that a firm’s profitability is determined 
by: 'the value of its product or service to customers; the intensity of 
competition and the relative bargaining power at different levels in the 
production chain (italics added)'. Michael Porter’s (1979) 'five forces of 
competition framework' analysis recognises the importance of analysing the 
competitive environment within which a firm operates in as it competes for 
profitability and territorial dominance. Porter’s (1981) main stance is that a 
firm’s performance is mainly affected by the competitive industry environment 
it operates in and such structure influences its conduct, which in turn 
determines its performance (Hoskisson et al.,1999:425).  
 
In the 1980’s, Schmalensee (1985) was one of the first to explore the 
determinants of firm profitability by using the variance decomposition 
methodology, breaking up the variance in firm profitability across business 
sectors into the various ‘components associated with year, industry, the 
corporate-parent and business-specific effects’ (McGahan & Porter, 
2002:834). Schmalensee (1985) found firm effects to be nonexistent or 
insignificant but industry effects on a firm’s rate of return to be significant. In 
addition he concluded that industry effect is more important than managerial 
influences. However, the results of subsequent studies of industry effect 
versus firm effect on firm profitability vary. For example, Rumelt’s (1991) 
study demonstrated that industry effect is negligible on inter-firm return on 
assets, but rather business-specific effects are more pronounced. Also 
McGahan and Porter (1997) found industry effect accounts for only 19% of 
the variance in business unit profitability and that the effect is more 
pronounced in service industry than in manufacturing industry. In a 




cross section of industry, McGahan and Porter (2002) found significant effect 
in the order of business segment effects being the most important, trailed by 
corporate parent effects and then industry effects. However, they made the 
point that industry, corporate-parent and business-specific influences on firm 
profitability are all important and they ‘are related  in complex ways to one 
another in cross section and over time’ (McGahan & Porter, 2002:850). Other 
studies found firm/business-specific effect to be more influential, for example, 
Mauri and Michaels (1998); Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989); Cubbin and 
Geroski (1987); Jacobson (1988); Vasconcellos and Hambrick (1989); Hough 
(2006) and Misangyi et al (2006). In Mauri and Michaels’ (1998) study a two-
tiered effect was found. They found firm effect to be more influential on firm 
performance but industrial level drivers are more influential on core strategies 
proxied by variation in R&D (research and development) and advertising 
expenditures. This tends to lend support to the two opposing schools of 
thought, that of RBV (heterogeneity) and industrial organisation 
(homogeneity), in that resource endowments create competitive advantage 
but firms in the same industry will in the long run imitate core strategies of 
successful firms. Brush, Bromiley and Hendrickx (1999) found that 
corporation and industry do affect business units profitability, but corporation 
effect is more pronounced.  
 
In other cases, results of industry effect versus firm effect vary according to 
firm size and the relative industry position the firm is in. Headd and 
Kirchhoff’s (2009:548) study of small US firms, that is, those with less than 
500 employees, 'could not find evidence that an industry’s overall growth or 
decline has an effect on the volatility of small firms'. Chang and Singh 
(2000:749) found the relative sizes of variance vary according to firm size 
with large firms’ (total sales USD between 121billion and 893 million) 
performance influenced more by business unit effects (47.6%), followed by 
industry effect (19.3%) and corporate effect (9.5%). They found for medium-
sized firms (total sales USD between 892 million to 171 million), the size of 
the corporate effects increased to 27.3 percent, while business effects 
decreased to 8.8 percent and industry effects improved to 40.4 percent. For 




dominate with 54.2 percent of the variance of  market share, while business 
effect stayed at 8.9 percent and corporate effects decreased to 15.8 percent. 
According to them, their results indicate that the pool of resources, which 
confer competitive advantage, resides at firm level ‘which in turn leads to 
higher market shares and higher levels of profitability’ (Chang & Singh, 
2000:750). Following from this, larger firms are organised into more self 
sufficient business units with ‘relative few benefits from resource sharing with 
other units’ (Chang & Singh, 2000:750). Dean, Brown and Bamford (1998) 
also found industry effect influences large and small firms differently. 
Harrigan’s (1980) study of sixty US firms, facing decreasing demand 
environment, found that success depended on the relative competitive 
strength of the firm and the structure of  the industry the firm was in. Tiered 
effect within subpopulations was also found to be relevant. For example, 
Hawawini, Subramanian and Verdin (2003:11) found that ‘on average, 
industry factors have little impact on performance’, but rather asset factors 
do, especially on top and bottom performers in the industry. However, when 
the top and bottom two performers were removed from each industry they 
conclude that industry structure only matters to the average firms, who are 
not top or bottom performer, that is those with ‘average managerial 
capabilities and performance’. On the other hand, McGahan and Porter 
(2003:79) found ‘Industry and corporate-parent effects influence high 
performance to a far greater degree than low performance. Low performance 
is dominated by business-specific effects’. 
 
The varying and equivocal research results of industry versus corporate and 
business unit effect on firm performance may be because of the choice of 
statistical method, and its characteristics, used by the researcher (Bowman & 
Helfat, 2001; Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 1999; Bush & Bromiley, 1997; 
McGahan & Porter, 2002; Ruefli & Wiggins, 2003, 2005). A review of 1125 
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extant studies of the relative significance of industry, corporate and business 
level influence on firm performance by Bowman and Helfat (2001) revealed 
that the dominant  methodology  used by the researchers in the 11 studies 
was the variance decomposition methodology. They found that associated 
with this methodology, the statistical techniques used by the studies were the 
sequential analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the variance component 
analysis (Bowman & Helfat, 2001:3). In addition, the 11 studies used average 
returns in their estimation process in decomposing the variance between 
various effects. This ‘implies that individual corporations need not have an 
identical impact on each of their businesses in order for studies to find a 
corporate effect’ (Bowman & Helfat, 2001:6). Ruefli and Wiggins (2003:864) 
contend that one of the basic reasons for the conflicting results obtained thus 
far is that ‘while sample selection and refinements of statistical techniques 
are important operational issues, efforts to improve the validity of, or to 
resolve conflicts between, findings by refining methods are for naught if the 
results of those method are constrained in their interpretation by the deeper 
contextual assumptions inherent in the methodology’. According to Ruefli and 
Wiggins (2003:864), fundamental to the variance component analysis 
technique is the contextual assumption of ceteris paribus, that is with all other 
factors remaining the same,  of the research context. Whilst this may be valid 
for research in economics, the field of strategic management is often 
premised on the assumption of  ‘management efficacy’ (Ruefli & Wiggins, 
2003:864) in regard to organizational performance. As such, a mutatis 
mutandis model, that is management making the necessary changes, either 
reactively or proactively, to achieve the desired outcome rather than holding 
everything constant or unchanged, is more appropriate. According to them 
managerial actions can influence the performance ranking of firms as they 
improve on their performance against their rival firms, for example by 
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imitating the actions of high-performing firms. Over time their actions will 
produce a positive relationship between firm effect and industry effect. The 
opposite negative relationship between firm effect and industry effect can 
also eventuate as managers try to detach their associations or actions from 
an under or poor performing industry. Such managerial actions over time 
narrow the difference in firm performance among firms. In this regard, 
‘managers have strategic influence on the factors influencing performance’ 
(Ruefli & Wiggins, 2003:877).  Any methodology used in studying the relative 
effect of firm specific, corporate specific and industry specific factors’ effect 
on firm performance should take this system effect on the variable measured 
into account. In this context the adoption of the variance decomposition 
methodology in strategic management research, which assumes ceteris 
paribus may not be valid. Using non-parametric statistical techniques, which 
allow for a mutatis mutandis context, rather than using the restrictive (in 
terms of  structural form and exogenous variable independence assumptions) 
parametric methods used in antecedent research, Ruefli and 
Wiggins(2003:876) did not find industry factor to be significant in affecting 
business segment performance but rather corporate effects did, thus run 
contrary to the SCP (structure-conduct-performance) paradigm.  
 
Subsequently, McGahan and Porter (2005) criticise Ruefli and Wiggins’ 
(2003) assertion of the appropriateness of the mutatis mutandis contextual 
assumption of the non parametric statistical technique over the  ceteris 
paribus assumption of the parametric variance-component analysis (‘VCA’) 
method used predominantly in the determinants of firm profitability body of 
research. McGahan and Porter (2005:874) are of the opinion that the main 
purpose of research in this area is ‘simply to describe the variance in 
performance without any claim about the underlying causal relationships 
between the effects’, and that nowhere in the relevant research literature thus 
far attempts to invoke any underlying contextual ceteris paribus assumption. 
In short, the main purpose of the VCA technique is to report and describe on 
the variances and not making claims about causality (McGahan & Porter, 
2002). Further, they state that ‘the VCA method was adopted only because of 




Porter, 2005:874), and that most current research, in this area, since the mid 
1990s relied on other methods of analysis. Examples of other methods used 
in more recent studies  based on the multilevel analysis methodology, are 
Hough (2006), Hough and White (2003) and  Misangyi et al, (2006) who 
utilised the Hierarchical Linear Modelling technique. Further, the influence on 
performance variances is not the exclusivity of managerial actions and many 
other factors ‘can give rise to industry, corporate, or business-specific effects’ 
(McGahan & Porter, 2005:874). 
 
Ruefli and Wiggins (2005) subsequently wrote a response to  McGahan and 
Porter’s (2005) criticism of their 2003 article (Ruefli & Wiggins, 
2003).Essentially, in their 2005 response, Ruefli and Wiggins went into more 
details the disadvantages of the VCA or ANOVA (analysis of variance) 
technique, which in addition to the ceteris paribus assumption, assumes the 
requirement of statistical distributional normality. According to them, often 
researchers, using parametric statistical technique to which VCA belongs, do 
not explicitly qualify their results that they are valid only under the assumption 
of normal distribution. Further, the violation of the normality assumption may 
be the reason why ‘puzzling’ results are obtained when using the VCA 
technique (Ruefli & Wiggins, 2005:881,882). Despite their differences of 
opinion, both Ruefli and Wiggins  (2005:885) and McGahan and Porter 
(2003:850) all agree that in the area of industry, corporate and business 
segment effect on performance research, it’s time to explore new approaches 
and methodology to further expand our current understanding of this 
important topic.  
 
The inherent weakness of the VCA or the ANOVA technique is the 
assumption of independence of effects, that is the effects do not have 
relationships with each other, which stands contrary to existing theory and 
studies (Bowman & Helfat, 2001; Misangyi et al., 2006). From a strategy 
theory perspective, businesses conduct can be influenced by its competitive 
environment and the industry they are in, and the relationship is a two way 
one and not independent of each other (Porter, 1980, 1981). From a 
research results view point, McGahan and Porter (2002:850) are of the 




related in complex ways to one another in cross section and over time’ and  
‘industry, corporate-parent and business-specific influences are all important’ 
in determining their relative influence on firm performance. If the 
independence condition is breached, the estimation derived by both methods 
will be bias (Brush et al., 1999b)(Brush et al., 1999b). Further, ANOVA 
assumes sequential ordering of effects (McGahan & Porter, 1997), and 
reliability of the results generated by the VCA is questionable (Brush & 
Bromiley, 1997). Misangyi, et al, (2006:573) analysed the results of previous 
studies which used the VCA technique versus those that used the ANOVA 
technique and concluded that the latter ‘appears to produce more stable 
results than does the VCA’.  
 
If firm performance is influenced by managerial strategy and practice, then 
the VCA and ANOVA techniques are found to be lacking in discovering such 
causality effects. This is because the main purpose of both methods is 
descriptive in nature (reports the size of the effect/variance) and only 
captures categorical effects of industry, corporate and business units as a 
whole (Misangyi et al., 2006). They do not examine the causality factors or  
‘management efficacy’ (Ruefli & Wiggins, 2003) that brought about the effect. 
As organisations, including businesses, are ‘hierarchically ordered systems’ 
(Hough, 2006:46) whereby employees in ‘departments are nested within 
divisions, and divisions make up corporations’ (Hough, 2006:46) which are 
nested in industry (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et al., 2006), the cross-nested 
levels of variance are related and needed to be penetrated to investigate the 
underlying influential factors. The deficiency of the ANOVA26 or VCA 
motivates researcher to look for alternative research techniques in order to 
uncover the influence of other underlying strategic influencing factors. The 
more recent studies, for example, Hough (2006) and Misangyi et al (2006) as 
mentioned above, are in this category. Hough (2006) investigated the 
influence on business segment return on assets of a sample of diversified 
and undiversified US firms on a three-level nested basis with year (level 1) 
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nested within business segments (level 2) which in turn are nested within 
cross-classification of corporations and industries (level 3). Hough (2006:59) 
found, ‘corporate effects explain almost four times more variance in business 
segment performance than industry effects (20.2% vs. 5.3%)’. Misangyi et al 
(2006) investigated the influence of industry capital intensity, industry 
concentration, industry munificence, industry dynamism, corporate capital 
intensity, corporate resource availability and business segment size on firm 
performance. Misangyi et al (2006: 587) found ‘the relative importance of 
business unit effects far outweighs those of corporate or industry effects and 
that the latter effects are of similar relative magnitude’ on performance. 
 
The varying research results highlight the debate (Hoskisson et al., 1999) as 
to whether strategy (conduct) affects firm performance (C-P) or industry 
structure (the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) Bain/Mason paradigm) 
(Bain, 1956, 1968; Mason, 1939).  
 
Setting aside the debate on the relative merits of the different research 
methodology, results of studies to date tend to favour the proposition of 
business level effects over industry influence on firm performance. However, 
because of the determinants of firm performance being a multi-faceted 
causal factor effect, and taking note of McGahan and Porter’s (2002:850) 
comments that ‘industry, corporate-parent and business-specific influences  
are all important’ in determining their relative influence on firm performance, 
the following is hypothesised. 
 






Businesses do not operate in a vacuum and their financial performances are 
often subject to the 'ebbs and flows' of the business cycle, which in turn is 




and influencing events are often outside the control of management 
(Schendel et al., 1976).  In a down economy or economic recession one 
would expect general demand to fall off, which would adversely affect 
companies’ sales and profitability as evidenced by the recent global financial 
crisis of 2007 to 2010 (US sub-prime and oil crisis). Logically, one would 
expect that the slowdown in general economic activity would increase the 
propensity of firms to fail (Jacobs , 2009). Recognising this, Altman (1971) 
included the change in gross national product (∆GNP), a proxy variable for 
change in general economic activity, as a predictor variable in his equation to 
forecast change in companies' failure rate.  
 
According to the environmental munificence perspective, a benign 
environment (e.g. a booming economy) is characterised by higher demand 
for products and services (which influences profitability), lower competition 
and easier access to and availability of resources. In such a benign 
environment, one would expect distressed firms’ access to funds and 
resources, and achievement of profitability targets to be easier than in a 
down or recessionary economy, thus increasing the likelihood of a successful 
performance turnaround. According to Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004:23) 
industrial organisation scholars suggest an inverse relationship between firm 
failure rates and resource availability. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
proposed.  
 
H3: The effect of the economy is significant in influencing profitability and the 
likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 
 
 Firm size 
 
The important role that firm size plays as a determinant of firm profitability 
has been mentioned in the literature as early as in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
((Baumol (1967), Hall and Weiss (1967),Gale (1972),Shepherd (1972)). 
Resource dependency perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), as distinct 




firms with more resources than smaller ones are less reliant on external 
resources (Baum & Oliver, 1996). Categories of resources identified by 
classical economic theory (Smith, 1776) are land, labour and capital. Such 
categories of resources have been extended by modern writers to include 
financial resources (debt, equity, cash), physical resources (plant and 
equipment, inventories, land and buildings), human capital, organisational 
resources (systems, organisational relationships), technological capabilities 
(superior production systems, high yielding and low cost) and intangibles 
(technology, reputation, culture, brands, goodwill, intellectual properties) 
(Grant, 2002; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Rasheed, 2005).  
Larger firms are also expected to have more assets to use as collateral 
security to raise additional funds to weather a downturn in operating 
performance, and generally are able and better equipped to more readily 
access capital markets (White, 1989) and have greater market power (Bain, 
1956). Sudarsanam and Lai (2001:189) note that larger firms are more able 
to negotiate and restructure debt more effectively than smaller ones. 
Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) remarked that the deterministic view of the firm 
in relation to organisational failure posited by the proponents of classical 
industrial organisation studies and organisation ecology—for example, 
(Sutton, 1997); (Hannan & Freeman, 1984)—is that size does matter as 
small firms have higher failure rates than larger ones. Small firms are less 
able to attract and retain better qualified and skilled staff, and have higher 
administrative costs (Aldrich & Auster, 1986).  
There is a tendency for firms to over exploit their resources (Pandit, 2000), 
which will lead to organisational stress and if not corrected (e.g. through 
replenishment from external sources via equity or debt funding) can lead to 
organisational distress and eventually decline and demise.   
Larger firms are no exception in over exploitation of resources, but because 




arrangements. If the amount and availability of free assets27 is an important 
determinant in distinguishing between recovered and non-recovered firms—
and if larger firms have more resources, hence more free assets—then firm 
size would prima facie be an important variable in influencing the probability 
of firm performance recovery. Despite this logical deduction, research results 
regarding firm size being a determinant of performance turnaround have not 
been unequivocal. Sudarsanam and Lai (2001:196), Barker and Mone 
(1998), Casey et al. (1986) and (Pant, 1991) did not find firm size to be a 
significant factor in turnaround whilst Campbell (1996:25) found recovered 
firms are generally larger in size. Smith and Graves (2005) found larger firms 
are more likely to enact successful recovery. But Pant (1991) found 
turnaround firms are generally smaller in size than non-turnaround firms. 
Small firms’ response and turnaround efforts are also observed to be 
different from larger firms’ in enacting performance turnaround (Rasheed, 
2005). Rasheed‘s (2005) testing of 68 small owner/manager US firms found 
that perception of past financial performance and availability of resources 
affect owner/managers’ response to adopt strategic (growth) turnaround 
actions as opposed to retrenchment. He found that irrespective of the 
owner/managers’ perception of high or low past financial performance or 
resource availability, the entrepreneurial spirit of the owner/manager often 
spurred him/her on to adopt growth strategies over retrenchment. Chowdhury 
and Lang (1996) found that there is a preference by smaller firms to enact 
operational efficiency measures to achieve performance turnaround rather 
than strategic entrepreneurial changes due to lack of slack resources and 
restricted access to additional funding, which creates the urgency to achieve 
cost reduction as quickly as possible to stem the cash burn. This is in line 
with Sudarsanam and Lai’s (2001:189) comments that 'certain strategies 
such as acquisition and divestment are more appropriate for larger than 
smaller firms'. This implies that larger firms have the flexibility and more 
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internal slack resources to use both efficiency and strategic measures to 
achieve turnaround. However, testing of the effect of firm size on the 
likelihood of achieving turnaround has not been conclusive. For example, 
Sundarsanam and Lai (2001:196), Barker and Mone (1998) and Casey et al. 
(1986) did not find firm size to be a significant factor in turnaround whilst 
Campbell (1996:25) found recovered firms are generally larger in size. Smith 
and Graves (2005) found larger firms are more likely to enact successful 
recovery. In view of the inconclusive test results but leaning towards logical 
deduction, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H4: The likelihood of a successful turnaround is positively related to firm size.  
 
 
 Operating efficiency improvement strategies 
 
Operating efficiency improvements are: short-term revenue generation, cost 
cutting and asset reduction strategies (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Hofer, 
1980). These efforts are principally designed with the objectives to give fast 
relief on cash flow and to achieve operating profitability within a short space 
of time. Chowdhury and Lang’s (1996) study of turnaround in small firms 
concluded that operational efficiency efforts are more pertinent to small firms 
than large firms who can more afford big picture strategic manoeuvring (e.g. 
diversification, new markets, divestment, acquisitions). Their study, in 
general, supports the research and findings of Robbins and Pearce (1992), 
(1994); Hambrick and Schecter (1983); Bibeault (1982) and Slater (1984) 
regarding the effectiveness and importance of efficiency improvement efforts 
in successful turnarounds. It should be noted that whilst Hambrick and 
Schecter’s conclusion has more relevance to businesses in mature 
industries, where room for strategic domain/market manoeuvring is restricted 
or limited, Robbins and Pearce’s overarching conclusion is that, irrespective 
of the cause of the performance decline, retrenchment and cut backs are the 
necessary initial stage laying the foundation for recovery. Therefore, the 





H5 : Operational restructuring strategies—that is, efficiency improvement 
efforts—are more effective in achieving financial performance turnaround 
than strategic and financial restructuring strategies.   
 
  
 Intensity and timely execution  
 
According to Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) swift, intense and timely execution 
of turnaround strategies is needed to successfully turn a financially 
distressed firm around. Superficial cost cutting may not be sufficient to stop 
the bleeding of cash. Cost cutting has to be deep and swift to be effective, 
and 'very significant change in operating efficiency and overall strategy 
appears necessary to break out of the inertia of earnings decline' (Schendel 
et al., 1976:10). Proper implementation of strategies rather than the content 
of strategies is considered important in turnaround situations (Barker & 
Mone, 1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Hoffman, 1989).  
 
Timeliness (i.e. early intervention) is important. Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) 
found timeliness and intensity of efforts have to go hand in hand to be 
effective. Accordingly the following hypothesis is proposed.  
 
H6: Intensity of efforts and timely execution of turnaround strategies are 
positively related to the likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 
 
 Employee retrenchment (lay-off) 
 
Between the choice of minimising cost and increasing sales, cost is a more 
'definite' variable to manipulate as it deals with the current status quo rather 
than an expectation of the future as in the case of trying to increase sales. In 
a down economy, increasing sales may be difficult because of falling or 
depressed demand. In simple terms, profit is defined as revenue (sales) 




minimisation of cost presents an attractive (and arguably) easier option to 
increase short-term operating profit.  
 
The cost of human capital or resource is often one of the largest items on an 
organisation’s profit and loss account. It is therefore very attractive to CEOs 
for firms enacting turnaround strategy to slash salary and wage related cost 
to increase operating profit. Robbins and Pearce (1994) are unequivocal that 
irrespective of the cause of performance decline, cutbacks or retrenchment of 
costs and assets remain the foundation of business turnaround, especially in 
the initial stage of recovery, which they have termed the 'retrenchment stage'. 
More specifically this stage entails fast pay back strategies like liquidation 
and divestment of unprofitable activities or business segments, ways to 
improve operational efficiency, product elimination and head count cuts 
(Robbins & Pearce, 1992:291). They believe that such retrenchment 
activities will facilitate stemming the decline and stabilise the firm before it 
embarks on the second stage—which they term the 'recovery stage'—and 
which entails strategies with a long-term focus like 'market penetration, 
reconcentration/segmentation, new markets, acquisitions and new products' 
(Robbins & Pearce, 1992:291). 
 
Another important aspect of Robbins and Pearce’s findings is that the 
severity of performance decline dictates the degree or extent of 
retrenchment. Within this, they found 'cost retrenchment was significantly 
associated with success across all levels of situation severity; and the 
'relationship between asset retrenchment and performance was significant 
only among firms in severe turnaround situations' (Robbins & Pearce, 
1992:304).28  
 
Retrenchment may be context specific, that is, in different turnaround 
context, in the case of small firms (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996) and firms in 
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matured industries (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). Castrogiovanni and Bruton 
(2000) found retrenchment did not have a significant effect on performance in 
a post-acquisition context. Hidden cost and resistance to severe cost 
reductions (e.g. extent of unionised workforce) may hinder the effectiveness 
of such actions (Slater, 1984). This is especially so in Australia due to work 
union representation and involvement and the new Fair Work Australia 
legislation. Francis and Desai (2005:1219) found that their results did not 
support Robbins and Pearce’s (1994) main assertion that retrenchment is 
essential for every firm in need of a turnaround. Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan 
(2003:522) remark that ‘one of the most controversial aspects of turnaround 
research in the West is the topic of retrenchment (e.g. Hambrick and 
Schecter, 1983)‘.  
 
Given the controversy regarding retrenchment as a necessary turnaround 
tool for successful recovery, further testing is needed. Barker and Mone 
(1994:403) remark that retrenchment is a wide term and that 'we lack the 
knowledge base to predict accurately which particular retrenchment 
strategies and practice promote recovery'. It should be noted that Robbins 
and Pearce’s ‘retrenchment’ term, as discussed above, is a much wider term 
than just retrenchment of employees, which is just one of the cost cutting 
items. As employee retrenchment is topical within the context of distressed 
firms and turnaround, it is selected here for testing. Often, in most firms, 
especially in service firms, it is one of the large expense items affecting firm 
profitability. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 




 Severity of performance decline 
 
Severity of decline has been found to not only affect the type of turnaround 
remedial actions needed for successful turnaround but also the likelihood of 




preposition that severity of decline dictates the type of appropriate remedial 
action or 'gestalts'. If the decline is severe—defined as operating 
performance results way below break-even profitability—then revenue-
increasing or asset reduction strategies are more effective, whilst cost cutting 
efforts are more effective if the decline is less severe, that is, operating 
performance result close to break-even profitability level.  Robbins and 
Peace (1992) contends that the extent of retrenchment depends on the 
severity of the decline. Francis and Desai (2005:1218) found that the severity 
of decline in terms of its magnitude rather than the suddenness of the decline 
contribute more to the likelihood of a non-recovery.   
 
Using UK data, Smith and Graves (2005) found that the severity of distress 
was statistically significant in influencing the success of performance 
turnaround in that firms in severe distress were less likely to recover. Hence, 
the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 




 Free assets 
 
The RBV of the firm posits that firms derive competitive advantage over their 
competitors because such firms possess certain resources which are 
valuable, scarce, inimitable and non-substitutable (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). However, possession of such resources per se doesn’t 
confer that advantage but rather, the utilisation and exploitation of them via 
'formulating and implementing a strategy that exploits the unique features of 
each firm’s collection of resources and capabilities' that produces higher 




these scarce, valuable and inimitable resources that enables a firm to 
achieve rents29 (Penrose, 1959:54).  
 
The literature suggests that there is an optimal growth rate for the firm, which 
is a balance between exploitation of existing resources and development of 
new ones (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; Wernerfelt, 1984). There is a 
tendency for firms to over exploit (e.g. through over diversification) the 
resources they possess. The over exploitation may result from 
entrepreneurial (i.e. risk taking) activities which the firm has embarked on to 
earn entrepreneurial Schumpeterian rent (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 
1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rumelt, 1987; Schumpeter, 1934). Such 
over exploitation of resources by a firm often leads to financial distress, 
whereby its cash resources are depleted to finance operating and expansion 
activities, leading to the difficulty of not being able to pay debts and 
commitments as and when they fall due. In accordance with the resource 
dependency, a distress firm will look for free (unencumbered) assets to act 
as collateral for additional funding (e.g. bank loans). Therefore, subject to 
meeting financiers’ loan serviceability requirements, it is logical to assume 
that the quantum and accessibility to funding would be directly dependent on 
the amount of free assets that a firm possesses. Additional funding helps 
alleviate cash flow problems and, when put to good use, helps financial 
performance turnaround.  
‘Free assets’ refer to unencumbered or unpledged assets which are not 
provided as collateral to banks or financial institutions to secure firm funding 
arrangements. From an accounting perspective the amount of free assets is 
generally defined as excess of assets over liabilities. The amount of free 
assets is important when a firm in financial distress seeks to alleviate its cash 
flow problems by looking for alternative sources of funding. A financially 
distressed firm, with its ability to access the equity market greatly restricted 
by its predicament and public perception—as indicated by its poor performing 
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share price—will pursue debt raising strategies if it has sufficient free assets 
to pledge as collaterals for loans.  
Research evidence indicates that the amount of free assets is statistically 
significant in distinguishing between successful turnaround firms and those 
that fall by the wayside of liquidation (Campbell, 1996; Casey, McGee, & 
Stickney, 1986; Routledge & Gadenne, 2000), thus providing support for 
White’s (White, 1984, 1989) model proposition of free assets being an 
important determinant between distressed firms that successfully recovered 
and those that failed. Smith and Graves (2005) found recovered firms 
generally have more free assets. Accordingly the following hypothesis is 
proposed. 
 
H9: The likelihood of a successful performance turnaround is directly related 
to the amount of free (unencumbered) assets that a firm has.  
  
To operationalise the above equation and testing of hypotheses, the following 
conceptual model serves to provide the theoretical construct and framework 
for this research. 
 
 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1   Development of a conceptual model. 
 
 
There is no general consensus regarding what constitutes financial distress. 
In a general sense, 'distress' is defined by the Australian Pocket Oxford 
Dictionary' (1996:315) as '1. anguish or suffering caused by pain, sorrow, 
worry, etc; 2. lack of money or comforts; poverty'. The application of the 
phrase 'in distress' in a corporate financial context would generally mean a 
lack of money or in danger of not being able to meet a firm’s financial 
commitments, and in the long run would endanger its economic sustainability 





Decline is the precursor to distress and eventual failure. Most researchers 
and writers would agree that the symptoms of decline include decreasing or 
depletion of internal firm resources over time (Altman, 1968; Cameron et al., 
1988; D'Aveni, 1989). According to D’Aveni (1989) declining firms display 
declining resources in the two critical areas of finance and human resources. 
Symptoms of depletion of finance resources include worsening liquidity, 
decreasing profitability and borrowing capacity (drop in credit rating) due to 
increasing leverage (Altman, 1968). Symptoms of decreasing human 
resources refers to the decreasing number of prestigious managers 
replenishing the firm’s human capital stock (D'Aveni, 1989).  
 
Gilson (1989:243) defines financial distress as 'an inability to meet the fixed 
payment obligations on debt. Within a given year, a firm is financially 
distressed if it is in default on its debt, bankrupt, or privately restructuring its 
debt to avoid bankruptcy'. The Corporations Act (ss 9, 95A, 347A) adopts an 
extreme view of the term by defining financial distress (insolvency) as the 
inability to pay one’s debts as and when they fall due. 
 
Despite the singularly narrow view adopted by the above-mentioned 
legislation, in reality there are various degrees of financial distress 
experienced by a firm. Altman distinguishes between the various degrees or 
types of financial distress—those of failure, insolvency and bankruptcy 
(Altman, 1971). 'Failure' according to Altman is when a firm fails to achieve 
an adequate return on its capital. 'Insolvency' is closely akin to the definition 
adopted by the Corporations Act as described above. The ultimate of 
financial distress is when a firm files for bankruptcy in the American context, 
whilst in Australia the directors of a financially distressed firm can seek to 
have the firm go into voluntary administration as described in Chapter 2. 
 
Financial distress is symptomatic of performance decline. In reality a firm can 
be in performance decline for a number of years and if unattended to, can 
slip into insolvency. A review of extant literature regarding firm performance 




definition and measurement of what constitutes performance decline (Pandit, 
2000; Pretorius, 2009; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).  
 
Most researchers and writers have adopted a temporal measurement of what 
constitutes performance decline and a successful turnaround. Schendel et al. 
(1976) use four consecutive years of decreasing profits to represent 
performance decline and four consecutive years of profit improvements to 
represent a successful turnaround. Yawson (2004) uses one year of a firm’s 
positive industry adjusted operating performance (i.e. EBITDA/TA, earnings 
before interest, tax and depreciation divided by total assets) followed by a 
substantial decline in operating performance the following year to represent 
performance decline (performance shock) and a recovery period of 
significant operating performance improvements for three years following the 
distressed year as turnaround recovery. Sudarsanam and Lai (2001:188) in 
their study define a distressed firm as one that has 'a minimum of one year of 
negative Z-scores after two consecutive years of positive Z-scores' (Z-score 
refers to Altman’s Z-score) and successful turnaround is measured by two 
positive Z-score years following the distressed year. The above are some 
examples to illustrate that there is no universally acceptable performance 
measure or threshold for performance decline and the amount of time 
required for turnaround.  
 
It is this researcher’s belief that it is difficult to obtain universal agreement on 
the question of performance measurement and turnaround time frame 
because of the multiplicity of influencing factors—for example, firm size 
(Bibeault, 1982), severity of decline (Hofer, 1980), matured business 
(Hambrick & Schecter, 1983) to name a few. Despite these difficulties, 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983:235) are of the opinion that 'a systematic study 
of turnarounds should articulate criteria for decline and upturn, even though 








3.3.2    Business Performance: Return on total assets 
 
 
The subject of 'Business Performance' is of particular interest to 
management academic scholars and practitioners. Indeed, the common 
recurring theme in the study of business strategy is 'performance'. However, 
there appears to be no general agreement on what constitutes 'business 
performance', as evidenced by the proliferation of literature on this subject 
matter. The concept, definition and measurement of 'business performance' 
has been the subject of academic debate (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 
1986).  
 
Profitability is often used as a benchmark to gauge financial performance and 
strategic performance (Chakravarthy, 1986:440). The measurement adopted 
for a firm’s profitability varies from researcher to researcher. For example, 
Woo and Willard (1983) identified 14 quantitative measures of performance  
used by researchers and noted that measurements of performance in terms 
of profitability rank high in their factor analysis of the 14 performance 
measurement variables.  
 
Researchers often used financial ratios to operationalise the measurement of 
profitability in their test models. Hossari and Rahman’s  (2005:325) analysis 
of financial ratios used by 53 corporate collapse studies using multivariate 
approach for the period from 1966 to 2002, found that of the 48 financial 
ratios used, 'only five out of 48 financial ratios have been found useful in 
more than one quarter of the relevant literature'. The five ratios are: NI/TA 
(net income divided by total assets), CA/CL (current assets divided by current 
liabilities), TL/TA (total liabilities divided by total assets), WC/TA (working 
capital divided by total assets) and EBIT/TA (earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets). Of the five financial ratios, two relate to the 
measurement of profitability, that is, NI/TA and EBIT/TA.  
 
This study adopts EBIT/TA (renamed Return on Total Assets, ROTA) as the 
dependent variable in the test model because of its usefulness, 




financial databases. Return on assets essentially shows how much profit a 
company is making on the assets used in its business. It 'gives a measure of 
the operating efficiency of the total business' (Walsh, 2008:50). Campbell 
(1996), Routledge and Gadenne (2000), and Casey et al., (1986) found that 
the 'profitability’ variable is statistically significant in discriminating between 
bankrupt firms that recovered and non-recovered ones. These three studies 
use return on assets as a measure of profitability. Pinches, Eubank, Mingo 
and Caruthers’ (1975) analysis of 48 financial ratios with respect to their 
predictive power found earnings before interest and tax divided by total 




3.3.3    Turnaround strategies: Operational, financial and strategic   
 
The question of whether efficiency improvement measures (termed 
operational strategies) are more effective in turning around a distressed 
firm’s financial performance or 'big picture' changes (termed strategic or 
entrepreneurial efforts) has been the subject of much academic debate. 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983:232) refer to the dichotomy of turnaround 
strategic efforts as 'doing different things' and operational efforts as 'doing 
things differently'. 
 
Robbins and Pearce (1994) are of the strong opinion that efficiency-oriented 
strategies like retrenchment, down-sizing and cut-backs are important in 
laying the foundation of performance turnaround irrespective of the cause of 
the decline. This is contrary to earlier literature and research showing that 
successful remedial turnaround efforts depend on adopting appropriate 
actions in accordance with an understanding of the cause of the performance 
decline (Schendel et al., 1976). The Robbins and Pearce’s (1994) 
retrenchment proposition is contrary to the views expressed by Barker and 
Mone (1994), that strategic change is necessary and indeed retrenchment 
and cut-backs diminish the firm’s capacity and exacerbate further decline. 




support the 'efficiency' school of thought. Large sample testing by Hambrick 
and Schecter (1983) of 260 US mature industrial product business units also 
supports efficiency-oriented moves as more successful and faster in 
achieving profit improvement and turnaround. Efficiency improvements, cut 
backs and investments in technology are found to improve profitability, which 
leads to increase in spare resources, which assists a firm to turnaround 
(Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani, 1997).   
 
Financial strategies have often been given less prominence in extant 
strategy-based literature as being instrumental in corporate turnarounds 
when compared to financed-based literature (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). 
Hofer (1980) believes that in the longer term, a firm’s finances will take care 
of themselves if other sections of the firm, (e.g. markets, technology, and 
production facilities) are in order and performing.  A financially depressed 
firm often experiences cash flow problems in that it has difficulty in meeting 
debt (e.g. loan interest payments) and operating commitments (e.g. creditor 
payments) as and when they fall due. In Australia, in practice, one of the first 
signs of a financially depressed firm is if it is unable or having difficulty 
meeting tax payment obligations—for example, PAYG (pay as you go) and 
GST (goods and services tax)—within legislated deadlines. Often funds set 
aside for tax obligations are spent in meeting operating commitments. 
Grinyer and McKiernan’s (1990:138) study of 25 'sharp-benders' companies 
found that 80% of them introduced stronger financial controls. Ofek (1993) 
found a positive link between pre-distress high leverage level and debt 
restructuring when times are bad. Chowdhury and Lang’s (1993:14) study of 
US small business firms found that recovered ones have higher debt to 
equity ratios. They conclude that the reason for their recoverability is due to 
their ability to increase their liquidity through external sources of financing. 
Financial restructuring strategies, defined as the recrafting or realignment of 
a firm’s capital structure to alleviate cash burn, are either equity-based or 
debt based (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001).  
 
Equity based strategies comprise of issuing new capital (e.g. quasi-equity 




suspending dividend payout. Most firms in financial distress find it difficult to 
raise new capital, and will most likely suspend or cut dividend payments. 
Gentry et al. (1985) found decrease in dividend payout to be a significant 
variable in identifying and classifying financially failed firms from non-failed 
ones.  
 
Debt-based financial restructuring strategies aim to alleviate or reduce the 
pressure of meeting periodic/recurring fixed debt commitments like loan 
interest or principal repayments. Distressed firms with their ability to raise 
additional equity capital or raise additional loans curtailed or greatly 
diminished normally would embark on debt based restructuring (Ofek, 1993). 
According to Jensen (1989a), highly geared distress firms are more likely to 
restructure during performance decline. 
 
 
3.3.4    Distress and Recovery 
 




A firm is financially distressed or suffers performance decline if it satisfies the 
following conditions: 
1. if it descends into having a negative net income (EBIT) at the end of any 
financial year (the distress year) preceded by three consecutive years of 
positive net income, that is, pictorially the '+++-' rule,  
and 
2. with a quick ratio, (CA-IN)/CL (current assets-inventory)/current liabilities) 
less than one at the end of the distress year. 
 
The first criterion of negative net income (loss of earning power) is often 
symptomatic of early incubation period of financial distress  (Fitzpatrick, 
1934). The use of the unscaled EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Tax) 




EBIT is not 'polluted' by other special items like income tax expense and 
minority interest. 'It is a cleaner measure than earnings of the productivity of 
operating assets (e.g. EBIT/total asset)' italics added (Barber & Lyon, 
1996:364). 
 
The second criterion often signifies the firm may have a cash flow problem, 
which is a symptom of financial distress or sickness (Murty & Misra, 2004). 
The use of the quick ratio in preference over the cash flow variable is 
because 'CA' includes other current items like short-term investment deposits 
and near cash or convertible to cash items, for example trade debtors can be 
factored to finance companies to provide the much need cash flow. Casey 
and Bartczak (1985:395) found 'that operating cash flow data do not provide 
incremental predictive power over accrual-based ratios' in predicting financial 
distress. Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (1985) found that using only cash 
flow ratios from operations did not adequately classify financially non-failed 
from failed firms. 
 
The variables of EBIT (and its variant) and CA/CL (and its variant) ratio are 
popularly used by researchers of corporate collapse and turnaround (Hossari 
& Rahman, 2005). 
 
 
 Severity of decline 
 
The cognitive school of thought maintains that the characteristics of decline 
trigger management to take remedial action (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). The 
characteristic of decline normally refers to the severity of decline, which is 
defined as threat to going-concern viability. Under this theory, firms in severe 
decline or crisis are more willing to take drastic action to turnaround than 
those experiencing lesser degree or slow, creeping, imperceptible decline 
(Chowdhury & Lang, 1993). Slow decline is often a common precursor of 
failure to turnaround (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). Firms in severe decline 
(brink of bankruptcy) are considered to have less options due to the severe 




decline have more choices of turnaround strategies, which may range from 
increased marketing efforts to entering into a new niche market or domain 
(Lohrke & Bedeian, 1998). Robbins and Pearce (1992) found that it is harder 
for  firms in severe decline to turnaround. 
 
In this research, performance decline is severe if the pre-decline year’s EBIT 
differs from the distress year’s EBIT by a negative 10% or more. This 
'theoretically grounded performance floor' is consistent with Barker and 
Mone’s recommendation (1994:403). Severity of decline may affect the 
urgency, pace, timing and type of remedial action (Hofer, 1980; Sudarsanam 
& Lai, 2001). Firms in severe decline are more likely to change strategy 
(Schendel et al., 1976). 
 
 
 3.3.5   Recovery: effectiveness of turnaround 
 
In this research model, decline and recovery have been uniquely and 
conservatively defined to include the three performance factor areas as 
adopted by Bird and McHugh (1977) and generally accepted as an indication 
of a firm’s financial health (Van Horne, 1977). The choice of the following 
variables is based on Pinches, Eubank, Mingo and Caruthers’ (1975) 
analysis of 48 financial ratios as predictors of financial performance 
constructs. Amongst the 48 ratios examined, Pinches, et al. (1975) found 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets (EBIT/TA) to be a 
significant predictor of return on investment, a profitability construct; debt 
divided by total assets (LTD/TA) to be a significant predictor of financial 
leverage and current assets divided by current liabilities (CA/CL) to be a 
significant predictor of short-term liquidity. 
 
The three performance factor areas are:  
(i) Operating efficiency: profitability improvement (ROTA) 
(ii) Financial leverage: improvement in slack financial resources (LTD/TA) 





Effectiveness of turnaround strategies is measured by satisfying the following 
criteria at the end of the two-year period following the distress year: 
 
• Return on Total Assets (ROTA) > than the yield (risk free rate) of 
a three-year Australian Government bond at time t,  
and 
• improvement in the depletion of slack financial resources (SFR) 
to sustain normal operation measured by CA/CL >=1 with a 
decrease in LTD/TA where LTD=long-term debt and TA=total 
assets30 
 
Using an objective benchmark rate of return (Australian Government bond 
rate) is consistent with the six-month US treasury notes recommended and 
used by Barker and Duhaime (1997:22). Other researchers also support the 
use of a generally accepted risk-free bench mark rate as a measure of a 
firm’s long-term viability (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003; Lohrke, Bedeian, & 
Palmer, 2004; Pandit, 2000; Porter, 1980). 
 
Improvements in SFR (‘slack financial resources’) are as per Lohrke, 
Bedeian and Palmer’s recommendations (2004:82). Barker and Duhaime 
(1997) found that declining firms, in trying to survive, accumulate more debts 
before turning around (due to depletion of SFR). Singh (1986:567) refers to 
slack resources as either absorbed 'excess costs in organisations' or 
unabsorbed 'uncommitted, liquid resources in organisations'. Internal 
financial resources are considered important as they not only provide funds 
for investments but also 'slack cash to cover short–run cash crisis' (D'Aventi, 
1989:578). SFR and its availability act as a buffer, that ‘can give a firm time 
to respond appropriately to decline and provide it with the capabilities and 
                                                     
 
30
 The slack financial resources, ‘SFR’, construct adopted here, in the main, follows that 
found in finance and management literature. A discussion of ‘Improvement in SFR’ is found 
in the following paragraph. It is not intended by the researcher to add the two measures of 
current ratio and long term debt /total assets to get a composite score for each of the firm in 
the sample, but rather improvement in slack resources for a sampled firm is taken to be the 






resources to achieve a successful turnaround’ (Francis & Desai, 2005:1206). 
It provides the financial resources—for example, working capital, cash, 
inventory, or access to credit—for the firm to draw on or realise so that it can 
meet its obligations as and when they fall due and act as a necessary 
cushion for the implementation of recovery strategy (Barker & Duhaime, 
1997; Francis & Desai, 2005; Francis & Mariola, 2005). Depletion of slack 
financial resources constrains flexibility and the ability to effect strategic 
change or remedial action (Barker & Mone, 1998).  Following on from the 
above, it is logical to assume that declining firms with SFR staging a 
turnaround have a better chance of achieving success than one that has 
limited or no SFR.  
 
It should be noted that from the above discussion SFR not only refers to the 
firm’s existing excess physical resources but also the firm’s unused 
borrowing capacity to gain access to credit and loans. The latter often 
depends on the amount of existing debt (financial leverage) and 
uncollateralised/unencumbered (‘free’) assets a firm has. It is argued that 
here that firms with higher financial leverage and few free assets will have a 
lower capacity to access credit and loans than firms who are lowly leveraged 
and have more free assets. So in this sense, the concept of SFR, financial 
leverage and free assets are inextricably linked in the literature.  
 
Following from the above discussion, slack financial resources have been 
measured in extant turnaround and finance literature as: 
 
• firm’s debt to asset percentage (Stickney, 1990); 
• 1-[(long-term + debt in current liabilities/total assets) x 100] (Francis & 
Mariola, 2005); and 
• Cash + short-term securities+0.5(inventory)+0.7(accounts receivable) – 
short-term loans (Cleary, 1999:680);  
 
The extent of recovery is measured by the percentage differential of ROTA 




the two years/second financial year end reporting period post-distress. The 
two-year period of either recovery or failure is consistent with that adopted by 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) and Chowdhury and Lang (1996). Accordingly 
to Bibeault (1982) the recovery time frame depends on firm size and ranges 
from one to three years. 
 
Intensity of recovery actions and strategies 
 
Borrowing from Sudarsanam and Lai (2001), this is measured by the amount 
of  cash or expenditure incurred on the activity as a percentage of  pre-
distress year total assets. 
 
 
3.3.6    External contextual contingencies and influencing factors 
 
External environmental and firm-specific factors influence the success or 
failure, that is, effectiveness, of turnaround strategies (Arogyaswamy et al., 
1995; Barr et al., 1992; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; 
Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). External environment relates to the state of the 
general economy as one would logically expect that if the economy is on a 
downward trend then company failures would rise. Firm-specific relates 
mainly to firm size. Altman (1971), in trying to predict change in company 
failure rates, believes that the change in corporate failure rates is a function 
of change in GDP (economy effect), change in stock market index (stock 
market sentiment effect) and change in money supply (general credit 
squeeze). For example, equity raising may not be a viable option if the 
economy is depressed, in decline or in a 'bear' stock market (i.e. depressed 
stock market). Similarly, if the industry is in a down cycle, realisation of asset 
sales may be sub-optimal as potential buyers will be scarce. 
 
Pant (1991) applied the structure/conduct/performance framework as a 
backdrop in his research to identify whether structural firm and industry 
characteristics are discriminating factors that characterise turnaround versus 




larger firms and that some industry characteristics are more conducive to and 
facilitate performance turnaround and recovery of member firms. Such 
industry characteristics are those with low entry barriers, high R&D 
investments and lower advertising/sales ratio (as proxy for entry barriers) , 
which often characterise a competitive environment in which newer or 
smaller firms are able to compete with established rivals. He found that 
turnaround firms suffer more difficulties than non-turnarounds. The main 
reason given is that crisis often spurs firms on to initiate immediate 
turnaround initiatives faster than those suffering less severe non-crisis 
performance decline. In summary, industry characteristics can influence 
performance recovery and turnaround. 
 
Flowing on from the above comments, the following control variables are 
included in the model to cater for the external and internal contingency 
factors. 
 
Control environmental variables 
 
Industry effect:  
 
This is proxied by the change in industry median Return on Total Assets  
(ROTA) between the distress year and end of two years/second financial 
year end reporting period post-distress that the firm belongs to, as per the 




This is proxied by the rate of change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
post-decline years, and is calculated as ∆GDP= (GDPdy2-GDPdy)/GDPdy. Per 
Bibeault (1982:85) improved economic conditions account for 16% of 
turnarounds. Altman (1971) used change in GDP as one of the predictor 










The proxy control variable for firm size is the firm’s market capitalisation of its 
equity in the pre-decline year. This technique was used by Sudarsanam and 
Lai (2001:189). Firm size may dictate the effectiveness of turnaround 
strategies—for example, larger firms are often in a better bargaining position 
to source for cheaper cost of funds and anecdotally have more slack 
resources than smaller firms. Hence, 'firm size is a proxy for both the 
flexibility and internal slack available to the declining firms' (Sudarsanam & 
Lai, 2001:189).   
 
The use of market value for firm size overcomes any common variance or 
collinearity with ROTA book value. Collinearity refers to the 'expression of the 
relationship between two (collinearity) or more (multicollinearity) independent 
variables' (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010:156). Multicollinearity 
among ratios distorts the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables, resulting in test results being misleading and sample-
sensitive (Chen & Shimerda, 1981:59).  
 
Further, Chen and Shimerda (1981) advised that because of the danger of 
collinearity when using financial ratios, which are often generated from the 
same book value from the firm’s financial statement, it is important to 
minimise the number of ratios to represent each factor or construct for 
statistical analysis. Similar warnings are sounded by Horrigan (1965).  
 
The logarithm of total assets or total assets is commonly used by researchers 
to measure firm size (e.g. Yawson, (2004); Routledge & Gadenne, (2000); 
Tan & See, (2004); Haveman, (1993); Chen et al., 2009); Kelly & Amburgey, 
(1991)). As this research uses return on asset, proxied by earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets as the dependent variable, it is 
considered more prudent to use a market-determined measure (i.e. firm’s 




total assets) to measure firm size in order to minimise the risk of collinearity 
or multicollinearity in the statistical test model.  
 
Flowing on from the above discussion, a conceptual model diagram, as 
shown in Figure 3, is used to form the basis for the development of a test 
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                                                                  STRATEGIES 
 
 
3.4        Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter sets out to develop a conceptual model to act as a 
framework for testing the various hypotheses listed above. All constructs 
and hypotheses are theoretically justified and explained. The next chapter 
deals with the methodology used to test the hypotheses. 
Figure 3. Conceptual model diagram 
Note. Source: adapted from Smith and Graves (2005) and amended for this 





















































CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1      Introduction and chapter outline 
 
The objective of this chapter is to operationalise the conceptual model of 
Chapter 3 by describing and explaining the methodology used in this 
research. For clarity, operational definitions of terms used in this research are 
defined and explained. Theoretical rationale underpinning the independent 
variables is set out in easily readable matrix format. This chapter also 
describes data collection, sampling procedures and data preparation before 
testing. 
 
Section 4.2 of this chapter discusses the justification for the ontological 
paradigm chosen by this research. Section 4.3 defines and explains the 
operational definitions used in this research. Section 4.4 deals with the 
measurement of constructs. Section 4.5 sets out in matrix format the 
theoretical rationale underpinning the independent test variables. Section 4.6 
explains the decision rule used by this researcher in distinguishing between 
operational strategies and strategic actions. Section 4.7 sets out the 
statistical  methodology used and the various test models. Section 4.8 
discusses the nature and attributes of the research data. Section 4.9 
describes the data collection, sampling method, sample selection and sample 
attributes. Section 4.10 provides justification for small sample size.  Section 
4.11 demonstrates and validates the effectiveness of the financial 
performance selection rule of '+++-' by using non-parametric Wilcoxon-signed 
rank T test on the financial characteristics of the sample firms, three 
consecutive years prior to distress compared to their financial characteristics 
in the distress year. As Multiple Regression Analysis assumes normality, 
section 4.12 normalises the firm size variable as a data preparation 
procedure before testing. Section 4.13 discusses the treatment of missing 
data values and outliers. Section 4.14 discusses rigour in the context of this 




4.2       Theoretical perspective 
 
Justification for the ontological paradigm chosen. 
 
A researcher views the world/reality through certain perspectives or 
ontological lenses, via assuming an objective/positivist or 
subjective/constructivist stance. The positivist research paradigm assumes 
that reality can be objectively determined as it exists (i.e. being) apart from 
the researcher, is singular and can be comprehended, observed and 
measured (Creswell, 1994:5; 2003). The constructivist research paradigm 
takes the view that reality is constructed by people in their effort to 
understand and interpret the events and experiences of this life world 
(Creswell, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Therefore multiple realities exist 
among the researcher, the subject individual under the study and the reader 
interpreting the results of the study (Creswell, 1998).  
 
The philosophy of reality is one of 'becoming' in the case of a constructivist 
paradigm rather than 'being' as in the case of the positivist paradigm. The 
ontological ('what is knowledge') assumption taken by the researcher 
determines the epistemology ('how we know it') adopted, which is either 
empirical (for the positivist ontology) or interpretative (for the constructivist 
ontology) (Creswell, 1994; 2003:6; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Following from 
the above assumption, research methodology takes different paths, that of a 
quantitative methodology, for the positivist ontology—and that of a qualitative 
one, for the constructivist ontology (Creswell, 1994). Research methodology 
can also take a mixed paradigm of both.  
 
Methodology relates to the process of how one is to perform the research 
whereby facts are gathered, collated, categorised, reviewed, interpreted and 
analysed (Remenyi, Williams, Money, & Swartz, 1998). In short, Creswell 
(1998:75) refers to methodology as 'the process of research'. In a qualitative 
methodology the researcher normally uses inductive logic to capture the 
'multiple realities' of the informants regarding a phenomenon and develops 




advance of the research' (Creswell, 1998:77). A quantitative methodology 
uses deductive logic to form, in advance, hypotheses from relevant extant 
literature, existing empirical findings or from a known premise and has the 
hypotheses tested (e.g. for statistical significance). The main purpose of a 
quantitative study is to enable a predetermined hypothesis to predict, explain, 
and understand a certain phenomenon  (Creswell, 1994). 
 
A qualitative methodology is not considered appropriate for this research as a 
firm’s financial distress is often a phenomenon couched and treated with 
extreme confidentiality and sensitivity by the subject firm’s management or 
the failed entrepreneur owner. A qualitative study would be fraught with the 
difficulties of locating the 'errant' manager, who most likely would have left 
the firm for greener pastures. The results of a qualitative methodology would 
be seriously biased, as the present management would most certainly blame 
the previous one for all the 'woes' that the firm had suffered. Social 
psychology cognition attribution theory suggests that people have cognitive 
biases with a tendency to credit their own success to internal factors (e.g. 
own skill and capabilities) whilst attributing failures to external factors—for 
example, outside their control, unfair, too difficult, et cetera (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991). Research studies support such human traits and failings—for 
example, Wagner and Gooding (1997); Huff and Schwenk  (1990). Hence, 
people’s recollection of events and construction of meanings attaching to 
events and multiple realities may skew the truth of what actually happened. 
The methodology of collecting data via interviews and/or questionnaire will be 
logistically made difficult resulting in distortions, half truths and ‘retrospective 
reporting biases’ (Shepherd, 2005:126). 
 
It is envisaged that the phenomena of financial distress, performance decline 
and recovery are real processes and can be objectively observed and 
measured. Following Mone et. al (1998), this research adopts the definition 
and measurement of organisational decline expounded by Cameron, Kim 
and Whetten (1987a:224): a depletion and decline of an organisation’s 
resources, that is, 'Organisational decline is a condition in which a 




over a specified period of time' and that it 'refers to reduction of resources 
within the organisation itself. The environment may or may not have 
changed'.  Flowing on from this definition, 'The most common procedure to 
measure decline is to subtract levels of resources at time one from levels at 
time two' (Cameron et al., 1987a:223). Accordingly, the variables in Table 2 
in this chapter are measured on a 'change' basis between time dy (distress 
year) and dy2 (post-distress). Hence, a positivist research paradigm has 
been adopted here. Data for this research is sourced from the public domain. 
 





4.3       Operational definitions 
 
a)  Financial distress: is the risk of insolvency or the threat 
of 'going concern' viability when a firm has difficulty in its 
ability to 'pay its debts as and when they become due and 
payable', as defined in the Corporations Act (ss 9, 95A, 
347A). A prolonged period of financial distress without 
remedial efforts to turn it around often leads to business 
failure when a firm ‘involuntarily becomes unable to attract 
new debt or equity funding to reverse decline; 
consequently, it cannot continue to operate under the 
current ownership and management’ (Pretorius, 2009:10). 
In the Australian context, directors of financially distressed 
firms can file for voluntary administration under the 
Corporations Act whereby the firm and its business will be 






b) Organisational decline and Performance decline: a firm 
is said to experience organisational decline if it 
experiences deterioration in its ability to utilise its 
resources sufficiently to achieve viability and 
sustainability (Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987; 
Lohrke, Bedeian, & Palmer, 2004). Cameron, Kim & 
Whetten (1987:224) define organisational decline as a 
‘condition in which a substantial, absolute decrease in 
an organisation’s resources base occurs over a 
specified period of time’. 
 On the other hand, performance decline is a 
consequence or manifestation of organisational 
decline. Pretorius (2009:10) defines a firm in 
performance decline ‘when its performance worsens 
(decreasing resource slack) over consecutive periods 
and it experiences distress in continuing operations. 
Decline is a natural precursor in the process to failure’. 
Performance decline may be as mild as a performance 
shock or severe, threatening the viability of the firm 
(Pretorius, 2004, 2009). Severity is often measured in 
quantifiable terms. For example , Hofer (1980) views 
severity of decline as distance from a firm’s breakeven 
profitability level. Situations requiring turnaround can 
include firms earning less than their cost of capital 
(Hambrick, 1985) or organisations not meeting 
performance expectation of their stakeholders, 
analysts, vendors and employees. (Kow, 2004). 
‘Performance decline’ and its severity in this thesis 
refers to financial performance decline. 'Performance 
decline' is operationalised as satisfying the conditions 





b) Performance turnaround: a firm is said to have had a 
‘turnaround’ or adequately recovered from a 
performance decline or firm-threatening survival/crisis 
when it reverses that decline and achieves improved 
financial performance and profitability. (Gopal 1991; 
Robbins and Pearce 1993; Barker and Duhaime 1997; 
Lohrke, Bedeian et al. 2004). ‘Performance turnaround’ 
is operationalised in section 3.3.5. 
 
d) Top management team (TMT) and chief executive 
officer (CEO): Barker and Barr (2002:966) define 
TMT as the 'executive leadership that initiates and 
directs strategic reorientation and includes two basic 
groups of leaders, the TMT and the board of directors 
(BOD)'. The top operational representative of the 
TMT is the chief executive officer (CEO) or managing 
director (MD). The CEO or MD is the person who has 
significant authority over operational management 
and is often responsible for the profitability and 
strategic direction of the firm. Results of empirical 
research on strategic change and top management 
team lends support to the above-mentioned 
definitional functional role (Westphal & Fredrickson, 
2001). 
 
In regards to CEO, Barker and Barr believes that 'the CEO would have 
causal attributions that were most representative of the TMTs beliefs' (Barker 
& Barr, 2002:969). However, there is no standardisation as to the proxy 
variable to represent top management, as the variable used in research 
studies varies from research to research. Top management has also been 
variously defined in studies as  CEO, president and chairman of the board 




(Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992; Mueller & Barker, 1997), CEO and board of 
directors (Barker & Barr, 2002), and directors (Daily & Dalton, 1995; Thain & 
Goldthrope, 1989b). Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991:434) define the CEO as 
'(typically) portrayed as someone who has primary responsibility for setting 
strategic directions and plans for the organisation, as well as responsibility for 
guiding actions that will realise those plans'. Given this role definition, this 
research defines a 'CEO' as someone who bears the title of CEO, managing 
director or chairman. Accordingly, any incidence of change in any of the 
above-mentioned will be considered as a change of CEO. The variable 'CEO' 
in this research has been used as a proxy to represent the construct, TMT.   
 
e) Return on Total Assets (ROTA): This is defined as: 
ROTA = Earnings before interest and tax / Total assets  
ROTA is a key measure of a company’s profitability, equal to a fiscal year’s 
pre-tax earnings divided by its total assets.  
 
Although the independent variables are generically annotated, this research 
will penetrate below the 'level of generics' by examining the impact and 




4.4      Measurement of constructs 
 
 Operational, financial and strategic restructuring efforts 
 
Consistent with the approach adopted by turnaround researchers (Bibeault, 
1982; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Sharma & Mahajan, 1980), 
managerial turnaround efforts are observable through the indicators of the 
independent performance variables in Table 1. These are categorized into 
three broad categories of: operational restructuring, financial restructuring 





Following Chowdhury and Lang (1996), operational efforts will be 
represented by retrenchment and plant level reduction variables and strategic 
moves by revenue-generation variables and divestitures. The financial 
performance indicators will be statistically regressed.  
 
In Table 1, the first column marked ‘Strategy’ the descriptive item in italics 
beneath it serves to describe the area of interest. In the second column 
marked ‘Area’ the specific independent variable is selected for testing. For 
example, ‘Down-sizing/cost cutting’ is the categorical descriptor area of 
interest and ‘Employee retrenchment’ is the selected independent variable. 
That is, employee retrenchment is only one of the many ‘down-sizing/cost 
cutting’ efforts a firm can undertake in attempting turnaround. Column three 
headed ‘Variables’ sets out the formula for calculating the independent 
variable chosen for testing. The ‘average’ is the mean of the reported closing 















Source: developed for this research 



















(Average employee numberdy2 less Employee 
numberdy) / Employee numberdy  
 
where dy2= two years or  second financial year 
end reporting period post dy and dy=distress 
year. 
 











(Average cash received asset salesdy2 / 
Average gross book value of assetsdy2)  – 
(Cash received asset salesdy / Gross book 














change relative to 
sales 
 
(Average inventorydy2 / Average salesdy2 ) – 






(Average dividend paid or provideddy2 / 
Average net after tax incomedy2 ) – (Total 























(Average total debtdy2  / Average total share 
capital and reserves dy2) – (Total debt dy / Total 
share capital and reservesdy) 
 
(Average EBITdy2 /Average borrowing costdy2) – 
(EBITdy / Borrowing costdy) 
 
Financial leverage + Debt cover 
 
(Average placement proceedsdy2 / Average 
contributed capitaldy2) – (Placement proceedsdy 











4.5      Theoretical rationale under-pinning the independent variable 
 
The following Table 2 explains the theoretical rationale underpinning the 










Dummy equals 1 if new CEO in dy, dy1 or 











(Average BOD size post-distress years ) – 



















Dummy variable equals 1 if new business 
acquired, and/or new geographical or 
industry segment entered into in dy, dy1 or 
dy2, otherwise  0 
 













Dummy variable equals 1 in dy, dy1 or dy2 if 




Table 2 Operational variables rationale matrix 
 






































( Average employee numberdy2 less Employee 
numberdy ) / Employee numberdy  
If employee numbers are available. 
where dy2= two years or  second financial year 
end  reporting period post dy and dy=distress year 
  
EBPC 
If employee numbers are missing  
 
(EBPdy2 less EBPdy  ) / EBP dy 
 
Firms make provision for employee benefits (e.g. 
annual leave and long service leave) in their 
accounts. This provision is calculated based on 
the number of employees and their pay rates. Cost 
of staff lay-off (retrenchment) is normally paid out 
of this provision. Large movement (e.g. decrease) 
in the provision account normally would imply staff 
lay-off.  
 
Efficiency improving cost cutting measures are 
recommended as quicker in yielding results than 
entrepreneurial oriented measures (Hambrick & 
Schecter 1983; Robbins & Pearce 1992; Pearce 
and Robbins 1994). Chowdury and Lang (1996) 
found small size firms rely more heavily on 
employee efficiency rather than newness of plant 
& equipment as an important determinant in 
performance turnaround due to lack of slack 
resources. Large matured firms also found 
efficiency measures yield faster results in short-
term turnarounds (Hambrick & Schecter 1983). 
 
The lay-off variable measures the magnitude of 
employee retrenchment in post-distress years as a 
proportion of distress year’s total employee 
number.  
















































( Average cash received asset salesdy2  / Average 
gross book value of assetsdy2  )  – ( Cash received 
asset sales dy  / Gross book value of assetsdy ) 
 
Asset sales by a declining firm often increase the 
firm’s focus on remaining productive assets resulting 
in improved performance as the firm disposes of its 
surplus/unproductive/non-synergistic assets (John & 
Ofek, 1995). For firms operating far below 
performance break-even (severe case), Hofer (1980) 
recommends asset reduction measures. The much-
needed cash from realisation of asset sales often 
provides additional working capital (slack resources) 
resulting in cash flow relief and reduction of financial 
leverage (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996:175; Yawson, 
2004).  
 
Expressing proceeds from asset sales as a 
proportion to gross book value (cost) of assets gives 
an indication of the extent of asset sales carried out 
by declining firms. Increase in asset sales in 























































(Average inventorydy2 /Average salesdy2) – 
(Inventorydy / Salesdy ) 
 
Slow moving inventories tie up working capital 
(slack resources). Therefore reducing inventory 
level releases much-needed cash, decreases 
inventory carrying cost and interest expense 
(Chowdhury & Lang 1996). This variable is an 
'efficiency in the usage of working capital' proxy, 
as by expressing the numerator inventory in 
relation to denominator sales it is an indicator of 
the extent inventory is turning over relative to 
sales. A lower ratio should indicate more 
efficient inventory and working capital 
management and conversely, higher inventory 
sale conversion rate. 
 
The recovery years dy2 versus distress year dy 
effect gives an indication of inventory reduction 










































( Average dividend paid or provided dy2  / Average 
net after tax incomedy2 ) – (Total dividend paid or 
provided dy / Net after tax incomedy)  
 
Oflek (1993:29) found highly-leveraged firms 
when experiencing short-term distress (one year 
profitable followed by distress year)  were more 
likely to respond quickly in an operational sense 
to  implement actions like restructuring assets, 
laying off employees and 'financially, through 
dividend cuts, debt restructuring and bankruptcy'. 
Reducing or suspending dividend payout is part 
of equity based restructuring strategies carried 
out by financially distressed firms (Sudarsanam & 
Lai, 2001:187). DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s (1990) 
study of 80 financially distressed New York Stock 
Exchange listed firms during 1980 to 1985 
revealed that despite the absence of binding debt 
covenants, managers are often reluctant to omit  
dividend payments, but rather to reduce them, 
especially if the firm has a long dividend paying 
history. They found declining firms cut dividends 
aggressively and rapidly when responding to 
financial distress and 'some dividend reductions 
may be strategically motivated, for example, 
designed to enhance a firm’s bargaining position 


































Gentry, Newbold and Whitford’s (1985:160 & 
156) matched-pair study of 33 failed and non-
failed US firms for the 12-year period 1970 to 
1981 found 'the dividend funds flow component 
was a significant variable in the failed/non-failed 
classification' and that 'the smaller the relative 
dividend component, the higher the probability of 
failure'. Although dividend reduction or omission 
may be a consequence of decline, the variable 
dividend/net after tax income has been included 
to discover any other motivations or strategic 
reasons that may account for the difference in the 
dividend policy of successful and unsuccessful 
turnaround firms and its relative 
effectiveness/impact on the probability of 
turnaround.  
 
Dividend paid or provided / net after tax income 
measures the proportion of available profit that is 
distributed (conversely the proportion of profits 
retained). So change in the resultant variable 































































(Average total debt dy2  / Average total share capital & 
reserves dy2) – (Total debtdy  / Total share capital & 
reservesdy) 
 
This ratio, variously referred to as 'financial leverage', 
'financial gearing' or 'debt-to-equity', measures the 
proportion of debt in a firm’s capital structure (Gilson, 
1989:244). Per Pfeffer (1972:224) it is a proxy 
measure of a firm’s 'need for access to external 
capital markets'. Hossari and Rahman’s (2005:324) 
formal ranking of 48 financial ratios used in modelling 
financial collapse in 53 studies, between 1966 and 
2002 inclusive, revealed that the financial leverage 
ratio of total liabilities/total equity was popularly found 
useful in 23% of the studies. Barker and Duhaime 
(1997) found in their study that declining firms had 
high debt levels before turning around as they 
accumulate more debt (due to scarce financial 
resource depletion) in trying to survive. Depletion of 
scarce financial resource places constraints on the 
ability to embark on strategic moves, which are 
generally 'big ticket items'. Yawson (2004:22) found 
firms that are able to lower their financial leverage via 
asset sales proceeds and had 'conversion of debt to 
equity instruments experience performance 
improvements' due to lowering of interest cost. Oflek 
(1993:28 & 29) found in a study of 358 US firms 
experiencing short-term distress (defined as 'one year 
of normal performance followed by one year of 
extreme poor performance'), 'highly–leveraged firms 
react faster to a decline in performance than do less-
leveraged companies' due to debt-influenced/imposed 
discipline. The lower the resultant ratio, the lower the 
firm’s financial risk profile. 
 
By comparing average gearing in recovery years to 
































































( Average EBITdy2  /  Average borrowing costdy2 ) – ( 
EBIT dy / borrowing cost dy  ) 
 
This ratio measures the number of times earnings 
cover borrowing cost (interest expense) and is a 
profitability/leverage servicing indicator (Sharma & 
Mahajan, 1980). Generally, all things being equal, the 
higher the ratio the better the ability of the firm to 
meet interest payment. Interest are fixed 
commitments and are charges against profit 
irrespective of whether the firm makes profit, whereas 
dividends are appropriation of profits which need not 
be paid if the firm has no or insufficient retained 
earnings. Declining firms normally would embark on 
debt-based restructuring strategy  to avoid or solve 
financial distress (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). A debt–
based restructuring transaction is one  'where a firm's 
debt contracts are amended on one of the following 
terms: (i) promised interest or principal payments are 
reduced; (ii) the debt’s maturity is extended; or (iii) 
creditors are given equity in the firm (securities 
convertible into common stock) '(Gilson, 1989:245).  
 
Lowering of interest commitments results in an 
increase in the debt servicing coverage ratio, 
indicating an improvement in the firm’s ability to 
service fixed debt commitments from its earnings. 
 
The resultant differential of this variable gives an 
indication of the magnitude in the improvement in a 
firm’s debt servicing ability in the recovery years 





                                                     
31 For parsimony due to the specified limitation of the MRA technique of the number of cases to 
number of independent variables, the two variables are added together by using the SPSS 
compute/ transform/add facility. The theoretical rationale is that both relate to the debt gearing 
construct. A Pearson two tailed correlation test  between the combined variable COMLEV and 
the Debt cover variable revealed significant correlation at the p<0.01 level. 











































Leverage + Debt cover 
 
As the two debt variables attempt to measure the same 
gearing construct, the two variables are combined for a 
more effective measure of a firm’s indebtedness 31. 
 
(Average placement proceedsdy2 / Average 
contributed capitaldy2) – (Placement proceeds dy / 
Contributed capital dy) 
Extant literature tends to pay little attention to this 
strategy on the basis that a firm in distress is 
handicapped in its ability to raise additional equity 
capital. However, such a stance tends to forget that 
equity instruments can be placed out to private 
friendly or sympathetic parties. 
 
The recent global financial crisis bore this out in that 
firms in their effort to repair their sheets, the values 
of which were destroyed by the recent financial 
crisis, used the financial markets to place out share 
instruments for additional capital (Mitchell & Ciampa, 
2009; Stanton, 2009).  
 
The success of such an exercise depends on the 
state and sentiment of the financial market and the 
firm’s degree/severity of financial distress.  
 
Change in this variable indicates an increase (+) or 












































Dummy  equals 1 if new CEO in dy, dy1 or dy2, 0 
otherwise (Yawson, 2004) 
 
 
Gilson’s (1989:246) study of 381 US exchange-
listed firms found 52% of sample financially 
distressed firms experienced TMT change 
compared to a 19% TMT turnover rate in non-
financially distressed firms. Similarly, Grinyer and 
McKiernan’s (1990) study of 26 'sharp-benders' 
found 55% had changes in CEO. Arrival of a new 
CEO, acting as new change agent (e.g. strategic 
change (Barker & Duhaime, 1997:33)), often 
raises expectations of better (and changing) times 
ahead when perceived by external (e.g. 
shareholders and financiers) and internal (e.g. 
employees) stakeholders. Empirical evidence 
tends to suggest that there is a positive 
correlation between changing CEO, revenue 




















   





(Average BOD size 2 post-distress years) – 
(Average BOD size three pre-distress years) 
 
Mueller and Barker (1997:129) in their study of 33 
matched-pair US manufacturing firms for the 1977 to 
1993 period found 'that non-turnaround firms were 
more likely to have boards that were either too large 
or too small in the critical years of responding 
decline'. They found in the second year, turnaround 
firms that are most likely to recover had BOD sizes 
of five to seven directors. A matched-pair sample 
study by Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985) of 
42 US retail firms for 1970 to 1976 found BOD size 
and corporate failures are related with non-failed 
firms having larger BODs. This variable is derived 
from a head count of the number of directors as 
reported in a firm’s published annual report. 
 
A negative (-) score for this variable indicates a 
decrease in BOD size since distress year. 















































Dummy variable equals 1 if new business 
acquired, and/or new geographical or industry 
segment entered into in dy, dy1 or dy2, otherwise  
0. 
 
Strategic reorientation or change is needed if a 
firm’s problems are caused by strategic 
misalignment with its environment and markets 
(Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Hofer, 1980; 
Schendel et al., 1976). 'Domain–changing 
actions' may include going into new 
geographical and/or product segments (Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997:25). 
 
Product market diversification and geographical 
diversification are often the two representative 
dimensions of corporate strategic change 
mentioned and operationalised in extant strategy 
literature and related empirical research 
(Boeker, 1997; Kim, 1989; Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 2001).  
 
As segment reporting is mandatory for ASX 
listed firms, this variable is to capture 'domain-
changing' or reorientation actions taken by firms 
attempting performance turnarounds.  
 
Acquisition of new businesses is one of the 
turnaround strategic moves by declining firms in 
an attempt to effect strategic change or 
reorientation (Barker & Duhaime, 1997). This 
may include acquisition of firms or business 
'competing outside or within historical lines of 
business' (Barker & Duhaime, 1997:25). 
 
Other than capturing new business acquired this 
dummy variable also serves to capture 'domain-
changing actions' (Barker & Duhaime, 1997:24 
&25) like joint-venture, co-opetition, mergers and 
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(Average net salesdy2  – Net sales dy) / Total 
operating revenuedy2) 
 
Sales are the 'forerunner' or prerequisite to 
profitability. Agenti’s (1976) analysis of  business 
failures concluded that the inability to generate 
profit and high leverage were among the main 
symptoms of  failure. The 'sales' variable was used 
as a primary indicator for testing of strategic change 
represented as 'revenue-generating strategy' and 
'product/market refocussing strategy' in Hambrick 
and Schecter’s (1983:236) turnaround study of 260 
US matured industrial product business units in the 
mid to late seventies. Hence, sales growth is often 
used as a performance indicator linked to strategic 
change/revenue generating activities (Chowdhury & 
Lang 1996:173) 
 
The resultant ratio is an indication of how much of 
the post-distress years’ total operating revenue is 
































Dummy variable equals 1 if divestment in 
dy,dy1 or dy2, otherwise 0. 
 
According to Bowman and Singh (1993:6) 
corporate restructuring 'involving mainly 
organisational structure change is often 
accompanied by asset disposal or 
acquisition'. Barker & Duhaime (1997:25) 
refers to strategic change or reorientation as 
'domain-changing' actions. Bibeault‘s 
(1982:243) survey of 81 US turnaround 
company chief executives found that the 
frequency of using 'divestment of operating 
divisions' and 'divestment of substantial 
operating assets' as asset-redeployment 
strategies was 57% and 31 % respectively. 
 
Denis and Kruse (2000:420 & 415) found in 
their study of 350 large US firms with assets 
greater than USD100 million for the period 
1985 to 1992 that 'asset restructurings are 
linked with subsequent operating 
improvements' and positive share reaction 
to asset restructuring announcement. This is 
possibly because of selling off least 
profitable assets. Grinyer and McKiernan’s 
(1990:140) study of 25 UK 'sharp-benders' 
revealed that sample firms frequently retract 
to well-understood/familiar core business via 
business closures (50%), sale (45% ) or 
harvesting of weaker businesses (5%).  
 
The expectation is that divestment will be 
statistically significant from the results of the 







4.6      Research context decision rule 
  
Strategic versus operational moves   
 
This section seeks to explain the thinking used by this research to distinguish 
between whether a strategy adopted by a firm is 'strategic' or 'operational'. It 
discusses the distinction between the two based on existing extant turnaround 
literature. In practice the distinction between the two may be difficult to 
differentiate—for example, closing a branch versus closing a whole operating 
division. Hence, this chapter attempts to develop some workable decision rules 
to facilitate the conduct and performance of this research.  
 
Strategic change or reorientation is often referred to as 'domain' changing action 
(Barker & Duhaime, 1997:25.) and is often accompanied by 'corporate 
restructuring' (Bowman & Singh, 1993) activities when a firm attempts to 
respond, align and adapt to external environmental changes (Ginsberg, 1988; 
Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997). According to Prahalad and Hamel (1993:77), 
'"being strategic" implies a willingness to take the long view and "strategic" 
investments are those that require a large and pre-emptive commitment of 
resources—betting bigger and betting earlier—as well as a distant return and 
substantial risk'. 
 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983:232) refer to the dichotomy of turnaround 
strategic efforts as 'doing different things' and operational efforts as 'doing things 
differently'. Identifying the causes of performance decline is important in order to 
implement effective turnaround strategies (responses) (Schendel et al., 1976). In 
practice the distinction between strategic—sometimes referred to as 
'entrepreneurial'—versus operational or efficiency improvement measures may 
be 'blurred' and not easily identifiable32. According to Snow and Hambrick 
                                                     
32 The dichotomy of 'strategic' versus 'operational' turnaround actions may sometimes be difficult 




(1980), firms facing external challenges or pressures often adjust rather than 
change their strategies. Overall, strategic change or reorientation is expensive 
as it often involves a complete overhaul of the firm’s business model or 
processes and in the process consumes large amounts of (slack) resources, 
which may compound the risk of further decline. 
 
For this research, the following are decision rules used in identifying the 
distinction between 'strategic' and 'operational' turnaround measures. 
 
Changes effected with a ‘big picture’ or strategic re-focus will be deemed 
'strategic'. Chowdhury and Lang (1996:170) refer to such ‘strategic turnaround 
actions’ as ‘grand, long-term initiatives such as diversification, vertical 
integration, new markets share trusts, and divestment’. On the other hand, 
changes at operational level especially to increase efficiency by better use of 
resources or cut wastage will be deemed 'operational'. For example, closure of 
unprofitable branches will be considered operational whilst divestitures of 
unprofitable segments of business due to non-strategic/non-synergistic fit will be 
deemed 'strategic'. 
 
Barker and Duhaime (1997) provide the following three general attributes of 
decline that are typical of the need for strategic reorientation or operational 
efficiency improvement measures.  
 
• The extent of a firm’s decline often dictates the need for strategic change. 
A firm with extremely poor performance normally has fundamental 
strategic misalignment problems when compared to a firm suffering a less 
severe decline. (Incidentally this resonates with Hofer’s (1980) severity of 
decline whereby the degree of 'severity' is the distance close to (less 
                                                                                                                                                            
two terms, but rather seeks a workable set of decision rules to facilitate the conduct and 
performance of the research project. The above decision rules are formulated with this objective 




severe) or far below (more severe) a firm’s performance break-even 
profitability. The less severe case needs only efficiency improvement 
measures to turnaround and the severe case needs strategic change or 
re-alignment.)  
 
• Firms suffering firm-based decline in growing or stable industries often 
need strategic change. These firms often suffer 'weak strategic positions' 
relative to their peers due to management’s inertia or misalignment with a 
changing environment and will continue to decline 'unless a strategic 
reorientation creates new assets and skills that better match 
environmental demands' (Barker & Duhaime, 1997:19).  
 
• Declines caused by cyclical business downturn generally have a lesser 
need for turnaround strategic change. For firms suffering such a decline, 
efficiency improvement measures (e.g. cost cutting) are often effective 
while waiting for the economic upturn to arrive. 
 
 The above attributes will act as persuasive influences or guidelines when 
deciding whether a particular strategy implemented by firms attempting 
turnaround is 'strategic' or  'operational'. Severity of decline  
 
Following on from the above paragraph, one would expect the effects of 
'strategic' change to be far reaching, the implementation of which change is 
often expensive. Hence, the dollar value materiality involved is a persuasive 
indicator. Per Snow and Hambrick (1980:529) 'strategic change occurs only 
when the organisation (1) modifies in a major way its alignment with the 
environment and (2) substantially alters technology, structure, and process to fit 
the new alignment'. Materiality will be determined in relation to a firm’s total 





The extant turnaround literature considers revenue-generating strategies (e.g. 
sales/product/market/technology initiatives) and cost cutting/belt-tightening 
measures (e.g. employee lay-offs, business unit asset disposal and cost control) 
as observable performance indicators of strategic change and operational 
moves respectively (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Grinyer 
& McKiernan, 1990; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). Hambrick and Schecter 
(1983:232) citing Hofer (1980) consider 'strategic' such strategies that involve 'a 
major redefinition of the firm and/or attempts to increase market share 
dramatically'. 
 
Product market diversification and geographical diversification are often the two 
representative dimensions of corporate strategic change mentioned and 
operationalised in extant strategy literature and related empirical research 
(Boeker, 1997; Kim, 1989; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). Diversification into 
core business related markets by firms in the California savings and loan 
industry was found to reduce their failure  and mortality  rate (Haveman, 1992). 
 
Strategic change or reorientation involving domain changing actions (Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997) can be either offensive or defensive (Tan & See, 2004). The 
former is often expansionary (growth oriented) while the latter is often 
contractionary (retractive) Tan & See, (2004:190). When faced with performance 
decline, risk taking firms would most likely respond by expanding their domain, 
beyond their current one, by way of seeking new markets, mergers, acquisitions, 
joint ventures, co-opetition and other revenue-generating strategies like new 
product introduction, new marketing initiatives/reorientation, increase in 
advertising expenditure, new technology adoption and price structure changes.  
Tan and See’s (2004) study of 46 publicly listed Singapore manufacturing firms 
between 1995 and 1998 found earnings declining firms were, on the whole, 
more likely to adopt a defensive strategic stance than an offensive one in order 
to conserve cash. These were generally smaller sized firms (in terms of total 




an expansionary strategic stance due to their access to a higher level of 
potential slack resources. Defensive strategies are often more conservative, with 
the firm staying within or contracting its 'current domain of operations' Tan & 
See, (2004:190). They normally take the form of downsizing (e.g. divestments), 
efficiency and conservation and minimisation of slack resource consumption. 
Tan and See’s findings of smaller declining firms' propensity to adopt defensive 
strategies are in congruence with Grinyer and McKiernan’s (1990) findings that  
'sharp-benders' when faced with performance decline often retract to well-
understood/familiar core business via business closure (50%), business sale 
(45%) or harvesting of weaker businesses (5%). These findings also tie in with 
Bibeault’s proposition as described below.   
 
Bibeault (1982:228) is of the opinion that strategic changes 'are usually not 
attempted in weak firms facing emergency turnaround conditions ….strategic 
actions take longer to pay off'. This 'longer yielding pay-off period ' as a 
differentiating feature is also shared by Hofer (1980). Hence, this differentiating 
criterion will be a persuasive influence in the categorisation of strategic versus 
operational actions taken by a firm in this research context.   
 
The perspective and theory of core competencies seek to explain the 
comparative competitive advantage of firms (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, 1993; 
Sanchez & Heene, 1997; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997:516). Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990:82) refer to a firm’s core competencies as the 'collective learning in 
the organisation, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies' to come up with core products and 
end products for which the firm is noted for, for example, the famous Sony’s 
miniaturisation technology and Canon’s optics, imaging, microprocessor controls 
technology. Applying this perspective, strategic change and/or reorientation 
would therefore entail the firm acquiring or developing new 'competency' outside 
or from its current 'core', for example, via seeking new technology and 




strategy'—Prahalad & Hamel, (1994:126). Following on from this perspective, 
such actions taken by a firm attempting performance turnaround will be deemed, 
in this research context, as strategic actions. 
 
Corporate diversification as a business strategy can be linked to one aspect of 
the manifestation of the theory of core competencies. The extant strategy 
management empirical literature on corporate diversification shows that 
diversification per se does not necessarily lead to superior firm performance in 
terms of earnings and profitability. Early diversification-performance research 
tends to support the proposition that diversification into related activities within 
the firm’s 'central skill or competence' leads to better profitability over an 
extended period of time than non-related diversifiers (Christensen & 
Montgomery, 1981; Palepu, 1985:241; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Rumelt, 1982). 
This is because of the ability of the firm to leverage from its comparative 
advantage of deep-seated expertise or knowledge, market power and size and 
the synergistic effect from its core product 'through mechanism such as cross-
subsidization, predatory pricing, reciprocity in selling and buying and barriers to 
entry' (Markides & Williamson, 1994; Palepu, 1985:241). However, recent 
diversification-performance researchers caution that not all related 
diversifications will yield superior performance results. An important determining 
and influencing factor is having an appropriate diversification implementation 
strategy, principally the maintenance of an adequate level of slack resources as 
the synergistic effect of shared organisational resources eventually wears out 
(law of diminishing returns) as diversification often leads to increased 
complexity in  other areas, for example, administration costs (Gary, 2005). Also 
performance differentials of diversifiers may also be linked to characteristics of 
market structure (e.g. market share, concentration, growth and firm size) in 
which the firm operates (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981). Corporate 





Declining firms, which eventually merged with other entities in the recovery 
years, will not  be included in the final sample. Such firms may display unusual 
financials from their  declining years. They may lose their original corporate form, 
and continuity of basic  underlying financials may be distorted and be unable to 
provide any meaningful turnaround analysis.  Further, as this study is confined 
to public listed companies, these declining firms may be  purchased primarily for 
their public listed status (Bruton et al., 2003). Such a 'backdoor listing' exercise 
often resulted in the closure of the firm’s original business  and the injection of 
new businesses and assets by the investor, resulting in abnormal increase or 
decrease in financial parameters.    
 
 
4.7     Methodology 
 
4.7.1    Statistical tool multiple regression analysis and model #1 
 
This research uses linear Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) statistical 
technique and the pc based SPSS software as analysis tools. The advantage of 
using MRA, as opposed to just analysis of financial ratios per se, is that it can 
explain the simultaneous effect of multiple predictor variables on the dependent 
variable (Tummins & Watson, 1975; Whittington, 1980). The MRA equation 
takes the form of: 
 
Y= a +ß1X1+ ß2X2 + ß3X3+ ß4X4……..+ ßnXn + ε 
 
where the ßn’s are called coefficients of partial regression which measure 'the 
percentage of the variance in the dependent variable Y that is explained by a 
single independent variable Xn, with the other independent variables held 
constant'—Italics added (Zikmund, 2003:578). The constant a is the vertical axis 





Closely associated with MRA is the coefficient of multiple determination R2, a 
test statistic which indicates the percentage of change/variation in the 
dependent variable Y explained by the variation in the independent predictor 
variables Xn’s. For example, if R
2=0.75, the indication is that the variation in the 
independent predictor variables Xn’s collectively account for 75% of the variation 
in the dependent variable Y. 
 
The F test statistic in MRA is a statistical significance test for the whole 
equation, that is, it compares the variation of the variables defined in the 
equation (Zikmund, 2003:578). The result of the F test statistic together with the 
significance level p-value (a measure of confidence level) enables the 
researcher to know that 'the estimated functional relationship is not due to 
chance or random variation' (Zikmund, 2003:579) and that there is less than x% 
chance of  that  not holding true (Sekaran, 2003:407). Hence, this enables the 
researcher to reject or not reject the null hypothesis. 
 
The MRA model #1 is used to test hypotheses H1 to H5, repeated here for easy 
reference.   
 
H1:  ROTA is positively related to the adoption of a combination of operational, 
financial and strategic turnaround strategies. 
 
H2:  Industry effect is significant in influencing profitability and the likelihood of 
successful turnaround. 
 
H3:  The effect of the economy is significant in influencing profitability and the 
likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 






H5 :  Operational restructuring strategies—that is, efficiency improvement 
efforts—are more effective in achieving financial performance turnaround than 
strategic and financial restructuring strategies. 
 
4.7.2    Further analysis—model #2 financial profile over time 
 
 
The first objective of this test and analysis of its results is to identify recovery 
firms from those that did not recover or did not fully recover according to the 
three-fold criteria of financial health: those of improvement in profitability, 
financial leverage and liquidity.  The second objective of this test is to 
supplement the MRA test model #1 described above. This is because of the 
small sample size of 88 and the MRA constraint of having a minimum of 'at least 
five times more cases than independent variables' (Coakes, 2005:169). The 14 
independent variables are within the minimum MRA requirement given a sample 
size of 88 firms (number of cases). As this technical constraint, because of 
sample size, limits the number of independent (predictor) variables one can 
have in the MRA model #1, this test 'model #2 financial profile over time' is 
designed to pick up any discriminating trends that separate recovery firms from 
non-recovery ones. In the course of doing so, more effective turnaround 
strategies not tested by the MRA model may be detected. 
 
The results of the MRA model enable the researcher to determine the set of 
predictors which are tested as being statistically significant in explaining the 
variance in the dependent variable ROTA. Having determined this, the financial 
profile of the sample firms at the end of their distress year and at the end of two 
years, or the second financial year end reporting period post-distress, will be 
examined and analysed. The reason for doing so is because the eventual effect 
of the predictors and dependent variable flows through to a firm’s profit and loss 
account and balance sheets. These financial statements form an integral part of 




(2004) are of the opinion that a company’s annual report often provides a rich 
and useful source of information for the strategy researcher. By analysing the 
change in selected relevant financial ratios, computed from the financial 
statements, for the distress year and post-distress years, discerning trends and 
patterns can be observed which will assist the researcher to discriminate 
between successful turnaround firms and unsuccessful ones. This 'grave to 
cradle' approach will help to identify the turnaround efforts and strategies that 
led to the end results reported in the financial statements.  
 
The financial profile of the sample firms is examined according to the three-fold 
performance factor areas of: operating efficiency (profitability), financial leverage 
and liquidity defined in Chapter 3, section 3.3.5. 
 
For easy reference, the variables for the three-fold performance areas are 
repeated here: 
 
1. Operating efficiency/profitability: 
 Proxy measurement variable: 
 
• DYROTA-BND (defined as the distress year/period return on total 
assets minus the three-year Australian Government bond yield rate) 
 
• TYROTA-BND (defined as the target second financial year end/period 
post-distress return on total assets minus the three-year Australian 
Government bond yield rate) 
 
2. Financial leverage  
 Proxy measurement variable: 
 





3. Liquidity: working capital  
 Proxy measurement variable: 
 




Based on the results of the above analysis, this research classifies the sample 
firms into three categories for ease of analysis.  These are:  
 
Category one (recovery firms): these are firms which satisfy the stringent 
three-fold inclusive turnaround criteria of: 
 
TYROTA–BND  >0 (that is the return on total assets at the end of the second 
financial year/period post-distress is greater than the Australian government 
three-year bond yield rate) 
 
TYLTD/TA – DYLTD/TA <0 (that is the ratio of total long-term debt to total 
assets at the end of the second financial year/period post-distress is less than 
that which existed at the end of the distress year) 
 
TYCA/TYCL ≥1 (that is current asset ratio at the end of the second financial 
year/period is greater or equal to one) 
 
Category two (partial recovery firms): these are firms that satisfy the 
profitability criterion of TYROTA-BND >0 only. 
 
Category three (non-recovery firms): these are non-recovered firms with 






For this section, this research uses the Mann-Whitney U (MWU) statistical test 
to compare and examine the differences in the above defined financial profile 
variables of category two and three with category one firms. The MWU test is a 
non-parametric test to assess whether two independent samples of observations 
come from the same distribution. Implicit in the MWU test is the null hypothesis 
that the sample observations come from the same population with equal 
probability distributions (e.g. equal means) and the alternative hypothesis is that 
they are not of equal probability distributions. It is  equivalent to the independent 
group t test (Coakes, 2005:211; Zikmund, 2003:543). 
 
 
4.7.3    Model #3 intensity and timing  
 
This model is designed to test hypothesis H6: 
 
Intensity of efforts and timely execution of turnaround strategies are positively 
related to the likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 
The effectiveness of turnaround strategies on the financial performance of firms 
depends on the intensity and timing of such actions as their adoption and 
implementation per se does not guarantee success. Inertia or slow/delayed 
implementation or inappropriate actions by corporate managers often leads to 
corporate failures (Argenti, 1976; Hoffman, 1989; Schendel et al., 1976; Weitzel 
& Jonsson, 1989). Intensity relates to the amount of resources and effort 
expended on implementation of turnaround strategies as opposed to superficial 
or cosmetic cost reduction or revenue improvement efforts.  
 
The process by which a firm implements a strategy is more important than the 
choice of a particular strategy (Hoffman, 1989). Swift and decisive efforts to stop 




as procrastination of remedial action leads to eventual corporate oblivion. Timing 
of remedial action is of critical importance.  
 
Borrowing from Sudarsanam and Lai (2001), but modified where applicable, 
'intensity' is proxied by the amount incurred by the sample firms for the following 
activities as reported in their financial statements. 
 
Each of the 'activity' values as reported in the financial statements is expressed 
as a proportion of the pre-distress year’s total asset values, except for CEO 
change, divestitures and new industry or geographical segments, which are 
differently defined as indicated below. The common base values of using the 
pre-distress year’s total assets is to enable one to gauge the intensity of 
turnaround strategies adopted by the sample firms  over time.   Increasing 
resultant ratio over DY, DY1 and DY2 implies increasing intensity and 
decreasing ratio value implies decreasing intensity. 
 
The following formulas where they are labelled with the descriptor ‘change’ are 
not defined in the change mode format—that is they are not defined as time ‘t1 
value minus to value’ format. The descriptor ‘change’ should be read as ‘intensity 
of expenditure relative to or as a proportion of pre-distress year’s assets’. The 
preference for using the descriptor ‘change’ is in keeping with the sense and 
objective of the following corresponding result/analysis section of 5.4 whereby 
the increase or decrease in intensity of turnaround strategy for each of the test 
variable over the dy1 and dy2 post distress periods are reported and analysed.  
 
Hence:      
 
Asset sales intensity = cash received for asset sales divided by pre-distress 
year’s total assets.     
 





Dividend change = dividend paid or provided divided by pre-distress year’s total 
assets.      
 
Long-term debt change = long term debt divided by pre-distress year’s total 
assets.      
 
Equity issue/placement intensity = cash received via equity raising divided by 
pre-distress year’s total assets.  Equity raising includes also quasi-equity 
instruments like convertible notes, options and rights issue.     
 
Financial assets/investment sales intensity = cash received for financial 
investment assets sales divided by pre-distress year’s total assets.      
 
CEO change = one or zero otherwise     
 
Divestitures = one or zero otherwise     
 
New industry or geographical segment = difference between the pre-distress 
year’s number of business (industry) segments and geographical segments 
reported in the sample firms’ annual financial report and that reported for the 
distress year and each of the two post-distress years/periods.     
 
New/increase or reduction in plant and equipment expenditure intensity = total 
cost of plant and equipment divided by pre-distress year’s total assets.  
 
This model uses the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test as a statistical 
procedure to assess the statistical difference in the mean values of the above 
variables between category one (recovery firms),  category two (partial recovery) 




Category one firms’ activity intensity is separately compared to category two 
firms' and category three firms'. 
 
4.7.4    Model #4 employee retrenchment  
 
Although the question of lay-off or employee retrenchment has been tested in 
the MRA model #1 as a predictor variable, it does not answer the 'extent of lay-
off' question. As staff retrenchment is an important and much published topical 
issue in corporate distress and turnaround, the following test is designed to 
further supplement the testing in the MRA model #1 for the lay-off/employee 
retrenchment predictor variable. 
 
This model is designed to test hypothesis H7, which states that: 
 
The extent of employee lay-off or retrenchment is significant in affecting the 
likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 
Lay-off of employees or retrenchment of staff—euphemistically called 
downsizing or re-engineering—is a well-publicised turnaround operational 
strategy considered and implemented by most distress firms. Indeed, 
researchers like Robbins and Pearce (1992, 1993, 1994) believe that 
retrenchment as a stand-alone strategy should be the universal precursor to any 
recovery effort regardless of the cause of the performance decline. They 
recommend a two-stage process: first retrenchment to stabilise the firm’s 
operation, then in the recovery stage implementation of strategic changes or 
reorientation with a long-term focus. The retrenchment definition adopted by 
Robbins and Pearce in their 1992 article is wider than just employee 
retrenchment to include cost and asset reductions. Their view was contrary to 
the views held by earlier turnaround researchers that distress firms’ weak 
strategic standing vis-á-vis their competitors’, poor implementation of a sound 




reorientation is central to turning them around (Hofer, 1980; Hofer & Schendel, 
1978; Schendel et al., 1976:11). However, there appears to be general 
consensus that retrenchment, being a short-term focus strategy is quicker in 
pay-back terms than strategic change in turning a firm around (Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980). Cutbacks, efficiency improvements and 
investment in technology improvements were found to be important in improving 
profitability in the short-term (Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani, 1997). This 
researcher believes that strategic change is often more expensive than short-
term retrenchment. 
 
In view of the above differences of opinion, the question of the effectiveness of 
retrenchment as a turnaround operational restructuring strategy is separately 
examined and tested here. The testing model below adopts a narrower definition 
of retrenchment, being the laying-off of employees. In this regard it uses the 
number of employees reported by the above sample firms in their published 
annual financial statements, to gauge the extent and timing of retrenchment 
between turnaround and non-turnaround firms. However, such information on 
the number of employees is not always found to be available for all the relevant 
years in the study period. Most reporting firms only comply with mandatory 
reporting regulations and accounting standards on a minimal basis due to the 
cost of information gathering, processing and provision of such information. 
Hence, the 'number of employee' information was found to be generally 
available for only the reporting period/years 2000 to 2004. Therefore this test 
covers sample firms who have ‘number of employees’ reported for the period 
2000 to 2004. This researcher believes that, despite this handicap, the number 
of employees is a more effective way of examining the staff lay-off 
proposition/question than using financial information based on wage cost.  
  
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test is used to assess the statistical 




one, two and three firms. The parameters of category one firms are separately 
compared to the parameters of category two firms and category three firms.  
 
 
4.7.5    Model #5 severity of decline 
 
This model is designed to test hypothesis H8, which states: 
 
Firms in severe performance decline are less likely to turnaround. 
 
Hofer (1980) was one of the first to introduce the propositions of severity of 
performance decline as a contingency affecting the success or failure  of 
implementing recovery measures. Anecdotally, the logical assumption is that 
firms in severe performance decline are less likely to turnaround. Severity of 
decline in this research is defined as a decline of more than 10% in EBIT 
between the distress year and the year immediately before the distress year. 
Hence, severity of decline is measured by the following formula: 
 
 Severity = ((EBIT Dy – EBITDy-1)/(EBIT Dy-1))  
 
Where Dy = distress year and Dy-1 = year immediately before distress. 
 
This model uses the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test as a statistical 
procedure to assess the statistical difference in the mean values of the above 
severity variable between category one, two and three firms. 
 
 
4.7.6    Model #6 free assets 
 




The likelihood of a successful performance turnaround is directly related to the 
amount of free (unencumbered) assets that a firm has.  
 
The resource based view posits that a firm derives competitive advantage over 
its competitors because of certain resources it possesses that are valuable, 
scarce, and inimitable (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). As mentioned earlier, 
the over exploitation of such resources often leads to financial distress. A firm in 
financial distress will often seek to alleviate cash flow pressure by looking for 
additional sources of funding. Sources of funding often take the form of equity 
raising or debt financing. Equity raising often takes longer to organise than debt 
funding.  
 
Firms that have sufficient free or unencumbered (unpledged) assets are looked 
upon more favourably by external financiers (e.g. banks and financial 
institutions) as these free assets can act as collateral for loans. Firms with 
sufficient free assets (i.e. less geared) generally have greater borrowing power. 
Free assets are generally defined as excess of assets over liabilities, or more 
specifically, excess of tangible assets over secured loans (Smith & Graves, 
2005). The level of free assets is found to be a statistically significant predictor in 
distinguishing between distressed firms which successfully recover and those 
which liquidate (Campbell, 1996; Casey et al., 1986; Routledge & Gadenne, 
2000; White, 1989). The argument supporting this conclusion is that distressed 
firms with sufficient free assets are better able to avoid the risk of 
bankruptcy/liquidation, as free assets increase firms’ ability to obtain additional 
funding, which enables them to ease immediate cash flow problems, finance the 
enactment of successful turnaround strategies and obtain the continuing support 
of existing financiers. However, Smith and Graves (2005:316) found no 
statistical significance at the 0.1 level for this free assets predictor variable, 
although they did remark that 'higher levels of free assets are associated with 
recovered companies'. The following test is designed to test this equivocal and 




The term 'free assets' has been variously defined by different researchers. For 
example, Casey et al. (1986) define 'free assets' as the ratio of uncollateralised 
assets (i.e. not given as collateral security) to total assets; Smith and Graves’ 
(2005) definition is (total tangible assets less secured loans)/total tangible 
assets; and Routledge and Gadenne’s (2000) proxy measure is leverage (free 
assets = total assets/total liabilities). 
 
Although the Casey et al. definition of 'free assets' is considered the most 
technically appropriate, as per Smith and Graves’ comments (2005), details and 
amount of collateralised assets are often not easily discernable from the 
published reports of Australian companies. In this regard, this research uses the 
following proxy variable to measure 'free assets' as a proportion of total assets. 
Hence: 
 
free assets Dy = (total assetsDy less long-term debtDy)/total assetsDy 
  
where Dy= distress year 
 
The rationale for using total assets as opposed to total tangible assets—as in 
the case of Smith and Graves’ (2005) study—is in line with the 'total' resource 
concept expounded by the RBV. In the above definition, total assets include 
tangible and intangible assets. The justification for including intangible assets is 
because in this post-industrial information era intangible assets like brand 
names, trademarks, patents, goodwill and intellectual properties do have 
commercial value. Grant (2002) expanded the traditional physical/tangible type 
of resources expounded by the RBV to include such intangible resources like 
reputation, brand recognition and goodwill as part of the resource suite of a firm. 
Additionally, in practice most Australian banks and financiers would normally 





The use of long-term debt (LTD) as proxy for collateralised debt is because such 
information is readily and consistently available from Australian companies’ 
reported financial statements. More importantly LTD will capture the 
collateralised commitments of a firm. Further, firms in financial distress will most 
likely avoid the 'mortal sin' in finance of 'borrowing short-term to finance long', 
thus adding more pressure to their cash flow problem and debt maturity 
pressures.  
 
To test hypothesis nine, the Mann-Whitney U test will be used to test and 




4.8    Data  
 
Corporate turnaround research is often handicapped by the availability of 
information due to firm sensitivity and confidentiality reasons. As information 
relating to private non-listed firms is not readily available, this research will only 
consider public firms listed on the ASX. According to Barker, Patterson and 
Mueller (2001:245) 'there is no evidence that findings from turnaround studies 
are not generalisable to private companies'. Data will be sourced from 
secondary sources in the public domain. These are firms’ published annual 
financial reports, from databases like Connect 4, Factiva, and Financial Analysis 
(Aspect Huntley—now called Morningstar DatAnalysis). Companies’ annual 
reports with careful content analysis can provide a rich and useful source of 
quantitative and qualitative information for the strategy researcher (Bowman, 






4.8.1    Rationale and weakness of accounting data 
 
Despite the limitations of using accounting data in measuring firm performance 
(e.g. Chakravarthy, 1986; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986), due to the risk of 
manipulation of accounting information, policies and valuation bases, this study 
believes that the following are mitigating factors. 
 
• ASX public listed firms are reporting and independently audited 
entities. 
 
• The study period is 11 years33 and any 'rogue'  public listed firm 
would not out-live such a long period by continuing to misstate its 
financial results to the ASX and ASIC. Any inadvertent inclusions 
would be few and unlikely to be statistically significant. 
 
• Reporting entities (e.g. ASX listed companies) that are regulated 
by the Australian Corporations Act 2001 are required to apply 
Australian Accounting Standards (AASBs) in the preparation of 
their financial statements. Compliance is mandatory.  The AASBs 
are reporting standards set by the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB)34, a government agency who develops 
and maintains financial reporting standards applicable to private 
and public entities in the Australian economy. Its statutory power 
                                                     
33 The sample period is 1995 to 2005. For each sample firm the years of interest covers six 
years, that is the selection rule of ‘+++-’ and  the two consecutive years post distress. The end 
year 2005 is extended to 2007 for sample firms whose distress year falls on 2005 and their two 
post recovery or failure years extend past 2005 to 2007. With each sample firm’s years of 
interest covering six years, the 88 sample firms would collectively cover 1995 to 2005. Hence, 
the study period mentioned above is 11 years.       
34
 Refer Australian Accounting Standards Board; Australian Accounting Standards; 
http://www.aasb.gov.au/About-the-AASB.aspx; 18.2.2012. 






and functions are prescribed by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission’s (ASIC’s) role is to protect the 
Australian business and financial community through regulating 
and enforcing laws relating to financial services and company 
matters. Prior to 2000, Australian Accounting Standards (AASs) 
were issued by the former AASB and the Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board (PSASB) of the Australian Accounting Research 
Foundation (AARF) on behalf of the Australian professional 
accounting bodies. Members of professional accounting bodies 
preparing financial statements are required to comply with the 
applicable AASs even to entities not regulated by the Corporations 
Act. Majority of the AASs were superseded by the AASBs for 
reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. Since 
1991, all standards issued by the AASB are captioned as AASB 
Accounting Standards, applicable to all types of entities. The 
mandatory (legal) requirement of ASX listed companies to prepare 
their financial statements in accordance with the AASBs should 
provide some level of acceptable standard in the quality of 
reported financial performance information. Australia also adopted 
and issued Australian equivalents of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) for annual reporting periods beginning 
on or after 1 January 2005. 
 
• Financial data and ratios have been used extensively by 
researchers to measure firm performance and collapse 
(Chakravarthy, 1986; Hossari & Rahman, 2005). 
 
• The use of share market values for measuring performance is 
considered not suitable as they are subject to ‘extreme volatility 




4.8.2    Financial ratios 
 
Financial ratios have been widely used by researchers, operational 
management practitioners and financial analysts for multiple purposes in relation 
to firm performance and firm financial characteristics. They have been widely 
used in decision making  (Gibson, 1963) and reported upon over the years in 
empirical studies in economics, finance, management and accounting. The two 
main uses of  accounting/financial ratios according to Whittington (1980) are 
'normative' and 'positive'. The former relates to comparing a firm’s performance 
ratio to a norm or standard, for example, industry or peers’ standard, and the 
latter relates to predicting/forecasting a certain event befalling a firm, for 
example, bankruptcy and credit risk assessment (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966a).  
This 'positive' use also includes the myriad of published research using financial 
ratios as input or proxy variables to empirical research models. To this, one can 
add a third category use of financial ratios—that of 'regulatory', whereby 
financial regulatory bodies used them to administer and gauge regulatory 
compliance in relation to predetermined parameters. 
 
The choice of which accounting/financial ratio to use and its usefulness depends 
on the task and question one has on hand. The numerous published financial 
ratios in current and past literature further complicate this choice, as more than 
one ratio may measure the same thing or phenomenon. In Walsh’s (2008) book 
entitled 'Key Management Ratios' there are more than 100 financial ratios listed 
and explained. Chen and Shimerda’s (1981) literature survey/review of 26 
studies, which used financial terms and ratios, notes that 65 of the 100 terms 
used are accounting ratios. Of  the sixty-five, 'forty-one of these were considered 
useful and/or are used in the final analysis by one or more of the researchers' 
(Chen & Shimerda, 1981:51). The same authors and others (Horrigan, 1965; 
Pinches et al., 1975) believe that a majority of the ratios are variants of the same 
basic equation or ratio and that this overlap and confusion can be eliminated by 




Pinches et al. (1975) found that financial ratios can be grouped into the following 
seven categories or factors of: return on investments, capital turnover, financial 
leverage, short-term liquidity, cash position, inventory turnover and receivables 
turnover. Hence the 'effectiveness of turnaround' variables in section 3.3.5 in the 
main follow this categorization, but with emphasis on efficiency measure 
(profitability EBIT), financial leverage (TD/TA) and liquidity (CA/CL); all 
necessary factors for a sustainable performance turnaround. 
 
The use of financial ratios in statistical modelling has its own 'idiosyncrasies' and 
challenges, which need special consideration. This relates to the assumption 
taken by most researchers that the predictor variables in the research statistical 
model have normal distributions. For example, the statistical models in the 
sixties and seventies predicting company insolvency and bankruptcy (Altman, 
1968; Altman, Haldeman, & Narayanan, 1977) although tested to be reliable one 
to three years prior to corporate failure (Mossman, Bell, Swartz, & Turtle, 1998) 
rely on the assumption of data (financial ratios) being derived from multivariate 
normal distributions. Altman’s bankruptcy prediction model uses multiple 
discriminant analysis, which requires the normal distributional characteristic of 
financial ratios for bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. This would be rare, as 
financial ratios often displayed skewed distribution caused by the presence of 
outliers (Deakin, 1976; Ezzamel, Mar-Molinero, & Beecher, 1987; Frecka & 
Hopwood, 1983; Watson, 1990) and also have theoretical distribution 
characteristics and form as described below. This methodical assumption has 
been questioned and criticised in regard to research result reliability and 
generalisability (Ohlson, 1980; Richardson & Davision, 1983; Zmijewski, 1984).  
 
Financial ratios by their constructional nature express a relationship (Lev & 
Sunder, 1979) between two accounting variables, often expressed as a 
numerator value (top) and a denominator (bottom) value. In short, it expresses a 
joint relationship between two variables. According to G. Whittington (1980:219): 




that a proportionate relationship exists or ought to exist between the two 
variables whose ratio is calculated'. If such assumption of proportionality is 
violated, than the joint distribution will be skewed (Barnes, 1982). Mcleay and 
Omar (2000:217) distinguish between two main types of financial ratios, those of 
unbounded ratios and bounded ratios.  
 
Bounded ratio: 'those ratios where the numerator and the denominator are each 
bounded at zero and where the resultant ratio may take positive values only 
(such as quick assets/current liabilities and sales/total assets)'. These ratios 
often have extreme right-hand tail positive values only. 
 
Unbounded ratios: 'those ratios where only one of the financial aggregates is 
bounded at zero and where the second variate may range through zero and take 
positive and negative values and where, therefore, the ratio itself may take both 
positive and negative values (such as earnings before tax/total assets and 
sales/net working capital)'. These ratios may have extreme values in both 
distribution tails.  
 
Mcleay and Omar (2000:217) also mention that there are other classes of ratios. 
These are: '(a) ratios with a lower bound of -100%, (b) ratios which are 
proportions and which are bounded by 0% and +100% and (c) ratios of two 
unbounded financial aggregates, each of which may take zero, and the ratio of 
which may therefore be  undefined'. 
 
For bounded ratios, Mcleay and Omar (2000) recommend a skewness-reducing 
transformation procedure and for unbounded ratios a kurtosis-reducing one.  
 
Other researchers (e.g. Mulchler, 1985; Watson, 1990), cognizant of the special 
problems (skewness and outliers) associated with using financial ratios, 
employed outlier identification, truncation/trimming processes and normality 




common transformation methods to induce normality are: applying square root 
and/or natural logarithms (Deakin, 1976; Pinches et al., 1975) to the raw data 
(financial ratios), which according to Kirk (1968) are generally and widely used 
and reported in accounting literature. However, according to Ezzamel, Mar-
Molinero and Beecher (1987), such transformation methods do not seem to 
solve the problems caused by the presence of outliers. 
 
In statistics, an outlier is 'a value that lies outside the normal range of a set of 
data' (Zikmund, 2003:490). Outliers distort the distributional properties of 
observations and cause distribution skewness resulting in departure from 
normality. A normal distribution is uniquely described by its mean and standard 
distribution (Ezzamel et al., 1987) with 'almost all (99 percent) of its value within 
± 3 standard deviations from its mean' (Zikmund, 2003:411). Some methods 
used by researchers to deal with outliers are elimination/deletion (e.g. Frecka & 
Hopwood, 1983) and the process of winsorising (Copland & Ingram, 1982), 
whereby the value of an outlier is changed to that of the closest non-outlier. This 
research uses the standard feature in the SPSS software to deal with outliers, 
whereby the default value of ± three standard deviations from the mean is used. 
 
Section 4.12 'test for normality' and section 4.13 'treatment of missing data 
value’ set out the methods used by this research to mitigate the above problems 
relating to the use of financial ratios. 
 
 
4.9        Data collection and sampling method 
 
Using the Aspect Huntley financial database (now called Morningstar 
DatAnalysis) and its enquiry facility, an initial sample of 110 ASX listed firms out 
of a population of 2220 ASX listed firms was found to satisfy the selection 




200535 and the list of 2220 firms was run on 25 May 2006. The main reasons for 
selecting this sample research period are as follows. This researcher started his 
doctoral studies in 2004-05. For contemporaneous, availability and currency of 
information reasons, the end period of 2005 was chosen. Also this period, 1995 
to 2005, witnessed the unfolding of certain macro economic events—the Asian 
financial crisis 1997, the introduction of the Australian goods and services tax on 
1 July 2000, the technology wreck (dot.com) 2002 and the US sub-prime/oil 
crisis 2007. Such environmental events have an impact on organizations/firms 
since environmental factors are important determining factors on 
organizational/firm performance as discussed in the literature review of Chapter 
2.  
 
 Basically, to recapitulate, the selection rule yielding the initial sample of 110 is 
that a sample firm must have experienced three consecutive years of positive 
EBIT followed by a negative year of EBIT. This negative EBIT year is deemed 
the distress year. Borrowing the concept used by Sudarsanam and Lai (2001), 
the EBIT selection criterion rule is pictorially referred to here as the '+++-' (plus, 
plus, plus, minus) rule. In addition, a sample firm must have a quick ratio, (CA-
IN)/CL (current assets-inventory/current liabilities) less than one at the end of 
the distress year. As banks, financial institutions and insurance companies are 
regulated financial institutions, using EBIT as a selection criterion would not be a 
valid representation of their financial performance, since a large proportion of 
their earnings is made up of interest revenue and interest expense. Sampling, 
therefore, excluded them. The three consecutive '+++' (plus, plus, plus) years 
followed by a '–' (minus) year rule is considered to be a conservative stringent 
selection process which led the researcher to be confident that the '–' (minus) 
year is a 'performance shock' (Yawson, 2004) or decline and not some random 
performance occurrence.   
 
                                                     
35 The end year 2005 is extended to 2007 for sample firms that had two post-distress years 




Data and test variable values and turnaround activities for the sample were 
collected from the firm’s annual report, from information stored in the Aspect 
Huntley database (now called Morningstar DatAnalysis) and Connect 4 
database. Twenty-two selected sample firms were eliminated from the initial 
sample of 110 for various reasons explained below. This resulted in a final 
































Table 3 Initial sample 
 
 
Count ASX  
Code 
Company name GICS 
SECTOR 
 
1 AAT Autron Corporation Limited IFT  
2 ACX Acma Engineering & Construction Group Limited IND  
3 AGG Anglogold Ashanti Limited - Eliminated 
4 AGX Agenix Limited HCR  
5 AIE A.I. Limited IND  
6 AIG Aircruising Australia Limited CDS  
7 AIX Australian Infrastructure Fund IND Eliminated 
8 AIZ Air New Zealand Limited - Eliminated 
9 AJL AJ Lucas Group Limited IND  
10 AOG Australian Oil And Gas Corporation Ltd - Eliminated 
11 ASB Austal Limited IND  
12 ASL Ausdrill Limited IND  
13 ATG Austin Group Limited CDS  
14 AUG Aurora Gold Limited - Eliminated 
15 AUO Austral Coal Limited MAT  
16 AUT Aurora Oil & Gas Limited ENG  
17 AUX Ausron Limited IFT  
18 AVR Avatar Industries Limited CDS  
19 BDL Brandrill Limited IND  
20 BPK Bremer Park Limited IND  
21 CAA Capral Aluminium Limited MAT  
22 CCW Carlovers Carwash Limited IND  
23 CEC Coneco Limited IND  
24 CHQ Chiquita Brands South Pacific Limited CSP  
25 CLK Cypress Lakes Group Limited CDS  
26 CLL P Cleland Enterprises Limited IND  
27 CLO Clough Limited IND  
28 CMK Cumnock Coal Limited ENG  
29 CNA Coal & Allied Industries Limited ENG  
30 COM Comops Limited IFT  
31 CPI CPI Group Limited IND  









Count ASX  
Code 
Company name GICS 
SECTOR 
 
33 CTY Country Road Limited CDS  
34 DLS Drillsearch Energy Limited ENG  
35 DMY Dromana Estate Limited CSP  
36 DOR Dome Resources NL  - Eliminated 
37 DTL Data3 Limited IFT  
38 EBG Eumundi Group Limited CDS  
39 ECT Ectec Limited - Eliminated 
40 EMB Embelton Limited IND  
41 ENE Energy Developments Limited UTI  
42 ERG ERG Limited IFT  
43 EWC Energy World Corporation Ltd UTI  
44 EZL Euroz Limited FIN  
45 FEA Forest Enterprises Australia Limited MAT  
46 GCL Gloucester Coal Ltd ENG  
47 GDL Hi Sun Holdings Limited  - Eliminated 
48 GNC Graincorp Limited CSP  
49 GRT Garratt’s Limited CSP  
50 HAO Haoma Mining NL MAT  
51 HGL Hudson Investment Group Limited FIN  
52 HLE Harvest Living Limited CDS  
53 IHG Intellect Holdings Limited IFT  
54 JVG JV Global Limited IND  
55 JYC Joyce Corporation Limited CDS  
56 KTL KTL Technologies Limited IND  
57 LAL Lowan Australia Limited CSP  
58 LAU Lindsay Australia Limited IND  
59 LMS Luminus Systems Limited - Eliminated 
60 MAH Macmahon Holdings Limited IND  
61 MDC McConnell Dowell Corporation Limited IND  
62 MNA Magnetica Limited - Eliminated 









Count ASX  
Code 
Company name GICS 
SECTOR 
 
64 MSF Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited (The) CSP  
65 MSI Multistack International Limited IND  
66 MTD Metroland Australia Limited FIN  
67 MUR Murchison United NL MAT  
68 NFO Network Foods Limited CSP  
69 NTG National Telecoms Limited IFT  
70 OCE Ocean Capital Limited CDS  
71 OLH Oldfields Holdings Limited IND  
72 OPI Optima ICM Limited IFT  
73 OTI Oriental Technologies Investment Limited IND  
74 OTR Otter Gold Mines Limited - Eliminated 
75 PAS Pasminco Limited CDS  
76 PDR Port Douglas Reef Resorts Limited CDS  
77 PLF Prime Life Corporation Limited FIN  
78 PLR Pearl River Tyre (Holdings) Limited - Eliminated 
79 PRH Primac Holdings Limited  - Eliminated 
80 QIL Quoin (Mintzberg) Limited - Eliminated 
81 QRS QRSciences Holdings Limited IFT  
82 RBM Redbank Mines Limited MAT  
83 RDF Redflex Holdings Limited IFT  
84 REM Reliance Mining Limited MAT  
85 RPG Raptis Group Limited FIN  
86 RTS Retail Technology & Services Limited IFT  
87 RYW Reynolds Wines Limited - Eliminated 
88 SBM St Barbara Limited MAT  
89 SCC Scott Corporation Limited IND  
90 SCD Scantech Limited IFT  
91 SDS SDS Corporation Limited IND  
92 SKT Sky Network Television Limited - Eliminated 
93 SNL Supply Network Limited CDS  
94 SRA Strathfield Group Limited CDS  
95 STR Service Stream Ltd IFT  
96 STS Structural Systems Limited IND  
97 TAN Tandou Limited CSP  








Table 3 Initial sample (cont’d) 
 
 
Count ASX  
Code 
Company name GICS 
SECTOR 
 
99 TEM Tempo Services Limited - Eliminated 
100 THO Thomas & Coffey Limited IND  
101 TNN Tenon Limited - Eliminated 
102 VII Vietnam Industrial Investments Limited MAT  
103 VLS Vita Life Sciences Limited HCR  
104 WBA Webster Limited CSP  
105 WCP WCP Resources Limited MAT  
106 WFL Willmott Forests Limited MAT  
107 WMT Western Metals Limited - Eliminated 
108 WSF Westfield Holdings Limited - Eliminated 
109 WWH Water Wheel Holdings Limited - Eliminated 
110 YTS Arthur Yates & Co. Limited  - Eliminated 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
 
4.9.1    Elimination reasons 
 
 
Company                                                                                           Reasons 
 
Anglogold Ashanti Limited Not an Australian company, financials 
in Rand and USD. 
 
Australian Infrastructure Fund                           An investment fund – financial  
                           institution 
 
Air New Zealand Limited                         Not an Australian company. 
 
Australian Oil And Gas Corporation Ltd Company taken over by a Canadian 
company in July 2002, subsequently 
delisted from ASX listing on 2 
September 2002. 
 
Aurora Gold Limited In February 2003, company completed 
a merger with Abelle Limited (ABX) and 






Dome Resources NL Delisted from ASX listing on 22 March 
2001 due to compulsory acquisition by 
a foreign company, Durban Roodepoort 
Deep Limited. 
 
Ectec Limited Delisted from ASX listing on 31 August 
2001 and placed in voluntary liquidation 
on 8 December 2000. 
 
Hi Sun Holdings Limited A Hong Kong operating company. 
Delisted from ASX listing on 21 June 
2001. 
 
Luminus Systems Limited Year ended 2000 financial report and 
comparatives were in US dollars. Also 
year ended December 1998 financial 
report was not available. 
 
Magnetica Limited Delisted from ASX listing on 15 October 
2007. Only financial reports for financial 
years ended 30 June 2006 and 2007 
are available. 
 
Otter Gold Mines Limited Delisted from ASX listing on 24 March 
2003 due to take over by Normandy 
Limited (ASX code NFM). 
 
Pearl River Tyre (Holdings) Limited Not an Australian company. An 
investment holding company. Delisted 
from ASX listing on 10 May 2004. 
 
Primac Holdings Limited Delisted from ASX listing on 30 
November 1998. 
 
Quoin (Mintzberg) Limited Financial reports in Papua New Guinea 
currency. Liquidator appointed to 
company on 27 September 2002. 
 
Reynolds Wines Limited Liquidator appointed to company in 
August 2003. Delisted from ASX listing 
on 30 August 2004.  
 
Sky Network Television Limited Not an Australian company. Financial 





Tempo Services Limited Delisted from ASX listing on 14 April 
2005 due to Pacific Service Solutions 
Pty Ltd’s 100% acquisition.  
 
Tenon Limited Not an Australian company. Financial 
reports in New Zealand dollars. Delisted 
from ASX listing on 2 October 2004. 
 
Western Metals Limited Entered voluntary administration in July 
2003. 
 
Westfield Holdings Limited Suspended from ASX listing following 
formation of WDC (Westfield Group) due 
to merger of Westfield Holdings Ltd, 
Westfield Trust & Westfield America 
Trust in July 2004. 
 
Water Wheel Holdings Limited Company in voluntary administration, 
16 February 2000.  
 
Arthur Yates & Co. Limited Delisted from ASX listing 6 April 2001. 
 
 
The above 22 companies were eliminated from the initial sample of 110 
companies for the reasons noted above. In general, when a company is delisted 
from the ASX official listing or in voluntary administration follow-up and tracking 
of its subsequent financial progress was not possible due to the unavailability of 
published public domain data relating to these companies. Similarly, company 
takeovers and/or subsequent privatizations render it impossible to meaningfully 




4.9.2    Final sample 
 
 
After the above eliminations, the final reduced sample size is 88 as set out in 





Table 4 Final sample  
 
Count ASX  
Code 




1 AAT Autron Corporation Limited IFT 2002 
2 ACX Acma Engineering & Construction Group Limited IND 2000 
3 AGX Agenix Limited HCR 2004 
4 AIE A.I. Limited IND 2001 
5 AIG Aircruising Australia Limited CDS 2000 
6 AJL AJ Lucas Group Limited IND 2005 
7 ASB Austal Limited IND 2003 
8 ASL Ausdrill Limited IND 2000 
9 ATG Austin Group Limited CDS 1999 
10 AUO Austral Coal Limited MAT 2004 
11 AUT Aurora Oil & Gas Limited ENG 2001 
12 AUX Ausron Limited IFT 2001 
13 AVR Avatar Industries Limited CDS 2002 
14 BDL Brandrill Limited IND 2003 
15 BPK Bremer Park Limited IND 2002 
16 CAA Capral Aluminium Limited MAT 2001 
17 CCW Carlovers Carwash Limited IND 1998 
18 CEC Coneco Limited IND 2001 
19 CHQ Chiquita Brands South Pacific Limited CSP 2004 
20 CLK Cypress Lakes Group Limited CDS 2005 
21 CLL P Cleland Enterprises Limited IND 2002 
22 CLO Clough Limited IND 2005 
23 CMK Cumnock Coal Limited ENG 2001 
24 CNA Coal & Allied Industries Limited ENG 2003 
25 COM Comops Limited IFT 2001 
26 CPI CPI Group Limited IND 2004 
27 CSH Concept Hire Limited IND 2002 
28 CTY Country Road Limited CDS 1998 
29 DLS Drillsearch Energy Limited ENG 2002 
30 DMY Dromana Estate Limited CSP 2003 
31 EBG Eumundi Group Limited CDS 2001 
32 DTL Data3 Limited IFT 2001 
33 EMB Embelton Limited IND 2004 
34 ENE Energy Developments Limited UTI 2001 
35 ERG ERG Limited IFT 2003 
36 EWC Energy World Corporation Ltd UTI 2002 
37 EZL Euroz Limited FIN 2004 
38 FEA Forest Enterprises Australia Limited MAT 1999 
39 GCL Gloucester Coal Ltd ENG 2001 





Table 4 Final sample (cont’d) 
Count ASX  
Code 




41 GRT Garratt’s Limited CSP 2003 
42 HAO Haoma Mining NL MAT 2004 
43 HGL Hudson Investment Group Limited FIN 2002 
44 HLE Harvest Living Limited CDS 2003 
45 IHG Intellect Holdings Limited IFT 2000 
46 JVG JV Global Limited IND 2003 
47 JYC Joyce Corporation Limited CDS 2000 
48 KTL KTL Technologies Limited IND 2001 
49 LAL Lowan Australia Limited CSP 2001 
50 LAU Lindsay Australia Limited IND 1999 
51 MAH Macmahon Holdings Limited IND 2001 
52 MDC McConnell Dowell Corporation Limited IND 2001 
53 MPI Mark Sensing Limited MAT 2001 
54 MSF Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited (The) CSP 2003 
55 MSI Multistack International Limited IND 2001 
56 MTD Metroland Australia Limited FIN 2000 
57 MUR Murchison United NL MAT 2000 
58 NFO Network Foods Limited CSP 2002 
59 NTG National Telecoms Limited IFT 2002 
60 OCE Ocean Capital Limited CDS 2003 
61 OLH Oldfields Holdings Limited IND 2001 
62 OPI Optima ICM Limited IFT 2002 
63 OTI Oriental Technologies Investment Limited IND 2001 
64 PAS Pasminco Limited CDS 2004 
65 PDR Port Douglas Reef Resorts Limited CDS 2001 
66 PLF Prime Life Corporation Limited FIN 2002 
67 QRS QRSciences Holdings Limited IFT 2004 
68 RBM Redbank Mines Limited MAT 2001 
69 RDF Redflex Holdings Limited IFT 1999 
70 REM Reliance Mining Limited MAT 2000 
71 RPG Raptis Group Limited FIN 1999 
72 RTS Retail Technology & Services Limited IFT 1999 
73 SBM St Barbara Limited MAT 2001 
74 SCC Scott Corporation Limited IND 1998 
75 SCD Scantech Limited IFT 2000 
76 SDS SDS Corporation Limited IND 1998 
77 SNL Supply Network Limited CDS 1999 
78 SRA Strathfield Group Limited CDS 2002 
79 STR Service Stream Ltd IFT 2001 
80 STS Structural Systems Limited IND 2002 




     
Table 4 Final sample (cont’d) 
Count ASX  
Code 




81 TAN Tandou Limited CSP 2005 
82 TCO Transmetro Corporation Limited CDS 1998 
83 THO Thomas & Coffey Limited IND 1999 
84 VII Vietnam Industrial Investments Limited MAT 2004 
85 VLS Vita Life Sciences Limited HCR 2002 
86 WBA Webster Limited CSP 2000 
87 WCP WCP Resources Limited MAT 2001 
88 WFL Willmott Forests Limited MAT 2002 
 





Final sample—distribution by GICS sector and firm size (mean$) 
 
 
The following graph in Table 5 shows the distribution of the 88 sample firms by 
firm size proxied by firm’s market capitalization (mean $million) and ASX GICS 





















Sample Distribution by GICS sectors and firm size
Number of companies 14 9 5 2 26 13 12 2 0 5
Firm size(mean)$m'000 67.5 472.0 84.9 42.1 132.8 89.8 206.0 206.0 0.0 28.3
CDS CSP ENG HCR IND IFT MAT UTI TEL FIN
 
 
Source: analysis of data 
 
Legend: ASX GICS sectors 
CDS = Consumer discretionary 
CSP = Consumer staples 
ENG = Energy 
HCR = Health care 
IND = Industrials 
IFT = Information technology 
MAT = Materials 
UTI = Utilities 
TEL = Telecommunication services 








Small sample size is often typical of turnaround-related research, for example, 
Barker and Mone (1994)—sample size 32; Barker and Patterson Jr. (1996)—
                                                     




sample size 29; Grinyer and McKiernan (1990)—sample size 25; Robbins and 
Pearce (1992)—sample size 32; Chaganti, Mahajan et al. (1985)—sample size 
21 matched pairs; Barker and Barr (2002)—sample size 29; Castrogiovanni and 
Bruton (2000)—sample size 46; and LoPucki (1983)—sample size 41. Nearer to 
home, Routledge and Gadenne’s (2000:248) reorganisation/liquidation study of 
Australian firms has a sample size of 40.  
 
According to Barker and Patterson (1996:315) 'studies of turnaround attempts 
often have smaller sample size because firm-level turnarounds are not an 
everyday occurrence and sample firms must be carefully selected for a study 
based on patterns in financial performance data…' Further, they are of the 
opinion that 'there is no evidence that findings from turnaround studies are not 




4.11        Financial characteristics of sample distress firms 
 
 
To illustrate and validate the effectiveness of the financial performance selection 
criterion of '+++-' Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT), the following Table 6 
shows the financial profile of the distress firms represented by the following 
accounting indicators. The accounting indicators or ratios were selected to cover 
the three key areas of financial performance, that is, accounting (accrual) 











Table 6 Summary of financial characteristics of distress firms: year of distress 














Asymp. Sig (2 
tailed) 
ROTA %  0.088 -0.137 -8.147 0.000*** 
QUICKR % 1.584 0.558 -6.468 0.000*** 
SALES $m 130.0 113.8 -2.087 0.037* 
TOTREV $m 138.8 124.2 -1.408 0.159 
NPAT $m 4.6 -0.436 -7.189 0.000*** 
TD $m 55.2 52.1 -2.664 0.008* 
 
Source: developed from analysis 
 
*** indicates significance at the <0.001 




ROTA = pre-tax return on total assets  
QUICKR = quick asset ratio, a proxy indicator of liquidity 
SALES = trading income 
TOTALREV = total revenue 
NPAT = net after tax profit 
TD = total debt 
(1) Mean (average) of the three years prior to the distress year 
 
To illustrate and validate the deterioration in financial performance of the sample 
88 firms, the non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test was 
used. Barber and Lyon (1996:395) have demonstrated that the 'non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed–rank T test statistics are uniformly more powerful than 
parametric t-statistics' in studies dealing with accounting based operating 
performance, especially if there are extreme observations in the distributions. It 
tests the significance of the difference in mean score of samples which are not 




subjects are measured twice' (Zikmund, 2003:542). In this context the 'before 
and after' results are encapsulated in the EBIT financial performance sample 
selection criterion of '+++-', that is, three years of consecutive positive EBIT 
followed by one year of performance shock of negative EBIT. 
 
The Z-test statistic in Table 6 results shows significant difference in the mean 
scores for all the selected financial characteristic variables except for TOTREV. 
This is because total revenue includes sales revenue plus non-core activity or 
miscellaneous income when compared to sales, which comprises a firm’s 
trading or core activity income. Such non-core income often does not occur with 
the same regularity as a firm’s sales income. Although TOTREV did not yield a 
significant p value, its mean value shows a deterioration from 138.8 to 124.2. 
 
 
4.12       Testing for normality—firm size 
 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the chosen variable to proxy firm size is the firm’s 
market capitalization value as defined and obtained from the Aspect Huntley 
database (now called Morningstar DatAnalysis) as: 
 
Market Capitalisation ('MC') = 'The market value of the company’s equity 
capital.' 
 
This is calculated by multiplying the number of common shares by the current 
price. Other classes of equity such as preference shares are normally not 
included, except in certain cases where the shares are 'quasi-ordinary'. The 
current price is the 'closing share price on the last day of the company’s financial 





The use of a firm’s market capitalization value, rather than other book based 
accounting values (e.g. total assets or total sales), overcomes any common 
variance or collinearity with the return on total assets (ROTA) book value.  
The MC adopted by this research is the MC of the firm at the end of its financial 
year preceding its distress year. 
 
As one of the essential assumptions of multiple regression analysis, the 
assumption of variable normality is therefore considered necessary as a 
preliminary step to test the normality of the variable Firmsiz (Firm size). Lee 
(1985) argues that firm size may inadvertently introduce systematic bias 
resulting in non-normality of financial ratios. This is borne out by the following 




Using SPSS Analyse, Descriptive Statistics and Explore functions the following 




Table 7 Normality testing results 
 
Descriptives 
   Statistic Std. Error 
Mean 100.85568 29.251684 
Lower Bound 42.71479  95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean Upper Bound 158.99657  
5% Trimmed Mean 52.59040  
Median 19.20000  
Variance 75298.171  
Std. Deviation 274.405121  
Minimum 1.000  
Maximum 2149.100  
Range 2148.100  
Interquartile Range 68.450  
Skewness 5.661 .257 
FIRMSIZE 




Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
FIRMSIZE .358 88 .000 .361 88 .000 
 




The Shapiro-Wilk test is usually considered more appropriate for small sample 
size (Bird & Mchugh, 1977), for example, less than 100, and more sensitive to 
detect non-normality than the Kolmogorov-Smironov test (Ezzamel et al., 1987). 
Shapiro and Wilk (1965) and Shapiro, Wilk and Chen (1968) have shown that it 





As can be ascertained from the above, the Shapiro-Wilk statistic shows a 
significance level of 0.000 < 0.05 which indicates that sample’s firm size 
distribution is skewed and non-normal. A distribution is considered exactly 
normal if skewness and kurtosis values are equal to zero (Coakes, 2005:35). 
The distribution as reported above is positively skewed with high positive 
skewness and kurtosis scores. The result is of no surprise as firms listed on the 
ASX are of varying sizes. In the sample, the range value is large at 2148.1 with 
a mean of 100.85 and a standard deviation of 274.4.  
 
Logarithmic transformation and square root transformation are two of the most 
common transformation to normality techniques used. Such techniques are 
often acceptable in accounting literature and research to reduce skewness in 
raw data distributions (Deakin, 1976; Kirk, 1968). Both techniques are not 
applicable to negative values. The resultant product variable Firmsiz as defined 
above will always be of positive value as the number (quantity) of shares in a 
firm and their related market price per share will always be of positive values 
only. Financial ratios which take on positive values only is referred to by Mcleay 
and Omar (2000:213) as 'bounded ratios' and 'are characterized by extreme 
values in the right hand tail only'. As skewness was extreme, it was considered 
necessary to transform the Firmsiz variable by using the SPSS natural 
logarithmic transformation function—that is, LN(numexpr). According to  Hair et 
al., 2010:78 'logarithm or square root typically works best on positive skewness', 
and that although 'several transformations "fixed" the normality problem, but 
only the logarithmic transformation also addressed heteroscedasticity' (Hair et 
al., 2010:82). Ezzamel, Mar-Molinero and Beecher (1987:479) are of the opinion 
that: 'It seems that logarithmic transformations are most useful when the 
distribution is substantially non-normal for the raw data'( italics for emphasis).  
 






Table 8 Normalised firm size 
 
Descriptives 
   Statistic Std. Error 
Mean 3.21878 .167254 
Lower Bound 2.88634  95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Upper Bound 3.55121  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.17712  
Median 2.95490  
Variance 2.462  
Std. Deviation 1.568979  
Minimum .000  
Maximum 7.673  
Range 7.673  
Interquartile Range 2.116  
Skewness .467 .257 
NORMALISED FIRMSIZE 
Kurtosis .117 .508 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 




.136 88 .000 .975 88 .080 
a. Lilliefors significance correction 
Source: developed from analysis 
 
With Shapiro-Wilk at 0.08 >0.05 significance, normality has been achieved in the 




4.13    Treatment of missing data value  
 
 
Small sample size and missing data 'are common problems with research in the 
area of financial distress' (Routledge & Gadenne, 2000:257). The data value 
found to be missing in this research relates to the non-availability of published 
data relating to the number of employees reported by listed firms for some of the 
years in the study period. Of the 88 sample firms, employee numbers were 
available for 68 of them. This was due to a change in public companies reporting 
requirements. The period within which firms are required to report such 
employee information was from 2000 to 2004 inclusive. In dealing with missing 
data, Hair et al. (2010:54) remark that there is no perfect imputation techniques 
for missing data and that: 'What should be recognised is that each method has 
advantages and disadvantages, such that the researcher must examine each 
missing data situation and select the most appropriate imputation method'. 
Further, they remark that 'mean substitution is one acceptable means of 
generating replacement values for the missing data', and that there are several 
other acceptable statistical methods which enable ‘the researcher to combine 
the estimates into a single composite’ to overcome this problem.(Hair et al., 
2010:64).    
 
An alternative solution to the missing employee numbers problem is to substitute 
the missing value with the value of the change in the provision for employee 
benefits for the sample firms with missing employee numbers to give a predictor 
variable called LAY-OFF, as a proxy for employee retrenchment, as defined in 
Table 1 (Independent variables) in Chapter 4. The provision for employee 
benefits is reported each year by all sample firms in their balance sheets. The 
rationale underpinning LAY-OFF is set out in Table 2 (Operational variables 







4.14      Rigour  
 
  Rigour in any research context dictates that the objectives of validity, 
reliability, accuracy and representativeness be met. In this research:  
 
1. validity is achieved by the observation of performance indicators, which 
  are the results of managerial actions 
 
2. reliability and accuracy is achieved by the use of independently audited 
public domain information as well as research subjects’ compliance and 
adherence to generally accepted accounting and auditing standards 
 
3. representativeness is achieved by the research subjects meeting 
rigorous predetermined financial criteria of improvements in three critical 
performance areas of profitability, leverage and liquidity, as stipulated in 
section 3.3.5, for distinguishing a successful turnaround firm from an 
unsuccessful one.  
 
Tan and See (2004) are of the opinion that the use of published annual reports 
of listed firms satisfies the validity and accuracy requirement. This is because 
such reports are signed as 'true and fair' by members of top management who 
hold important fiduciary responsibilities. In the Australian context, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission exercises regulatory and supervisory 
compliance with provisions set out in the Corporations Act. 
 
 
4.15      Conclusion 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction and chapter outline paragraph, this chapter 
operationalises the conceptual model of Chapter 3 for testing. It sets the stage 




independent variables, methodological framework, data attributes and sampling 
procedures for this research. The effectiveness of the sampling criterion of '+++-' 
was statistically tested and found to be effective in identifying sample firms with 
deterioration in financial performance decline. As MRA assumes variable 
normality, firm size (FIRMSIZ) is normalised by logarithmic transformation 
















The overall objective of this chapter is to report on the patterns and trends of 
test results and analyse them for their relevance to the research questions and 
hypotheses. 
  
Section 5.2 of this chapter operationalises the conceptual research model 
described in Chapter 3 and the research methodology of Chapter 4. This section 
also reports and analyses the results of the multicollinearity test, the multiple 
regression model #1 test within the backdrop of the relevant hypotheses, 
discusses overall model fit and normality and linearity assessment. Section 5.3  
reports on the results of test model #2 'financial profile over time' of turnaround 
versus non-turnaround firms. Section 5.4 reports on and analyses the results of 
test model #3 'intensity and timing'. Section 5.5 examines the effectiveness of 
retrenchment of employees as a turnaround operational strategy and reports on 
the results of test model #4 'employee retrenchment'. Section 5.6 reports on the 
results of test model #5 which deals with whether the predictor 'severity of 
decline' discriminates between firms that successfully recovered and those that 
did not. Section 5.7 reports on the test results of model #6 which is designed to 
test the hypothesis as to whether the amount of free assets is a significant 
predictor in discriminating between distressed firms that recovered and those 











The operationalised multiple regression analysis (MRA) model #1 is: 
           
 
ROTAdy2 = a + β1LAY-OFF + β2ASTSAL + β3 INTYCHG + β4DIV + β5COMLEV +  
 
β6SHAREPLC + β7CEOCHG + β8BODSIZ + β9NEWBUS + β10 SALGRO +  
 





a is the constant, the vertical axis intercept 
 
βn = beta coefficients 
 
ε = error term (or residual) 
 
 
Dependent variable is: 
 
 
ROTAdy2 = return on total assets at the end of dy2 where dy2 = two years or   
 
second financial year end/period post-distress. 
 
 




LAY-OFF  = employee retrenchment. 
 
ASTSAL = plant and equipment and fixed asset sales (ASSET SALES) 
 
INTYCHG = change in inventory level (INVENTORY CHANGE) 
 
DIV = change in dividend paid or provided (DIVIDEND) 
 
COMLEV = change in financial leverage and debt servicing ability (LEVERAGE). 
 






CEOCHG = CEO change (CEO CHANGE) 
 
BODSIZ = Board of directors size change (BOARD SIZE) 
 
NEWBUS = new business or segment (NEW BUSINESS) 
 
SALGRO = sales revenue growth (SALES GROWTH) 
 
DIVEST = divestments of business units and/or entities (DIVESTITURES) 
 
 
The predictor variables are defined, explained and rationalised in Table 1 and 
Table 2 of Chapter 4. 
 
 
Control environmental variables are: 
 
 










NFIRMSIZ = Normalised firm size (FIRM SIZE) 
 
 




The 14 independent variables are within the minimum MRA requirement of  
having 'at least five times more cases than independent variables' (Coakes, 
2005:169) given a sample size of 88 firms (number of cases). 
 
 
Significance of statistical test results are reported in the following manner as 




• significant : p < 0.05  
• highly significant: p < 0.01  
• very highly significant: p <0.001  
 








Multicollinearity refers to the problem of the independent predictor variables 
being co-related with each other, that is, they measure the same thing or 
construct. Such a problem affects the regression co-efficient of the predictor 
variable, as in an MRA model the regression co-efficient measures the effect of 
a unit change in the predictor variable on the dependent variable, while holding 
other predictor variables constant. Multicollinearity will therefore result in 
imprecise regression co-efficient for the affected variable (Hair et al., 2010; 
Mendenhall & Sincich, 1989).  
 
 
To test for multicollinearity of all the variables in the model, the Pearson 
correlation test is performed. 
 
 
Table 9 shows the summary results of the SPSS Pearson correlation test and 
the mean and standard deviation of variables used in the MRA model. 
 
 
According to (Bryman & Cramer, 2005), a correlation value equal to or in excess 
of 0.8 for a predictor variable would indicate a multicollinearity problem. 
In Table 9, all the values of the predictor and control variables in the Pearson 
correlation matrix are less than 0.8, including those that are tested significant, 





Further confirmation of this is the VIF and tolerance values. The VIF (variance 
inflation factor) relating to the coefficient of each predictor (i.e. independent 
variable) provides an indication of whether a coefficient is badly estimated. A 
small VIF value indicates multicollinearity is not a problem. Per Montgomery, 
Peck, et al. (2006:307) 'if any VIF exceeds five or ten, that coefficient is poorly 
estimated or unstable because of near-linear dependences among the 
regressors.'  
 
The VIFs in Table 10 entitled 'Coefficients' are all less than two (i.e. maximum 
value 1.657, minimum value 1.049) and not within five to ten, hence 
multicollinearity and poor estimation of coefficients have not been violated. A 
tolerance value—the VIF is the inverse of the tolerance value—near to one 
would not indicate a multicollinearity problem (Hair et al., 2010:201). In Table 10 




Table 9 Pearson correlation test results 
 
Source: developed from analysis 
† p <0.1;   * p <0.05 ;   ** p <0.01;   *** p <0.001 
 
Variables 

























                          
 
3.BOARD SIZE 
0.136 1.904 -.171 -.072 -                         
 
4 CEO CHANGE 




7.041 53.741 .269* -.027 .042 -.012 -                     
 
6.DIVIDEND 
-14.484 112.738 -.037 .021 .080 -.089 -.006 -                   
 
7.DIVESTITURE 
0.614 0.490 -.171 .119 .094 .310** -.031 -.042 -                 
 
8.GDP CHANGE 
0.077 0.016 .123 -.104 .074 -.057 .104 -.009 -.050 -               
 
9.INDUSTRY      
RETURN ON 
TOTAL ASSETS 




-0.140 0.975 -.006 .004 -.094 .188 .006 -.019 .150 .147 .066 -           
 
11.LAY-OFF 
0.162 1.899 .081 -.058 .056 .073 .118 .023 .050 -.028 .219* -.009 -         
 
12.NEW BUSINESS 




3.219 1.569 .141 -.004 -.097 .037 .071  -.278** .127 .351** .084 .058 -.221* .209 -     
 
14.SALE GROWTH 













To test hypotheses one, two, three, four, and five, the MRA model as per section 
5.2 is run using the SPSS computer software. The following table, Table 10, 




Table 10 Summary results of MRA model #1. 
 
 























df Mean square F Sig. 
Regression 7.110 14 0.508 8.262 0.000a 
Residual 4.487 73 0.061   
Total 11.597 87    
 
a. Predictors: (constant), asset sales, board size, CEO change, leverage, dividend, 
divestiture, GDP change, industry return on assets, inventory change, lay-off, new 
business, normalised firm size, sale growth, share placement.  
 



















Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Constant -.173 .146   -1.183 .241     
ASSET SALES .006 .006 .069 .921 .360 .954 1.049 
BOARD SIZE -.029 .015 -.150 -1.905 .061† .855 1.169 
CEO CHANGE -.043 .064 -.056 -.679 .499 .789 1.267 
LEVERAGE .001 .001 .218 2.775 .007** .856 1.168 
DIVIDEND .000 .000 .090 1.129 .263 .837 1.195 
DIVESTITURES -.052 .061 -.070 -.859 .393 .796 1.257 
GDP CHANGE .005 1.821 .000 .003 .998 .791 1.265 
INDUSTRY 
ROTA 
-.326 .589 -.044 -.555 .581 .848 1.179 
INVENTORY 
CHANGE 
-.006 .029 -.016 -.201 .841 .880 1.136 
LAY-OFF .027 .016 .142 1.745 .085† .806 1.241 
NEW BUSINESS -.125 .068 -.168 -1.852 .068† .646 1.549 
FIRMSIZE .074 .022 .316 3.372 .001** .604 1.657 
SALES 
GROWTH 
.002 .000 .679 8.852 .000*** .900 1.111 
SHARE 
PLACEMENT 
.302 .176 .139 1.714 .091† .806 1.240 
 
Source: developed from analysis 
 
a. dependent variable: Return On Total Assets (ROTATY) 
 




The results of the multiple regression analysis in Table 10 indicates that the 
seven independent variables together account for a majority of 61.3% (R2) of the 
variance in the dependent variable ROTATY (i.e. the return on total assets at the 
end of two years or second financial year end/period post-distress). The F 
statistic at 8.262 shows a significance level of p <0.001 (i.e. 0.000), indicating 





The above coefficients in Table 10 shows that the seven independent variables 
with various levels of significance are: 
 
     










The rest of the predictor (independent) variables were tested not significant.  
 
 
The partial regression coefficients (standardised Beta’s) relating to the seven 
variables are in the right direction as expected, except for COMLEV and the 
NEWBUS (new business) variable.  
 
 
5.2.3   Stepwise regression analysis 
 
 
In order to find out which among the predictor variables are the most influential 
in accounting for the variance on the dependent variable, a stepwise multiple 
regression was preformed (Sekaran, 2003:407). Results of this test are 
summarised below. 
 









Independent Variables Std.Beta coefficients Sig. 
BOARD SIZE -0.150 0.061† 
LEVERAGE 0.218 0.007** 
LAY-OFF 0.142 0.085† 
NEW BUSINESS -0.168 0.068† 
FIRMSIZE 0.316 0.001** 
SALES GROWTH 0.679 0.000*** 
SHARE PLACEMENT 0.139 0.091† 
Independent Variables R2 CHANGE Sig. 
SALES GROWTH 0.438 0.000*** 
FIRM SIZE 0.047 0.007** 
BOARD SIZE 0.039 0.011* 
LEVERAGE 0.031 0.019* 




As can be seen from the above, the four predictors account for the bulk (56%) of 
the variance in the dependent variable with change in sales accounting for 44% 
of the 56%.  
 
 
5.2.4   Hierarchical regression analysis  
 
 
To determine which set of predictor variables is significant in adding to the 
variance of the dependent variable a hierarchical regression analysis is 






From the above results, the seven predictors of 'sales growth, leverage, firm 
size, board size, lay-off, share placement and new business', taken as a set of 
strategies account for 59% of the 61% variance in the dependent variable, 
ROTATY (return on assets). Of the 59%, the hierarchical regression analysis 
shows that the first four predictor combination of 'sales change, leverage, firm 
size and board size', accounts for the lion’s share of 56% and 'lay-off, share 
placement and new business', account for 3%.  Other predictor variables of 
'asset sales, inventory change, dividend, CEO change, divestiture, industry 
ROTA (industry effect) and GDP change (economy effect)', were tested not 
significant. 
Independent Variables R2 CHANGE Sig. 
SALES GROWTH,LEVERAGE,FIRM SIZE,BOARD SIZE, 0.555 0.000*** 
LAY-OFF,SHARE PLACEMENT, NEW BUSINESS 0.035 0.084† 





                                                                                                                                 
H1 ROTA is positively related to the adoption of a combination of operational, 
financial and strategic turnaround strategies, is supported. 
 
H4 The likelihood of a successful turnaround is positively related to firm size, is 
supported. 
  
This is because the combination of sales growth (strategic), firm size (contextual 
control), leverage (financial), new business (strategic), share placement 
(financial), board size (strategic) and employee lay-off (operational) has a 
significant effect on the dependent variable ROTA.  
 
H2 Industry effect is significant in influencing profitability and the likelihood of 
successful turnaround, is not supported. 
 
H3 The effect of the economy is significant in influencing profitability and the 
likelihood of successful turnaround, is not supported. 
 
H5 Operational restructuring strategies (i.e. efficiency improvement efforts) are 
more effective in achieving financial performance turnarounds than strategic and 
financial restructuring strategies, is mildly supported (Employee layoff, as an 
example of efficiency improvement strategies, was tested significant at p=0.085 
< 0.1 level).  
 
5.2.5 Overall model fit—assessment and generalisability 
 
 
There is no marked difference between the adjusted R2 value and the R2 value 
(0.613 versus 0.539, see Table 10) indicating that there is little loss in the 




model (Hair et al., 2010:227). The standard error of the estimate in Table 10 
shows 0.247927, which means that at the 95% confidence level (p<0.05) the 
margin of error for any predicted value of ROTA can be calculated to be within ± 
0.5 (± 1.96 x standard error of the estimate, i.e. ± 1.96 x 0.247927 = ± 0.49) 
variation, which is not material. However, for generalisability, the guideline is 
that the ratio of observations to variables in the regression equation should be at 
least 20:1 (Coakes, 2005; Hair et al., 2010:219). The model meets the minimum 
requirement for multiple regression analysis of five observations to one variable 
(Coakes, 2005:169) in that it has 88 observations to 14 variables, a ratio of 
6.3:1. Hence, although it meets the multiple regression minimum conditions it 
may have limited generalisabilty. 
 
 
5.2.6 Normality and linearity assessment 
 
 
The scatterplot of residuals against predicted values indicates that there is no 
clear relationship between residuals and predicted values indicating the 
assumption of linearity for the regression variate (Coakes, 2005; Hair et al., 
2010). Normal probability plots of the residuals show the values fall within the 
diagonal with no substantial or systematic departures indicating that the 




5.3      Further analysis—model #2 financial profile over time 
 
 
This analysis is not to test any hypothesis. The objectives of this test are 





The first objective of this test and analysis of its results is to identify recovery 
firms from those that did not recover or did not fully recover according to the 
three-fold criteria of financial health: those of improvement in profitability, 
financial leverage and liquidity.  The second objective of this test is to 
supplement the MRA test Model #1 described above. This is because of the 
small sample size of 88 and the MRA constraint of having a minimum of 'at least 
five times more cases than independent variables' (Coakes, 2005:169). The 14 
independent variables are within the minimum MRA requirement given a sample 
size of 88 firms (number of cases). That is, the MRA model #1 has 6.3:1 
predictor variables to one sample firm (case). As this technical constraint, 
because of sample size, limits the number of independent (predictor) variables 
one can have in the MRA model #1, this test 'model #2 financial profile over 
time' is designed to pick up any discriminating trends that separate recovery 
firms from non-recovery ones. In the course of doing so, more effective 
turnaround strategies not tested by the MRA model may be detected. 
 
Having determined the set of predictors which are tested statistically significant 
in explaining the variance in the dependent variable ROTA, the next section 
5.3.1 examines the financial profile of the sample firms at the end of their 








 Model #2 financial profile over time 
 
 
In accordance with Chapter 4, the financial profile of the 88 sample firms at the 
end of the second financial year/period post-distress was examined under the 





1. Operating efficiency/profitability: 
 Proxy measurement variable: 
 
• DYROTA-BND (defined as the distress year/period return on total 
assets minus the three-year Australian Government bond yield rate ) 
 
• TYROTA-BND (defined as the target second financial year/period 
post-distress return on total assets minus the three-year Australian 
Government bond yield rate ) 
 
2. Financial leverage  
 Proxy measurement variable: 
 
• LTD/TA (defined as total of long-term debts divided by total assets)  
 
3. Liquidity: working capital  
 Proxy measurement variable: 
 
• CA/CL (defined as total current assets divided by total current 
liabilities) 
For analysis purpose, this study classifies the 88 sample firms’ financial profile 
into three categories based on the following criteria. 
 
Category one (recovery firms): these are firms which satisfy the stringent 
three-fold inclusive turnaround criteria of: 
 
TYROTA –BND  >0 (that is, the return on total assets at the end of the second 
financial year/period post-distress is greater than the Australian government 






TYLTD/TA – DYLTD/TA <0 (that is, the ratio of total long-term debt to total 
assets at the end of the second financial year/period post-distress is less than 
that which existed at the end of the distress year). 
 
TYCA/TYCL ≥1 (that is, current asset ratio at the end of the second financial 
year/period is greater or equal to one). 
 
Category two (partial recovery firms): these are firms which satisfy the 
profitability criterion of TYROTA-BND >0 only. 
 
Category three (non-recovery firms): these are non-recovered firms with 
TYROTA-BND < 0 that is, they did not satisfy the profitability criterion. 
 
 
A Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test is performed to compare and examine the 
differences in the above defined financial profile variables, of category two and 
three firms with that of category one firms over time DY, DY1 and DY2. Tables 
11a, 11b and 11c show the financial profile of the three categories of firms in 
accordance with the above financial variables at the end of the distress year DY 
and second financial year or reporting period post-distress (DY2).  
 
A summary of the mean values of their financial profile is reported in Table 12. 
















DY = distress year 
 
TY = target year, which is the end of the two years/second financial year end 
reporting period post-distress (i.e. DY+2). 
 
Firm size = firm’s market capitalisation in millions of dollars prior to distress 
 
ROTA = return on total assets 
 
ROTA-BND = ROTA minus three-year Australian government bond rate 
 
LTD/TA = long-term debt divided by total assets 
 























A.I.E Limited 16.6 -0.021 0.060 -0.076 0.016 0.341 0.083 1.079 1.121 
Austal Limited 252.7 -0.154 0.149 -0.199 0.098 0.061 0.048 1.218 2.271 
Ausdrill Limited 31.4 -0.028 0.058 -0.087 0.002 0.118 0.061 1.037 1.756 
Avatar Industries Limited 23.9 -0.022 0.105 -0.078 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.934 1.195 
Brandrill Limited 18.3 -0.203 0.066 -0.247 0.015 0.299 0.146 0.520 1.103 
Data3 Limited 18.4 -0.040 0.098 -0.105 0.054 0.048 0.002 0.870 1.045 
Eumundi Group Limited 4.8 -0.002 0.169 -0.056 0.111 0.597 0.375 0.476 1.543 
Embelton Limited 5.1 -0.013 0.077 -0.068 0.032 0.202 0.001 1.460 1.561 
Austin Group Limited 13.7 -0.009 0.075 -0.066 0.020 0.111 0.001 1.321 1.829 
Optima ICM Limited 14.3 -1.715 0.088 -1.770 0.044 0.028 0.002 0.994 1.215 
Scott Corporation Limited 21.9 -0.013 0.088 -0.072 0.032 0.386 0.334 1.073 1.004 
SDS Corporation Limited 29.2 -0.022 0.096 -0.079 0.042 0.111 0.028 1.052 1.592 
Euroz Limited 2.2 -0.025 0.059 -0.081 0.004 0.098 0.000 1.565 1.615 
Count  = 13          
MEAN 34.8 -0.174 0.092 -0.229 0.040 0.185 0.083 1.046 1.450 
 























































Autron Corporation Limited 310.4 -0.022 0.086 -0.079 0.032 0.009 0.098 0.932 1.408 
Acma Engineering & 
Construction Group Limited 
23.4 -0.060 0.067 -0.113 0.022 0.000 0.168 0.710 0.836 
Aircruising Australia Limited 1.6 -0.013 0.078 -0.073 0.022 0.001 0.000 0.269 0.719 
Austral Coal Limited 119.7 -0.099 0.093 -0.153 0.035 0.249 0.395 0.212 0.774 
Coneco Limited 9.3 -0.085 0.201 -0.141 0.156 0.419 0.490 0.735 0.780 
Chiquitta Brands South Pacific 
Limited 
123.9 -0.047 0.074 -0.101 0.017 0.202 0.288 1.620 1.018 
Cumnock Coal Limited 175.4 -0.059 0.078 -0.110 0.024 0.014 0.000 1.236 0.841 
Coal & Allied Industries Limited 2149.1 -0.012 0.231 -0.066 0.179 0.201 0.020 0.541 0.627 
Concept Hire Limited 12.8 -0.254 0.191 -0.310 0.136 0.007 0.080 1.227 1.144 
Energy Developments Limited 394.4 -0.033 0.100 -0.077 0.049 0.356 0.361 0.667 2.500 
Energy World Corporation Ltd 17.5 -0.141 0.083 -0.196 0.025 0.221 0.443 0.108 1.065 
Hudson Investment Group 
Limited 
15.6 -0.052 0.130 -0.071 0.078 0.020 0.521 0.379 0.101 
Joyce Corporation Limited 17.5 -0.171 0.063 -0.227 0.018 0.000 0.301 0.815 1.255 
Macmahon Holdings Limited 14.3 -0.036 0.099 -0.091 0.054 0.329 0.196 0.670 0.622 
National Telecoms Limited 199.9 -1.971 0.542 -2.016 0.491 0.040 0.025 0.427 0.918 
Oldfields Holdings Limited 5.1 -0.206 0.075 -0.262 0.021 0.045 0.118 1.008 1.401 
Supply Network Limited 4.3 -0.025 0.117 -0.081 0.061 0.000 0.006 1.691 1.702 
COUNT = 17            






































Agenix Limited 60.9 -0.105 -0.557 -0.160 -0.615 0.116 0.000 1.436 2.525 
AJ Lucas Group Limited 79.9 -0.405 0.042 -0.456 -0.023 0.209 0.246 1.042 1.257 
Aurora Oil & Gas Limited 2.9 -0.128 -0.208 -0.183 -0.253 0.153 0.000 0.944 0.000 
Ausron Limited 72.1 -0.023 -0.043 -0.079 -0.088 0.099 0.003 1.007 0.600 
Bremer Park Limited 152.2 -0.020 0.001 -0.066 -0.053 0.260 0.389 1.176 1.109 
Capral Aluminium Limited 477.5 -0.039 -0.012 -0.090 -0.066 0.000 0.086 1.581 1.697 
Carlovers Carwash Limited 15.1 -0.129 0.059 -0.181 -0.006 0.254 0.136 0.310 0.331 
Cypress Lakes Group Limited 17.4 -0.062 -0.017 -0.113 -0.081 0.496 0.379 0.441 0.438 
P Cleland Enterprises Limited 27.4 -0.055 0.043 -0.111 -0.011 0.502 0.000 0.674 7.734 
Clough Limited 184.9 -0.124 -0.182 -0.175 -0.246 0.016 0.140 1.256 0.989 
Comops Limited 23.8 -0.141 -0.142 -0.192 -0.196 0.099 0.491 0.830 0.777 
CPI Group Limited 45.2 -0.045 0.020 -0.099 -0.038 0.051 0.000 1.752 1.507 
Country Road Limited 79.5 -0.042 0.037 -0.094 -0.023 0.044 0.024 2.481 2.812 
Drillsearch Energy Limited 5.7 -0.049 -0.046 -0.105 -0.100 0.005 0.003 0.457 1.577 
Dromana Estate Limited 6.1 -0.021 -0.067 -0.066 -0.118 0.034 0.005 1.558 1.868 
ERG Limited 917.8 -0.081 -0.065 -0.137 -0.120 0.398 0.075 1.176 0.995 
Forest Enterprises Australia 
Limited 
109.6 -0.116 0.010 -0.171 -0.035 0.004 0.095 0.909 1.119 
Gloucester Coal Ltd 26.9 -0.084 -0.212 -0.140 -0.267 0.648 0.079 1.330 0.716 
Graincorp Limited 391.5 0.000 0.045 -0.069 -0.008 0.368 0.290 1.113 1.373 
Garratt’s Limited 2.4 -0.019 -0.065 -0.139 -0.122 0.223 0.012 0.801 0.669 
Haoma Mining NL 23.2 -0.085 -0.315 -0.108 -0.369 0.000 0.040 0.517 0.215 
Harvest Living Limited 12.0 -0.026 -0.445 -0.940 -0.501 0.000 0.000 0.584 2.005 
Intellect Holdings Limited 92.6 -0.881 0.018 -0.425 -0.033 0.008 0.275 0.985 1.579 




































KTL Technologies Limited 6.8 -0.301 -0.333 -0.356 -0.387 0.021 0.143 0.677 0.700 
Lowan Australia Limited 6.7 -0.149 -0.083 -0.213 -0.134 0.131 0.170 1.049 1.194 
Lindsay Australia Limited 5.2 -0.020 0.030 -0.075 -0.015 0.083 0.244 0.866 1.035 
McConnell Dowell 
Corporation Limited 72.8 -0.025 0.033 -0.080 -0.011 0.003 0.014 1.389 1.398 
Mark Sensing Limited 22.5 -0.046 0.009 -0.091 -0.042 0.013 0.009 1.103 1.695 
Maryborough Sugar Factory 
Limited  16.1 -0.017 -0.205 -0.072 -0.250 0.064 0.064 0.477 0.551 
Multistack International 
Limited 12.4 -0.057 0.041 -0.110 -0.005 0.002 0.001 0.742 0.820 
Metroland Australia Limited 8.4 -0.015 -0.001 -0.075 -0.057 0.319 0.451 0.630 0.785 
Murchison United NL 133.2 -0.465 -2.290 -0.521 -2.344 0.010 0.000 0.201 0.254 
Network Foods Limited 2.7 -0.063 -0.045 -0.018 -0.096 0.133 0.051 1.303 1.408 
Ocean Capital Limited 7.5 -0.016 0.044 -0.071 -0.001 0.170 0.098 0.300 0.846 
Oldfields Holdings Limited 5.1 -0.206 0.075 -0.262 0.021 0.045 0.118 1.008 1.401 
Oriental Technologies 
Investment Limited 14.0 -0.010 0.056 -0.061 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.498 1.024 
Pasminco Limited 1001.4 -0.003 -0.032 -0.058 -0.077 0.669 0.000 0.420 0.584 
Port Douglas Reef Resorts 
Limited 22.2 -0.036 0.015 -0.092 -0.039 0.138 0.001 1.941 4.229 
Prime Life Corporation 
Limited 106.2 -0.077 0.033 -0.132 -0.024 0.212 0.165 0.867 0.414 
QR Sciences Holdings 
Limited 1.0 -0.008 -0.106 -0.063 -0.151 0.322 0.000 0.229 0.759 
Redbank Mines Limited 1.6 -0.001 -0.941 -0.057 -0.997 0.002 0.000 0.256 6.124 
Redflex Holdings Limited 48.0 -0.091 0.017 -0.151 -0.039 0.000 0.000 -0.155 2.620 
Reliance Mining Limited 10.4 -0.061 -0.192 -0.117 -0.247 0.000 0.000 1.692 41.719 
Raptis Group Limited 9.0 -0.018 0.025 -0.075 -0.030 0.228 0.281 0.992 0.546 
Retail Technology & 
Services Limited 9.6 -0.321 0.003 -0.377 -0.042 0.121 0.198 0.809 1.282 








Source: developed from analysis 
 




Table 12 Model #2 summary of mean values—financial profile of category one, 











Legend: cat1 = recovery firms, cat2 = partial recovery firms, cat3 = non-recovery 
firms 
ROTA = return on total assets 
ROTA-BND = ROTA minus three-year Australian bond rate  
LTD/TA = long-term debt divided by total assets 




























Scantech Limited 14.7 -0.397 -0.299 -0.449 -0.359 0.131 0.302 1.280 1.349 
Strathfield Group Limited 64.6 -0.056 0.043 -0.112 -0.011 0.006 0.155 1.030 1.159 
Service Stream Ltd 3.7 -0.005 -1.898 -0.061 -1.943 0.149 0.000 0.296 0.201 
Structural Systems Limited 16.3 -0.073 0.003 -0.129 -0.051 0.062 0.225 1.057 1.261 
Tandou Limited 37.5 0.000 -0.127 -0.052 -0.195 0.251 0.498 0.644 1.668 
Transmetro Corporation 
Limited 14.0 -0.053 0.042 -0.105 -0.018 0.432 0.382 0.630 1.158 
Thomas & Coffey Limited 21.8 -0.239 0.037 -0.295 -0.019 0.105 0.182 1.030 1.179 
Vietnam Industrial 
Investments Limited 19.1 -0.007 -0.016 -0.058 -0.077 0.075 0.009 1.107 1.152 
Vita Life Sciences Limited 108.9 -0.044 0.009 -0.090 -0.042 0.206 1.016 0.995 0.816 
Webster Limited 21.2 -0.012 0.008 -0.072 -0.048 0.192 0.168 1.350 1.296 
WCP Resources Limited 19.3 -0.001 -0.398 -0.056 -0.443 0.079 0.000 1.286 1.173 
Willmott Forests Limited 20.3 -0.041 0.038 -0.097 -0.016 0.135 0.152 0.893 0.646 
COUNT = 58          
MEAN 83.2 -0.103 -0.158 -0.163 -0.211 0.150 0.136 0.923 2.045^ 
    DISTRESS YEAR    POST-DISTRESS  
 CAT1 CAT2 
 
CAT3  CAT1 CAT2 
 
CAT3 
ROTA -0.174 -0.193 -0.103  0.092 0.136 -0.158 
ROTA-BND -0.229 -0.245 -0.163  0.040 0.084 -0.211 
LTD/TA 0.185 0.124 0.150  0.083 0.206 0.136 




Table 12a Financial profile: results of test of difference in mean values—














Table 12b Financial profile: results of test of difference in mean values—










Source: developed from analysis 
† p <0.1; *p <0.05;  ** p <0.01;  *** p <0.001 
 
(a) Excluding outliers with TY CA/CL>5.0, the mean value is 1.132 and z=-2.483 
with p= 0.013 
 
 




(i) Category one (recovery) versus category two (partial recovery)—distress year 
DY 
 
The mean values of category one’s ROTA in DY in Table 12a is -0.174 versus 
category two’s -0.193 with a Z-statistic of -1.843 and the difference in ROTA 
mean values is statistically mildly significant at the 0.1 level (p=0.065). However, 
the difference (severity of loss) in mean ROTA in DY in percentage terms 
between the category one and category two is only about 2% (-0.193 minus -
                 DISTRESS YEAR              POST-DISTRESS 












ROTA -0.174 -0.193 -1.843 0.065† 0.092 0.136 -1.298 0.194 
ROTA-BND -0.229 -0.245 -1.423 0.155 0.040 0.084 -1.215 0.225 
LTD/TA 0.185 0.124 -1.362 0.173 0.083 0.206 -1.949 0.051† 
CA/CL 1.046 0.779 -1.862 0.063† 1.450 1.042 -2.616 0.009* 
                 DISTRESS YEAR              POST-DISTRESS 
 CAT1 CAT3 
 










ROTA -0.174 -0.103 -1.071 0.284 0.092 -0.158 -5.583 0.000*** 
ROTA-BND -0.229 -0.163 -0.996 0.319 0.040 -0.211 -5.606 0.000*** 
LTD/TA 0.185 0.150 0.669 0.503 0.083 0.136 -0.734 0.463 




0.174). That is, the magnitude of their severity of distress is quite comparable in 
the distress year. 
 
The other variable which is tested statistically mildly significant at 0.1 level 
(p=0.063) is the liquidity ratio CA/CL with a Z-statistic of -1.862. The 
magnitude/quantum difference between mean CA/CL for category one and 
category two is about 27% (1.046-0.779). That is category one firms on average 
are about 27% more liquid than category two firms in the distress year (start of 
the distress–turnaround period). 
 
The other two financial profile ratios of ROTA-BND and LTD/TA for category one 
and category two firms in DY are tested not statistically significant with z = -
1.423, p= 0.155 and z =-1.362, p=0.173, respectively. On average, the 
difference in mean ROTA-BND between category one and category two firms in 
DY is about 2% (-0.229 minus – 0.245). The difference in mean LTD/TA in DY 
between category one and category two firms is about 6% (0.185-0.124). That 
is, category one firms are on average 6% more highly geared than category two 
firms in DY (start of the distress–turnaround period). 
 
In summary, the financial profile of category one and category two firms in DY is 
as follows. 
 
Severity of distress is fairy comparable (difference of about 2%) as indicated by 
their ROTAs and the difference is tested statistically mildly significant at the 0.1 
level. 
 
In terms of liquidity, category one firms are on average 27% more liquid than 






In terms of financial leverage, category one firms are on average 6% more 
geared than category two and the difference is not statistically significant.  
 
 
(ii) Category one (recovery) versus category two (partial recovery)—Post-
distress (i.e. DY+2)  
 
Moving from DY to DY2 post-distress, their financial profile changed as indicated 
in the Post-distress section in Table 12a. The difference in the mean profitability 
ratio variables of ROTA and ROTA-BND are tested not statistically significant, 
that is, ROTA z = -1.298, p=0.194 and ROTA-BND z = -1.215, p=0.225. 
However, the difference in mean leverage (LTD/TA) and liquidity (CA/CL) ratios 
are tested statistically mildly significant and significant respectively, that is, 
LTD/TA z = -1.949, p=0.051 (at 0.1 significance) and CA/CL z = -2.616, p=0.009 
(at 0.05 significance). In terms of profitability, category one firms have improved 
from a loss situation in DY of mean ROTA = -0.174 to a positive profit situation 
of mean ROTA = 0.092, a turnaround of about 27% (0.174+0.092). Similarly, 
category two firms’ profitability improved from a loss of mean ROTA in DY of -
0.193 to a profit situation of 0.136 in DY2; a turnaround of approximately 33% 
(i.e. 0.193+0.136). Category one’s improvement (decrease) in mean leverage 
LTD/TA is about 10% between DY and DY2 (i.e. 0.185-0.083). However, 
category two’s mean LTD/TA has moved in the opposite direction, an increase 
of about 8% from 0.124 in DY to 0.206 in DY2. This implies category two firms 
mainly fund the growth in profitability through long-term debt financing. This 
lends support to the MRA model’s test results, as described above, that debt 
when put to effective use is positively related to the profitability variable. Both 
category one and category two firms improved their liquidity positions as 
evidenced by the improvement in mean CA/CL of about 40% (i.e. 1.450-1.046) 
for category one and an improvement of about 26% (i.e. 1.042-0.779) for 
category two between DY and DY2. 
 






Both category one and two firms have on average improved their profitability 
performance from a loss to a profit situation, and the difference in the values of 
profitability ratios is statistically not significant. 
 
Both categories have improved their liquidity positions, with category one firms 
on average being more liquid than category two firms. The difference in the 
mean values of the liquidity ratio CA/CL is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. 
 
In the leverage area, both have moved in opposite directions with category one 
achieving a decrease in LTD/TA whilst category two’s mean LTD/TA has 
worsened. The difference in the mean values of LTD/TA is statistically mildly 
significant at the p < 0.1 level.   
 
 
(iii) Category one (recovery) versus category three (non-recovery)—distress 
year DY  
 
The mean values of category one’s ROTA in DY in Table 12b is -0.174 versus 
category three’s -0.103 with a Z-statistic of -1.071 and the difference in ROTA 
mean values is statistically not significant, p=0.284. The difference (severity of 
loss) in mean ROTA in DY in percentage terms between the category one and 
category three is about 7% (-0.174 minus -0.103). Similarly, there is no 
significant difference in the mean ROTA-BND in DY between category one and 
category three firms (i.e. z = -0.996, p=0.319). The difference in mean ROTA-
BND is also about 7% (i.e. -0.229 minus -0.163). On average, category one 
firms are 7% worst off in terms of the profitability ratios ROTA and ROTA-BND 





The other two financial profile ratios of LTD/TA and CA/CL for category one and 
category three firms are tested not statistically significant with z = 0.669, p= 
0.503 and z = -1.219, p=0.223, respectively. On average, the difference in the 
leverage ratio mean LTD/TA between category one and category three firms in 
DY is about 4% (0.185 – 0.150); with category one more geared than category 
three. The difference in the liquidity ratio mean CA/CL in DY between category 
one and category three firms is about 12% (1.046-0.923). That is, whilst 
category one and category three firms are quite comparable in the leverage 
department, on average category one is 12% more liquid than category three in 
DY (start of the distress–turnaround period). 
 
In summary, the financial profile of category one and category three firms in DY 
is as follows. 
 
In terms of profitability (severity of loss), on average category one is 7% worse 
off than category three, and this difference is statistically not significant.  
 
In terms of financial leverage, category one and category three firms are quite 
comparable, with category one being approximately 4% more geared between 
the two. This difference is not statistically significant. 
 
In terms of liquidity, category one firms are 12% more liquid than category three 
firms and the difference is not statistically significant. 
 
 
(iv) Category one (recovery) versus category three (non-recovery)—post-
distress (i.e. DY+2)  
 
Moving from DY to DY2 post-distress, their financial profile changed as indicated 
in the post-distress section in Table 12b, which shows a completely different 




positive with mean ROTA = 0.092 and mean ROTA-BND =0.040 respectively. 
Category three’s loss has worsened by 6%, that is, mean ROTA slipped from -
0.103 in DY to -0.158 in DY2, whilst category one on average achieved a 
turnaround in profitability of 27% (i.e. 0.092+0.174). The difference in mean 
ROTA and ROTA-BND is significant at the p < 0.001 level, that is, ROTA  z  = -
5.583, p =0.000; ROTA-BND z = -5.606, p =0.000.  
 
In terms of financial leverage, category one mean LTD/TA improved by about 
10% (i.e. 0.185-0.083) over the DY to DY2 period, whilst category three’s shows 
slight improvement of about 1.4% (i.e. 0.150-0.136). This difference is not 
statistically significant with z = -0.734, p = 0.463. 
 
In terms of liquidity, both categories have improved. Category one’s mean 
CA/CL improved by 40% from 1.046 DY to 1.450 DY2, and category three’s 
shows much improvement of 112% from 0.923 DY to 2.045 DY2. (If excluding    
outliers with TY CA/CL > 5.0, the improvement is 21% from 0.923 to 1.132 for 
category three). This difference in mean CA/CL is statistically mildly significant 
with z =-1.903, p = 0.057 at the <0.1 significance level. (If outliers are excluded, 
z = -2.483, p =0.013 at the <0.05 significance level). That is the results are 
significant in both cases. Category three firms, in their efforts to turnaround, 
actively sold off assets and inventories to repay debts—for example, in the 
financial year ended 30 June 2000 Reliance Mining Limited (Geographe 
Resources Limited) ran down/sold its gold bullion inventories to pay off $9million 
of debts in current liabilities and P Cleland Enterprises Limited in the financial 
year ended 30 June 2003 realised approximately $74 million from sale of assets, 
business and controlled entities to repay current and long-term debts.  Distress 
firms, category three, actively reduced debt level, especially those due and 
payable, to a more serviceable and affordable level relative to operating income 
to stay afloat. Repayment of debt in current liabilities improves the CA/CL ratio. 
Whilst category one firms, already on the road to recovery, felt less liquidity/cash 




In summary, by the end of DY2 we have: 
 
Category one firms have successful turnaround according to performance 
criteria set out in Chapter 3, whilst category three firms are still in a loss 
situation. The difference in profitability is statistically significant at the 0.001 
level. 
 
Both categories have decreased their financial leverage, with category one, on 
average, showing a bigger decrease of 10% compared to category three’s 
decrease of 1.4%. The difference in LTD/TA is not statistically significant. 
 
In the area of liquidity, both show improvement with category three’s 
improvements (112%) far outstripping category one’s (40%). The difference in 
CA/CL between category one and three is statistically mildly significant at the p 
<0.1 level. (If adjusting for outliers the improvement for category three is 21% 
with p<0.05 significance level). Both categories use their improvement in 
liquidity to lower long term debts with category one firms’ LTD/TA mean value 
falling by 10% (0.185 to 0.083) by the end of DY2 than category three’s falling 
by only 1.4% (0.150 to 0.136) for the same period.  
 
 
5.4 Model #3 intensity and timing 
 
Having looked at the changing financial profiles of the three categories of firms 
between DY and post-distress DY2, which reflect the results of strategies 
adopted and identified by the MRA test as per section 5.2.2, the following 
section examines the intensity and timing of strategies implemented by the 
sample firms. 
 





Intensity of efforts and timely execution of turnaround strategies are positively 
related to the likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 
'Intensity' is proxied by the amount incurred by the sample firms for the following 
activities, as defined by the test variables below, which is repeated here for easy 
reference. 
 
Each of the 'activity' values as reported in the financial statements is expressed 
as a proportion of the pre-distress year’s total asset values, except for CEO 
change, divestitures and new industry or geographical segments, which are 
differently defined as indicated below. The common base values of using the 
pre-distress year’s total assets is to enable one to gauge the intensity of 
turnaround strategies adopted by the sample firms  over time.  Increasing 
resultant ratio over DY, DY1 and DY2 implies increasing intensity and 
decreasing ratio value implies decreasing intensity. 
 
The following formulas where they are labelled with the descriptor ‘change’ are 
not defined in the change mode format—that is they are not defined as time ‘t1 
value minus to value’ format. The descriptor ‘change’ should be read as ‘intensity 
of expenditure relative to or as a proportion of pre-distress year’s assets’. The 
preference for using the descriptor ‘change’ is in keeping with the sense and 
objective of the following corresponding result/analysis section of 5.4 whereby 
the increase or decrease in intensity of turnaround strategy for each of the test 
variable over the dy1 and dy2 post distress periods are reported and analysed.  
 
 
Hence:      
 
Asset sales intensity = cash received for asset sales divided by pre-distress 





Inventory change = inventory divided by pre-distress year’s total assets.     
 
Dividend change = dividend paid or provided divided by pre-distress year’s total 
assets.      
 
Long-term debt change = long term debt divided by pre-distress year’s total 
assets.      
 
Equity issue/placement intensity = cash received via equity raising divided by 
pre-distress year’s total assets.  Equity raising includes also quasi-equity 
instruments like convertible notes, options and rights issue.     
 
Financial assets/investment sales intensity = cash received for financial 
investment assets sales divided by pre-distress year’s total assets.      
 
CEO change = one or zero otherwise     
 
Divestitures = one or zero otherwise     
 
New industry or geographical segment = difference between the pre-distress 
year’s number of business (industry) segments and geographical segments 
reported in the sample firms’ annual financial report and that reported for the 
distress year and each of the two post-distress years/periods.     
 
New/increase or reduction in plant and equipment expenditure intensity = total 
cost of plant and equipment divided by pre-distress year’s total assets.  
Category one firms’ activity intensity is separately compared to category two 
firms' and category three firms'. 
 
 





The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test is used to assess the 
statistical difference in the mean values of the intensity of turnaround efforts per 
summary Table 13. Category one (recovery) firms’ parameters are separately 
compared to category two’s (partial recovery) and category three’s (non-
recovery). The results of the MWU tests are tabulated in Tables 14a and 14b 
below. 
 
Table 13 examines the intensity of turnaround strategies of recovered and non-
recovered firms over the distress and post-distress periods. It summarises the 
intensity (mean values) of turnaround strategy over time, being at the end of the 
distress year and at the end of year one or next financial reporting period 





Table 13 Model #3 summary of intensity (mean values) of turnaround strategies 




Distress Year  
 DY 
Distress Year +1  
DY1 
Distress Year +2 
DY2 
 
CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 
Turnaround strategy          
Operational restructuring          
  Asset sales 0.012 0.040 0.052 0.081 0.046 0.085 0.012 0.034 0.062 
  Inventory change 0.165* 0.095* 0.177 0.171† 0.080† 0.137 0.188† 0.092† 0.146 
Financial restructuring          
  Dividend change 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.017** 0.014 0.003** 
  Long-term debt change 0.495 0.322 0.305 0.372 0.328 0.273 0.240 0.328 0.344 
  Equity issue/placement  0.079 0.023 0.053 0.084 0.018 0.111 0.123 0.009 0.103 
  Financial assets/investments 
sales 0.002 0.017 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.121 0.001 0.005 
Strategic restructuring          
 CEO change 0.308 0.235 0.276 0.385 0.235 0.241 0.231 0.118 0.276 
  Divestitures 0.231 0.235 0.234 0.385 0.235 0.310 0.385 0.176 0.293 
  New industry or geographical 
segment -0.231 -0.059 0.052 -0.538† -0.353 0.052† -0.385 -0.353 -0.155 
New / increase or reduction 
plant & equipment  0.354 0.460 0.336 0.275 0.505 0.242 0.290† 0.549† 0.308 
 
Source: developed from analysis 
 
See tables 14a and 14b for MWU test results of corresponding Z-statistic score 
and p-value.  
 
† p <0.1;   * p <0.05 ;   ** p <0.01;   *** p <0.001 
 
 





Table 14a Model #3 test statistics intensity comparison between category one 








Source: developed from analysis 
a. not corrected for ties                                                             
 † p <0.1;   * p <0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 














































Mann -Wh i t n e y  U 104.500 102.500 100.500 110.000 9 9 . 0 0 0 62.500 99.000 102.000 93 . 000 108.000 
W i l c o x o n  W 195.500 255.500 191.500 201.000 190.000 215.500 252.000 255.000 184.000 199.000 
Z - . 2 5 3 - . 4 3 7 - . 5 3 8 - . 0 2 9 - . 6 8 9 - 2 . 009 - . 4 8 1 - . 4 0 2 - . 7 3 2 - . 2 4 2 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 8 0 1 . 6 6 2 . 5 9 1 . 9 7 7 . 4 9 1 . 0 4 5 * . 6 3 0 . 6 8 8 . 4 6 4 . 8 0 9 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed Sig.) 
 
. 8 0 5 a . 7 4 2 a . 6 8 0 a 1 . 0 0 0 a . 6 5 0 a . 0 4 3 a . 6 5 0 a . 7 4 2 a . 4 8 3 a . 9 3 4 a 





































Mann -Wh i t n e y  U 8 5 . 5 0 0 94.000 100.500 94.000 9 3 . 5 0 0 67 . 500 1 00 . 0 0 0 89.500 7 3 . 0 0 0 107.000 
W i l c o x o n  W 238.500 247.000 191.500 247.000 246.500 220.500 1 91 . 0 0 0 242.500 164.000 198.000 
Z - 1 . 0 8 2 - . 8 7 0 - . 5 9 9 - . 8 7 0 - 1 . 6 4 5 - 1 . 8 0 1 - . 4 3 9 - . 9 9 2 - 1 . 5 6 9 - . 1 8 1 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 2 7 9 . 3 8 5 . 5 4 9 . 3 8 5 . 1 0 0 . 0 7 2 † . 6 6 0 . 3 2 1 . 1 1 7 . 8 5 6 
Exact Sig.(2-tailed Sig.) . 3 0 0 a . 5 0 9 a . 6 8 0 a . 5 0 9 a . 4 8 3 a . 0 7 2 a . 6 8 0 a . 3 8 5 a . 1 2 3 a . 9 0 2 a 




































Mann -Wh i t n e y  U 108.500 98.000 109.000 8 7 . 5 00 107.000 6 9 . 5 00 73.000 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 68.000 106.000 
W i l c o x o n  W 199.500 251.000 200.500 240.500 198.000 222.000 164.000 2 5 3 . 0 0 0 159.000 197.000 
Z - . 0 8 5 - . 8 1 0 - . 0 4 5 - 1 . 2 5 6 - . 2 8 1 - 1 . 7 1 7 - 1 . 569 - . 5 4 2 -1.779 - . 2 2 5 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 9 3 2 . 4 1 8 . 9 6 4 . 2 0 9 . 7 7 8 . 0 8 6 † . 1 1 7 . 5 8 8 . 0 7 5 † . 8 2 2 




Table 14b Model #3 test statistics intensity comparison between category one 









Source: developed from analysis 
† p <0.1;   *p <0.05;  ** p <0.01; ***p< 0.001 
b. Grouping variable: Cat  





































Mann -Wh i t n e y  U 317.500 365.000 347.500 364.500 305.000 337.500 361 . 000 3 6 4 . 0 0 0  289.500 324.000 
W i l c o x o n  W 2028.500 2076.000 438.500 455.500 396.000 2048.500 452 . 000 2075.000 2000.500 415.000 
Z - . 8 9 5 - . 2 2 9 - . 6 1 5 - . 2 4 1 - 1 . 3 2 8 - . 5 8 7 - . 2 3 8 - . 2 1 9 - 1 . 3 0 1 -1.170 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 3 7 1 . 8 1 9 . 5 3 9 . 8 1 0 . 1 8 4 . 5 5 7 . 8 1 2 . 8 2 7 . 1 9 3 . 2 4 2 





































Mann-Whi tney  U 318.000 323.000 368.500 349.000 347.500 318.500 374.000 377.000 293.500 283.500 
W i l c o x o n  W 2029.000 2034.000 2079.500 2060.000 438.500 2029.500 2085.000 2088.000 2004.500 374.500 
Z - . 8 8 2 - 1 . 0 4 7 - . 2 1 9 - . 5 1 4 - . 6 1 5 - . 8 7 1 - . 0 4 5 . 0 0 0 -1.242 - 1 . 8 5 9 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 3 7 8 . 2 9 5 . 8 2 7 . 6 0 8 . 5 3 9 . 3 8 4 . 9 6 4 1 . 0 0 0 . 2 1 4 . 0 6 3 † 



































Mann-Whitney U 351.000 360.000 246.000 342.500 346.000 307.000 288.500 340.500 268.500 305.500 
W i l c o x o n  W 442.000 451.000 1957.000 2053.500 437.000 2018.000 379.500 431.500 1979.500 396.500 
Z -.396 -.330 -2.888 -.640 -.732 -1.043 -1.316 -.609 -1.614 -1.320 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 




Results of test of intensity and timing of turnaround strategies (model #3). 
 
Table 13 above shows the shifting pattern of the intensity of efforts expended on 
each turnaround strategy over time by category one, two and three firms. 
 
 
Asset sales:  
 
For all firms, the intensity of asset sales increased in the first year/period 
following the distress year. For category one, starting with a mean value of 
0.012 at the end of the distress year DY, it increased to 0.081 one year post-
distress (DY1) and eased off dramatically in year two (DY2) after distress at 
0.012. This is expected as the need to generate more cash inflows decreases 
once a recovering firm is well on the road to recovery. Category two’s mean 
values for the corresponding years/periods show less variations starting at 
0.040, then 0.046 and then 0.034. On the other hand, category three’s mean 
values show increasing intensity being maintained, starting at 0.052, then 0.085 
and only slight easing-off at the end of the second year post-distress at 0.062. 
This is expected as a non-turnaround firm would indulge in more asset sales to 
make ends meet. The difference in mean values for asset sales intensity is 
tested not statistically significant for all cases. This indicates that all firms 
indulged in asset sales with intensity in the first year following distress in their 





Funds tied up in excess inventory amount to idle unproductive cash and are an 
indication of the inefficiency of short-term asset utilisation/realisation. To release 
this idle tied-up cash, firms will try to increase turnover of inventory (e.g. through 




inventory on hand at the end of each reporting period or financial year. 
Surprisingly, except for category three, the mean values of inventory change for 
category one and two in Table 13 did not show a convincing downward trend 
between the distress year and the post-distress years. However, there is a 
significant difference in inventory change in DY between categories one and two 
(z = -2.009, p=0.045, <0.05, refer to Table 14a panel one). Category one shows 
a gradual build up of inventories (i.e. 0.165 at the end of DY, 0.171 in DY1 and 
0.188 at the end of DY2). Category two shows a decrease of about 16% from 
0.095 at the end of DY to 0.080 at the end of DY1 and back up to 0.092 at the 
end of DY2. In DY1, the difference in mean values of inventory change between 
category one and category two is statistically mildly significant with z = - 1.801, 
p=0.072, < 0.1, refer to Table14a panel two. Similarly in DY2, the difference in 
mean value of inventory change between category one (mean value 0.188) and 
two (mean value 0.092) is tested mildly significant with z=-1.717, p=0.086, < 
0.10, refer to Table14a panel three. Category three firms, by themselves, do 
overall show a gradual decrease over the period in question, with 0.177 at the 
end of DY, 0.137 at the end of DY1 and 0.146 at the end of DY2, (i.e. a 
decrease of about 18% from DY 0.177 to 0.146 at the end of DY2). The figures 
tend to suggest that category one’s mean inventory level increased gradually as 
sales improved, whilst category three firms were still reducing inventory levels 
two years post-distress in an effort to turnaround and improve cash flow. 
Category one firms’ inventory level mean value of 0.188 at the end of the DY2 is 
two times greater than category two’s 0.092, suggesting that recovering 
category one firms, with improvement in liquidity37, built up their inventory to a 







                                                     
37 Analysis of liquidity proxy measurement CA/CL tabulated in Table 12a shows significant 




Dividend change:  
 
When faced with profitability and cash flow problems, a firm will try to 'walk a 
tight rope' between cutting dividends to shareholders without unduly damaging 
its market reputation and its shareholder relationship. Category one and two 
firms’ mean values for dividend change show similar pattern for dividend change 
intensity. Category one reduced their dividend intensity mean value to 0.001 by 
the end of DY1 from 0.002 in DY (a decrease of 50%), but increased it in DY2 to 
0.017. For category two, similar patterns are evident at 0.004 in DY1 and an 
increase to 0.014 at the end of DY2. On the other hand, category three’s post-
distress years (DY1 and DY2) dividend change mean values at 0.003 are less 
than their distress year’s 0.010 (a decrease of 70%). This reduction in dividend 
by financially distressed firms in their efforts to turnaround has empirical support 
(e.g. DeAngelo & DeAngelo 1990). Recovered firms—for example, category one 
in this instance—appear to restore their dividend policy/amount per share as 
soon as cash flow and profitability allow them to do so in order to protect and 
maintain their market image and shareholder relationship. This is evidenced by 
the significant difference in mean values (z = -2.888, p=0.004, < 0.01, refer 
Table14b panel three) between category one (mean value 0.017) and category 




Long-term debt change: 
 
 
Debt or the level of leverage in capital structure carries the burden of having 
enough profits to service the level of debt and meet bank or financier debt 
covenant. As interest commitments are a charge against profit irrespective of 
whether there is enough profit to meet such charges, distress firms will try to 
embark on strategies to reduce or refinance their existing debts by seeking out 
lower interest bearing debt instruments and/or less onerous financial obligations. 
Category one firms’ mean values of long-term debt change intensity shows a 




distress and down to 0.240 (i.e. about half—52%—of its distress year’s 0.495) at 
the end of DY2. Category two firm’s mean values stay fairly constant throughout 
the distress and post-distress years at 0.322, 0.328 and 0.328, whilst category 
three firms’ 0.305, 0.273 and 0.344 evidenced a slight decrease at the end of 
one year post-distress (to 0.273), but a slight increase back to the 0.344 distress 
year level in DY2. The evidence tends to suggest recovery or turnaround firms 
are those that are more successful in reducing their debt level. This intensity of 
effort seems to gather pace in the first year post-distress (DY1) whereby the 
mean value went from 0.495 to 0.372, which is a 25% decrease for category one 
firms. However, the difference is tested not statistically significant in all cases.  
This implies debt reduction may not be the single determining factor for 







Distress firms facing cash flow problems will seek out alternative cheaper and 
less onerous sources of finance. Equity raising is an attractive source of finance, 
as dividend—which is the cost of equity capital—is an appropriation of profit and 
not a charge against profit and need not be paid if there is not enough profit to 
meet such obligation. However, the ability of a distress firm to seek out equity 
finance is often constrained by the general economic environment and its own 
financial and profitability status. In a down economy, equity raising from the 
capital markets and the general public can arguably be less likely to be 
successful than in a boom economy. In Table 13, Category one firms are found 
to intensify their equity issue/placement efforts during the distress year and 
throughout the post-distress years with mean values of 0.079, 0.084 and 0.123. 
Category two firms showed a decreasing trend of intensity with mean values of 
0.023, 0.018 and 0.009. This may account for the fact that the financial profile of 
category two firms differs from that of fully satisfying the stringent three-fold 




cash flow/liquidity area. Category three firms also increased the equity raising 
activity during distress and throughout the post-distress years (i.e. 0.053, 0.111 
and 0.103). However, the difference is tested not statistically significant in all 
cases. The increase in the intensity of equity raising for category one firms 
during the distress-turnaround period also coincided with the trend in the 
reduction of long term debt (LTD/TA) as discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
This may explain why category one firms are more successful in turning around 
by raising equity and paying off long term debts. Equity raising per se may not 




Financial assets/investments sales:  
 
 
Proceeds from sale of financial assets (e.g. shares) held as investments often 
helped to alleviate cash flow pressure. Category one firms’ mean value for this 
activity increased from 0.002 (mean value) at the end of the distress year to 
0.121 at the end of DY2, an increase of 5950%. Category two firms show a 
decrease in the intensity of this activity with mean values of 0.017, 0.000 and 
0.001 over the same turnaround period. However, the difference in mean values 
between category one and two firms is tested not significant in DY (z=-0.689, 
p=0.491), DY1 (z= -1.645, p = 0.100) and DY2 (z= -0.281, p=0.778), refer to 
Table14a, panel one, panel two and panel three, respectively. On the other 
hand, Category three firms appear to intensify this activity in DY (mean value 
0.009) and one year post-distress (mean value 0.011), but the intensity 
decreased to 0.005 (mean value) at the end of DY2. This may imply that 
Category three firms in their effort to turnaround consume a greater amount of 
spare resources as the crisis worsens and eventually run out of diminishing 








CEO change:  
 
Table 13 shows 31% (0.308) of category one firms changed their CEO or MD 
during the distress year, 39% (0.385) in DY1 and 23% (0.231) in DY2. For 
category two firms the change percentage is 24% (0.235) in DY and DY1 and 
12% (0.118) in DY2. The percentage of category three firms that changed their 
CEO stays fairly constant at 28% (0.276), 24% (0.241) and 28% (0.276) for the 
same comparative periods. This tends to indicate that recovered or turned 
around firms decrease the frequency of CEO or MD change as they recover 
from financial distress or decline. Also there appears higher percentage of CEO 
change in the early period of distress (i.e. DY and DY1 for category one firms 
rather than categories two and three). However, the difference in mean values 
for this variable has not shown statistical significance in all cases. This does not 
negate the fact that between 39% and 24% of sample firms change their CEO in 




Divestitures:   
 
 
In order to stem the decline in profitability it is reasonable to assume distress 
firms will seek to sell or dispose of the unprofitable or loss-making part of their 
business in order to conserve and minimise the utilisation of cash and scarce 
resources. Table 13 shows that firms in all three categories effected divestitures 
in one form or another. Twenty-three per cent (0.231) of category one firms 
effected divestures in the distress year and 39% (0.385) of them in both DY1 
and DY2. For category two firms, the percentage is 24% (0.235) in the distress 
year DY with the same 24% (0.235) in DY1 and 18% (0.176) of them in DY2. 
For category three firms the percentage is 23% (0.234) in DY, 31% (0.310) in 
DY1 and 29% (0.293) in DY2. Divestiture, therefore, appears to be a popular 




extent (percentage) of such occurrence tends to follow the extent of CEO or MD 
changes mentioned above. This is in line with the expectation that a new CEO 
or MD will effect structural or strategic change. The difference in the mean 




New industry or geographical segment:  
 
 
When compared to the number of industry or geographical segments which a 
sample firm operates in the pre-distress year, category one firms in Table 13 
appear to intensely decrease the number of such segments with negative mean 
values of minus 0.231 for the distress year, minus 0.538 and minus 0.385 for 
DY1 and DY2 respectively. Similarly, category two firms also displayed such a 
trend: minus 0.059 in DY, and staying static (i.e. no change in number of 
segments) at minus 0.353 for DY1 and DY2. The key result is that category 
three firms appear to do the opposite with positive mean value of 0.052 for both 
DY and DY1 (i.e. no change in the number of segments) but with a reduction in 
the mean value of minus 0.155 only in DY2. This belated action may be the 
reason which adversely affects the success of remedial efforts to achieve 
turnaround. Also there is a mild significant difference (z = -1.859, p=0.063, <0.1, 
refer to Table14b panel two) in the mean value for this strategy between 
category one (-0.538) and category three firms (0.052) at the end of DY1. This 
shift in intensity from short operational restructuring to long-term strategic focus 
early in the turnaround effort by recovering category one firms is consistent with 
the turnaround actions of distress firms reported by Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) 
and Grinyer, Mayes et al. (1988). Further, P Grinyer and P McKiernan 
(1990:140) in their research reported that frequently, the strategic business 
changes effected by sharp-benders relate mostly to 'a return to a well-
understood core business, by means of closure (in 50% of the companies), sale 







New/increase or reduction in plant and equipment expenditure intensity:  
 
 
Among the three categories, category one firms show the least mean values of 
0.354, 0.275 and 0.290 for DY, DY1 and DY2 respectively. Category two firms 
appear to intensify their investment in new plant and equipment with increasing 
mean values of 0.460 DY, 0.505 DY1 and 0.549 DY2, whilst Category three 
firms’ intensity decreased slightly at 0.336 for DY to 0.308 at the end of DY2 with 
more decrease in the interim to 0.242 one year post-distress. The difference in 
mean values between category one (0.290) and category two (0.549) at the end 
of DY2 is mildly significant with z = -1.779, p=0.075 at the p<0.1 level, refer to 
Table14a panel three. Category two’s intensity in new plant investments may 
have accounted for the lesser CA/CL liquidity score when compared to category 




Summary of the results of intensity and timing tests. 
 







Results indicate asset sales intensity and timing is not statistically significant 
among categories one, two and three as all engaged in asset sales. In terms of 
timing and intensity, category one and category three effected higher intensity 
for this activity earlier (in DY1) than category two, but category one eased off 














Results indicate statistical significance (p<0.05) at the end of DY between 
categories one and two. By the end of DY1 and DY2 the difference was mildly 
significant (p<0.1). On the other hand, category three intensified inventory sales 
between DY and DY2, evidenced by 18% decrease (i.e. mean value 0.177 to 





As expected, results indicate significant difference (p <0.01) between category 
one and category three firms at the end of DY2. Category one firms reduced 
dividend intensity by about 50% between DY and DY1 whilst in the same period 
category three firms reduced by about 70%. However, recovery category one 
firms restored their dividend payout as soon as possible. 
 
 
Long-term debt change: 
 
Overall, the difference among the three categories is tested not statistically 
significant. However, category one firms were more successful in reducing debt 
level—that is, a 52% decrease in average long-term debt between DY (mean 
0.495) and DY2 (mean 0.240—and they did this earlier (25% reduction) in DY1 











Results indicate no statistical significance among all three categories. However, 
except for category two, categories one and three show increasing intensity 
between DY and DY2. However, the difference between category one and three 
is that category one’s increasing intensity in equity raising corresponds with a 
downward trend in long term debt between DY and DY2. 
 
 
Financial assets/investments sales: 
 
Test results indicate that category one firms aggressively sold off financial 
investments in the period between DY and DY2 (a 5950% increase in mean 
values). Although all categories participated in this activity, categories two and 
three’s intensity decreased by the end of DY2, presumably because they ran out 






Results indicate no statistical significance in the difference in intensity (mean 
values) among all three categories. However, between 39% and 24% of sample 
firms changed their CEO in their effort to turnaround. Category one’s intensity is 






Results indicate no statistical significance in the difference in intensity among all 






New industry or geographical segment: 
 
Results show a mild significant difference, p=0.063 (p<0.1), in the intensity 
between category one and three at the end of DY1. However, categories one 




New/increase or reduction in plant and equipment expenditure intensity: 
 
Results show only mild significance, p=0.075 (p<0.1), in the intensity between 
category one and two firms at the end of DY2. Category two shows increasing 
intensity between DY and DY2, whilst category one shows decreasing intensity 
for the same period, which started earlier  in DY1. 
 
 
From the above analyses, overall the evidence supports H6 that: 
 
Intensity of efforts and timely execution of turnaround strategies are positively 
related to the likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 
The discriminating factors appear to be that category one (recovery) firms often 
effect turnaround strategies earlier and in greater intensity than category two 
(partial recovery) and category three (non-recovery) firms. This is evidenced by  
category one firms’ commencement of turnaround strategies earlier (often in DY 
or DY1) and in greater intensity than category two or three firms in the activities 
of: asset sales, long term debt reduction, new industry or geographical segment 
and new/increase or reduction in plant and equipment expenditure intensity 
(refer above analysis identified by the word ‘earlier’ in bold italics print). The 
variables tested significant are: inventory change, dividend change, new industry 








5.5  Model #4 employee retrenchment 
 
Although the question of lay-off or employee retrenchment has been tested in 
the MRA model #1 as a predictor variable, it does not answer the 'extent of lay-
off' question. As staff retrenchment is an important, much-published, topical 
issue in corporate distress and turnaround the following test is designed to 
further supplement the testing in the MRA model #1 for the lay-off/employee 
retrenchment predictor variable. 
 
This section tests hypothesis seven, which states that: 
 
The extent of employee lay-off or retrenchment is significant in affecting the 
likelihood of successful turnaround. 
 
Table 15 is a summary of the mean and median values of DY1EMP and 
DY2EMP in the distress and post-distress years for category one, two and three 
firms after eliminating cases with incomplete number-of-employee data and 
abnormal events, (e.g. corporate takeovers and mergers) which would distort 
the mean value computation. However, any firm that strategically realigned or 
changed their principal activity has been included in the computation. The test 
model variables are defined as follows. 
 
DY1EMP = number of employees one financial year (or first financial year end 
reporting period) after distress divided by distress year’s number of employees. 
DY2EMP = number of employees two financial year (or second financial year 
end reporting period) after distress divided by distress year’s number of 
employees. 
 
The reason for expressing the above variables as a proportion (percentage) of 
distress year’s number of employees is to gauge the extent of staff lay-off. For 




the intensity of staff lay-off was 13% and 0.90 (90%) would imply a 10% lay-off 
and so on. 
 
Table 15 Model #4 retrenchment of employees—summary of mean and median 
values 
 




















Turnaround strategy       
Operational restructuring       
  Retrenchment of employees       
Mean 0.870 0.883 0.926 0.905 0.888 0.924 
Median 0.897 0.891 0.876 0.934 0.862 0.835 
Source: developed from analysis 
 




The above Table 15 shows the shifting intensity of employee retrenchment over 
time by category one, two and three firms. Intensity is represented by the mean 




Model #4 employee retrenchment: test for significant difference 
 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test is used to assess the statistical 
difference in the mean values reported in Table 15 below. Category one firms’ 
parameters are separately compared to category two’s and category three’s. 








Table 15a Model #4 employee retrenchment test statistics intensity comparison 
between category one versus category two firms 
 
 
15a Panel #1 









CAT 2 Z   
ASYMP.SIG 
(2 TAILED)* 
Turnaround strategy     
Operational restructuring     
  Retrenchment of employees     
Mean 0.870 0. 883 -0.089  0.929 
Median 0.897 0.891   
 
 
15a Panel #2 









CAT 2 Z   
ASYMP.SIG 
(2 TAILED)* 
Turnaround strategy     
Operational restructuring     
  Retrenchment of employees     
Mean 0.905 0.883 -0.447  0.655 
Median 0.934 0.862   
Source: developed from analysis 







Table 15b Model #4 employee retrenchment test statistics intensity comparison 
between category one versus category three firms 
 
 
15b Panel #1 









CAT 3, Z   
ASYMP.SIG 
(2 TAILED)* 
Turnaround strategy     
Operational restructuring     
  Retrenchment of employees     
Mean 0.870 0.926 -0.353 0.724 
Median 0.897 0.876   
 
 
15b Panel #2 









CAT 3, Z   
ASYMP.SIG 
(2 TAILED)* 
Turnaround strategy     
Operational restructuring     
  Retrenchment of employees     
Mean 0.905 0.924 -0.782 0.434 
Median 0.934 0.835   
Source: developed from analysis 




Model #4 results of the MWU retrenchment test 
 
The MWU test output shows that the results, after adjusting for ties and Z-score 
conversion, are not statistically significant in all cases. 
 
In DY1 category 1 versus category 2, Z = -0.089, p=0.929 (p>0.05), and in DY2, 
Z= -0.447, p=0.655 (p>0.05).  
 
In DY1 category 1 versus category 3, Z = -0.353, p=0.724 (p>0.05) and in DY2, 
Z= -0.782, p=0.434 (p>0.05). 
 
In terms of mean (median) values at the end of DY1, category one firms’ DY1 




DY2 the mean (median) staff number was 90.5% (93.4%). The slight increase in 
DY2, but still below the DY level, may be due to the fact that category one firms 
are already on their way to recovery. The median value indicates that at least 
50% of category one firms shed their staff numbers by about 10% by the end of 
the first year (DY1) after distress (i.e. 100% minus 89.7%).  
 
Similarly, category two firms did the same as category one in DY1. In terms of 
mean (median) values, at the end of DY1, category two firms’ DY1 staff level 
was about 88.3% (89.1%) of that which existed in DY and by the end of DY2 the 
mean (median) staff number was  88.3% (86.2%). However, unlike category 
one, category two firms’ mean (median) staff level at the end of DY2 remained 
fairly static at mean (median) 88.3% (86.2%). That is category two firms, on 
average, did not increase their staff level from that which existed at the end of 
DY1. This may be that, unlike category one firms, they were not quite on the 
road to recovery due to liquidity constraint. (To recapitulate, category two firms 
did not satisfy the liquidity criterion set forth in Chapter 3). However, over the 
two post-distress years (DY1 and DY2), at least 50% of category two firms shed 
about 11% to 14% of their staff from their distress year’s (DY’s) level—that is, 
median for DY1 is 89.1% and DY2 is 86.2%.  
  
The mean (median) value for category three firms at the end of DY1 was 92.6% 
(87.6%) of their distress year’s level. Although category three firms did lay off 
staff in DY1, the extent was lower than that of category one and two firms’. The 
mean value of category three at the end of DY1 was 92.6% versus category 
one’s 87% and category two’s 88.3%. At the end of DY2, category three’s mean 
value of 92.4% did not move much from its DY1 level of 92.6%. However, 
category three’s median of 87.6% DY1 and 83.5% DY2 imply that at least 50% 







Summary of results—staff retrenchment/lay-off: 
 
The above indicates that the difference in the extent of employee retrenchment 
is not statistically significant for all three categories of firms for the time period 
concerned. This is because all three categories retrenched their staff over the 
post-distress years, barring those that strategically reoriented or changed their 
business activities or because of acquisitions of businesses. Hence, H7—The 
extent of employee lay-off is significant in affecting the likelihood of successful 
turnaround—is not supported.  
 
However, the observation in all cases is that 50% of the firms retrenched about 
10 to 16% of their staff by the end of two years post-distress in an effort to 
achieve profitability turnaround. According to Chowdhury and Lang (1993:14),  




5.6 Model #5 severity of decline 
 
This model tests hypothesis eight, which states that: 
 
Firms in severe performance decline are less likely to turnaround. 
 
 
To recapitulate the definition for severity of decline: 
 
Severity = ((EBIT Dy – EBITDy-1)/(EBIT Dy-1))  
where Dy = distress year and Dy-1 = year immediately before distress. 
 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test is used to assess the statistical 




compared to category two, and three. The mean and median values together 
with the results of the MWU tests and corresponding Z-statistic are reported in 




Table 16 Severity of decline: testing for statistical difference of mean values  
 
Panel 16a Test of severity mean value difference between category one firms 
compared to category two. 
 













     
Cat2 
 
-3.814 -2.010      
   
 
83 236 -1.151 0.250 0.263
a 
Source: developed from analysis 
a. not corrected for ties. 
b. grouping variable: category 




Panel 16b Test of severity mean value difference between category one firms 
compared to category three. 
 


















    
   
 
290 2001 -1.293 0.196 




a. grouping variable: category 
 
Model #5 results of the MWU severity of decline test 
 
Panel 16a shows that the decline in EBIT mean and median value of category 
one firms from the pre-distress year’s EBIT is -5.019 (decrease 502%) and -
1.394 (decrease of 139%) respectively. For category two firms, the decline is 
mean -3.814 (decrease of 381%) and median - 2.010 (decrease of 201%).  
 
Panel 16b shows that the decline in EBIT mean and median value of category 
three firms from the pre-distress year’s EBIT is -21.165 (decrease of 2116%) 
and -2.336 (decrease of 234%) respectively. 
 
In percentage terms the performance decline mean and median value 
experienced by all three categories is severe—that is, more than 10% from their 
pre-distress year’s EBIT (i.e. from the EBIT of  the year immediately before the 
distress year). 
 
However, the MWU test output panels 16a and 16b show that the results, after 
correction for ties and Z-score conversion, are not statistically significant in all 
cases, which is: 
For category one (recovery) versus category two (partial recovery), z = -1.151, 
p=0.250 (p>0.05).  
For category one (recovery) versus category three (nonrecovery), z = -1.293, 
p=0.196 (p>0.05).  
 
Therefore, H8—firms in severe performance decline are less likely to 
turnaround—is not supported as no statistical significant differences in severity 
of decline exist in all cases. Despite this, category three’s (non-recovery) 
severity mean value (-21.165) is about four times greater than category one’s 
(recovery) (-5.019). This tends to indicate partial support for hypothesis H8, 






5.7 Model #6 free assets 
 
This model tests hypothesis nine, which states that: 
 
The likelihood of a successful performance turnaround is directly related to the 
amount of free (unencumbered) assets that a firm has. 
 
The definition for free assets is as follows: 
 
Free assets Dy = (total assetsDy less long-term debtDy)/total assetsDy 
Where Dy = distress year 
 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test is used to assess the statistical 
difference in the mean values of the 'free assets' variable of category one firms 
compared to categories two, and three. The mean and median values together 
with the results of the MWU tests and corresponding Z-statistic are reported in 
Table 17 below. 
 
Table 17 Free assets: testing for statistical difference of mean values  
Panel 17a Test of free assets mean value difference between category one 
















     
Cat2 
 
0.876 0.960      
   
 
78 169 -1.362 0.173 0.183
a 
Source: developed from analysis 
a. not corrected for ties. 




Legend: cat1 = recovery firms, cat2 = partial recovery firms, cat3 = non-recovery 
firms 
Panel 17b Test of free assets mean value difference between category one 
firms compared to category three. 
 
 







Cat1 0.815 0.889 
 







    
   
 
332 423 -0.669 0.503 
 
Source: developed from analysis 




Model #6 results of the MWU free assets test 
 
Panels 17a and 17b above show that the mean values of the predictor 'free 
assets' are fairly comparable among category one, two and three firms, that is, 
about 80 to 90% of the total assets are not pledged to secure long term debt 
(category one 82%, category two 88% and category three 85%). Also the 
median values between category one (88.9%) and category three (89%) are 
almost equal. The median value for category two is higher at 96%. 
 
However, the MWU test output panels 17a and 17b show that the results, after 
correction for ties and Z-score conversion, are not statistically significant in all 
cases as follows: 
 
For category one (recovery) versus category two (partial recovery) z = -1.362, 





For category one (recovery) versus category three (non-recovery) z = -0.669, 
p=0.503 (p>0.05).  
 
Therefore, H9—the likelihood of a successful performance turnaround is directly 
related to the amount of free (unencumbered) assets that a firm has—is not 





5.8  Summary  
 
This chapter operationalises and tests the conceptual MRA model and the 
various models used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 by using the 
methodology described in Chapter 4. The hypotheses are developed with the 
aim of assessing the relative effectiveness of corporate turnaround strategies 
carried out by Australian firms between 1995 and 2005.38 The main emphasis is 
to illuminate the present unsettled controversy of whether operational efficiency, 
financial or entrepreneurial strategies are more effective in turning around the 
financial performance of distressed firms. 
 
As profitability is a priori condition to achieve financial performance turnaround, 
the above MRA model shows that the set of predictors that significantly 
accounts for the variance in the profitability dependent variable ROTA is: sales 
change, financial leverage, firm size, board size, employee retrenchment, share 
capital raising (placement) and new business. The MRA results indicate that 
improvement in financial performance turnaround depends on a combination of 
operational efficiency, financial and entrepreneurial strategies, rather than on a 
single type of strategy.  
 
                                                     





The analysis of the changing financial profile or characteristics of the sample 
firms as they moved from the distress year to post-distress years revealed that 
successful turnaround firms show improvements in the three critical areas of 
profitability, financial leverage and liquidity. The ‘improvement’ criteria are 
explained, theoretically supported by extant literature and defined in section 
3.3.5.   
 
The intensity and timing analysis of turnaround efforts revealed that inventory 
change, dividend change, new industry or geographical segments and 
decreasing plant and equipment intensity effected early  are significant effective 
discriminating turnaround strategies.    
 
The Z-statistic test on the extent of employee retrenchment between category 
one, two and three firms did not show statistical significance differentiating 
recovery category one firms from category two and three. The main reason for 
the non-significant results is that all three categories effected employee 
retrenchment, especially in the first post distress year, thus there was no 
significant difference in the mean values. It was observed that at least 50% of 
the firms in all categories retrenched between 10 to 16% of their staff by the end 
of two years following distress. On the question of the impact of employee 
retrenchment on financial performance, the MRA model shows employee 
retrenchment to have mild significance on ROTA as a discriminating turnaround 
strategy. 
 
The Z-statistic test of mean values of predictor 'severity of decline' did not 
support the hypothesis that: firms in severe performance decline are less likely 
to turnaround. Despite this, the severity of decline mean value of category three 
(non recovery) firms is about four times greater than category one’s (recovery), 
indicating partial support for this hypothesis. 
 
Similarly, the Z-statistic test of mean values of predictor 'free assets' did not 




turnaround is directly related to the amount of free (unencumbered) assets that 
a firm has. 
 
The next chapter is a discussion of the above findings in the context of extant 
turnaround literature and implications for practising managers trying to effect a 
successful financial turnaround. It also discusses theoretical contributions, 










6.1   Introduction 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to summarise the findings of this research. It 
discusses their implications in relation to existing literature, suggests practical 
implications for practising managers enacting corporate performance 
turnarounds, discusses the limitations of this research, suggests future 
directions for turnaround research and concludes on the research problem. 
 
 
Section 6.2 of this chapter provides links to chapters one and two in this thesis 
by a recapitulation of their main points relevant to this research. The next 
section 6.3 summarises the test results of Chapter 5 and section 6.4 discusses 
the test results in relation to extant corporate turnaround literature and empirical 
findings. Section 6.5 discusses the applicability of the resource based view of 
the firm and the stage perspective of turnaround in relation to test results. 
Section 6.6 links the research findings to the various major theoretical 
propositions and schools of thought described in the literature of Chapter 2. 
Section 6.7 provides an overall summary and conclusion of the results of this 
research. Section 6.8 discusses the contributions made by this research to the 
body of corporate turnaround knowledge. Practical implications for practising 
managers are discussed and prescribed in section 6.9. Section 6.10 discusses 
the limitations of this research. Future directions and suggestions of potential 
performance turnaround research topics and 'room for improvements' are 





6.2    Recapitulation 
 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 highlight the fact that existing corporate turnaround literature is 
a 'charted but unsettled sea of opinions' and research test results to date—in 
regards to what are the determinants for a successful turnaround—are patchy, 
inconclusive and in some cases, contradictory. The present conundrum is due to 
a lack of a generally accepted theoretical framework or a theory of turnaround to 
guide empirical research (Chowdhury, 2002; Meyer, 1988; Pandit, 2000; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1993) and the lack of a generally accepted operational 
definition and measurement of performance decline (Pandit, 2000; Pretorius, 
2009; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Added to this fluid scenario, there is a paucity 
of corporate turnaround research outside the Anglo-American context (Ahlstrom 
& Bruton, 2004), that is, using Australian sourced data in an Australian context. 
This indicates that further testings are needed. This research aims to fill this 
theoretical gap by assessing the applicability of the RBV and stage perspective 
in relation to research findings and improve on the operational definition of 
performance turnaround for sustainable financial health and its measurement. 
This research uses ASX listed companies’ financial data for testing in order to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. To what extent do the causal contingencies of Resource 
Based View  (RBV) of the firm and Stage Perspective of 
Turnaround (SPT) relate to the research findings and affect 
the  relative effectiveness  of turnaround efforts? 
2. How do Australian firms react when faced with performance 
shock or firm survival-threatening  performance decline? 
3. What strategies or measures account for successful 
turnaround situations in the Australian context? 






6.3 Summary of findings 
 
For easy reference, a summary of test results are presented in the following 
Table 18.  
 





H1 ROTA is positively related to the adoption of a combination of 





H2 Industry effect is significant in influencing profitability and the 






H3 The effect of the economy is significant in influencing 






H4 The likelihood of a successful turnaround is positively related to 
firm size.  
 
Supported 
H5 Operational restructuring strategies (i.e. efficiency improvement 
efforts) are more effective in achieving financial performance 






H6 Intensity of efforts and timely execution of turnaround strategies 








H7 The extent of employee lay-off is significant in affecting the 











H9 The likelihood of a successful performance turnaround is 
directly related to the amount of free (unencumbered) assets that a 








6.4 Discussion of test results 
 
 6.4.1   Hypotheses H1 to H4 : strategies, industry, economy & firm size 
 
Hypothesis H1: Return on Total Assets—ROTA—is positively related to the 
adoption of a combination of operational, financial and strategic turnaround 
strategies. 
Hypothesis H2: industry effect is significant in influencing profitability and the 
likelihood of successful turnaround. 
Hypothesis H3: the effect of the economy is significant in influencing profitability 
and the likelihood of successful turnaround. 
Hypothesis H4: the likelihood of a successful turnaround is positively related to 
firm size.  
 




The MRA test results in Chapter 5 show that the seven predictors of sales 
growth (strategic), firm size (contextual control), leverage and debt cover 
(financial), new segment/business (strategic), share placement (financial), board 
size (strategic)  and employee lay-off (operational) account for 59% of the 61% 
change in the dependent variable, return on total assets.  
 
 
Sales growth or change 
 
Overall the MRA results show that of the seven influential predictors, sales 
growth is one of the three predictors which significantly (p<0.001) affects the 
profitability measure of return on total assets ROTA). SALES GROWTH 
accounts for 44% of the 61% of R2. It has a p value of 0.000. The profitability 
variable has been tested significant in differentiating between recovered 
bankrupt firms from those that eventually liquidated (Campbell, 1996; Casey et 
al., 1986; Routledge & Gadenne, 2000). Similarly, these studies use ROTA as a 
measure of firm profitability. The beta coefficient of +0.679 is in the right positive 
direction as expected, that is, sales increase directly contributes to operating 
profit and hence ROTA. The increase in sales as a discriminating factor between 
recovered and non-recovered firms is further evidenced by category one 
(recovery firms), two (partial recovery firms) and three’s (non-recovery firms) 
median value of sales increase (decrease) as a proportion of DY2 (two financial 
years or second statutory reporting period post-distress) total operating revenue. 
Category one’s median sales improvement was +0.058 (5.8%), category two’s 
was +0.089 (8.9%) whilst category three’s experienced a decrease of -0.083 
(minus 8.3%). The increase in sales for turnaround firms supports Schendel and 
Patton’s (1976) study that recovered firms achieved greater increase in sales 
and reduction in cost of sales to sales ratio. However, net operating profitability 
of a firm, hence ROTA, is also dependent on the level of expenses incurred by a 
firm. Firms in decline generally will cut expenses, especially discretionary ones, 




rates if firms cannot establish stable customer relationships (Baum, 1996; 
Levinthal, 1991). Following on from this, the logical conclusion is that strategies 
that increase sales would reduce the chance of firm failures. However, 
Henderson (1999) warns of the risk of pursuing sales growth strategies (e.g. 





This predictor variable, firm size, NFIRMSIZ, like sales growth, has been tested 
statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level (p=0.001). The beta coefficient is a 
positive 0.316, that is, the bigger the firm size the more positive effect it has on 
increasing ROTA. Hence, hypothesis H4 is supported. However, the question of 
firm size having a deterministic effect on the success or failure of firm 
performance turnaround has not been fully settled as test results to date have 
been mixed. For example, Campbell (1996) found recovered firms are generally 
larger than failed ones, but Pant’s (1991) findings contradicted this in that 
smaller firms have a better chance of  turnaround. According to Pant, a small 
firm is more nimble and can adjust faster and more easily to a changing 
environment than larger firms. Like Pant (1991), Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan 
(2003) found firm size has a significant negative relationship with performance in 
the context of turnaround. Whilst White (1989) is of the opinion that it is easier 
for larger firms to raise additional capital than their smaller counterparts in their 
quest to remain viable, because they are better equipped to do so, due to their 
previous success in external capital raising. Barker and Mone (1998) found no 
support for the positive influence of size on turnaround. Routledge and 
Gadenne’s (2000) study of 20 reorganised and 20 liquidated Australian firms 
that went into voluntary administration between 1993 and 1995 found firm size 
was not a significant predictor of successful/unsuccessful reorganisation. 
However, Ohlson’s (1980) study of 105 bankrupt US firms between 1970 and 




firms more likely to fail. The result of this research supports the larger firm 
proposition as indicated by the positive beta coefficient and the statistically 
significant result.  
 
 
Leverage and debt cover 
 
The predictor variable, financial leverage and debt cover, COMLEV, has been 
tested statistically significant at the p < 0.05 (p=0.007) level. The beta coefficient 
is a positive 0.218. It is therefore surprising the beta coefficient is not in the 
opposite direction (i.e. negative) as the cost of servicing debt is a charge against 
profit irrespective of whether there are profits to meet debt obligations and loan 
covenants. Such charges have a negative impact on profit. However, it is 
generally believed that there is a distinction between good and bad debt as it 
depends on whether funds from debt are put to good and effective use. Under 
current Australian tax legislation, interest on debt is income tax deductible so 
long as the interest is incurred in the course of carrying on a business to 
produce assessable income, Income Tax Assessment Act s 8.1. Tax savings on 
interest deductibility will release more funds for operational requirement through 
payment of lower income tax expense/liability. 
 
This variable COMLEV is a combination of change in financial leverage and 
change in interest cover (i.e. extent of EBIT covering interest/borrowing cost) 
over the distress years as defined in Chapter 4 Table 2. Ability to service interest 
cost is positively related to EBIT, (i.e. firms with higher profits are more likely to 
have better interest cover).  The ability of a firm to service interest cost from its 
earnings often places a lid on the firm’s ability to infinitely increase its debt level. 
Hence, the above factors also account for a positive beta coefficient. The 
positive beta coefficient also implies the ability to service debt increases as 
leverage decreases (i.e. interest cost decreases with debt level), thus a positive 





The reasons for the positive beta coefficient, as explained above, are also in line 
with the test results of model #3—intensity and timing (refer section 5.4). There 
the results show turnaround firms are those that were more successful in 
reducing their debt levels and they did this reduction earlier than non-turnaround 
ones. The results are in line with Thain and Goldthorpe’s (1989a) study of 27 
Canadian listed turnaround firms, that about a third of the firms embarked on 
debt restructuring to lower leverage and that the closer a firm was to crisis 
decline (risk of insolvency and difficulty in paying debts as and when they fall 
due) the more likely they were to pursue debt restructuring as part of their 
strategy to turnaround. 
 
However, the results for leverage and debt cover in this research contradict the 
results of some of the US studies. For example, Chowdhury and Lang (1993:14) 
found that 'firms that increase their debt/equity ratios appeared to have higher 
instances of turnarounds'. The main reason put forward by them is that firms 
that achieved successful turnarounds are those that can 'marshal financial 
support for the turnaround'. Pant (1991) found turnaround firms have higher 
proportionate debt (debt/asset ratio) relative to their industry average. This 
implies that turnaround firms relied on external debt financing to provide excess 
funds to take on turnaround activities. The difference in findings may be 
because of the perception of risk between US capital market providers and 
Australia’s, with the latter being more conservative in their lending policies, as 
Australian banks, who are part of the Australian financial services industry, are 
regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority39 (APRA). The 
recent US financial crisis (e.g. sub-prime mortgage and related problems) 
                                                     
39 APRA 'is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial services industry. It oversees 
banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance companies, life 
insurance, friendly societies and the majority of the members of the superannuation industry' 





highlighted the less-regulated US capital markets when compared to its 
Australian counterparts.  In more conservative capital markets, firms in distress 
may find it harder to obtain debt or equity finance. Logically, one would expect 




New segment or business  
 
The predictor variable, new business, NEWBUS, has been tested statistically 
mildly significant at the p < 0.1 (p= 0.068) level. The beta coefficient is a 
negative 0.168. This variable attempts to capture the effect of a firm’s 
entrepreneurial or strategic turnaround efforts as opposed to efficiency oriented 
ones. The negative beta coefficient is somewhat surprising—that is, it has a 
negative effect on the earnings dependent variable ROTA. Firms in severe 
decline are more likely to change strategy (Schendel et al., 1976). However, a 
new business often takes a few years to be in a profit situation as it seeks to 
establish new customers and market footing. In the initial two or three years it 
will require resources and possibly a drain on profits to establish its new 
business. There is evidence that a high proportion of new start-up firms failed 
within five years (Phillips and Kirchhoff (1988) as cited by Chowdhury and Lang 
(1993)). Bates (2005) notes that in the United States, according to Census 
Bureau CBO data, 36% of small businesses who were active in 1992 had closed 
down by 1996. Similarly, Cressy (2006:103) mentions that recent studies 
reported in small business economics literature provide empirical support that 
around half of randomly selected start-ups die in the first two and a half years of 
trading, and ‘a less known but equally remarkable fact is that firm failure 
distribution over time trading is positively skewed with a mean that appears 
relatively constant in calendar time’. Hence, this ‘liability of newness’ syndrome 
may account for a negative beta coefficient, especially in the first two years of 






The purpose of this predictor, share placement, SHAREPLC, is to capture the 
effect of new shares and/or quasi related equity instruments, like convertible 
notes and options, issued by a distress firm to replenish its depleted cash 
resources. SHAREPLC is tested statistically mildly significant at the p < 0.1 (p= 
0.091) level with a positive beta coefficient of 0.139 on ROTA. Distressed firms 
are often constrained in their ability to raise additional capital. However, this 
research found that additional capital raising can take place with friendly or 
related investors like a parent entity or director in the group. Additional capital 
raised often increases a firm’s earnings capacity or propensity to generate 
operating profits if the funds are put to effective use in the course of a firm’s 
turnaround efforts. Hence, it accounts for a positive beta coefficient. Such 
additional scare resources will help finance entrepreneurial moves, pay down 
debts or provide a buffer to cushion further downturns (Francis & Mariola, 2005; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1993).  
 
 
Board of director (BOD) size 
 
The predictor variable, board of directors, BOD, yields a mild statistical 
significance on ROTA with a p value of 0.061, that is, p < 0.1. This variable aims 
to capture the change in average BOD size two years post-distress from the 
average BOD size three years pre-distress. The beta coefficient is a negative 
0.150 effect on ROTA. This negative relationship on ROTA is surprising as the 
resource dependency perspective posits that larger boards have an advantage 
over smaller ones as BOD acts as an interface with the environment to reduce 
uncertainties and also as a conduit to procurement of resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Hence, larger boards with reputable outside directors will be 
advantageous for firms, especially those in financial distress. As discussed in 




(ratio of inside to outside/independent directors) and its effect on firm financial 
and organisational performance have not been unequivocal (Chaganti et al., 
1985; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Mueller & Barker, 1997; Provan, 1980; Zahra & 
Stanton, 1988). This research found that the mean value of BOD size change 
variable is 0.136—that is, sample firms on average increased their post-distress 
BOD size by 14%. This average increase in BOD size in post-distress years 
tends to provide support for the resource dependency perspective, as bigger 
BODs can act as conduit to procure funding and resources to fund turnarounds. 
The beta coefficient is a negative 0.150. Larger boards of directors generally 
lead to higher total directors’ fees, which will lead to lower profitability, hence this 
has a negative effect on ROTA, at least in the short-term until the increase in 
revenue is in full swing.   
 
 
6.4.2   Hypothesis H5: operational restructuring strategies  
 
Efficiency improvement efforts are more effective in achieving financial 
performance turnarounds than strategic and financial restructuring strategies.  
The MRA model #1 is also used to test the hypothesis H5. 
 
 
The predictor variable, Lay-off (employee retrenchment) was tested mildly 
significant with p value=0.085 <0.1 and a positive beta co-efficient of 0.142.   
This implies that employee retrenchment has a positive impact on the 
dependent variable ROTA. Employee retrenchment as part of operational 
efficiency improvement strategy is often proposed to yield quicker results in 
relation to financial performance turnaround. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
Robbins and Pearce (1992, 1994) are of the opinion that irrespective of the 
cause of the decline retrenchment of assets and costs are necessary in 
achieving performance turnaround, especially in the first stage of implementing 




retrenchment) discussed in section 5.8 lends support to Robbins and Pearce’s 
opinion as 50% of the firms tested therein retrenched between 10 to 16% of their 
staff at the end of two years post distress. The reason why H5 is rated as 
partially supported is because of the mild p value of 0.085 at the < 0.1 level 
obtained by the MRA model.  Also, the hierarchical regression analysis results of 
section 5.2.4 indicate that ‘Lay-off’ did not form part of the first group of a 
combination of sales growth (strategic), leverage and debt cover (financial), firm 
size (firm specific) and board size (strategic) which together account for 56% 
(0.555) of the 59% variation in ROTA.  
 
 
6.4.3    Non-significant predictors 
 
 
The following predictor variables are tested not statistically significant in the 





The chief executive officer change, CEOCHG, variable is tested not significant 
p=0.499 with a beta coefficient of negative 0.056. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
frequent and sudden TMT change is often symptomatic of a distress or 'sick' 
organisation. Distress organisations are more likely to change their senior 
management team—for example, CEO (chief executive officer) or MD 
(managing director). Some researchers are of the opinion that changes to top 
management team are important to effect and achieve a successful turnaround 
(Bibeault, 1982; Castrogiovanni, Baliga, & Kidwell, 1992; Hofer, 1980; Slater, 
1984). They believe that a new CEO and a new top management team will be 
more willing to effect change with new motivation, new insights and expertise 




actions and bias. However, test results have been mixed. For example, Smith 
and Graves (2005) found the change in CEOs and directors was not statistically 
significant between recovered and non-recovered firms, whilst Thain and 
Goldthrope (1989b) found that one of the significant changes made by 
recovered firms is a change of senior management.  
 
The non-significance of the CEO change factor as a discriminating factor 
between recovered and non-recovered firms obtained by this research may be 
due to two factors. Firstly, differences in the Australian corporate context and 
'atmosphere' as compared to that existing in the USA. In Chapter 1 it was 
highlighted that although there are similarities between the corporate 
governance regulatory framework of Australia, the US and the UK, there are 
practical consequential dissimilarities in that the corporate governance in 
Australia is less regulated with the principles of good governance recommended 
by the ASX (Suchard et al., 2001). In this less regulated40 environment, boards 
of directors are less likely and tardier at getting rid of the CEO in declining firms 
unless pressure is brought to bear by market and analyst sentiment due to poor 
performance of the firm’s share price. Suchard et al. (2001) also found a 'lagged 
response' between firm performance and CEO turnover in Australia in 
comparison to the US/UK markets where current poor performance results in 
faster CEO removal. Smith and Graves’ (2005) research used listed UK 
manufacturing companies, whilst Thain and Goldthrope’s (1989b) used listed 
Canadian firms. Secondly, CEO change may be a consequence of decline 
rather than a deterministic driver on return on assets. This uncertainty resonates 
                                                     
40 The comment of ‘less regulated’ refers to corporate governance in Australia being less 
prescriptive and more flexible when compared to the US and the UK due to the ‘if not why not’ 
approach adopted by the ASX for listed companies if they depart from ASX recommended good 
corporate governance principles as discussed in chapter 1. However, in Australian financial 
markets financial institutions such as banks, credit unions, building societies, insurance 
companies and majority of the members of the superannuation industry are further regulated by 





with Mueller and Barker’s (1997) observations that failing firms experienced 





The predictor variable, asset sales, ASTSAL, has not been tested statistically 
significant, p=0.360, in the MRA model. The variable ASTSAL is measured as 
the average asset sale proceeds in the two post-distress years compared to that 
in the distress year as defined in Table 2 of Chapter 4. However, the beta 
coefficient is in the right positive direction +0.069 indicating that increase in 
asset sales contributes to profitability, return on total assets, albeit only 
approximately 7%.  
 
The intensity of effort test shows that all firms carried out asset sales in the first 
year following distress. Those who successfully turned around (i.e. category one 
firms) eased off the intensity by the end of year two after distress. This is 
expected as recovered firms are well on the way to recovery with improved 
liquidity and hence less reliant on asset sales to generate liquidity. The non-
significant result shown by the MRA model may indicate the problem of asset 
specificity (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). Specialised assets normally have a 
restricted market and the principle of 'double co-incidence of wants'41 and 
information asymmetry between seller and potential buyer works to reduce the 
incidence of sale. The value of assets which require high maintenance costs or 
regular updating usually fall in value for firms in severe decline as  the risk of 
liquidation increases (Titman, 1984). In this context, the buyer is worried that he 
                                                     
41 The term 'double coincidence of wants' is an economic transaction cost term coined by W.S. 
Jevons relating to limitations of a barter economy. (Jevons, W. S. 1875. Money and the 
mechanism of exchange. New York: Garland.)  
The use of money as a medium of exchange and common denominator, rather than a barter 
system, has mitigated this problem. The narrow usage of the term here only refers to the 




will be left with a high cost problem and this will likely act to reduce demand for 
the asset in question. The bankruptcy costs of these specialised assets are 
normally higher (Titman, 1984). 
 
Another reason for the non-significant result may be due to the fact that, in 
practice, distressed assets are often sold at below or near to written down book 
value (wdv), the so called 'fire-sale' price. Hence, although asset sales help 
bring in more cash, thus easing cash flow, the profit on sale resulting from the 
difference between wdv and sale proceeds may not be as high as wished for. 
Hence, the effect on the construct profitability variable, ROTA is also negligible. 
This may also account for the non-significant MRA result for asset sales. In sum, 
the indication is that asset sales may help alleviate cash flow but may add little 
to profitability. Smith and Greaves (2005:317) infer that 'companies that expand 
their asset base are more likely to affect a recovery'. Yawson (2004) found asset 
sales to be significant in the year following the distress year but with a negative 
effect on firm performance. He suggests that 'an ad hoc decision to eliminate 






The predictor variable inventory change, INTYCHG, has not been tested 
statistically significant, p=0.841, in the MRA model. However, the beta 
coefficient is in the right negative direction, that is, minus 0.016. This variable 
captures ‘the change in inventory level relative to sales’ between the distress 
year and the second year post-distress of sample firms. A lower ‘inventory level 
relative to sales’ ratio indicates more efficient inventory sale conversion rate, 
hence higher ROTA. High turnover of inventory (i.e. lower inventory to sales 
ratio) is normally a measure of efficiency and liquidity as high inventory level 




turnover of inventory is one of the drivers of sales revenue and profitability 
contribution (Walsh, 2008:79-93).The intensity of efforts test shows category 
one, two and three firms actively reduced their inventory levels in the distress 
year to increase cash flow. Recovered category one firms were found to build up 
inventory by the end of DY1, to meet increasing sales, whilst category three 
firms were still actively reducing their inventory, two years post-distress. Prudent 
inventory policy would be to decrease inventory level when demand falls off and 
increase it when sales increase as excess inventory involved excess carrying 
cost.  
 
The main reason for the non-significant MRA model result for this variable on 
the profitability variable ROTA is that firms in distress often discount their 
inventory to increase sales in a desperate attempt to increase cash flow. Hence, 
the profit margin contribution may not be as great as in normal times. In the 
distress context, better utilisation and turnover of inventory is more a liquidity 
driver than a profitability driver. This is evidenced by the fact that category one, 
two, and three’s liquidity proxy measure CA/CL shows improvements between 
DY and DY2, that is, category one’s CA/CL mean value went from 1.046 to 
1.450, category two’s from 0.779 to 1.042 and category three’s from 0.923 to 
2.045 (refer Tables 12a and 12b). As lack of liquidity is one of the immediate 
urgent short-term 'enemies' a distress firm has to fight and efficiency measures 
are faster in yielding short-term relief and results (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; 
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983), the realisation of slack resource like idle inventory 
is one of the logical choices. The non-significant MRA result for this inventory 
change variable is in agreement with Chowdhury and Lang’s (1996) test results. 
Dividend 
 
The predictor variable dividend, DIV, has not been tested statistically significant, 
p=0.263, in the MRA model. The beta coefficient is 0.09. The DIV variable 
measures the change in dividend between DY and DY2 (two years or second 




direction, as expected, as dividend is normally paid out of profits/retained 
earnings. Hence, it has a positive relationship with the profitability variable 
ROTA. Ordinarily, under the Corporations Act it is not legal to be paid out of 
share capital.42 The non-significance result is due to the fact that dividend is 
normally met from retained earnings and may not necessarily be out of current 
profits. Therefore there is a 'lagged' response to the sensitivity of dividend to 
current profits. It was found that sample firms in the pre-distress year may have 
committed themselves to the payment of dividend in the prior profit pre-distress 
year. However, further testing of intensity of efforts does provide support for the 
view expressed by extant literature on dividend, as discussed below. 
 
The extant literature suggests that distress firms move to quickly restructure 
their financial affairs, which includes dividend cuts or reducing dividend to 
preserve cash flow (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990; Ofek, 1993; Sudarsanam & 
Lai, 2001). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) found support for the agency view of 
dividend policy that debt covenants influence the dividend policy of large public 
listed US firms. However, they also found dividend policy has a 'strategic' 
dimension to it.  Even when debt covenant is not a binding issue, firms 
voluntarily cut dividends to lobby government or 'enhance the firm’s bargaining 
position with organised labour' (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990:1430) and dividend 
cuts are significantly more often used than dividend omission. They suggest that 
managerial reluctance to omit dividends is to preserve the firm’s public image 
with shareholders, especially from the view of an unbroken history of firm 
dividend payment. Further, managers’ reluctance to use total dividend omission 
is to preserve their own reputations, as people might think that their policies and 
strategies had resulted in poor cash flow. Hence, dividend may convey that 
                                                     
42 Following recent amendment to current legislation that took effect from June 28 2010, a 
'balance sheet' test is now required. Basically, the test requires that a company cannot pay a 
dividend unless its assets exceed its liabilities immediately before the dividend is paid. The 
current legal debate centres on the unintended 'possibility' that dividend may inadvertently be 
paid out of capital.(Whitbourn, M. 2010. Dividend law reform urged., The Australian Financial 




message to the market at large. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) found that the top 
executives of firms that reduce their dividends are 50% less likely to receive 
outside directorships than top executives of companies that did not reduce their 
dividend. Kalay (1980) could not find enough evidence to refute the information 
content of dividend cuts and that forced dividend cuts via binding dividend 
restrictions were in the minority, that is, they found in 5% of their sample firms. 
This tends to support the DeAngelo proposition discussed above. 
 
Although the MRA model did not result in a significant p value for the dividend 
variable on ROTA, the intensity of efforts test shows that category one firms 
(recovery) cut dividend marginally. Category one’s dividend change intensity  
between DY and DY2 are, (refer Table 13):  DY 0.002 (0.2%), DY1 0.001(0.1%) 
and DY2 0.017 (1.7%). On the other hand, category three firms (non-recovery) 
effected drastic cuts: DY 0.010 (1%), DY1 0.003 (0.3%) and DY3 0.003 (0.3%). 
The difference between category one and three firms in DY2 is tested 
statistically significant at p<0.01 (p=0.004, refer table14b panel three).The 
findings support extant literature on dividend policy that distress firms cut 
dividend to preserve cash flow. However, due to the lack of (sensitive) 
information in published financial statements, it is not possible to determine 
whether dividend policy of Australian firms is strategically motivated, although 
anecdotally listed firms are concerned about shareholders’ negative perception 
and market sentiment on share price. This may explain why category one firms 






The predictor variable divestiture, DIVEST, did not yield a significant p value in 
the MRA model with p = 0.393. The beta co-efficient has a negative value of 




divestments of operating divisions, businesses or substantial operating assets 
are considered as 'domain changing' actions (Barker & Duhaime, 1997:25), 
strategic organisational structure change (Bowman & Singh, 1993),  as 'doing 
different things' as opposed to efficiency improvement strategies, which involve 
'doing things differently' (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983:232). Grinyer and 
McKiernan’s study of 25 UK sharp-bending companies from stagnation or 
decline to recovery, found strategic changes were less frequent than operational 
efficiency improvements. Also they found most of the 'strategic' changes were 
more of a 'strategic readaptation rather than fundamental change of business' 
(Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990:139). They found that when in decline the sample 
companies retracted back to their well understood core business by divesting 
themselves of less understood, unprofitable or peripheral businesses 'by means 
of closure (in 50 percent of the companies), sale (45 percent) or harvesting (5 
percent) of weaker businesses' (Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990:140). Grinyer and 
McKiernan (1990:144) also note that core business can be shrunk or part of it 
divested away, especially if a company is 'completely weak in a declining or 
mature industry'. Although infrequent, this research found one sample firm 
completely got out of its core business to embark on a completely new business 
of financial services. Further this research found that 61% of sampled firms 
divested unprofitable or non-core peripheral businesses in their efforts to 
turnaround. Hence, it lends support to Grinyer and McKiernan’s (1990) study 
mentioned above. 
 
The negative relationship with dependent variable ROTA is somewhat 
surprising. Two likely explanations can be offered here. The realisation of 
distressed assets is often below their book value or replacement value. 
Anecdotally, it is often difficult to sell a loss-making business at a premium—
unless the buyer is buying it for a strategic reason, such as buying out a 
competitor—forward or backward integration to secure supplies or for 
prospective synergy with the buyer’s existing business. Asset specificity issues 




depressed realisation price. Any loss on sale translates directly to the bottom 
line profitability of the vendor firm. Secondly, the gestation payback period of 
strategic decisions is often longer than efficiency improvement strategies 




Economy –GDP change 
 
The control environmental variable, gross domestic product change, GDPCHG, 
did not yield a significant p value in the MRA model with p = 0.998. The beta 
coefficient is 0.000 (effect of rounding to three decimal places) which means 
there is miniscule effect on dependent variable ROTA. Hence, hypothesis H4—
the effect of the economy on successful turnaround—is not supported. 
GDPCHG is designed to gauge the effect of the change in GDP (gross domestic 
product) between the distress year and two years since distress on ROTA. 
Anecdotally, one would expect the state of the economy to affect the financial 
performance of firms. That is if the economy is in decline there will be a rise of 
company failures, as evidenced by the recent global financial crisis.   Altman 
(1971) includes change in GDP as a variable in his model in predicting company 
failure rates. However, Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) found in their study of UK 
companies the effect of the economy, proxied by the growth in GDP rates in the 
two years after distress, did not yield a significant contribution to their sample 
firms’ recovery. Bibeault (1982) found improved economic conditions account for 
16% of turnarounds. The above highlights the pluralism of empirical results to 
date regarding the effect of the economy on firm performance and recovery. The 
voluntaristic perspective of management, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, 
posits that the fate of an organisation lies with internal management rather than 
being determined by external environmental factors. In this regard the basic 
rationale is premised on the belief that the actions and the decisions of 




(e.g. macroeconomic factors). The non-significant economy effect on recovery 
actions of sample firms tends to support this viewpoint and is in line with 





The control industry variable, industry median return on total assets, INDROTA, 
is found not to be a significant predictor of ROTA with p= 0.581. Hence, 
hypothesis H2 is not supported. The beta coefficient is negative 0.044. There is 
debate in the literature as to whether the structure of industry (e.g. growth, 
decline, maturity) or firm specific factors (e.g. size, internal factors—behavioural, 
sociological, management decisions, managerial capabilities and calibre) are the 
determinants of firm performance (Brush et al., 1999; Hansen & Wernerfelt, 
1989; Hawawini, Subramanian, & Verdin, 2003; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; 
McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). Essentially, it is 
about the heterogeneity of firms versus the homogeneity proposition. The 
heterogeneity proposition supported by the RBV, for example, Penrose (1959) 
and Barney (1991), of strategic management suggests that firm factors are 
determinants of firm performance, whilst the homogeneity proposition supported 
by industrial organisation economics, for example, Porter (1980) and Mason 
(1939), suggests that industry factors are more influential on firm performance. 
Hawawini, Subramanian and Verdin (2003) note that before the 1970s, industrial 
organisation economics provided the main theoretical basis underlying the 
majority of industry versus firm effect research. The inadequacy of industrial 
organisation economics to explain intra-industry firm performance variation led 
to growing research in strategic management since the 1980s focussing on the 
firm as the unit of analysis in explaining financial performance differentials. 





Rumelt (1991) found business-unit specific factors are more important 
determinants on firm performance than industry and corporate membership. 
Hansen and Wernerfelt (1984) found that although both economic factors and 
firm specific factors are important independent performance determinants, firm 
organisational factors are twice as influential on firm profit variation as industry 
level effects. However, Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) using Tobin’s q to 
measure profitability and US two digit SIC data to control for level of 
diversification, found industry effects account for 12 to 19% of firm profit 
variation, whereas firm effects account for 2 to 4%. On the other hand, McGhan 
and Porter (1997) found business-specific effects account for 32% of variation in 
firm profitability as compared to industry effect of 2%. Further, they found that 
the importance of effects varies from industry sector to sector (e.g. in 
manufacturing sector, industry effects are smaller; in entertainment, services, 
wholesale/retail trade and transportation, industry effects are larger). Brush et 
al.(1999) found industries and corporations both influence business unit 
profitability but corporations effects are more influential.  
 
Using economic valued-based and market based profitability measures as 
distinct from accounting based ratios (used by most industry-firm effect 
researchers) and adjusting for outliers or exceptional firms’ performance (i.e. 
star/leader performance and losers/laggard performers), Hawawini, 
Subramanian and Verdin (2003) found  these exception performers accentuated 
the firm effect. For the non-star performer or losers, industry effects are more 
important in explaining performance than firm specific effects, whilst for the 
leaders, firm effects are more influential on firm performance. Flowing on from 
this, Hawawini et al. (2003:14) proposes that the possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that 'superior (or poor) management leads to superior (or poor) 
firm performance irrespective of industry structure' and that 'industry structure 
matters only for firms that do not manage to be leader or loser, i.e. for firms with 





Other researchers implicitly assume membership of industry matters by 
subtracting industry performance parameters, for example, industry median 
EBITDA (earnings before tax, depreciation and amortisation) from exogenous 
and/or endogenous variables to arrive at firm effect (Denis & Kruse, 2000; 
Yawson, 2004). This pluralism of empirical results reflects the economists’ (e.g. 
industrial organisation economics) view of external factors being more influential 
versus strategic management scholars’ viewpoint that the firm is not a 'black 
box' and firm specific views are important determinants of firm profitability. There 
is current debate even among strategic management scholars  (McGahan & 
Porter, 1997; Rueli & Wiggins, 2003; McGahan & Porter, 2005; Rueli & Wiggins, 
2005). 
 
Given the current contradictory empirical results as discussed above, it is of no 
surprise that this research did not find significant industry effect on ROTA. This 
lack of significant effect may be due to adoption of the ASX GIC classification 
convention in the MRA model. The two digit ASX GICS classification (Global 
Industry Classification Standard) based on the industry sector classification 
developed by Standard and Poor’s and MSCI Barra, may be too broad to pick 
up any significant industry effect.43 For example, Energy sector includes energy 
equipment and services as well as oil, gas and consumable fuels. However, the 
GICS classification has been used by other Australian researchers (Chen et al., 
2009; Yawson, 2004) and practitioner analysts for industry sector classification 
and differentiation.  
 
 
6.4.4   Hypothesis H6: intensity and timing  
 
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) highlighted the importance of intensity and timing of 
restructuring strategies and efforts  in achieving successful turnarounds. 
                                                     
43 The ASX adopted the GICS industry sector classification from 1 July 2002 which superseded 




'Intensity' refers to the concentration of dedicated efforts and resources and 
'timing' refers to the implementation and enactment of strategies at the right time 
during the distress–turnaround period. 
 
Model #3 'intensity and timing' is designed to test hypothesis H6. Intensity of 
activities or efforts include asset sales, inventory change, dividend change, long-
term debt change, equity issue/placement, financial assets/investment sales, 





For asset sales, results of MWU test indicate that intensity and timing for this 
activity is not statistically significant between all three categories of firms. This is 
because all the three categories carried out asset sales in an effort to generate 
extra cash to alleviate 'cash burn'. The test results indicate that all firms carried 
out asset sales with intensity in the first year DY1 following distress. The mean 
values for this variable in DY are: category one 0.012, category two 0.040, 
category three 0.052 (refer Table 13). In DY1 are: category one 0.081, category 
two 0.046 and category three 0.085. In DY2 are: category one 0.012, category 
two 0.034 and category three 0.062. As indicated, over the turnaround period by 
DY2, category one’s intensity remains constant (0.012), category two has a 
reduction in intensity of 15% (i.e. from 0.040 DY to 0.034 DY2) and category 
three has an increase of 19% (i.e. 0.052 DY to 0.062 DY2).  Recovery firms are 
found to ease off asset sales sooner than non-recovery or slow to recover ones, 
the asset sale intensity of which continued on to year two post-distress (DY2).  
Inventory change 
 
Efficiency improvement efforts take the form of better management and 
realisation of inventory. Surprisingly, the mean values of inventory change for 




DY1 0.080 and DY2 0.092) did not show a convincing downward trend between 
distress and post-distress years (refer Table 13). Category one increased their 
inventory level instead. Category two did show a decrease at the end of year 
one post-distress, but built up their inventory again in the second year post-
distress. On the other hand, category three firms on average decreased their 
inventory by about 18% (i.e. 0.177 to 0.146) between the distress year and end 
of year two post-distress (i.e. DY 0.177; DY1 0.137 and DY2 0.146; refer Table 
13). This implies recovery firms do not totally rely on reducing inventory to 
turnaround but instead build up inventory as they recover to meet increase in 
sales. Non-recovered firms tend to rely more on the 'inventory' strategy which 
involves increasing the turnover of inventory via sales to bring in much needed 
cash flow. Increasing sales of inventory, thus lowering inventory level, can be 
through discounting of selling price. Timing of such effort and its intensity 





On average, sample firms reduced their dividend drastically straight away in the 
year following distress. Category one reduced by 50%, category two by 25% 
and category three by 70%, refer Table 13. Category one and two firms on 
average restored and increased their dividend intensity by the end of two year 
post-distress, whilst category three still maintained its reduced intensity of 70% 
of the distress year’s even to the end of the second year post-distress. The 
difference in the mean value for dividend change intensity between category one 
and three at the end of two years post-distress is significant at the p < 0.01 level 
(p= 0.004)—refer Table 14b panel three. This implies that recovered firms may 
be concerned in maintaining their market image and shareholders' relationship. 
Dividend cut/omission was found not to be an effective recovery strategy 
(Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001:196). They found non-recovered firms resorted to 




proposition as in the case of category three firms.  Also the MRA model #1 did 
not yield a significant result on the dependent variable ROTA. 
 
 
Long-term debt change 
 
The intensity test shows category one firms are more successful in reducing 
their debt level over the turnaround period, that is, a 52% decrease between the 
distress year’s mean value of 0.495 to 0.240 by the end of year two post-
distress (refer Table 13). They started the reduction early in the first year 
following distress by reducing the debt level by 25% from the distress year’s, 
that is, 0.495 to 0.372, refer Table 13. For categories two and three, the debt 
reduction is far less drastic, with debt level remaining fairly constant over the 
turnaround period. Category two’s debt level stayed fairly constant at DY 0.322; 
DY1 0.328 and DY2 0.328, (refer Table 13). In fact category three increased its 
average debt level by about 13% (DY 0.305 to DY2 0.344, refer Table 13) by the 
end of the second year post-distress, after a slight decrease in the following year 
after distress of 10% (0.305 to 0.273, refer Table 13).  The earlier reduction in 
debt level and its intensity tends to suggest that it is an effective turnaround 
strategy, although the MWU test did not yield a significant result. However, the 





Results of the intensity and timing test for this variable indicate no statistical 
significance among all the three categories of firms. The non-significant results 
obtained here for all three categories of firms, that is, recovery and non-recovery 






Except for category two firms, category one and category three show increasing 
intensity for this activity over the turnaround period. We have category one’s 
intensity mean value: 0.079 in DY, 0.084 in DY1, 0.123 in DY2; category two’s 
0.023 in DY, 0.018 in DY1, 0.009 in DY2; category three’s 0.053 in DY, 0.111 in 
DY1 and 0.103 in DY2, refer Table 13. Category two firms show decreasing 
intensity over the same period for this equity issue/placement activity.  The 
same intensity trend displayed by recovery (category one) and non-recovery 
firms (category three) for this activity may have accounted for the non-significant 
MWU test result. The MRA results show the predictor variable SHAREPLC 
having a mild significant effect on ROTA. It therefore appears that equity 
issue/placement is not an effective discriminator in turnarounds. 
 
 
Financial assets/ investment sales 
 
Proceeds from sale of financial assets (e.g. shares) often help to alleviate cash 
flow pressure. Category one recovery firms embarked on intense sale of 
investments during the turnaround period as evidenced by increase in the mean 
value of intensity from 0.002 DY to 0.121 DY2, a large increase of 5950% (refer 
Table 13). Although all three categories carried out investments sale, category 
two and three’s intensity decreased by the end of the second year post-distress, 
presumably because they ran out of free investment assets to sell. The intensity 
of sale of financial assets carried out by category one firms supports Robbins 
and Pearce’s (1994) retrenchment of assets proposition. However, the MWU 
test did not yield a significant p value suggesting that this activity may not be an 




The MWU test results indicate no statistical significance for the 




TMT is necessary for successful turnarounds. Closer examination of the data in 
Table 13 revealed that between 24% and 39% of sample firms changed their 
CEOs in their efforts to turnaround. About 31% (0.308) of category one firms 
changed their CEO or MD during the distress year and 39% (0.385) in the 
following year post-distress, but the number of CEO changes decreased to 23% 
(0.231) by the end of two years post-distress. Category two’s is lower at 24% 
(0.235) for the distress year and one year post-distress but decreased to 12% 
(0.118) by the end of two years post-distress. Category three’s stays fairly 
constant at around 24 to 28% (0.276 in DY, 0.241 in DY1 and 0.276 in DY2) for 
the whole of the turnaround period. This indicates recovered firms decreased 
the frequency of CEO change as they approached recovery. The results tend to 
support Hofer’s proposition, but the difference in mean values was tested not 
significant for all three categories. The MRA did not give a significant result for 
this predictor variable. This implies CEO change may not be an effective stand-
alone strategy and may work in 'synergy' with other predictor variables (Yawson, 





The MWU test results for intensity and timing of this activity indicate no 
statistical significance in the difference in mean values for all three categories of 
sample firms.  The MRA test results also do not show a significant effect on 
ROTA. In terms of intensity, category one firms maintained the intensity in this 
activity throughout the turnaround period as compared to the other two 
categories. We have category one intensity mean value 0.231 in DY, 0.385 in 
DY1 and 0.385 in DY2; category two has 0.235 in DY, 0.235 in DY1 and 0.176 
in DY2; and category three has 0.234 in DY, 0.310 in DY1 and 0.293 in DY2 
(refer Table 13). As indicated, categories two and three decreased their intensity 
by the end of DY2, whilst category one still maintained the intensity in divestiture 








New industry or geographical segment 
 
The MWU test results for intensity and timing of this activity indicate a mild 
statistical significance in the difference in mean values between category one 
and category three firms at the end of DY1, that is, z= -1.859 , p = 0.063 (p<0.1) 
(refer Table 14b panel two). Category one’s mean value of intensity in DY1 is a 
negative 0.538, whilst category three’s is positive 0.052 (refer Table 13). That 
means while category one is shrinking its industry/geographical domain, 
category three is doing the opposite. It is also noted that category one started 
the shrinking process much earlier than category three, that is, category one’s 
mean value in DY is negative 0.231 and category three’s is  positive 0.052 (refer 
Table 13). It is only in DY2 that category three’s mean value turned negative 
0.155. Results therefore indicate that firms must retract from unprofitable  
geographical areas or industry as soon as possible. The delay in doing so 
appears to be a discriminator between failure and recovery.   
 
 
New/increase or reduction in plant and equipment expenditure intensity 
 
The MWU test results for intensity and timing of this activity indicate a mild 
statistical significance in the difference in mean values between category one 
and category two firms at the end of DY2, that is, z= -1.779, p = 0.075 (p<0.1) 
(refer Table 14a panel three). Category one shows decreasing intensity in this 
activity over the turnaround period DY to DY2 with mean score of 0.354 DY, 
0.275 DY1 and 0.290 DY2 (refer Table 13). Category two shows increasing 
intensity with mean score of 0.460 DY, 0.505 DY1 and 0.549 DY2 over the same 




slightly at 0.336 for DY to 0.308 at the end of DY2 with more decrease in the 
interim to 0.242 DY2 (refer Table 13). The difference between category one and 
two is that category one decreased the intensity early in DY1, whilst category 
two increased the intensity instead. This accounted for the mild significance of 
p=0.075 (p<0.1) between the two in DY2 (refer Table 14a panel three).  
 
The decreasing intensity of this activity by category one firms supports Robbins 
and Pearce’s (1994) retrenchment proposition that retrenchment of costs and 
assets are necessary irrespective of the cause of the decline. The results of this 
research also tend to support the results of Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani’s 
(1997) study of 89 turnarounds and 115 non-turnarounds US manufacturing 
firms between 1976 and 1986. They found that cut-backs alone are not sufficient 
as a means to turnaround. They found that a large portion (73.2%) of the non-
turnarounds did employ cutback strategies, but the discriminating factor between 
turnarounds and non-turnarounds was that the former also enacted efficiency 
improvement strategies, which included investment in appropriate technology—
especially for manufacturing firms—and the ability to properly manage that 
technology. They emphasise that cutbacks 'when inappropriate or poorly 
managed may actually worsen organisation performance' and that 'cutbacks 
should not be viewed as the panacea for all declining organisations' 
(Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani, 1997:8). Improvements in efficiency need not 
be automated procedures and may include better management and realisation 
of inventories, better use of suppliers’ credit days, improved trade receivables 
collection days, consolidation of product lines, shortened customer delivery 
times and human resource training, to name a few examples. They found that 
'26.4% of turnarounds and 14% of non-turnarounds improved efficiency without 
resorting to cutbacks.' (Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani, 1997:8). Further, 
cutbacks, when not properly managed or poorly choosing areas to cut back may 
worsen decline. Their final proviso seems to echo Schendel et al.’s (1976) 
proposition that the choice of strategy depends on the cause of the decline—for 




caused by poor internal controls or efficiency problems—which may not need 
investment in new technology but rather efficiency improvement strategies. 
 
Applying Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani’s propositions, discussed above, to 
the results of this research we have—per the retrenchment layoff test results of 
model #4 in section 5.5, Table 15—the median staff lay-off values for category 
one, two and three firms in DY1 are 0.897, 0.891 and 0.876 and in DY2 are 
0.934, 0.862 and 0.835 respectively. That is, all categories enacted staff cutback 
strategy. The test results of intensity and timing test for variable 'inventory 
change' in section 5.4, Table 14a panel one, are significant at the p<0.05 level 
(z= -2.009, p= 0.045) for category one versus two in DY and mildly significant at 
the p <0.1 level (z= -1.801, p=0.072) in DY1 and DY2 (z= -1.717, p = 0.086), 
refer to Table 14a panels two and three. This indicates that the cutback and 
efficiency improvements in inventory management are discriminating turnaround 
factors, thus providing support to the Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani’s 
cutback plus efficiency improvement proposition.  
 
 
Summary of intensity and timing test. 
 
Overall, the intensity and timing tests results indicate that intensity and timing of 
turnaround strategies are important determinants of turnaround, thus hypothesis 
H6 is supported. In the words of Sudarsanam and Lai (2001:194) effective 
turnaround strategies depend  'not only doing the right things but also doing 
them right'. Similarly, M Teng (2010:60) opines that when downsizing success 
depends very much on how one does it rather than in what one does. 
 
6.4.5   Hypothesis H7: Employee Lay-off  
 
The extent of employee lay-off is significant in affecting the likelihood of 





This predictor variable, employee lay-off, LAY-OFF, attempts to capture the 
effect of employee retrenchment on the earnings dependent variable, ROTA in 
the turnaround process. This variable is tested statistically mildly significant at 
the p < 0.1 level (p= 0.085) with a positive beta coefficient of 0.142, signifying 
that more employee retrenchment will lead to higher ROTA. Retrenchment is 
often considered by turnaround researchers as a short-term efficiency oriented 
turnaround strategy necessary and critical to any successful financial 
performance turnaround (Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani, 1997; Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). However, the mildly significant 
employee retrenchment result may indicate that the efficiency cut-back strategy 
alone may not be sufficient to turn a firm around. There may well be other 
factors at play. Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani’s (1997) study of 204 US 
manufacturing firms over an eight-year period found that some firms turned 
around even without implementing cut-backs. Their results indicate that cut-
backs or downsizing must also be accompanied by implementation of efficiency 
improvement strategies. They made the point that many researchers often treat 
cut-backs as being synonymous with efficiency, or think that they will lead to 
improvements in efficiency. This may not necessarily be the case. Their results 
show that a larger percentage (82.4%) of turnaround firms versus 48.8% of non-
turnarounds had improved efficiency. Improvement in efficiency strategies or 
measures includes rationalising production systems to concentrate on high 
yielding profitable products, improved inventory control and turnover, better 
managed credit days (for both accounts receivable and payables), better staff 
training, increased plant and equipment maintenance, better cost analysis and 
increase in investment in appropriate technology (e.g. pertinent to manufacturing 
organisations), to name a few examples. 
 
In this research, the results of intensity of activity test show that inventory 
change is statistically significant and mildly significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 level 




distress years DY1 and DY2, respectively, thus lending support that cut-back 
(e.g. retrenchment) together with efficiency improvement efforts are determinant 
factors in achieving financial performance turnaround. Cut-back alone may 
worsen decline (Arogyaswamy & Yasai-Ardekani, 1997). 
 
The Mann-Whitney U (MWU) Z-test results in model #4 'employee retrenchment' 
in section 5.5 did not yield statistical significance when comparing the extent of 
employee retrenchment carried out by category one, two and three member 
firms. Hence, hypothesis H7 is not supported. Their p values are relatively large 
(i.e. 0.929, 0.655, 0.724 and 0.434). One of the problems of small p value is that 
sometimes it does not 'always reflect practical significance of a phenomenon' 
(Chowdhury & Lang, 1993:14; Cryer & Miller, 1990). However, in practical terms, 
this research found 'that at least 50% of the firms in each category did retrench 
their staff by about 10 to 16% by the end of two years post-distress' (refer 
section 5.5). The reason for the non-statistically significant result obtained by the 
MWU test appears to be that all three categories of firms retrenched staff by 
roughly the same magnitude; hence the MWU test did not yield a small p value. 
The intensity results tend to lend support to Robbins and Pearce’s (1994) 
retrenchment proposition.  However, as stated earlier in Chapter 2, empirical 
evidence, especially from human resource management literature has not been 
convincing in establishing the long-term beneficial effect of downsizing on 
organisational performance. Cascio et al. (1997) found that firms that combined 
staff lay-off and asset restructuring achieved higher return on assets and share 
price and dividend appreciation than their peers in the same industry. This tends 
to indicate staff lay-off per se may not be sufficient to turn firm financial 
performance around. The result of the MRA model of a mildly significant p value 
for the Lay-off variable tends to support the proposition that retrenchment alone 






6.4.6   Hypothesis H8: severity of decline 
 
 
The MWU test results of model #5 in section 5.6 of Chapter 5, do not show 
statistical significance of mean value for the 'severity' variable for category one 
(recovery) versus category two (partial recovery) firms (z= -1.151, p = 0.250 > 
0.05) and category one versus category three (non-recovery) firms (z= -1.293, p 
= 0.196 >0.05)—refer Table16a and 16b. Category one firms, for recollection 
purpose, are those firms that had successfully recovered, based on the three-
fold criteria of improvements in profitability, liquidity and leverage over a defined 
threshold in Chapter 3; category two are those that had satisfied the profitability 
criterion only and category three are those that did not  satisfy the profitability 
criterion. Hence, on the surface it appears hypothesis H8 is not supported, 
which is somewhat surprising, but see further analysis below. 
 
Hofer (1980) is one of the first to introduce the proposition of severity of decline 
as influencing the likelihood and choice of appropriate strategy for recovery. He 
is of the opinion that distress firms operating just below net income break-even 
profitability or their 'sales are about 60 to 80 percent of break-even' and they 
have 'high direct labour costs, high fixed expenses, or limited financial 
resources,  then cost-cutting strategies are usually preferable' and cost cutting 
actions are quicker in pay back than revenue generating or asset reduction 
strategies (Hofer, 1980:26). If decline is severe, for example, 'current sales are 
less than a third of its breakeven, then the only option is an asset reduction 
strategy' (Hofer, 1980:27). 
 
The mean and median values of percentage decline in EBIT for all three 
categories were severe, being more than 10% over EBIT of the year 
immediately before distress. Despite the failure of the MWU test to yield 
significant p value, as noted above, an examination of the mean and median 
values between category one and category three firms as per Table 16 panel 




severity of decline variable are: -5.019 mean,-1.349 median versus category 
three’s -21.165 mean; -2.336 median. Based on these numbers, category 
three’s mean and median are much greater than category one’s. This would 
prima facie provide partial support for hypothesis H8. This contradictory result 
may be due to the small sample size of 13 in the category one group, whilst 
category three has 58 (refer to Table 11a and 11c respectively). The small 
sample size of 13 in the category one group versus category three’s 58 may 
inadvertently increase the risk of a type one error, that is, an error of rejecting 
the null hypothesis when it is true (Hair et al., 2010:8 -10; Zikmund, 2003:504 & 
542). Hence, test result for H8 is stated as partially supported. However, there is 
empirical support for 'severity of decline' as a predictor of recovery (Francis & 
Desai, 2005; Smith & Graves, 2005; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Despite this 
empirical support, the 'severity of decline' question is not as clear cut. 
Chowdhury and Lang’s (1993) study of US small public listed firms of less than 
500 employees revealed that firms that had experienced 'crisis' decline, defined 
as sharp drop in ROI (rate of return on investment) in fact  are more successful 
in achieving turnaround that those that had experienced gradual performance 
decline pre-turnaround.  
 
One of the main reasons for the above mixed results relates to the definition and 
measurement of the construct variable 'severity of decline'. There appears no 
standard definition of decline and severity, as alluded to in the literature review 
of Chapter 2, or its related method of measurement or 'extent' of decline. In the 
above studies, 'severity of decline' is measured in a variety of ways. For 
example, Chowdhury and Lang (1993b) plotted the sample firms’ ROI (return on 
investment) for the period 1984 to 1985 and those US sample firms that were in 
the top quartile with greatest negative changes in ROI were considered to have 
suffered 'crisis' decline with the remainder as 'decline' firms. In Smith and 
Graves’ (2005) study using UK firms, they defined 'severity of decline' as change 
in Z-scores between each of the two consecutive years of financial distress 




study of UK firms measure 'severity of decline' as per the Z-score, based on 
Taffler’s model, in the distress year. Francis and Desai’s (2005) study of US 
firms measures 'severity of decline' by using Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) 
but added the construct 'urgency of decline' as equal to the product of 'severity 
of decline' and 'suddenness of decline'. 'Suddenness of decline' is measured 'in 
terms of the number of years it took for a firm to go from a healthy financial 
position measured at time one, to the lowest point in its decline cycle  measured 
at time two' (Francis & Desai, 2005:1211). Thus, the different 'shades' of 
'severity of decline' may account for the different test results obtained. 
 
 
6.4.7   Hypothesis H9: free assets 
 
The MWU test results of model #6 in section 5.7 of Chapter 5 do not show 
statistical significance of mean value for the 'free assets' variable for category 
one versus category two firms (z= -1.362, p = 0.173 > 0.05) and category one 
versus category three firms (z= -0.669, p = 0.503 >0.05)—refer Table 17a and 
17b. That is, hypothesis H9 is not supported. This is surprising, as logically one 
would expect that free unencumbered assets, as slack resources, can act as 
collateral to secure funding from financial institutions. Availability of slack 
resources should increase the likelihood of recovery. Closer examination of the 
mean and median values for this variable revealed no material difference 
between the three categories. Per Table 17a and Table 17b we have: category 
one’s mean 0.815, median 0.889; category two’s mean 0.876, median 0.960 and 
category three’s mean 0.850, median 0.890. The mean values are in the 80% to 
90% range, although the median value for category two is higher at 96%. The 
above comparable values tend to support the non-significant results of the MWU 
test. 
 
Empirical tests results to date of 'free assets' as a predictor of successful 




statistically significant between recovered and failed firms in a UK study by 
Smith and Graves (2005). There was no reason given, although they did 
observe that recovered firms have more free assets. Other studies showing free 
assets as a discriminator between firms that failed/liquidate and those that 
reorganised are Casey, McGee and Stickney (1986); Routledge and Gadenne 
(2000) and Campbell (1996). However it should be noted that these studies are 
from the liquidation-reorganisation point of view and the counter argument is that 
they are from an 'ex post'/different perspective in that firms that successfully 
reorganise will logically be those with more free assets. From a informal 
turnaround perspective, as opposed to a formal reorganisation Chapter 11 (US) 
and Voluntary Administration (Australia) perspective, the above literature 
empirical results are contrary to Robbins and Pearce’s (1992, 1994) proposition 
that retrenchments of assets and costs are important determinants of successful 
turnaround, at least during the initial stage of the turnaround efforts. Hence, 
implicit in Robbins and Pearce’s retrenchment proposition is that there may not 
be a lot of free assets available in distress firms, as these are sold off to finance 
enactment of turnaround strategies towards recovery. The non-significant test 
result of this research for 'free assets' as a discriminator of successful 
turnaround supports the findings of Smith and Graves (2005). As indicated 
above there was no material difference in the level of 'free assets' among the 
three categories of sample firms. 
 
 
6.5   Theoretical framework—causal contingencies 
 
Resource based view ('RBV') 
 
Pandit (2000) suggests to test the proposition of using the RBV as a theoretical 
framework for turnaround research. Further, Mahoney and Pandian (1992: 373) 
are of the opinion that the RBV shares a 'good’ conversation with strategic 




illuminating generalisable theory of the growth of the firm'. In accordance with 
research objective in section 1.3(1) and research question in section 1.4(1), the 
next section tests and discusses the applicability of the RBV in the context of 
this research. 
 
The RBV emphasises the heterogeneity of firms by positing that firms derive 
sustainable competitive advantage by possessing resources which are rare, 
valuable, inimitable and non-substitutable. However, the possession of 
resources by itself does not confer competitive advantage but, rather, the 
effective utilization and management of the idiosyncratic resources is what 
creates that competitive advantage resulting in earning of superior returns. 
Firms pursue strategy in their 'continuing search for rent' (Bowman, 1974:47), for 
value creation (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb, 2007) and for growth. Morrow 
et al (2007:272) state that value creation is through effective resource 
management which involves ‘combining existing resources and capabilities, or 
by acquiring or accessing new resources externally that are then bundled with 
existing resources into new capabilities’. Optimal growth is when there is a 
balance between exploitation of existing resources and renewal or development 
of new ones (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; Wernerfelt, 1984). In their zeal and 
quest to earn economic rent there is a general tendency for firms to over exploit 
their resources without adequate and continuing replenishment of the run down 
resources (Pandit, 2000). This disequilibrium in the long run often leads to 
financial distress which, if left unattended, will spiral into liquidation and demise. 
In an attempt to find out where firm resources come from and how resource 
variations emerge, evolutionary search literature (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Helfat, 
1994; Katila, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) posits that 
firms search the environment to replenish depleted resources or to find new 
ones so as to derive advantage over competitors. The search process is often 
evolutionary and through trial and error. Trigger events for search happen when 
firms exhaust their current technological resources, area or know-how or 




2004). These events trigger firms to embark on search paths for science (e.g. for 
new technology and knowledge-based resources) or new geographical areas 
(e.g. for new product markets or technology). Over expansion or excessive 
expenditure in the search, development or acquisition of new resources may 
bring about financial distress. This research found proof of such activities when 
a sample firm relocated/expanded its manufacturing activity to China in search 
of lower cost of production as part of its strategic efforts to turnaround. The 
predictor variable NEW BUSINESS in the MRA test in section 5.2.2 although 
yielded a mild statistical significance (p=0.068) on ROTA is further proof of such 
a search activity.  
 
The opportunistic actions of the firm as the manifestation of the opportunistic 
view, discussed in Chapter 2, may result in financial distress. Firms often scout 
the environment for investment opportunities to renew, replace, combine or add 
on to their existing portfolio of resources. The resource management processes 
‘convey significant risk’ (Morrow et al., 2007:272). Argenti (1976) found that one 
of the causes of firm failure is due to over commitment of firm resources relative 
to firm size and available financial resources. Risky projects if embarked upon 
without due evaluation of risk involved often consume more resources than less 
risky ones. Over commitment often leads to financial distress. In contrast to 
classical decision theory44, Miller and Chen (2004)  found that managers’ risk 
preference varies according to contextual factors. Poorly performing firms in loss 
situations or near bankruptcy were found to be willing to take higher risk than 
firms whose performance improved relative their performance aspiration level. 
Ketchen and Palmer’s (1999) study of a sample of regional US hospitals found 
poorly performing organisations will make strategic changes, for example in 
regard to the product and services they offer rather than rely on their past 
                                                     
44  Classical decision theory posits that the decision maker’s choice of action is mainly based on 
the mean (expected value) and variance (risk) of the probability distribution over possible 
outcomes attached to each possible action.  March, J. G. & Shapira, Z. 1987. Managerial 




actions to reverse their poor performance as posited by the threat-rigidity 
perspective. This research found support for such a high risk taking activity and 
complete strategic change.  A sampled firm changed its name and completely 
changed its portfolio of resources by selling all its underperforming fluid 
handling, foundry and machining operations to finance and establish a 
stockbroking business as its principal activity in Perth, Western Australia.  
 
The above results provide support to the proposition and findings by Morrow et 
al (Morrow et al., 2007:281; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007) that by ‘recombining 
existing resources or acquiring and integrating new resources into the firm, firms 
can turnaround their performance even if taking higher risks’. 
 
In the financial profile analysis of sample firms in section 5.3, distress firms’ 
ability to earn economic rent was eroded as evidenced by the negative ROTAs 
in DY. For example, the mean values of ROTA of category one in the distress 
year DY is negative 0.174, category two’s is negative 0.193 and category three’s 
is negative 0.103 (refer Table 12a and 12b in section 5.3.1). This was due to 
severity of decline in EBIT for all three categories in DY when compared to pre-
distress EBIT. Mean values for severity of decline in EBIT are category one -
5.019, category two -3.814 and category three -21.165 (refer Tables 16a and 
16b). In this regard, failure in earning above-normal rates of return, that is 
economic rent, from the utilisation of resources via firm strategy sits well with the 
exposition of RBV and often forms the basis of analysis of competitive 
advantage. 
 
A criticism of the RBV theory is that it mainly focuses on strategic assets 
(resources) and processes that create competitive advantage, the so-called 
positive side of the ledger, with few mention of the negative side of factors which 
impede, work against or erode the resultant competitive advantage (Arend, 
2008; West & Decastro, 2001). West and Decastro (2001:418) are of the opinion 




strengths and weaknesses tied semi-permanently to firms’, in the main RBV 
theory and research thus far has concentrated on the strength of possessing 
RBV strategic resources with few mention of the negative effects of factors that 
work against that strength. That is, as organisational outcome is an interaction of 
strength and weakness factors (Andrews, 1971), it is important to know the 
characteristics and implications of negative factors to provide a more balanced 
view, not to mention an important one.  West and Decastro (2001) refer to the 
negative factors on competitive advantage as ‘resource weaknesses’, whilst 
Arend (2004) refers to them as ‘strategic liabilities’45. Arend’s (2008) survey of 
US turnaround practitioners reveals that differences in RBV strategic factors 
(strategic assets and strategic liabilities) impact firm turnaround performance 
outcomes. Specifically, firms should minimise or get rid of their strategic 
liabilities (SLs) as they negatively impact firm performance by destroying net 
value as SLs provide the firm its strategic competitive disadvantage (SCD). SLs 
are rent destroyers as opposed to strategic assets which are rent generators 
(Arend, 2004). The top five SLs identified by Arend (2008:347) are: bad 
management, bad strategy, financial problems, bad acquisition execution and 
fraud, with the top first three ‘collectively accounting for over half of the SLs 
identified in the survey responses‘. In practice, one of the often encountered 
financial problems is the amount of debt (financial leverage) relative to the firm’s 
earning capacity to service recurring interest charges and meet debt covenants. 
Following this logic, reducing debt levels increases a firm’s borrowing capacity 
which reduces SCD and aids in the recovery-turnaround process. 
 
                                                     
45 See Chapter 2 where strategic assets and strategic liabilities are discussed. However, Arend 
defers from West and DeCastro as to whether a factor is a strategic asset or liability (resource 
weakness) in that Arend introduces the concept of context dependency. A strategic asset can be 
an asset within a given context and also a strategic liability in another. One of the examples 
provided by him is inventory, which is ‘valuable when there is excessive demand, but can be a 
liability in a glut of supply if the costs of holding it and disposing it are high.’ Arend, R. J. 2004. 
The definition of strategic liabilities and their impact on firm performance. Journal of 




The analysis of slack financial resources provides support for the applicability of 
the RBV and its related expanded perspective (as described above) in 
turnaround research. Slack resources enable a distress firm to draw on to 
finance recovery strategies. High unused debt capacity acts as slack resource 
and helps firms to better cope with performance decline (Tan & See, 2004). In 
section 3.3.5, the proxy, LTD/TA (i.e. long-term debt divided by total assets) for 
slack resources is defined in the context of financial leverage, that is, the more 
highly geared a firm is the less slack it has, as it has to service higher level of 
debt and a dilution of its borrowing capacity when compared to a lesser geared 
firm. Table 12a of financial profile analysis in section 5.3.1 shows category one’s 
mean value of LTD/TA is 0.185 in DY and this has improved to 0.083 in the 
second year post-distress DY2; a 55% improvement over DY’s. On the other 
hand, category two’s mean LTD/TA in DY is 0.124 and this has deteriorated to 
0.206 in DY2; a deterioration of 66% over DY’s. For the same variable, category 
three shows slight improvement, that is, 0.150 in DY to 0.136 in DY2; an 
improvement of only 9%. In this regard, recovery firms (category one firms), 
have much improved on their slack financial resources (unused borrowing 
capacity) post distress than non-recovery firms, providing support to Arend’s 
proposition of minimising SLs in turnaround situations helps recovery  (category 
1 firms) as discussed above.  
 
The liquidity ratio, working capital to total assets, has consistently shown to be 
significant to firm failure risk in bankruptcy studies (Cybinski, 2001). Although 
the proxy variable (financial ratio) for liquidity has been variously defined in the 
bankruptcy studies literature, the relationship between liquidity and failure risk is 
that as liquidity increases firm failure risk decreases. In table 12a and 12b of 
section 5.3.1, the liquidity ratio of CA/CL is shown to have increased for all the 
three categories of distressed firms over the distress and post distress periods. 
That is category one’s mean CA/CL in DY was 1.046 versus 1.450 in post-
distress; category 2’s in DY was 0.779 versus 1.042 in post distress and 




realising that liquidity is an important determinant in turnaround situation have 
adopted measures to increase this strategic asset over the distress and post 
distress period. This is in line with Arend’s (2008) proposition that increasing 




Stage perspective of turnaround 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Bibeault (1982) posits that corporate performance 
turnaround typically goes through five stages. The first stage is the change in 
management. The second is the evaluation stage, which normally takes a few 
weeks, whereby the different options and the causes of decline are evaluated. 
The third stage is the emergency stage when retrenchment measures consisting 
of cost cutting and asset reduction are taken to stop the 'cash burn', in order to 
survive and return to positive cash flow. The fourth stage is the stabilization 
stage, emphasizing organizational rebuilding and stabilization. The fifth stage is 
the return-to normal growth stage, which is more strategic and long-term in 
focus, as it deals with market share growth and development. The previous 
stages deal with the 'here and now' survival issues while the fifth stage deals 
with the 'next and where' long-term sustainability and growth issues.  
Robbins and Pearce (1992) also support the multistage perspective of 
turnaround, in particular the importance and necessity of the retrenchment 
phase as initial and critical to successful turnarounds. More specifically, they 
propose a two stage process of the retrenchment response and the recovery 
response. They are of the view that a firm’s prolonged performance decline 
often depletes a firm’s slack/surplus financial resources. Hence, retrenchment 
strategies should be the precursor strategies to stem the depletion in order to 
restore financial viability and sustainability. They did not rule out the need for 
recovery/growth or entrepreneurial strategies, but the emphasis is on 




Following from the multistage perspective of turnaround, Arogyaswamy, Barker 
and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) also propose an integrative two stage model viz: 
decline-stemming strategies (stage one) and recovery strategies (stage two).  
Chowdhury (2002) proposes a four stage model, that of decline, response 
initiation, transition and outcome. These four stages have sometimes been 
extended to five with the following comparable generic captions: decline and 
crisis (decline) triggers for change (response initiation), recovery strategy 
formulation, retrenchment and stabilization (transition) and return to growth 
(outcome)—(Balgobin & Pandit, 2001). 
This research has adopted a 'content' rather than a 'process' approach in its 
investigation of corporate performance turnaround. Accordingly, this limitation 
does not allow it to confirm the multiple stages of turnaround as posited by 
Bibeault (1982) and Chowdhury (2002). The chairman’s report and the directors’ 
report are often not detailed enough to provide a 'walk through' of the various 
stages a distress firm goes through between distress and turnaround. However, 
a two stage model can be discerned from the results of this research. It is able 
to confirm that initially the sample firms carried out retrenchment activities in the 
form of staff layoff and asset sales. This essentially deals with 'cleaning the 
deck' to stop or alleviate cash flow pressure in the early distress–turnaround 
period. However, the extent of staff layoff is not as extensive as expected. About 
50% of the sample firms retrenched staff by about 10 to 16% by the end of the 
two years post-distress (refer Table 15a panel one and 15b panel one). In stage 
two (DY2), recovery firms category one, increased their staff level to about 90% 
of distress year’s staff numbers (mean 0.905, median 0.934 in DY2, Table 15b 
panel two versus mean 0.870, median 0.897 in DY1, Table 15b panel one) and 
at the same time had gradual increase in inventory change (mean 0.165 in DY, 
0.171 in DY1 and 0.188 in DY2, Table 13) in anticipation of recovery and EBIT 
improvement. Recovery firms are those that are more successful in efficiency 




support for Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani‘s (1997) findings of cutbacks 
accompanied by efficiency improvements. 
 
This research has demonstrated that the RBV and the two stage model 
(retrenchment and strategic turnaround)46 can provide the theoretical framework 




6.6    Theoretical linkages 
 
This section links the research findings to the various major theoretical 
propositions and schools of thought identified and discussed in the literature 
review of Chapter 2. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the two over-arching perspectives in extant 
management literature in the context of organisational decline are the 
deterministic perspective and the voluntaristic perspective (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004; Rasheed, 2005). The deterministic perspective posits that environmental 
factors are more influential on organisational outcome than the actions of 
managers. The voluntaristic perspective takes the opposite viewpoint that 
managerial decisions and actions determine organisational outcome.  
 
It is generally agreed that the ancestor of the deterministic perspective is the  
Schumpeterian economics thesis of 'creative destruction' (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004). According to Schumpeterian economics, major changes in the economy 
or external environment lead to organisation failures. These changes weed out 
the weak firms that failed to adapt to the changed or changing environment, 
leaving the strong ones that survive and prosper. These environmental changes 
                                                     





can be caused by technological, new regulatory, economic or demographic 
changes (Anderson & Tushman 2001; Scott, 1998).The advent of Internet 
trading saw the demise of traditional booksellers who could not compete with the 
online Internet trading activities of Amazon.com. The present Australian Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) regime of 10% tax does not apply to imported goods 
worth less than AUD1000 (Kehoe, 2010; LaFrenz, 2010). Even if this exemption 
threshold is lowered, there is the administrative problem of how to collect the tax 
for goods bought over the Internet. The current firming of the exchange rate of 
the Australian dollar (AUD) against the US dollar (USD) works against the local 
Australian retailers as Internet purchases of goods are cheaper for Australian 
consumers when compared to local purchases. As most books are worth less 
than AUD1000, in practice there is no GST payable on books bought via the 
Internet. This severely affects the viability of smaller local book sellers and 
retailers who cannot compete on price. The advent of personal computers led to 
the demise of mainframe computers. The above are some examples of 
technological and regulatory/taxation changes having an impact on economic 
participants.  
 
This research found support for the voluntaristic perspective. The environmental 
variables of industry effect and economy effect were found to be statistically 
insignificant in affecting the profitability variable, ROTA. Rather it found that a 
combination of strategies aimed at sales growth (strategic) lowering of financial 
leverage (financial), employee lay-off (operational), share placement (financial), 
board size (strategic), firm-size and new business (strategic) significantly affect 
ROTA. The relative contribution to ROTA found is that sales growth (44%), firm 
size (5%), board size (4%) and leverage (3%) in total account for 56% of the 
variance in ROTA (refer section 5.2.3).This would imply that effects of 
environmental variables are secondary to the decisions and actions of managers 
in influencing financial performance profitability outcome. The logical deduction 
is that the decisions and actions of management can lessen the impact of 





At the firm level, firm size was found to be statistically significant and positively 
related to ROTA. Anecdotally and supported by literature, bigger firms have the 
advantage over smaller ones in terms of resources (Baum & Oliver, 1996). This 
provides support for the heterogeneity proposition of firms as posited by the 
RBV of the firm (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). The 
discriminating effect of and role played by the heterogeneity of firm resource on 
firm performance has empirical support, for example, Henderson and Cockburn 
(1994). Based on the literature of firm evolutionary search (Katila, 2002; Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) for resources and their creation, Ahuja 
and Katila (2004:887) found 'technological exhaustion and expansion beyond 
national markets' trigger firm management to look to replenish their resources 
via science search paths for new technology or geography search paths beyond 
national borders for new product markets and innovations. This further 
enhances the voluntaristic perspective of management in resource search to 
increase advantage over competitors. 
 
In terms of the choice of strategies, this research found that those adopted by 
recovery firms differ from those adopted by non-recovery firms with respect to 
timing and intensity of turnaround efforts. Similar to Sudarsanam and Lai’s  
(2001) findings, it was found that recovery firms implemented 
strategic/entrepreneurial turnaround strategies earlier than non-recovery firms in 
the distress–turnaround period. Non-recovery firms appeared to be dealing with 
solving problems at the operational level well into the latter part of the 
turnaround period. This tends to lend support to the strategic school of thought, 
which opines that strategic reorientation or strategic turnaround efforts are 
needed to lift the distress firm beyond its present 'playing field' to another level 
with higher propensity and capacity of revenue-profit generation (Barker & 
Mone, 1994). Equally important is the intensity and timing of withdrawal from 
unprofitable business or segments. This research found that recovery firms, on 




much earlier than non-recovery ones, and the difference in lead time appeared 
to be at least a year earlier in timing and execution. 
 
Hofer’s (1980) proposition that the severity of performance decline influences 
the likelihood and choice of appropriate strategy for recovery has been partially 
supported by the test results of this research for reasons explained in section 
6.4.6.  To recall, Hofer’s proposition is that operational cost-cutting strategies 
are preferable for distress firms with high direct labour costs, high fixed costs 
and with limited financial resources operating not far away from their break-even 
profitability level, whilst asset reduction strategies are preferable for severe 
decline cases. Further, cost-cutting strategies are quicker in achieving results 
than revenue or asset reduction strategies (Hofer, 1980:26). This researcher 
would like to add to Hofer’s 'distance from breakeven' proposition by introducing 
the proviso that the availability of slack resources that a firm has may influence 
the choice of the strategy chosen, irrespective of the severity of performance 
decline. Slack resources may afford a distress firm opportunity to enact strategic 
manoeuvring first. This is because slack resources serve to act as a buffer to 
finance strategic efforts, thus 'buying enough time' to enable revenue generation 
or giving asset reduction strategies time to bear fruit rather than cost-cutting as 
an initial first option. The improvement in the slack resource proxy variable long-
term debt as a proportion of total assets, LTD/TA—discussed in section 6.5 and 
section 6.4.4 hypothesis H6: intensity and timing—new industry or geographical 
segment enables recovery category one firms to embark on 
strategic/entrepreneurial turnaround efforts earlier than non-recovery firms. This 
is despite the fact that all categories of sample firms did suffer severe 
performance decline as evidenced by the deterioration of mean and median 
values of percentage decline in EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) of 
greater than 10% from the pre-distress year’s EBIT.   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the literature review, Schendel, Patton and Rigg’s 
(1976) seminal article introduced the notion of cause and appropriate response. 




factors that caused the performance decline. Accordingly, decline caused by 
operational factors is best solved by operation/efficiency improvement strategies 
and those caused by strategic factors (e.g. strategic misalignment) are best 
solved by strategic/entrepreneurial actions. This generally accepted proposition 
stood for more than two decades until it was challenged by Robbins and 
Pearce’s (1992) study of 32 US textile manufacturing firms, whereby they 
concluded that retrenchment of cost and or assets is necessary, irrespective of 
the cause of the decline. A further study by Robbins and Pearce (1993) 
introduced a two-stage model which incorporates the need for strategic change 
in the recovery phrase following retrenchment. Evidence from this research 
tends to support this two-stage model. In the retrenchment/staff lay-off test of 
section 5.5, about 50% of the distress firms retrenched about 10 to 16% of their 
staff by the end of year two post-distress in a effort to achieve profitability by 
cost-cutting. Further, recovery firms are observed to embark on strategic 
changes earlier than non-recovery ones as discussed above. This tends to 
indicate that effective turnaround strategies involve cost-cutting in the initial 
phrase to stem the decline and 'cash burn' and strategic/entrepreneurial 
strategies following the cost-cutting/stabilisation of cash flow phase. It is 
conceivable that cost-cutting and entrepreneurial strategies may concurrently 
take place rather than waiting for cost-cutting to work and then implementing 
strategic changes. The important point appears to be that a certain amount of 
cost cutting is necessary in a distress–turnaround situation. The amount and 
extent of cutback depends on the amount needed to achieve break-even 
profitability and is dependent on the amount of sales growth. 
 
This research found financial leverage to be an important determinant in 
financial performance turnaround. The MRA model #1 test results reported in 
section 5.2.2 show that financial leverage is statistically significant at the p<0.01 
level in influencing the variation in ROTA. Also the intensity and timing test 
results in section 5.4, model #3—intensity and timing long-term debt change—




proportion than non-recovery firms. The results are not in line with the 
proposition supported by traditional finance theory (except for the tax 
deductibility proposition47 but not for the risk of bankruptcy factor). Modigliani 
and Miller (1958; 1963) demonstrated that in a 'perfect' environment with 
costless and symmetric information, investment and financing decisions are 
independent of the capital structure (proportion of debt to equity). They show 
that the value of the firm is maximised when it is totally debt financed due to the 
tax deductibility of interest which increases firm profitability. However, in the real 
world, infinitely debt relative to affordability and profitability increases the risk of 
insolvency because of mandatory periodic loan and interest repayments and 
restrictive debt covenants. Research results in North America regarding debt 
level in the context of corporate performance turnaround have been 
contradictory. Thain and Goldthorpe (1989) found distress Canadian listed firms, 
especially those near to crisis decline, were more likely to pursue debt 
restructuring strategy. On the other hand, Chowdhury and Lang (1993) found 
turnaround US firms had higher debt to equity ratios. Routledge and Gadenne’s 
(2000:254) matched pair study of 20 reorganised and 20 liquidated Australian 
firms in Voluntary Administration found that successfully reorganised firms 'are 
more profitable, are more highly levered and have higher short-term liquidity'. It 
should be noted that Routledge and Gadenne’s study is a 
liquidation/reorganisation study. The fact that reorganised firms are generally 
highly levered may be because of banks’ vested self interest in having such 
firms successfully reorganised rather than have them liquidated, thus resulting in 
writing off loans as bad debt, which adversely affects banks’ profitability. The 
results of this research regarding financial leverage and recovery firms are more 
in line with Thain and Goldthorpe’s (1989) findings. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the extant turnaround literature pays skim or 
passing attention to equity/share placements or issues in the context of 
                                                     
47 Since the beta coefficient for the predictor, financial leverage, in the MRA model is positively 




performance turnaround. This is because firms in decline normally find it difficult 
to raise capital due to investors’ risk-adverse reaction to losing their investment 
money. However, this research found that equity instruments and shares can be 
placed out to a parent entity or friendly parties, (e.g. board members). 
Accordingly, the predictor variable, share placement, SHAREPLC is tested 
statistically mildly significant (p <0.1 (p= 0.091)) with a positive beta coefficient 
of 0.139 on ROTA in section 5.2.2. This implies that equity/share placement may 
not be an effective turnaround strategy by itself. Category three (non-recovery) 
firms were found to show increasing intensity in this activity in the distress–
turnaround period. Despite this, funds from share placements often can provide 




6.7     Summary and conclusion 
 
This research has contributed to Australian corporate performance turnaround 
research by using Australian data and contextual references. It investigates 
what Australian managers did to turn around firms which were identified as 
needing performance turnaround because of financial performance decline 
and/or firm survival-threatening decline. Based on a survey of extant literature, 
nine hypotheses were proposed and tested based on a sample of 88 firms listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange meeting predefined parameters of 
performance decline. It found that there is 'no one single road to success'. It 
found that no one type of strategy—operational, strategic, financial—takes 
precedence or is more effective by itself than any other. Rather, it is a 
combination of all three types of strategies (operational, strategic, financial) 
which, when working together, increases the likelihood of financial performance 
recovery. The seven predictor variables are: sales growth (strategic), firm size 
(contextual control), leverage and debt cover (financial), new segment/business 




off (operational). Together they account for 59% of the 61% change in the 
dependent variable, return on total assets. The non-significant predictor 
variables are asset sales, CEO change, dividend change, divestitures, general 
economy effect, industry effect and inventory change. 
 
This research also found that intensity and timing of turnaround strategies are 
important determinants of successful recovery. Intensity refers to the amount of 
resources expended on the activity and timing refers to when the strategy is 
implemented.  Sudarsanam and Lai (2001:194)  found that it is important that 
managers 'are not only doing the right things but also doing them right'. 
 
The research test result for the effect of 'severity of decline' on the likelihood of 
recovery is partially supported for reasons discussed in section 6.4.6 above. 
Therefore, Hofer’s supposition is partially supported here. As noted in the above 
discussion, there is a plurality of test results relating to his proposition. 
 
This research did not find support for the 'free asset' hypothesis, which states 
that the more unencumbered/unpledged assets a firm has, the more they 
increase the likelihood of recovery.  Again other empirical results to date are 
equivocal as discussed in section 6.4.7 above.   
 
The theoretical contributions to extant literature and practical implications for 
Australian management are discussed in the relevant captioned section below. 
 
 
6.8    Knowledge/theoretical contributions 
 






This research traces and describes how the studies and research of corporate 
turnaround strategies have evolved over the last three decades. Based on 
extant literature it integrates, synthesises and illustrates more lucidly how other 
disciplines have interacted and influenced the development and study of 
corporate turnaround strategies, principally those of economics, population 
ecology and relevant organisational studies, culminating in the two over-arching 
propositions of deterministic versus voluntaristic perspectives as described in 
the literature (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). Theoretically, the results of this 
research support the voluntaristic perspective of management in the context of 
firm performance decline; that management decisions and actions influence the 
fate of organisations as opposed to the deterministic view that managers are 
passive actors subservient to the influence of the environment or industry, which 
determine the fate of organisations. Economy and industry effects were tested 
not significant in influencing profitability outcomes but rather, seven predictor 
variables under the control of management of sales growth, firm size, leverage 
and debt cover, new segment/business, share placement, board size and 
employee lay-off, together are significant discriminating strategies in achieving 
successful performance turnaround. 
 
Firms often scout the environment for investment and entrepreneurial 
opportunities to increase profitability. This research extends the voluntaristic 
perspective of management by proposing 'the opportunistic perspective' of 
management as an additional variant of the voluntaristic perspective of the firm. 
In times of performance decline and distress, one would logically expect a 
curtailment of such entrepreneurial activities due to exhaustion of slack 
resources. This research confirms the observations by some turnaround 
researchers, for example, D’Aveni (1989) and Rasheed (2005), that distress 
firms do embark on opportunistic risk taking entrepreneurial activities in their 
efforts to turnaround. This research found that one sample firm expanded its 
manufacturing facility to China in search of cheaper manufacturing costs and 




into financial services in an attempt to turnaround. Such high risk activities are 
not expected when a firm is in distress.  
 
During normal times, the opportunistic perspective is observed to work. The 
manifestation of this is topical in relation to the recent emergence of private 
equity firms in Australia that scout the environment for opportunity to acquire 
underperforming firms at a discount and work to turn the under performer 
around, list the acquired firm via IPO (initial  public offering), and make a sizable 
capital profit (e.g. the Myer departmental store acquisition).  This opportunistic 
perspective of the firm is described and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of 
this research. 
 
To date, most turnaround research emphasises financial turnaround in terms of 
a single temporal construct of profitability measure (e.g. net after tax profit 
,earnings before interest and tax, return on investments, return on equity and 
return on assets, to name a few). This research extends and argues that 
sustainable financial viability must embrace the three critical areas of financial 
health: profitability, liquidity and financial leverage (i.e. debt/equity ratio). This is 
especially important when most firms account on an accrual accounting basis. 
An inherent danger of accrual accounting practice is that profitability does not 
automatically equate to liquidity. Hence, this research introduces a more 'holistic' 
construct of sustainable financial performance and recoverability. 
 
To improve test model construction, this research also introduces an objective 
'Australian' bench mark for profitability turnaround. It requires return on total 
assets, ROTA, of recovered sample firms to be greater than the risk free three-
year Australian government bond rate.  Using a floor risk free rate of return is in 
line with the recommendation of various turnaround researchers (Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997; Bruton et al., 2003; Lohrke et al., 2004; Pandit, 2000). It is 
believed that this adds robustness and rigour to turnaround model construction 




justification for the existence of business. Ethical considerations aside, the main 
purpose of business is to maximise profit (Friedman, 1962). 
 
Theoretically, Pandit’s (2000) recommendation of the applicability of using the 
RBV of the firm as a theoretical framework to guide corporate turnaround 
research is illustrated and supported by the results of this research. A discussion 
of this is in section 6.5. The RBV is considered suitable as it 'fits the bill' or 
shares a good conversation with corporate turnaround research, which deals 
with the loss of a firm’s competitive advantage and sustainability of resources, 
the over exploitation of its resources leading to performance decline and 
eventual recoverability through attaining equilibrium between exploitation of 
existing resources and replenishment and development of new resources. The 
RBV is general enough because the central tenet that a firm is 'essentially a 
pool of resources' (Penrose, 1997:36) and the sustainability of heterogeneity of 
firm resources, which will fit any firm. The non-sustainability of resources and 
depletion without search for new ones leads to performance decline. Further, 
this study provides empirical support to the growing literature on evolutionary 
search in relation to RBV (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Helfat, 1994; Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001). The earlier case given of a sample firm expanding offshore in 
search of cheaper manufacturing cost and resources is an example of this 
search activity. 
 
This research also found the variations in behaviour between turnaround and 
non-turnaround firms in the distress–turnaround period. It established that 
turnaround firms reacted and implemented recovery procedures and efforts 
earlier than non-turnaround firms and with greater intensity. It confirmed 
previous studies by Sudasanam and Lai (2001) that intensity and timing of 
turnaround efforts are important determinants of successful turnarounds. Thus it 





This research further extends Hofer’s (1980) proposition that the severity of 
performance decline influences the likelihood and choice of appropriate strategy. 
Basically, Hofer’s proposition contends that operational cost-cutting strategies 
are preferable for distress firms operating not far away from break-even 
profitability, whilst asset reduction strategies are preferable for severe decline 
cases (i.e. far below break-even profitability). This researcher would like to add 
to Hofer’s 'distance from break-even' proposition by introducing the proviso that 
the availability of slack resources that a firm has may influence the choice of the 
strategy chosen irrespective of the severity of performance decline. Slack 
resources may afford a distress firm opportunity to enact strategic manoeuvring 
first. This is because slack resources serve to act as a buffer to finance strategic 
efforts, thus 'buying enough time' to enable revenue generation or allowing asset 
reduction strategies time to bear fruit, rather than cost-cutting as an initial first 
option. The improvement in the slack resource proxy variable long-term debt as 
a  proportion of total assets, LTD/TA, discussed in section 6.5 and section 6.4.4 
hypothesis H6: intensity and timing—new industry or geographical segment, 
enables  category one (recovery) firms to embark on strategic/entrepreneurial 
turnaround efforts earlier than non-recovery firms despite severity of decline.   
 
Lastly, this research reaffirms support for the two stage (retrenchment and 
recovery) turnaround model (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Robbins & Pearce, 
1992;1993; Pearce & Robbins, 1994) as discussed in section 6.5 above under 
'Stage perspective of turnaround'. Sample category one (recovery) firms were 
found to take retrenchment actions to initially 'clear the deck', stabilise cash flow 
and then embarked on strategic/entrepreneurial turnaround strategies. 
 
 
6.9     Practical implications 
 
The results of this research support the proposition that there is no 'one size fits 
all' strategy to corporate performance recovery as supported by empirical 




that will do the job, but a combination of strategies working in tandem with each 
other. This is in line with one of the conclusions made by Harrigan (1980a:22) 
that 'a number of strategies were used during decline; there was no single road 
to success'. 
This research found that firms, in trying to turn around, adopt an eclectic 
approach in their strategies to reverse their adverse financial performance. This 
eclectic approach consists of a combination of initiatives to increase sales, lower 
financial leverage, lay-off employees, enter into new business or into new 
geographical segments, equity placements, and change in board size. These 
predictor variables as a whole significantly p= 0.000 (p <0.001) account for 
about 59% of the variation in dependent variable, ROTA (return on total assets).  
In terms of contextual contingencies, the control variable firm size is the only 
statistical significant discriminating variable in that it has a positive effect on 
increasing ROTA. This research did not find significant influence exerted by the 
general economy or industry effect on firm performance. This supports Francis 
and Desai’s (2005:1203 ) test results that 'overall factors under the control of 
managers contribute more to successful turnarounds than situational 
characteristics' and Sudarsanam and Lai’s (2001) findings. 
This research found that the intensity of efforts and timing are important 
determinants of performance turnaround. Further, the eclectic approach and 
intensity of efforts must be directed to improve the three critical areas of financial 
health, those of profitability, liquidity and financial leverage. This research found 
strategies to stamp the 'cash burn' and to increase sales must be effected as 
soon as possible. Firms that recovered appear to have such measures in place 
by the end of year one post-distress. Although all firms do display intensity of 
efforts during the distress and turnaround period, this research found that 
recovery firms 'cleared the decks' earlier by adopting operational restructuring 
strategies, posited by extant literature to give short-term fast effects (Chowdhury 




embarked on forward looking strategic moves, whilst non-recovery firms still 
relied on operational strategies well into the later turnaround period DY2. This 
lends support to the findings of Sudarsanam and Lai’s (2001) study and the two 
stage recovery model. 
 
Despite the conventional wisdom of the importance of employee retrenchment 
as a turnaround operational strategy, at least in the short-term, the test results 
show that about 50% of the sample firms retrenched approximately 10 to 16% of 
their staff numbers over the two years post distress. However, the lay-off 
variable’s effect was found to be mildly significant at the p <0.10 level (p=0.085) 
on the profitability dependent variable, ROTA (return on total assets). Test 
results also show that employee retrenchment has to be effected in conjunction 
with the implementation of other efficiency improvement strategies. The extent 
of the cut is surprisingly not big, that is, 10 to 16% from distress year’s employee 
numbers. This tends to support Barker and Mone’s (1994) and corporate 
turnaround specialist Teng’s (2010:115) comments that severe cuts in this area 
may endanger the long-term viability of the firm as it needs the necessary 
human capital in the recovery phrase. 
 
Specific recommendations for practising managers enacting turnarounds are as 
follows.  
 
Firstly, this research found improvements in sales is significant to financial 
performance turnaround. Managers must implement sales growth strategies, as 
soon as possible. Sales growth was found to be significant at the p< 0.001 level. 
Sales growth is considered by Chowdhury and Lang (1996:177) as an indicator 
of entrepreneurial strategy. M Teng (2010:60), a turnaround specialist with more 
than twenty years’ experience in corporate turnaround, remarks that a 
combination of increase in sales and/or margins and cost reductions of fixed and 
variable overheads can lead to dramatic positive operating results. The 




placement should enable a distress firm to release slack resource to finance 
sales growth strategies. 
 
Secondly, retrenchment strategies of cost and asset must be implemented as 
soon as possible in DY and DY1 to stop further decline and to stabilise the cash 
decline. This research found that employee lay-off, an example of cost 
retrenchment,  may not be effective as a stand-alone strategy and has to be 
supplemented by other efficiency improvement measures, for example better 
inventory management and realisation of inventory. Asset retrenchment—for 
example, asset sales—has not been established by this research as having a 
significant effect on the profitability variable ROTA, but rather as an 'alleviator' of 
cash flow, that is, provides the extra cash to fund operational and strategic 
turnaround efforts. Robbins and Pearce (1992:303) are of the opinion that 'cost 
and asset retrenchment in concert resulted in the highest average level of 
turnaround' and that retrenchment was a critical strategic element in attaining 
turnaround'. Cost retrenchment includes cutting down on discretionary 
expenses. The extent of retrenchment depends on the amount needed to 
restore a firm’s profitability to its break-even level. There is empirical support 
that efficiency improvement strategies yield faster pay back than strategic 
initiatives (Chowdhury & Lang 1996; Hofer 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). 
 
Thirdly, restructuring of debt level and obligation has to be considered. This 
research found that financial leverage and debt cover are significant 
determinants of turnaround. Lowering of interest and repayment commitments 
will alleviate cash flow pressure, which in a decline situation will worsen on a 
daily basis and procrastination of such remedial actions will worsen the cash 
flow. The extent of debt reduction depends on reducing interest and principal 
repayment to an affordability level.   
 
Fourthly, consideration should be given to the possibility of raising additional 




should be explored with friendly parties, for example, members of the board or 
parent entity. This research found that such a possibility did take place in 
sample firms although extant literature pays little mention of such an eventuality. 
This research found equity placement/raising by itself is not a discriminating 
factor of successful turnaround but the application of the funds raised to reduce 
debt as soon as possible is a discriminating factor between recovery and non 
recovery firms. 
 
Fifthly, this research found intensity of efforts and timing are important 
determinants of financial performance turnaround. The findings support 
Sudarsanam and Lai’s (2001:194) findings that ‘recoverer managers are not 
only doing the right things but also doing them right’. Intensity relates to the 
amount of resources devoted to remedial turnaround actions. This research 
found recovery firms intensely pursue remedial actions earlier in the distress-
turnaround process than non-recovery firms. For example, recovery firms 
pursued long term debt reduction more intensely in DY 1 and continued into 
DY2 than non-recovery firms. This debt reduction activity coincides with equity 
placements/raising. Similarly, recovery firms pulled out of unprofitable segments 
earlier and with more intensity than non recovery firms. 
 
In summary, this research found improving profitability, liquidity and reduction in 




6.10 Limitations  
 
 










First, it relates to the sample attributes. The small sample size of 88 firms limits 
the generalisabilty of results obtained. The main reasons for the small sample 
size are as follows. Firstly, the stringent definition of the '+++-' selection rule 
adopted by this research for identifying distress firms, although ensuring that the 
sample firms’ performance decline is not just a random occurrence, inherently 
acts to restrict the sample size. Secondly, the number of listed firms (i.e. 
population size) on the Australian stock exchange is not as many as in the UK or 
US situation. Thirdly, performance distress is not a common 'day to day' 
occurrence in the normal course of a firm’s life cycle. Fourthly, 'small sample 
size and missing data....... are common problems with research in the area of 
financial distress' (Routledge & Gadenne, 2000:257). 
 
Population frame and Sampling frame 
 
Second, it relates to the sampling frame.  
 
The population frame consists of ASX listed firms as reported in the Aspect 
Huntley data base (now called Morning Star DatAnalysis data base). The Aspect 
Huntley data base has been used by researchers for selecting firms in business 
research (e.g. Yawson (2004)). 
 
According to Zikmund (2003:373) a ‘sampling frame is the list of elements from 
which the sample may be drawn’ and that ‘the sampling frame is also called the 
working population because it provides the list that can be worked with 
operationally’. In this study the sampling frame consists of ASX listed firms, over 
the period 1995 to 2005, which satisfy the sampling criterion (element) of having 
experienced three consecutive years of positive earnings before interest and tax 
(‘EBIT’) followed immediately by one year negative EBIT. Pictorially, this is 




positive EBIT preceding a negative EBIT year is to minimize the chance of the 
negative EBIT year being a random or chance occurrence rather than the 
sampled firm had experienced financial stress or distress48.Other researchers 
have used various sampling element of  ‘+-‘, for example Yawson (2004) and ‘ 
++-‘ Sudarsanam and Lai (2001). The ‘+++-‘rule is considered by this researcher 
as more conservative to minimize a random occurrence as explained above. 
Where sampled firms experienced more than one series of ‘+++-‘in EBIT 
between 1995 and 2005, the latter (i.e. more recent) ‘+++-‘years were selected. 
The reason for this is because of the availability and currency of data for the 
latter years. Where a sampled firm’s distress year (negative EBIT) falls on 2005, 
and the two subsequent years of recovery or failure extend into 2006 and 2007, 
the study period was extended to 2007.  
 
The sampling period of 1995 to 2005 was chosen because the following 
interesting ‘macro’ economic events happened within a short period of time and 
each other. The Asian financial crisis 1997, the introduction of the Australian 
goods and services tax on 1 July 2000, the technology wreck (dot.com) 2002 
and the US sub-prime/oil crisis 2007 all happened over this period and its 
proximity. Such environmental events have an impact on organizations/firms 
since environmental factors are important determining factors on 
organizational/firm performance as discussed in the literature review of Chapter 
2. 
 
The sampling period and the sample selection criterion of ‘+++-‘inherently 
introduce the following limitations. Firstly, the +++- rule, although leaning 
towards conservatism as explained above, may not capture all distressed firms 
within the sampling period. They may well be captured by some other selection 
                                                     
48 In a study of prediction of success or failure of Croatian firms, whereby the Republic of Croatia 
did not have a bankruptcy court, Lussier and Pfeifer  defines failure as not having made a profit 
for the previous three years. Lussier, R. N. & Pfeifer, S. 2001. A cross-national prediction model 




rule of ‘+-‘, ‘++-‘or ‘++++-‘rule, to name a few example. Secondly, using EBIT as 
the financial performance measure and excluding financial institutions, such as 
banks and insurance companies, where interest income is a major component, 
inevitably excludes distressed financial institutions from the study. Thirdly, the 
sampling period of 11 years may not be sufficient to capture all cases or causes 
of financial distress experienced by firms.  
 
Despite the above limitations, the researcher believes that because of the 
limitations of resources and time available in a PhD thesis, the above are ‘cost 
and benefit’ compromises that are consciously taken. Further the researcher has 





Third, this research adopts the 'content' rather than the 'process' approach to 
studying corporate performance turnaround. Balgobin and Pandit (2001) 
distinguish the two by referring to the 'content' approach as answering the 'what 
to do' question and the 'process' approach as the 'how to do it' question. The 
'process' approach according to them would be more meaningful as it would 
uncover in detail the various stages in the turnaround process. Unfortunately, 
information on corporate distress and failures is often not readily or publicly 
available due to privacy and confidentiality reasons and the ability and 
opportunities to conduct a 'process' type of research via case study 
methodology are limited. Also, special permission may be required to be 
obtained from the subject firm in relation to publication of research results and 
ethical issues need to be considered. Finally, the length of time taken to conduct 
a case study or longitudinal study may not be feasible within the time frame and 
constraint of a PhD research project. It is envisaged that employees working in a 
firm that experiences performance decline and enacting turnaround will be in a 




research. Even in such a situation, stringent ethical and confidentiality 
warranties are expected to be priori conditions for such research studies. 
Published data 
 
Fourth, this study relies on publicly available ASX listed Australian companies’ 
data. As noted by other Australian researchers (Chen et al., 2009:219) such 
data may not be as exhaustive in content and detail as that available in other 
jurisdictions, hence some variables may have been less accurately and 
consistently measured than desired.  
 
This research uses the profitability measure of return on total assets based on 
book values. Chakravarthy (1986) argues that book value of assets can be 
subject to manipulation and accounting idiosyncrasies and conventions (e.g. 
depreciation policies). Using book values may not necessarily reflect the true 
worth or profitability of a firm. However, it is difficult to obtain replacement value 
of assets let alone the difficulty of obtaining details relating to the specific type of 
assets a sample firm owns. Therefore, one has to be cognitive of such 
limitations versus the impracticality of using replacement values. 
 
Consideration for using share market measures of financial performance was 
considered but abandoned taking heed of the warning by Hambrick and D’Aveni 
(1988:10): ‘due to their extreme volatility for troubled firms’. 
 
Stages of maturity 
 
Fifth, the stages of maturity of the industry that the sample firms belong to, has 
not been allowed for in the MRA model. Hambrick and Schecter (1983) found 
operating and market positions that a firm is in may influence the effectiveness 
of turnaround strategies. They found in matured business49 efficiency oriented 
                                                     
49 Matured business is defined as belonging to an industry that has real growth of less than 10% 









The last limitation relates to the potential issue of endogeneity. 
 
It is logical to assume that managers’ choice of strategy is not random but based 
on the expected outcome and attributes of the strategy, organizational capability 
and industry condition and context. In short, managerial choice of strategy and 
related decisions are self select and not random but rather endogenous to their 
expected performance implications and outcomes (Bascle, 2008:286; Hamilton 
& Nickerson, 2003:51; Shaver, 1998). The aim of this research is to identify 
successful strategies enacted by a sample of financially distressed firms to 
turnaround and achieve performance recovery and profitability. Failure to adjust 
for the problem caused by endogeneity may bias the coefficient estimates (e.g. 
in regression analysis) obtained from the statistical analysis in business 
research, for example in strategic management research. 
 
In the main, the issue of endogeneity relates to the problem in econometric 
model or statistical analysis, for example in regression model, when the 
predictor (independent) variables are endogenous (Chenhall & Moers, 2007; 
Larcker & Rusticus, 2007). In short, the theoretical construct of endogeneity 
contradicts the economist’s assumption of ceteris paribus in empirical research 
(Van Lent, 2007). 
 
According to Chenhall and Moers (2007:177), although there ‘is some variation 
in the meaning of endogenous and exogenous variables’, in general the 
distinction between the two is based on the origin of the variables as to whether 
                                                                                                                                                            
(Hambrick, D. C. & Schecter, S. M. 1983. Turnaround strategies for mature industrial product 




their values are determined either ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the structural equation. ‘A 
variable is endogenous if its value is determined within the context of the model, 
while an exogenous variable  is a variable that affects the values of endogenous 
variables, but whose values are determined outside the model’ (Chenhall & 
Moers, 2007:177). Endogenous variables are sometimes referred to as 
dependent variables and exogenous variables, variously, as independent or 
explanatory or predictor variables. 
 
The aim of theoretical quantitative research ‘is to test a causal relationship 
between explained and explanatory variables’(Chenhall & Moers, 2007:180). 
How well the regression model predicts that relationship depends on the value 
of the resultant co-efficients being unbiased and not inconsistent, ‘and the 
residuals are interpreted as summing up the causal variables not included in the 
model’ (Chenhall & Moers, 2007:180). 
 
On a practical level, endogeneity can arise because of omitted variables, result 
of measurement errors, simultaneity, sample selection errors and 
autoregression with autocorrelated errors (in time series data). In essence, 
endogeneity occurs when the exogenous variable in a model is correlated with 
the residual/error term. It also will arise, in the case of simultaneous causality 
when the causality runs in both directions, that is if there is a loop causality 
effect between the exogenous and endogenous variables in a model (Bascle, 
2008:291). In all the above cases, endogeneity will result in biased and 
inconsistent estimators (beta coefficients) within structural equations used to test 
theoretical propositions and hypotheses. This will lead to diminished confidence 
in research inferences and resultant conclusions (Chenhall & Moers, 2007; 
Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). 
 
In this research of more relevance are the problems of omitted variables, 




(reverse causality). Autoregression with autocorrelated errors are not of concern 




The selection of variables to include in the MR test model and their relationships 
are based on theoretical guidance, justification and past research as discussed 
in Chapter two and three. Despite this there will be variables that are considered 
secondary, but may be important, to the research question and objective, which 
may add predictive power to the model. These omitted variables (represented 
summarily by the residual/error term) may be variables whose values are not 
easily measured or whose data is not easily available. Of concern, is that an 
endogenous variable modelled as such is in fact also endogenous because of 
omitted variables (Chenhall & Moers, 2007). Practical guideline constraints in 
MR model in regard to the minimum number of cases to exogenous 
(independent) variables and (small) sample size (of 88) also adds to the risk of 
omitted variables that may be relevant. Of concern is that the omitted variable 
may have a causality effect with any of the exogenous variable. One such 
example is that the difficult to measure CEO strong personality may have a 
causal effect on BOD size. The DIVESTITURES and NEW BUSINESS variables 
in the MR model may be affected by the firm management’s cultural outlook on 
risk—as risk averters or takers. Also firms in the same industry may influence 
the strategy of each other with the less successful ones aping the strategy or 




This research uses published data from ASX listed firms. Despite due care 
being exercised in the formulation of financial ratios to measure certain 
constructs backed by theoretical justification and literature review, the choice of 




financial reports.  For example, the INDUSTRY control variable in the MR model 
uses ASX GICS sector categorisation of industry. This relies on correct and 
accurate reporting not to mention the broad industry inclusion of the GISC 
classification system. 
 
Sample selection error 
 




The endogenous variable in the MR model is ROTA, a profitability construct. 
There could be potential loop causality between this variable with some of the 
right-hand side endogenous variables. For example, NEW BUSINESS and 
DIVESTITURES also can arguably be dependent on the availability of firm 
profits to finance them. 
 
The two common text book econometric solutions to correct for the endogeneity 
problem are the instrumental variable (‘IV’) estimation and the two stage 
Heckman correction (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Heckman, 
1979) .The IV method essentially involves using a proxy (instrumental variable) 
that is not ‘endogenous’ in that it is highly correlated with the explanatory 
(exogenous) variable but uncorrelated with the omitted variables (structural error 
term) (Chenhall & Moers, 2007; Van Lent, 2007). The IV estimations are the 
most common way to deal with potential measurement error and when the 
underlying model is linear (Bascle, 2008; Schennach, 2007:202).The choice of 
the instrumental variable is dependent on the researcher’s theoretical 
justification and judgment. There are a few IV methods but the most common is 
the two-stage least squares estimation (‘2SLS’). The first stage is called the 
‘reduced form equation’ with the objective of isolating the variation in the 




resulting fitted value of Xi, say Ẍi, is then used in the second stage that is the 
structural equation, instead of the structural exogenous variable Xi. In the 
second stage, the endogenous variable, say Yi of the structural equation, is 
regressed on the exogenous variables and the resulting predicted values of Ẍi 
(Bascle, 2008). There must be ‘at least as many instruments as endogenous 
regressors’ (Bascle, 2008:294). The resulting coefficients, say βi … βn are the 
2SLS estimators. According to Chenhall and Moers (2007:187) the IV estimator 
is ‘consistent’ but generally never’ unbiased’. There are a few statistical tests to 
check the instruments’ strength, which is whether the instruments are ‘strong, 
weak or irrelevant’ fit (in terms of correlation) between the endogenous 
regressor and the instruments.50 
 
The Heckman correction is a two-step procedure which uses two equations to 
address the endogeneity problem. The first step known as the ‘selection 
equation’ is using a probit model to compute the correction factor called the 
‘inverse Mills ratio’. The second called the ‘outcome equation’ is to use this ratio 
as a correction factor (an additional explanatory variable) in the regression of 
interest (e.g. the MR operational model), in order to obtain unbiased estimators 
and evidence and significance of self-selection bias (Bascle, 2008:292). Bascle 
(2008:292) is of the opinion that the Heckman correction pertains better to the 
problem of omitted variables bias whilst the IV method for other types of 
endogeneity. 
 
In addition to the two methods discussed above, the Hausman test is commonly 
used to check for the endogeneity of a variable. In the main, it compares the IV 
estimates to the ordinary least square (‘OLS’) estimates.  If the two are 
substantially different and significant, then there may be an endogeneity 
problem. However, the test does not directly deal with the possible correlation 
between the exogenous (explanatory) variable and the residuals. It only 
                                                     
50 See Bascle, G. 2008. Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic 




indicates that endogeneity is only one of the many possibilities that the test will 
reject the null hypothesis. 
Endogeneity is a theoretical concept in relation to finite sample. The current text 
book solutions as discussed above are based on a certain specifications and the 
subjective judgment of the researcher. The Heckman two stage correction is 
dependent on meeting the assumption that the error terms have a bivariate 
normal distribution in the selection equation and the outcome equation in order 
for the estimates to be stable and unbiased (Bascle, 2008:292; Heckman, 1979).  
It is not advisable to use on small sample size of less than 200 because it is 
unstable (Bascle, 2008:293). Although the IV method offers more flexibility, the 
choice of the proxy variable (IV) depends on the subjective judgment of the 
researcher or analyst. 
 
Chenhall and Moers (2007:174) argue that ‘there is not a single empirical paper 
that does not have endogeneity issues’, and that ‘the potential for endogeneity 
exists in virtually all studies involving accounting, finance and economic 
variables’ (Chenhall & Moers, 2007:177). Despite this, there is little attention 
given in strategic management research to the endogeneity issue even though 
corrective implementable econometric techniques have been available for quite 
awhile now. Hamilton and Nickerson (2003:53) found that out of 426 empirical 
papers (from a total of 601 papers) published in the Strategic Management 
Journal between January 1990 and December 2001, only 27 of them 
econometrically correct for potential endogeneity concerns. More specifically, a 
total of 169 of the 196 performance related papers, that is 86%, do not control 
for endogeneity. To the best of this researcher’s knowledge few turnaround and 
related research papers correct for potential endogeneity problem also. Of those 
which do, they are generally more current research studies (e.g. Morrow, 
Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb, 2007). In the Morrow et al.,(2007) study they use the 
more appealing Heckman correction but no mention of whether the underlying 
bivariate normal distribution requirement regarding the error terms as discussed 





In this thesis, the researcher did not correct for potential endogeneity problems. 
Van Lent (2007:198) believes that ‘in practice there is little that can be done 
about endogeneity’. This is because in empirical research, valid instrumental 
variables are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain (Chenhall & Moers, 2007; Ittner 
& Larcker, 2001; Larcker, 2003). Although Hamilton and Nickerson (2003:67) 
draw attention to the endogeneity problem in strategic management research 
and suggests ways to address the problem, they also warn that ‘it is difficult in 
many strategy data sets to find instrumental variables that affect strategy choice 
but not performance’. According to them in the absence of suitable IVs, ‘the best 
the researcher may be able to do is to account for as much of the observable 
differences between firms adopting’ different strategies and at the same time 
‘should acknowledge the potential for bias induced by unobserved factors’ 
(Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003:67,68). Van Lent (2007:199) further opines that 
although endogeneity is a concern in empirical research, essentially it is ‘an 
econometric definition of the problem’. This is because, although most 
econometric textbooks define endogeneity as non-zero correlation between the 
exogenous variable and the structural error term and bring to attention the non 
fulfilment of the orthogonality condition51, knowing such bias exists still does not 
answer the question of ‘what is the source of the bias, what is the substantive 
meaning of the correlation between the error term and the independent 
variables, and when is it innocuous to assume orthogonality?’ (Van Lent, 
2007:199). Also as discussed above, selection of IVs is based on the judgment 
of the researcher who can never be absolutely sure that they have no causality 
with the residuals, especially in finite sample. The Heckman correction is 
sensitive to bivariate distributional specifications of the residuals, which may not 
always be the case. Further, the Heckman correction is unstable for small 
                                                     
51 The orthogonality condition, also known as the exogeneity condition, implies that the 
instruments has a zero correlation with the structural error term. Bascle, G. 2008. Controlling for 





sample size, less than 200. By not adjusting for potential endogeneity issue the 
results of this research should facilitate comparison with the majority of the 
extant turnaround research, which did not address this issue. The influence of 
endogeneity will be an interesting topic for further research. 
 
 
6.11    Future research directions 
 
This research is about how firms listed on the ASX respond to financial 
performance decline. Although there is no reason why findings of how publicly 
listed firms’ response to performance decline could not be translated directly to 
the private company domain, there could well be contextual, corporate 
governance or 'externalities' differences. Listed firms are 'reporting entities' 
under the Corporations Act and are subject to more stringent disclosure 
requirement and public scrutiny. Hence, their response to performance decline 
may well be different to that of private firms, for example, in terms of strategy 
choice and behavioural factors. The researcher is well aware of the difficulty of 
obtaining data relating to performance decline of private firms due to 
confidentiality reasons. However, it is envisaged that this can be overcome with 
a stringent confidentiality and disclosure agreement between the researcher and 
the subject organisation. The hypotheses of this research could be replicated in 
a private company corporate performance turnaround study. 
 
One of the reasons for the plurality of empirical results to date is the lack of 
standardisation in regards to the measurement of constructs in corporate 
turnaround research. For example, the proxy variables for measuring the 
profitability construct  include return on investments, net profit after tax, return on 
equity, EBIT and return on assets, to name a few. Unless measurement and 
definitions of construct are standardised, this will be a perpetual problem. It is 
therefore recommended that definitions for measuring decline, recovery and 




and their corresponding measurement method for each type of industry—for 
example, service, manufacturing, construction, property, utilities, mining, to 
name a few. This will help reduce the plurality of corporate performance 
turnaround results and make comparison of results more meaningful and easier. 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is little Australian corporate turnaround 
research. Most of the Australian corporate turnaround studies to date deal with 
the commercial/private non-public government sector.  As the public government 
sector has different governance and compliance regimes and as organisational 
performance decline is not the sole domain of private/commercial institutions, it 
would be interesting to extend the turnaround research to such organisations. 
Examples of such organisations are local council, hospitals, universities and 
non-profit organisations. 
 
Corporate performance turnaround (CPT) research is a wide topic involving a 
host of disciplines like economics, management study, strategic management, 
accounting, organisational ecology, behavioural organisational study and 
financial management study. As there is a paucity of turnaround research using 
Australian source data, most of the predictor variables identified by extant 
turnaround literature review in Chapter 2 can provide 'rich pickings' for 
Australian researchers to test them in the Australian context.  For example, 
future research can examine the effect of Australian board characteristics and 
structure (outside/independent versus inside/executive directors, predominance 
of certain professions, e.g. finance versus non-finance) on the likelihood of 
performance turnaround, thus validating the resource dependency perspective 
relating to BOD. Similarly, are there any significant differences in the board 
characteristics between recovered and non-recovered Australian firms? Are 
dividend policies of Australian firms in the turnaround context strategically 
motivated to assist the turnaround process? These are some of the 'offshoot' 





The resource industry is a major contributor to the Australian economy. As it is 
an important sector of the economy, volatility in earnings and performance 
decline will have great impact on the Australian economy and general 
employment. A recommended area of future turnaround research is to compare 
turnaround strategies enacted by distressed mining firms with that of other 
industry (e.g. manufacturing) to ascertain the relative effectiveness of 
operational, strategic and financial turnaround strategies. Do industry factors in 
Australia matter in turnaround? 
 
Following on from the above paragraph, it is noted that this research has 
examined the various type of turnaround strategies of operational, strategic and 
financial ones identified by extant literature. Cognizant of environmental factors 
(e.g. industry and economy effect) affecting performance turnaround as 
identified by extant literature, although test results to date are not unequivocal, 
this research has attempted to control such factors by using the broad industry 
and economy indicators. The use of the two digit industry ASX GICS 
classification and the movement in GDP may be 'too broad' and insensitive to 
achieve the stated objective. This may explain why this research did not find 
significant influence for these environmental variables. It is envisaged that future 
research should consider using other more 'micro' environmental proxies. 
 
Comparative studies of different countries incorporating cultural aspects of 
turnaround should provide fertile grounds for future research. For example, the 
question of whether results of Anglo-American turnaround research are directly 
applicable and transferable to the Asian context is questionable. Asian firms are 
often controlled by extended family members. The ability to turnover a CEO, 
TMT or board member may be restricted by cultural factors. Exploring the 
cultural aspects of corporate distress and turnaround should provide 'fertile 
grounds and rich pickings' for future research. Turnaround research in the Asian 
context has in recent years gathered momentum (e.g. Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004; 




different countries—for example, Fisher, Lee and Johns (2004)—will enrich 
turnaround theory and practice, especially in this globalised cross cultural world 
and cross boundary economy. Australian researchers should take heed and 
advantage of this area of growing interest especially when Australia’s trading 
partners are increasingly from the growing Asian economies (Hofstede & Bond, 
1988). The use of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural theory in turnaround research is 
interesting and should provide fertile grounds for future comparative cross 
cultural turnaround research . 
  
Comparative studies of turnaround of Australian small businesses versus 
turnaround in big Australian firms can provide fertile research for future studies. 
Rasheed (2005) and Chowdhury and Lang (1996) found US small businesses 
respond differently to big businesses  in performance turnarounds. 
 
The recent global financial crisis saw government around the world institute and 
implement fiscal stimulus to 'refire' the economy, with the objective of avoiding a 
recession with dire consequences on firm failure rates and general employment. 
Future research can examine the effect of the role and effect of government and 
government instrumentalities on firm performance turnarounds. 
 
6.12    Conclusion 
  
The summary of findings, their relevance to practitioners and theoretical 
contributions, limitations and directions for future performance research have 
been discussed in the preceding sections. 
 
In conclusion, it is hoped that this research does more than what the French 
novelist, Marcel Proust (1871-1922) says: 
'The real act of discovery consists not in finding new lands but in seeing with 
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